be absent nearly the whole year. He could absent himself for anything short of sixty days, return to the Territory for a day or two, then absent himself again. To obviate that objection, the first section provides, that if he should be absent from the Territory and his official duties for a period exceeding sixty days in any one year, the consequences shall follow. Another design of the amendment is to provide for such emergencies as may arise. Officers who are appointed for these different Territories may have occasion to return for their families, and sometimes will have occasion to absent themselves on public duty; and it is contemplated, when they do so absent themselves, with the permission of the President, or when they furnish a sufficient excuse in the judgment of the President, that the penalty shall not attach. Another object is to make the provision permanent; not to have it in an appropriation act, but in a permanent law, operating upon the officers of Territories in all times. I will now move as an amendment to the amendment the following, to come in at the end of the second section:

And the salaries of said officers, which have heretofore accrued, shall be paid, anything in the said proviso to the contrary notwithstanding.

intolerable, that his own safety and the safety of his family would require him to leave it, it seems to me he ought not to be deprived of his salary on that account, because he was, in effect, expelled. I think we may safely confide that trust to the President of the United States. Few of those officers, unless they had good cause for their absence, would submit their case to the President of the United States in a matter of that sort, when they must come here, make their application at the seat of Government, and present the facts and circumstances under which they were induced to absent themselves from the Territory. If the consent of the President could be obtained beforehand in all cases, and we were sure of it, I should have no objection to the amendment of the Senator from Ohio; but, as it stands now, they are in a condition very much exposed.

Mr. WALKER. I desire to make an inquiry || of those who have had this subject under consideration, and the inquiry may be understood by stating that to which it is designed to relate. Ifl understand it, most of the officers of one of the Territories have left, with the intention of not returning again; but they are, nevertheless, still in office. Now, sir, will not the operation of this legislation be to continue their salaries, notwithstanding they may remain here in Washington, or elsewhere in the United States, and have no connection whatever with the Territories, and no connection with the duties of the office, other than merely holding the position of officers? Will it not continue them, and continue their salaries?

Mr. WELLER. If I understand the matter alluded to by the Senator who has just taken his seat, it is different from what he has stated. I understand that these judges and other officers desire to return to Utah, but they have reported to the President, as I learn, that they are unable to execute the civil law, or the laws of Congress, in the Territory, without the aid of the military, and that their persons are not safe. The question now is, what step can be taken so as to secure obedience in that Territory to the laws that may be enacted by Congress? In my judgment it would be very impolitic to send a military force there, avowedly for the purpose of executing the civil law. But the difficulty may be obviated in this way: it is necessary that some military posts should be established through that Territory, not only for the protection of the inhabitants from the Indians, but, what to me is a matter of more

Mr. CHASE. I was about to move an amendment, which it seems to me would be more appropriate than that offered by the Senator from Missouri. It is to strike out the last clause of the section, which will leave the judges of the Terri tories to the discretion of the President for permission to absent themselves from their official duties. In the organization of the Territories of New Mexico and Utah, Congress thought fit to insert a clause providing that the judges should not be absent from the performance of their judicial functions more than sixty days without forfeiting their salaries. It may be, and I think is reasonable, that they should be allowed, in cases of emergency, and with the sanction of the President, to leave their Territories; but to permit absences at discretion for an unlimited time, and appeals to the indulgence of the President, not merely for payment after this law shall have been enacted, but for payment before it, seems to me to be going too far. We all know how important it is to the inhabitants of the Territories that the presence of these officers shall be secured; and we know, too, that in regard to the particular Territories which I have named, it is indispensable that they shall be retained in their places by some condition of this kind. I have heard from highly respectable gen-importance, for the protection of emigrants who tlemen of New Mexico, for instance, that the state of things there is so undesirable, that if the judges can be allowed to leave their posts, traverse the country at pleasure, and then throw themselves on the discretion of the President to be allowed their salaries, notwithstanding such absence, it will be almost impossible to retain them in their places. It seems to me to be our duty not to go further than the law now stands. At most, we should not do more than authorize the judges to absent themselves with the leave of the President. I shall vote against the proposed amendment of the Senator from Missouri, and then move to strike out the last clause of the first section.

Mr. GEYER. It occurs to me that recent events should admonish us that it is necessary to authorize, under certain circumstances, the officers to leave a Territory. I do not pretend to form any judgment as to the cause of the absence of the officers of the Territory of Utah; but if what they represent approaches the truth, their condition there would have been intolerable. It may be that, in those remote Territories, they cannot remain and attend to their duties without encountering difficulties that few men would be willing to encounter. Now, sir, in the Territory of Utah, where it is said a state of things exists which renders it altogether uncomfortable for any civilized Christian to reside, an officer must retire from the Territory, and he cannot wait for leave from the President of the United States. He can go into the Indian country, and remain there for a period less than sixty days, under existing laws; return to the Territory, and retire again to the Indian country. As the law stands, the judgment against the officer is peremptory, and is left to the accounting officer, and to him alone. It is now proposed to submit it to the judgment of the President of the United States. If the case should occur-I do not say it has occurred that the condition of a territorial officer would be rendered

are constantly passing that route to the State which I, in part, represent. Those military posts and depôts might be established as near as possible to Salt Lake, because in that vicinity there would be afforded facilities for obtaining supplies, which could not be obtained elsewhere. They would at all times be ready to aid the civil authorities in the execution of the law. If they were established, I have no doubt that the judges could return to the Territory in perfect safety, to execute the mandates of Congress. I would not send a military force along with the judges, for the reason that I am unwilling to treat these people as designing to subvert this Government. I know that there is no very friendly feeling among them towards the Government, but I would treat them as a loyal people, although, at the same time, I would have a military force to compel them to respect the law.

