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of secession. Jefferson, so far as can be judged from his writings, took no very active part in the initial efforts to cope with a problem that had once become of the utmost menace to the American body politic. But, from what has already been said, it is not difficult to imagine the interest with which he watched the rising storm and noted how rapidly the country was drifting to a settlement with Spain along the lines laid down in his memorandum to Carmichael nearly ten years before. Not even he, however, could foresee the singular turn affairs were to take before a settlement was actually reached.

The Louisiana country, it must be remembered, had originally belonged to France. Basing her claim on the explorations of La Salle and the gallant adventurers who came after La Salle, she had until the French and Indian War exercised dominion over the fertile lands stretching from the Gulf of Mexico to her Canadian possessions, and from the Appalachian to the Rocky Mountains. Never had she become reconciled to the cruel fate that ousted her completely from these fair territories, compelling her to turn them over in part to England as the result of conquest, and in part to Spain as the price of a Spanish alliance. For a time, torn and weakened by the internal dissensions that culminated in the Revolution, she was obliged to put aside all thought of endeavoring to re-establish her sovereignty overseas. But with the advent of Napoleon and the recrudescence of her vigor under his masterful impulse, her hopes rose anew. To Napoleon himself nothing seemed more desirable than to supplement his Old World programme of French aggrandizement by rebuilding the New World empire of France; and appreciating the essential weakness of Spain, he resolved to make a beginning by securing from her a retrocession of Louisiana, and, if possible, a cession of the Floridas also. Quietly and expeditiously he went to work, dangling before the dynastically ambitious Spanish court the bait of a rich Italian principality. The Floridas he failed to obtain, but, by the secret treaty of San Ildefonso, October 1, 1800, it was agreed that, in return for the ele

vation of King Charles's son-in-law, the Duke of Parma, to the throne of Tuscany, Spain would reconvey Louisiana to France.

Most mischievous to Spain, this absurdly one-sided bargain, and the more one-sided since Napoleon failed to fulfill his share of the agreement, promised to be no less mischievous to the United States by imposing upon her a powerful and aggressive neighbor. But it was months before so much as a rumor of the projected retrocession reached the shores of America, where, in the meantime, conciliatory action by the Spanish authorities at New Orleans had placated the wrathful men of the West, and where Jefferson had replaced Adams in the Presidential chair. When the news did leak out, it created the greatest uneasiness. Jefferson, who in his inaugural address had indulged his expansionist ideas so far as to assure his countrymen that they were "advancing rapidly to destinies beyond the reach of mortal eye," frankly voiced his alarm. "We fear," he wrote to his son-in-law, Thomas Mann Randolph, May 14, 1801, " that Spain is ceding Louisiana to France, an inauspicious circumstance to us ;" and similarly, twelve days later in a letter to Monroe, "There is considerable reason to apprehend that Spain cedes Louisiana and the Floridas to France. It is a policy very unwise in both, and very ominous to us." There was at the time no American Minister to France, but instructions were at once sent to the Minister to Spain urging him to ascertain what truth there might be in the reports concerning the retrocession. No satisfactory intelligence being obtained, the vacancy to France was now filled by the appointment of Robert R. Livingston, who was directed to press diligently for an acknowledgment of Napoleon's intentions. Still nothing definite could be learned, and at last, determined to make plain to France the attitude of the United States, Jefferson personally addressed to Livingston a long letter of instructions, bidding him let Napoleon know that "the day that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low-water mark. It seals the

approached him with an offer for the purchase of New Orleans and the Floridas, they were informed that France did not have the Floridas to sell, but was quite willing to part not only with New Orleans, but with all Louisiana.

There is nothing to show that this. counter-offer had been anticipated and that Monroe and Livingston carried secret instructions authorizing them to accept it. But, confident that their action would be indorsed by Jefferson, Congress, and the Nation, they did not hesitate. Less than a month after Monroe's arrival the treaty was signed, doubling the area of the United States

the "Confederacy" as "the nest from which all America, North and South, is to be peopled."

There were, to be sure, certain phases of the Purchase that troubled him. A stickler for strict construction of the Constitution, he could find nowhere in the Constitution authority for the acquisition of territory; and, moreover, such acquisition would do violence to another of his strongest political beliefs-the belief that government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed, it being evident that the people of Louisiana had had no voice in the transaction. But, Constitution or no

Constitution, acquiescence or non-acquiescence, the Purchase, he felt, must be carried through. Writing in August to Writing in August to the Kentucky Senator, John C. Breckenridge, he declared: "Objections are raising to the Eastward against the vast extent of our boundaries, and propositions are made to exchange Louisiana, or a part of it, for the Floridas. But

we shall get the Floridas without, and I would not give one inch of the waters of the Mississippi to any nation." He did, indeed, as a compromise with his fears regarding the unconstitutional character of the transaction, suggest that the Constitution be amended to permit the inclusion of Louisiana within the boundaries of the United States, and went so far as to draft an amendment to that effect. But when Livingston sent him word that there was danger of Napoleon's repenting the bargain and repudiating his agreement, he hesitated no longer, summoned Congress in extra session, and forced the treaty to a speedy and a happy vote.

Nor, when we recall his earlier declarations with respect to the future of the

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United States, can it be deemed surprising that he chose to appear a monster of inconsistency rather than sacrifice the splendid opportunity that so suddenly presented itself. On the contrary, it would have been surprising had he not pursued exactly the course he did. And, as a matter of fact, there was at bottom no inconsistency in his conduct. hold as he might State rights, limitations of government, and the like, not even Hamilton was more truly nationalistic at heart than was Thomas Jefferson. His fundamental principle was the welfare of the Nation, the making of the Nation really great and really strong. than this, as we have seen, his bounding vision overleaped the confines of space and time, hopefully anticipating the moment when his country would attain those "destinies beyond the reach of mortal eye." He did not expect to live to see the first of the great extensions of which he spoke so prophetically, and to bring about which he labored so earnestly. But a kindly fortune granted him that boon, and when the hour struck he was not found wanting.