Book 2: that which is the foundation of the telation; which may be done without having a perfect and clear idea of the thing it is attributed to. Thus having the notion, that one laid the egg out of which the other was hatched, I have a clear idea of the relation of dam and chick, between the two caffiowaries in St. James's park ; though perhaps I have but a very obfcure and imperfect idea of thofe birds themselves.

Relations all tern.inate in fimple ideas.

§. 9. Thirdly, Though there be a great number of confiderations, wherein things may be compared one with another, and fo a multitude of relations; yet they all terminate in, and are concerned about, thofe fimple ideas, either of fenfation or reflection: which I think to be the whole materials of all our knowledge. To clear this, I fhall fhow it in the moft confiderable relations that we have any notion of, and in fome that feem to be the most remote from fenfe or reflection; which yet will appear to have their ideas from thence, and leave it paft doubt, that the notions we have of them are but certain fimple ideas, and fo originally derived from fense or reflection.

Terms lead

ing the mind beyond the fubject denominated, are relative.

§. 10. Fourthly, That relation being the confidering of one thing with another, which is extrinfecal to it, it is evident, that all words that neceffarily lead the mind to any other ideas than are fuppofed really to exift in that thing, to which the words are applied, are relative words: v. g. a man black, merry, thoughtful, thirsty, angry, extended; thefe, and the like, are all abfolute, because they neither fignify nor intimate any thing, but what does or is fuppofed really to exist in the man thus denominated: but father, brother, king, hufband, blacker, merrier, &c. are words which, together with the thing they denominate, imply alfo fomething else feparate and exterior to the exiftence of that thing. Conclufion. §. 11. Having laid down thefe premifes concerning relation in general, I fhall now proceed to fhow, in fome inftances, how all the ideas we have of relation are made up, as the others are, only

of

但

of fimple ideas; and that they all, how refined or remote from sense foever they seem, terminate at last in fimple ideas. I fhall begin with the most comprehenfive relation, wherein all things that do or can exift are concerned; and that is the relation of caufe and effect. The idea whereof, how derived from the two fountains of all our knowledge, fenfation, and reflection, I fhall in the next place confider.

§. I.

CHA P. XXVI.

Of Caufe and Effect, and other Relations.

N the notice that our senses take

Whence their ideas got.

things, we cannot but observe, that several
particular, both qualities and substances, begin to exist;
and that they receive this their exiftence from the due
application and operation of fome other being. From
this obfervation, we get our ideas of caufe and effect.
That which produces any fimple or complex idea we
denote by the general name caufe; and that which is
produced, effect. Thus finding that in that fubstance
which we call wax fluidity, which is a simple idea that
was not in it before, is constantly produced by the appli-
cation of a certain degree of heat; we call the fimple
idea of heat, in relation to fluidity in wax, the cause
of it, and fluidity the effect. So alfo finding that the
fubftance of wood, which is a certain collection of fimple
ideas, fo called, by the application of fire is turned into
another substance called afhes, i. e. another complex
idea, confifting of a collection of fimple ideas, quite
different from that complex idea which we call wood;
we confider fire, in relation to ashes, as cause, and the
ashes as effect. So that whatever is confidered by us
to conduce or operate to the producing any particular
fimple idea, or collection of fimple ideas, whether fub-
stance or mode, which did not before exift, hath thereby
in our minds the relation of a cause, and fo is denomi
nated by us.

VOL. I.

Y

§. 2.

Creation,

generation, making alteration.

§. 2. Having thus, from what our fenfes are able to discover, in the operations of bodies on one another, got the notion of cause and effect, viz. that a caufe is that which makes any other thing, either fimple idea, fubftance or mode, begin to be; and an effect is that which had its beginning from fome other thing: the mind finds no great difficulty to diftinguish the feveral originals of things into two forts.

First, when the thing is wholly made new, fo that no part thereof did ever exist before; as when a new particle of matter doth begin to exift, in rerum natura, which had before no being, and this we call creation.