Mr. WALKER. I am obliged to the Senator for the information and views which he has expressed. As far as I have reflected upon this subject, my mind has come very much to the same conclusion that his has, that something of the kind he mentions will be necessary in the Territory referred to. But the only question in my mind, in view of this, is, whether the legislation now proposed is not premature? In view of what has been said, in view of the condition of things there, there is much more to be done before those gentlemen can enter upon the duties of their offices, before they can, in my opinion, safely remain in that Territory.

Another question is, whether, while we are legislating in view of the state of things which we know to exist there, we shall make provision for the salaries of officers who either do not, or cannot, discharge the duties of their offices. For one, I must say, that I cannot agree to it. These gentlemen have returned to the States. They tell us the reason why they have returned. They

acknowledge that they cannot discharge the duties of their offices. We know they cannot. They have reported the reasons why they cannot. Then, while they are here, it seems to me that it is incorrect gislation to provide for the payment of their salaries. I regret as much as any Senator can, to take this position. I know well that those gentlemen while here hold themselves in readiness to perform the duties of the offices to which they have been appointed. It would seem to be but reasonable, hence, that they should have some compensation. But we are legislating not for them as individuals. If we legislate at all, we legislate in view of the interests of the countryin view of the subject-matter to which their offices relate. It seems to me that we cannot feel ourselves justified in providing for the payment of their salaries, while they are not discharging the duties of their offices.

Mr. BADGER. I was originally opposed to the adoption of the proviso to the appropriation bill, the repeal of which is now sought to be obtained by the bill under the consideration of the Senate. I thought then, and I think now, that it was an unjust, and a hazardous, and very impolitic system by which to enforce the discharge of the duties of public officers, and espécially to enforce the discharge of the duties of judicial officers. If we had had a system upon this subject-a system of the Government of long and established continuance, and we were now called upon to make an exception out of that general system in favor of the particular class of officers to whom this bill refers the remarks of the honorable Senator who has just taken his seat, would be entitled to great weight. But this is the case of a proviso added to an appropriation bill-a proviso sprung upon the country, in virtue of which, whether the absence be with or without fault; whether the officer be expelled from his post, or prevented, unless at the peril of his life, from returning to it; or whether he had absented himself voluntarily and negligently, because he was careless and indifferent in the discharge of his duty-without reference to any consideration of that kind, we visit his offense (treating it as a judicial ascertainment of judicial default) with the forfeiture of his salary. Now, such a system as that cannot be right.

Without going into the particular circumstance to which the Senator from California [Mr. WELLER] has referred; agreeing with him in the sentiments which he has expressed on the subject, I will merely remark, that, however these difficulties may have originated, these gentlemen, with great difficulty, and at great expense, and at no small hazard to themselves, went into that Territory. A state of things has occurred there in which they cannot remain, and on account of which they were compelled to leave the Territory. They are here. It belongs to Congress, as the Senator from California has said, to institute the measures necessary to make their return safe and practicable, in order to enable them to execute the duties which their officers require in that Territory. In the mean time, they cannot go there. And until that state of things which has compelled them to leave is done away with, can it be right; is it fair; is it just; is it reasonable, to visit a sentence of starvation upon them while we are engaged or whether engaged or not, ought to be engaged in establishing some law by which the violated authority of the Union may be restored, and the peaceable return to that country of these judicial officers be effected, so that they may exercise their proper functions as they are executed in every other State and Territory of the Union?

The proviso itself was originally wrong, in my judgment. Subsequent events have proved the injurious purposes to which it may be applied. It seems to me that the Senate owes it to itself, owes it to these officers, owes it to the system on which our public affairs have been hitherto conducted, to repeal it at once, and declare that no injury shall result to the parties from its having been adopted.

Now, whether these gentlemen have the animus revertendi to that Territory or not, I have no means personally of knowing. The understanding is, that they have been, in effect, expelled from the Territory; and I presume that if, when they can return there with safety, they do not return, the President of the United States will discharge his duty by informing them that they can no

longer be allowed to hold offices when they cannot attend to the duties belonging to them.

Mr. CHASE. I regret very much to be compelled to differ from the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. BADGER] on this question. But the Congress of the United States has thought proper to define, by law, the terms on which these judges take their office. They have taken upon them, under the appointment of the President, the discharge of their judicial duties upon these terms, clearly understood by them. There can be no doubt as to that fact. When they became judges of these Territories, they knew that they would not be permitted to absent themselves from the performance of their judicial duties for a longer period than sixty days without the forfeiture of their salaries; and that if they should so forfeit them, they must appeal to the liberality of Congress for the payment, notwithstanding the forfeiture. If such payment were now proposed as a distinct and independent proposition, I am not prepared to say how I should vote upon it. But we are now called upon to legislate for all casesnot merely the cases which have occurred, but cases which may hereafter occur. We are asked to repeal a proviso under which these Territories were organized. It seems to me that it is unwise. It seems to me that it is unnecessary.

Something has been said as to the urgency of the circumstances under which the judges for Utah left the performance of their duties. I have read their report; I have read the statements of other gentlemen who were cognizant of the state of affairs in that country; and I have yet to see anything which satisfies my mind at all that they might not have remained there with perfect safety, and freely administered justice in all cases which might have been brought before them. It is very possible that they might have had very few cases submitted to them. If they had been sent to a community of Friends, or Quakers, they might have had no cases at all brought before them. But I have no doubt that they were at perfect liberty to adjudicate all cases submitted-to remain in that Territory, exempt from all danger to life or person, as long as they chose to stay. Notwithstanding that, they left the Territory. They left it, notwithstanding their duties bound them to remain; notwithstanding the law bound them to remain; notwithstanding the law imposed upon them a forfeiture of their salaries if they did not remain.

Now, if we adopt this provision, the practical result will be, that we shall have judges for these Territories who are under no obligation whatever to remain in them, and discharge their duties. They will not be bound to go there; they will not be bound to remain there, if they do go; they may absent themselves whenever and as long as they choose, and still their salaries would be dependant wholly, not on the will of Congress, not on the will of the legislative power, but on the will of the Executive. This strikes me as all wrong. The salaries of the judicial officers of the Government should be dependant on the will of Congress, and on the will of Congress alone; and they should be confined, in the performance of their functions, to the line which the laws of Congress prescribe. I am, therefore, averse to this amendment; though, at the same time, as I said before, I am quite willing to enact into a law a portion of this bill: that is, so much as authorizes the judges to leave hereafter, having first obtained the sanction of the President. That, it seems to me, is quite as far as we can be asked to go. I would not legislate for past events, but merely for future contingencies.

suspend the operation of the proviso in reference to those officers. That there is a necessity for the amendment, will appear from a single suggestion. Every officer who is appointed here, must be absent from the time of his appointment to the time when he arrives at the Territory of Utah-a period of more than sixty days. If, however, they should be appointed in a season (as I believe these officers were) when it is impracticable to pass the prairies, they will have to be from ninety to one hundred and twenty days absent from the Territory after the time of their appointment. The proviso, as it stands, operates as a forfeiture of their entire salary, because of this necessary absence from their duties and from the Territory. I supposed that the better way of adjusting this matter would be to restore the law, so far as the past is concerned, to what it was before the proviso was enacted. Then the first section of this act, if it should become a law, would operate hereafter to prevent any absence without leave of the President, or without good cause. An emergency may arise

where leave of the President cannot be obtained.

Then, when the good cause should be shown, the salary ought to be paid, especially if there should be anything like the emergency supposed in the report made by the officers from Utah.

The effect then, of this bill, if it shall be passed, will be this: the salaries, as far as they have accrued, will be paid. But, if any officer shall remain, after the passage of this act, sixty days absent from his duties, without leave of the President, or without showing good cause to the satisfaction of the President for such absence, he will forfeit his salary for the period of his absence. That is, I suppose, the extent to which the provision ought to go. For my own part, I happened to be in a minority in the Committee on the Judiciary. I favored a total repeal of that proviso, for the reason stated by the honorable Senator from North Carolina. But it was thought better to have a general provision upon the statute book, which should secure the presence of these officers hereafter; and under circumstances where judgment should not be taken upon them from the mere fact of absence, but that an opportunity should be given to present to some other tribunal, a sufficient excuse for that

absence.

Mr. BROOKE. I would ask respectfully, why it is, that an exception is made against these particular judicial officers, which does not prevail against any other officer of the Government? The Judges of the Supreme Court and the District Judges are not liable to a forfeiture of their salary in the event that they fail to perform their duties, either in whole or in part. I know very well that the Circuit Judge of the United States, assigned to the circuit in which is included the district of Mississippi, has not been performing duty in that State for several years. And yet I never heard of any liability being imposed upon him of a forfeiture of a portion of his salary. Does not the Constitution extend to and protect these territorial officers as well as other officers of the United States? If so, then my inquiry is answered.

to.

The amendment to the amendment was agreed

Mr. CHASE. I now move to strike out all after the word "absence," to the end of the first section of the amendment-being the words "unless good cause for such absence shall be shown to the satisfaction of the President." The effect of the amendment will be to allow an officer of any of the Territories to absent himself if he obtains leave from the President of the United States, and to be paid his salary if he has such leave. It will not at all affect the provision which has just been adopted by the Senate, but will make it necessary for an officer, in all cases, to obtain the previous assent of the President, before he can leave his post.

The amendment to the amendment was not agreed to.