Secondly, when a thing is made up of particles, which did all of them before exift, but that very thing fo conftituted of pre-existing particles, which, confidered all together, make up fuch a collection of fimple ideas as had not any existence before; as this man, this egg, rofe, or cherry, &c. And this, when referred to a fubftance, produced in the ordinary course of nature by internal principle, but fet on work, and received from fome external agent or caufe, and working by infenfible ways, which we perceive not, we call generation when the caufe is extrinfecal, and the effect produced by a fenfible feparation, or juxta-pofition of difcernible parts, we call it making; and fuch are all artificial things. When any fimple idea is produced, which was not in that subject before, we call it alteration. Thus a man is generated, a picture made, and either of them altered, when any new fenfible quality or fimple idea is produced in either of them, which was not there before; and the things thus made to exift, which were not there before, are effects; and those things, which operated to the existence, causes. In which, and all other caufes, we may observe, that the notion of caufe and effect has its rife from ideas, received by fenfation, or reflection; and that this relation, how comprehenfible foever, terminates at last in them. For to have the idea of caufe and effect, it fuffices to confider any fimple idea, or substance, as beginning to exift by the operation of fome other, without knowing the manner of that operation.

Relations of

§. 3. Time and place are alfo the foundations of very large relations, and all finite beings at least are concerned in them. But having already shown, in another place, how we get these ideas, it may fuffice here to intimate, that most of the denominations of things, received from time, are only relations. Thus when any one fays, that queen Elifabeth lived fixty-nine, and reigned forty-five years, these words import only the relation of that duration to some other, and mean no more than this, that the duration of her existence was equal to fixty-nine, and the duration of her government to forty-five annual revolutions of the fun; and fo are all words, anfwering, how long. Again, William the Conqueror invaded England about the year 1066, which means this, that taking the duration from our Saviour's time till now, for one entire great length of time, it fhews at what distance this invafion was from the two extremes: and fo do all words of time, anfwering to the queftion, when, which show only the distance of any point of time, from the period of a longer duration, from which we measure, and to which we thereby confider it as related.

§. 4. There are yet, befides thofe, other words of time, that ordinarily are thought to ftand for pofitive ideas, which yet will, when confidered, be found to be relative, fuch as are young, old, &c. which include and intimate the relation any thing has to a certain length of duration, whereof we have the idea in our minds. Thus having fettled in our thoughts the idea of the ordinary duration of a man to be feventy years, when we say a man is young, we mean that his age is yet but a small part of that which usually men attain to: and when we denominate him old, we mean that his duration is run out almoft to the end of that which men do not usually exceed. And fo it is but comparing the particular age, or duration of this or that man, to the idea of that duration which we have in our minds, as ordinarily belonging to that fort of animals: which is plain, in the application of these names to other things; for a man is called young at twenty years, and very young at feven years old: but yet a

Y 2

horfe

horse we call old at twenty, and a dog at feven years; because in each of thefe, we compare their age to different ideas of duration, which are fettled in our minds, as belonging to thefe feveral forts of animals, in the ordinary courfe of nature. But the fun and stars, though they have out-lafted feveral generations of men, we call not old, because we do not know what period God hath fet to that fort of beings. This term belonging properly to thofe things, which we can observe in the ordinary course of things, by a natural decay, to come to an end in a certain period of time; and fo have in our minds, as it were, a standard to which we can compare the feveral parts of their duration; and, by the relation they bear thereunto, call them young or old which we cannot therefore do to a ruby or diamond, things whofe ufual periods we know not.

:

Relations of place and extenfion.

§. 5. The relation also that things have to one another in their places and diftances, is very obvious to obferve; as above, below, a mile diftant from Charing-crofs, in England, and in London. But as in duration, fo in extenfion and bulk, there are fome ideas that are relative, which we fignify by names that are thought politive; as great and little are truly relations. For here alfo having, by obfervation, fettled in our minds the ideas of the bignefs of feveral fpecies of things from thofe we have been moft accustomed to, we make them as it were the ftandards whereby to denominate the bulk of others. Thus we call a great apple, fuch a one as is bigger than the ordinary fort of those we have been used to; and a little horfe, fuch a one as comes not up to the size of that idea, which we have in our minds, to belong ordinarily to horfes; and that will be a great horfe to a Welfhman, which is but a little one to a Fleming; they two having, from the different breed of their countries, taken feveral-fized ideas to which they compare, and in relation to which they denominate their great and their little.

Abfolute

terms often

$. 6. So likewife weak and ftrong are but relative denominations of power, comftand for re- pared to fome ideas we have at that time of greater or lefs power. Thus when we

lations.