The amendment reported by the Committee on the Judiciary as amended, was agreed to. The bill was reported to the Senate as amended, and the amendments made in Committee of the

||

Whole, were concurred in.

Mr. ATCHISON. I desire to inquire whether this bill is intended to cover all the officers within the limits of the Territories, or only those officers necessary to the territorial government.

Mr. GEYER. It includes all who were covered

Mr. ATCHISON. What officers in those Ter ritories are covered by that proviso?

Mr. BADGER. The judges and the secretsries, I believe. appropri

Mr. GEYER. The proviso is to the ation for the salaries of the governors, judges, and secretaries of the Territories.

Mr. ATCHISON. Then I have no objection. The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time.

NON-INTERVENTION.

The resolution some time since submitted by Mr. CLARKE, on the subject of non-intervention. came up as the special order.

Mr. BELL. Before the question is finally s ken on these resolutions, I wish to say something in regard to them, as my feelings have been some what questioned. I am very indifferent as to the time when I shall be heard. The Senate may fr on any time they may think proper. Perhaps this day week will be acceptable to the Senate. I un

derstand that there are two measures, the French

spoliation bill and the bill for the establishment of a Ravy-yard in California, which the gentlemen most interested in them are desirous to have disposed of this week. I have, therefore, suggested this day week as proper for the consideration of these resolutions. If that is not acceptable to the Senate, I will name any other day.

Mr. CLARKE. Let it be the first Monday in April.

Mr. BELL. The Senator from Rhode Island suggests the first Monday in April, which will be next Monday week. If that day is agreeable to the Senate, I have no objection; and, therefore, I move the postponement of this subject until that day.

The motion was agreed to.

NAVY-YARD AND DRY-DOCK IN CALIFORNIA.

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, re sumed the consideration of the bill to establish a navy-yard and depôt on the bay of San Francisce, in California.

The Committee on Naval Affairs report the b with an amendment, to authorize the President to provide for the construction of a basin and ral way in connection with the sectional floating dry. dock now being constructed at San Francisco, in California; and also to authorize him to alhow additional compensation (not exceeding double their present pay) to the officers he may appoint to select the site for the navy-yard in San Francisco bay.

Mr. BADGER, some time since, proposed an amendment to the amendment of the committee, which was to substitute "the Secretary of the Navy," for "the President of the United States," in making the contract for the construction of the basin and railway, and allowing extra compensat tion to the officers for performing this service; and also to appropriate $500,000 for carrying this act

into effect.

Mr. GWIN. Mr. President, the Committee on Naval Affairs did not report this bill without a full examination of the subject. At the last ses sion of Congress, the necessity of establishing a navy-yard in California was, through a resolution offered by me, brought to the notice of the committee. The Secretary of the Navy was consulted, and recommended that an appropriation should be made to commence the work, and the com mittee, by a unanimous vote, instructed the chairman to propose an amendment for this object to the naval appropriation bill.

It is well known to the Senate that the appropriation bills were near being lost at the last ses sion by a protracted discussion on the river and harbor bill. When the naval appropriation bili

came up, and the chairman of the Naval Commi tee was on the floor proposing the amendments he had been instructed to offer, the chairman of the Finance Committee [Mr. HUNTER] announced

to the Senate that if another amendment was permitted to be offered to the bill it would be lost; and thus the subject passed over. On the first day of this session I gave notice that I would offer a bill establishing a navy-yard in California, introduced it a few days thereafter, and had it referred to the Naval Committee. It was amended so as to include the basin and railway for a dock, and brought before the Senate in its present shape. (Mr. BRODWhen the bill was called up on a former occa

HEAD] opposed its passage for reasons which I shall now proceed to examine. He said, "it is a very important bill." This is true. It is a bill of the greatest importance, as it lays the foundation for national defense on the Pacific coast of the United States. Upon its fate depends the question of defending that coast, or leaving it in its present unprotected position. But this is not the light in which the Senator looked upon it as important. He attached importance to it because it would cost money to establish these defenses. The Senator commenced his remarks upon the bill with the skill of an able tactician. He struck at its weakest point; for I have learned from painful experience in my short service here that the necessity which exists for enacting laws for the State of California never has as much weight with Congress as the amount of money it will take to carry these laws into execution. The Senator must be well aware of this fact, and he avails himself of it in the very opening of his speech. He says the bill is important-and why? Because "it will involve the necessity of an expenditure of from $3,000,000 to $7,000,000. Now, sir, this is a bold assertion, and if sustained by proofs will materially affect the action of the Senate upon the bill. I undertake to say that the Senator has no estimate from any department of the Government upon which he bases this assertion. It is evidently a random shot-a statement made without due consideration. If based upon any calculation approaching to accuracy, he certainly would not have left a margin of $4,000,000. He says "from $3,000,000 to $7,000,000.” I should like to know whether he means it will be near seren, or nearer three millions?-whether it will be six millions or four millions? Or does he intend to split the difference, and say five millions is to be the cost of this work?

I hope the Senator [Mr. BRODHEAD] did not intend to take any unfair advantage of this measure, by exciting the alarm of the members of this body, who are the zealous guardians of the public Treasury-when he asserts that this bill will cause so enormous an expenditure. I undertake to say, that the lowest amount named by the Senator will never be required to be expended upon this work; and I hope that this round assertion will not deter any one from giving the bill a fair and impartial

consideration. To show that the Senator's estimate cannot be relied on, I will refer to other portions of his speech. He says "a railway and basin will cost $1,500,000, and perhaps $2,000,000, and will require from five to ten years for its construction. (The contract heretofore made required the completion of the work in four years.) As he advances in his argument, he reduces his estimate to 66 $1,000,000 or 1,500,000;" and he repeats this assertion on two other occasions, in his speech. Now, we know exactly what this basin and railway will cost. It is just $840,000, and no more. The Secretary of the Navy proposed to give this sum for its construction, and the patentees accepted the proposition. The Senator could easily have ascertained this in the Navy Department, when he was getting the facts he brought to the notice of the Senate; and I regret that he did not do so, for, as I said before, nothing is so detrimental to the passage of bills for California as the enormous amount it is supposed works of this description will cost in that country. If the Senator had stated that his principal opposition to the bill, was because it cost $840,000 to build a basin and railway, then his argument would have had its fair and legitimate weight upon the Senate. But he does injustice to the measure when he swells this item of $840,000 to $2,000,000. Again, the Senator says: "No Secretary of the Navy has ever recommended this basin and railway in connection with a dry dock." The Senator is not borne out in this assertion by the record, as I shall show. I read from a report from the Navy Department, dated February 12th, 1844, nade by the Hon. David Henshaw, then Secretary of the Navy, and one of the ablest that has ever presided over that Department:

"An excavated stone dock can accommodate, ordinarily, but one vessel at a time, and, during war, would hardly af ford the facilities that would be needed. The Navy commissioners, in a report dated February 17, 1836, state that it might require twelve thousand days' labor to repair the bottoin of a seventy-four-working in the longest days of the summer. In such a case, many weeks, if not months, inust elapse before such a vessel could be taken from the dock, owing to the comparatively small number of persons who could work upon her at once in so confined a place.

"The sectional floating-dock, with rail-tracks, could accommodate many vessels at once, where they would be placed with ample room, light, and air around them, and giving every facility for working with dispatch.

The object so strongly desired in Mr. Jefferson's message, before quoted-that our vessels may be laid up dry, and under cover from the sun, and which he hoped to obtain by the means of lock-docks-it is believed may be much better, and much more cheaply obtained, by the sectional dock and railway.

"All experience verifies the remark of Mr. Jefferson, that no cares, no attentions can preserve vessels from rapid decay, which lie in water, exposed to the sun;' and that works of wood, laid up dry, will remain scarcely atfected by time.

"Some of the most costly ships of our Navy have rotted, and been broken up, seeing little more service than lying at the wharves; while others, built about the same periods, remain comparatively uninjured, in the houses in which they were built.

"It is believed that the sectional dock and railways will not only answer for the repairs of ships, better than any other plan yet devised, but that they will become the only building-ways; and that, instead of letting our ships, when not in use, lie and decay at the navy-yards, in ordinary,

they will be raised from the water, and placed under cover,

protected from the weather, upon the rail-tracks.

"The plan of the sectional dock and railway commends itself to favor by its cheapness and simplicity; and if, on trial, it realizes what has been promised from its use, it will enable the Government to construct at a moderate cost, a dock at each of the navy-yards, capable of accommodating a number of ships at once.

"After carefully considering the facts, statements, and opinions which have been presented to the Department, at different periods, by the officers and others who have had the subject of a dry dock at the Brooklyn yard under investigation, the undersigned is fully persuaded that the plan of dock of Mr. Dakin, here spoken of, is worthy of trial on a scale sufficiently large for raising the largest ships."

Thus it will be seen, sir, that a Secretary of the Navy has recommended, and strongly recommended, the mode of docking vessels proposed by this bill. Nor is the Senator borne out in his assertion, by the reports of the present Secretary, who has evidently changed his opinion on the subject. In his report at the last session, he said, "that a sectional dock alone, with a pier to secure it, would answer every demand of the Navy on the coast of California, for many years to come. In his last report, he says, "It will be necessary to provide a pier or basin, to render this dock capable of use;" and he postpones an opinion between the basin and railway, and a pier, until a further examination is made of the waters of the bay at San Francisco, by a board of officers appointed for the purpose. It is here evident that the Secretary himself doubts the propriety of his former opinion, which, upon full examination, I have no doubt he will find to have been incorrect.

The Senator availed himself of a statement of the Secretary of the Navy, in his first report on this subject, that is calculated to mislead the Senate. It is that a pier, which will cost only $50,000 is all that will be necessary for the floating dock now building for California. He assumes this as a fixed fact, and proceeds to argue, that "a pier is all that is necessary," and that "merchants never think of making use of the basin and railwaythey use a pier which costs $50,000, instead of a basin and railway which will cost $1,000,000 or $1,500,000.' I shall now, sir, proceed to show, that a pier cannot be built in California for $50,000. It must be built of stone; for it is a well-known fact, that piers made of timber, in the Bay of San Francisco, are soon destroyed by worms.

Such

a work would soon become useless, and constantly liable to casualties. On examination it will be found that no officer of the Government who has any respect for his reputation, will recommend the building of a pier, in these waters, of any other material than stone.

will be five hundred feet in length, and answer all the purposes of a pier as well as a basin.

The Senator says, that "this basin and railway is wholly unnecessary and useless." I have just shown that the basin will answer all the purposes of a pier, and, therefore, the Senator's argument falls to the ground, for it will be useful. But suppose, for argument's sake, that he is correct; then this bill accomplishes the very object that he is aiming at; for, in that event, it entirely dispenses with the basin and railway. The bill provides "that when the site shall have been secured, and so soon thereafter as it shall have been ascertained to the satisfaction of the President of the United States, that the basin and railway at Philadelphia or Kittery, are in full and successful operation," then he is authorized to contract for the construction of a basin and railway. Now, sir, there is to be no experiment about this matter. This law requires a certainty that the basin and railway at Philadelphia or Kittery are in full and successful operation before a dollar of the public money can be expended on a similar work in California; and, sir, what is meant by "full and successful operation?" It is, that this basin and railway, in connection with a floating dock, can take up a ship of the line, with a full armament, place it securely upon the railway, and as securely return it through the dock to the water. When this is done, the President can act under this bill, and not before. Suppose that the experiment is successful, it is one of the greatest improvements of the age, and the very thing we want in California. It will give us, for $1,450,000, the use of a dozen docks, equal in capacity to the stone-dock in New York, which cost $2,146,730 10. The Emperor of Russia has recently paid nearly $13,000,000 for the building of seven stone docks; and here we have, for an expenditure of less than $1,500,000, docks of nearly double their capacity. Need I add another word to show the immense importance of adopting this improvement in California, if it should prove successful, where the price of labor and materials is so great. I wish it to be borne in mind, that the basin and railway must be proved to be entirely successful, or this law, so far as that matter is concerned, is a dead letter on the statute book.

The Senator says, "We have now more docks than there is any necessity for." But, where are they? From Pensacola, round Cape Horn, and up the Pacific to Bhering's Straits, there is no dock; and because there are more on the Atlantic coast than are useful, shall we, for this reason, have none on the Pacific? Are we to be told that, because money has been wastefully expended here upon useless works, none shall be expended upon useful works in California? I hope such will not be the policy adopted toward us by this Government. I do not agree with the Senator. I think these docks, navy-yards and coast defenses, on the Atlantic coast, are necessary and useful; and, although not on so extensive a scale, we need the same on the Pacific. In order to show that we are not extravagant in the demands we make on the Government for the defense of the Pacific, as compared with the past policy of this Government in defending the Atlantic coast, and giving to its commerce the advantages of light-houses, I have prepared a statement of the amount of money thus expended and estimated for.

The Atlantic coast of the United States, from the northeastern boundary on the ocean to the mouth of the St. Marys, is 1,450 miles. This is the whole of the Atlantic coast of the old thirteen States, and is less than our present possessions ou the Pacific. From the mouth of the St. Marys to the south cape of the peninsula of Florida is 450 miles, making a total of the Atlantic coast of 1,900 miles. I will now show to the Senate what has been paid from the national Treasury to fortify and protect this coast.

I take from the report of General Totten, Chief Engineer, on the subject of the national defenses, and will also add the estimate for new works and fortifications:

[From Report of General J. G. Totten, on the subject of National Defenses.]

Fortifications on Atlantic coast, with the "estimated cost of
construction and repair.—(Class A, pages 92–94. )
Maine
No. 1 to 5....
$154,219
New Hampshire... No. 6..............
Massachusetts.....No. 7 to 15..
Rhode Island...... No. 16,

17..

19.

17,691 676,738

12,000 255,941

.$1,392,939 96

2,455,426 00 3,48,596 00 1,167,995 55

761,035 75 2,682,857 72 2,284,629 04 820,043 43

15,053,523 45

Excluding Pensacola and Memphis........ 3,104,672 47 11,948,850 98 5,344,358 83

Add Docks on Atlantic Coast........

Aggregate for Navy Yards and Docks...... -$17,293,209 81||

It will be perceived that I confine myself exclusively to the Atlantic coast, excluding the Gulf of Mexico and the Lakes, and that in this Atlantic coast is included the peninsula of Florida, running like a finger post for hundreds of miles into the ocean, covering no extensive or important back country; and we have already expendedFor fortifications..... Light-houses....

Navy-yards and docks..

To which add estimate for fortifications...

.......

$15,421,597 00 2,245,508 55 17,293,209 81

15,847,000 00

66

Making a total for the Pacific coast of 1620 Nearly equal to the whole Atlantic coast, including the peninsula of Florida. And what have you expended on that extensive coast for fortifications, light-houses, navy-yards, and docks? Not one dollar! What have you appropriated? About $150,000 for light-houses not yet commenced, $250,000 for a dock, to cost, when completed, $610,000, and nothing for fortifications or a navyyard. Even the estimate for surveys for fortifications, of $50,000, made by the War Department, has been left out of the army appropriation bill by the Committee of Ways and Means, which

is an indication that we are to have no fortifications there.

Here is my own State, of California, which paid $3,212,127 79 into the Treasury from customs the last fiscal year, with a sea-coast of 970 miles, containing within her limits 188,981 square miles, more than four times the size of the State of New York, utterly destitute of light-house establishments, necessary and indispensable to our commercial marine in approaching her coasts. Here is the Pacific Empire State destined to command the commerce of the Pacific and Asiatic seas, left wholly unprovided for, in regard to works of protection and defense. In the agitations and political commotions of European nations, we know not at what hour we may find it necessary to place this nation in an attitude of defence, even if only to defend our neutral rights as a great maritime power, to say nothing of the importance of conforming to the policy of Washington and his successors, in time of peace to make proper preparation for war.

The honorable Senator has alluded to the war of 1812 to show that we need no national defense. I wish to call his attention to the historical fact that

the British sloop of war Racoon entered the port of Astoria, in Oregon, and in the defenseless con

dition of our rights there, formally took posses sion of the country in behalf of his Britannic Majesty, and changed the name of "Astoria" to "Fort George. Thanks to the valiant spirits that now occupy California and Oregon, no hos tile foot can ever tread that soil with impunity; yet who can estimate the extent of the mischief and ruin that would be there inflicted by the presence of a powerful hostile fleet, left as the country now is by the Government of the United States wholly unprotected.

The Senator makes a comparison between our country, during the war of 1812, and the present time, and draws the inference that, as we needed no defenses to protect our coast and commerce then, they are useless now. The Senator has cer tainly not looked at the commercial progress of this country since the close of the war of 1812, or he would have drawn no such inference. Í have examined the statistics of our commercial marine, and find that since 1815, (when the war with Great Britain closed) to 1850, we have built 34,792 vessels, with a tonnage of 447,591,045 tons. The registered whale fishery for the last twelve years, to wit: from 1840 to 1851, had a tonnage of 2,038,177. The registered whale fishery for 1851, had a tonnage of 181,645.

It is known that, perhaps with the exception of a single ship that visits the Greenland seas, the whale fishery is confined to the Pacific and South seas. The proceeds of the sea for the year ending June 13, 1850, from the whale fishery alone, amounted to $2,318,024. Are no means to be provided for the protection and encouragement of this valuable traffic? And are our possessions on the Pacific coast to be deprived of all those facilities, which aid in the exaltation of a State or nation, through a miserable, parsimonious policy, on the part of the General Government, which refuses: extend to us proper aid, when we are advancing, with giant strides, in all that constitutes real worth and greatness? So much for what the Government has failed to do, to build up the commercial greatness of her Pacific possessions. And when we look into the interior of the country, we have but lile hope that a more liberal policy will be pursued toward that section of the Union. We have no reliable evidence that we are to receive a grant of land to encourage the great railway system that will yet begirt this ocean-bound Empire, in order that we may do our part in improving our State, devel oping its boundless resources, and connect us with the Atlantic, by communications, as we are in principle, in all that concerns the glory of this Union.

Only twenty-five years have elapsed since the railway system began in the United States. At the end of the year 1850, we had 8,797 miles of railway, which cost $286,455,078. There were, up to the close of 1851, by estimate, 10,618 miles, and to the end of 1852, we have its extent estimated at 12,600-more than half the circumfer ence of the globe! Does any one suppose that this great system of land communication will stop until it reaches the Pacific ocean? Then, with a proper system of defense upon that coast, which will give us a permanent commercial ascendancy on the Pacific and Asiatic seas, the carrying trade between Asia and Europe will be within our ter ritory, and enable us to control the commerce and exchanges of the world. Congress has dealt liberally and justly with the East, in land, money, and improvements. Let them deal in the same spirit with the West. We ask nothing more.

The Senator says, that the commercial marine does not use the basin and railway. Preparations are now making in New York to build one, to avoid the expense of accumulating docks; to meet the wants of our commercial marine. The Senator also objects to the mode of completing the title for the site of the navy-yard; and supposes that a California jury will not do justice to the United States. He need be under no apprehensions on this subject, for the location of the navy-yard will greatly enhance the value of the property sur rounding it, and the owners of property near eligi ble sites for its location will be most willing to give a quit claim to the United States for any amount of land needed for this purpose. I doubt very much whether there is a man in California who would risk his title in a contest with the United States. Land titles in that country are not so perfect as to court an issue of title with the United States, for lands selected for public purposes.

This part of the bill was intended to do away with the necessity of further legislation as to the selection of a site. The Senator says this country has no necessity for national defense, because no nation wants to go to war with us. This may be true now, but will it always remain so? If the Senator was the emperor of the world, and should issue his edict that there should be no more wars, then there would be no necessity for national defenses, here or elsewhere. Unfortunately for mankind, he has not this power; and I prefer adhering to the time-honored policy of this Government, "to prepare for war in time of peace." The question now is, shall we make this preparation on the Pacific coast of the United States. Arguments in favor of the expenditure of public money in any State of the Confederacy have less weight, when they come from a representative of such State, than when they emanate from an entirely disinterested source.

It is fortunate for me that I can bring high authority to my aid in favor of this bill, by reading from an able report, made by the Naval Committee of the House at the last session:

"The next object which has engaged the attention of the committee is that which relates to the naval defense of our western coast.

"The acquisition of California, and the occupation of Oregon, have extended our sea front from the Atlantic to the Pacific ocean. The national defenses to be provided for those distant shores must, of necessity, be almost entirely naval. The approaches from every other direction except from the sea are difficult and doubtful, and may easily be well secured. But so weak and helpless against hostile approaches on the sea front are our fellow-citizens on the Pacific, that it is within the reach of any third or fourthrate naval power with whom the United States may be at war greatly to harrass and annoy them. So dependent are they upon ships for supplies of all kinds, that a blockade of her principal ports for a few months would reduce the State of California to a starving condition.

"The average population of Californía, for the last year, may be estimated at 200,000; and it may be assumed, that during the year there were about 2,000 vessels of all descriptions which entered her ports. This estimate is sufficiently accurate to show how entirely dependent that country is upon the sea, and how vulnerable from that quarter; for it proves that, in the average, one ship is required to supply the wants and necessities of about one hundred Californians-so little do they produce except gold, and so dependent are they upon foreign markets. The world would not afford sea-going vessels enough at this rate to fetch and carry for the people on this side of the Rocky mountains; nor does the world afford another instance of a people so dependent for supplies upon the sea, or so exposed and so utterly helpless in case of attack by sea, as are the people of California in their present condition.

"A blockade of our Atlantic ports might interfere with our intercourse abroad, but it could not bring the people here to such a degree of suffering, distress, and misery as would be inflicted on the people of California by a blockade of their coast. The voyage by sea hence to California and Oregon is the longest voyage known to navigation; and as far as the naval defenses of that State and Territory are concerned, they are as a colony in the most distant part of the world, which in war the navy has to protect, and the route to which would be thronged with the enemy and beset with dangers.

"In providing the means of naval defense, or planning a course of naval policy, regard must be had to the situation and condition of other nations.

"Seeing, then, the means of attack, and knowing the extent of their resources at sea, and our own, we can the better judge as to the degree and kind of preparation which it behooves us to make.

"Owing to the great naval resources of the States upon the waters of the Atlantic, it never has been and never will be consistent with the true policy of the country to keep up in peace a standing navy in proportion to the standing navies of other countries. Hence, though we find the United States the first commercial nation for tonnage, she is only the filth in actual naval force. The navies of Great Britain, France, Russia, and Turkey, all carry more guns than the American navy, and the Egyptian navy has only seven guns less.

"In proportion to commercial marine, the navy of the United States is the smallest navy in the world. The nations of Europe support navies that mount some twenty, some ten, but all more than two guns for every 1,000 tons of commercial shipping; whereas we mount, on the average, rather less than one gun. Great Britain has six, France ten, Russia twenty four guns for every 1,000 tons of shipping owned by their merchants. The naval force to be kept ordinarily in commission should not, in the judgment of your committee, ever reach such a figure as these navies present, nor do the public interests require that in times of profound peace it should exceed one third or one fourth of the lowest of these rates.

"As commerce expands and increases, the demands upon the navy for service also increase; therefore, there seems to exist somewhere a ratio between the tonnage of commerce and the guns of armed ships, which, if it could be discovered, an eye being turned to the degree of preparation of other navies and our own resources, would determine the proper size and the most judicious rate of growth for the American navy. That navy is no larger now for the protection of both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts than it was for the protection of the Atlantic coast alone; for the present size was determined before Texas was annexed, California acquired, or Oregon occupied. This increase of sea front, therefore, would seem to call for an expansion of the navy. But the committee do not propose any enlargement; they believe that the fundamental changes already

suggested in the models and armaments of our ships, together with other arrangements which may be easily adopted by executive authority for increased activity and efficiency, will render the present force amply sufficient for a peace establishment.

"In the opinion of the committee the naval resources of the Atlantic States, in contradistinction of the Pacific States, are unrivaled. The railroads, canals, and other great works and thoroughfares which penetrate into the interior and inter: ect among the mountains, have converted almost every forest into a timber shed for the navy. The tonnage of the United States is the greatest in the world. Our merchant ships are unmatched for speed and unequaled in size. We build more ships than any other people, and we may almost be regarded as a nation of ship builders. With sailors enough in peace to man the largest commercial marine that ever spread its sails to the breeze, we should have from that service gallant tars enough in war to man the largest flect the world ever saw.

"With such means, resources, and facilities at command for stretching out the naval arin upon the Atlantic in war, it would be neither wise nor desirable in peace to provide either ships or guns according to the numbers which Great Britain or any other nation may choose to build. All things considered, the Pacific coasts require the protection of a much larger navy in proportion than the Atlantic; for the case is different there. We have no private ship yards; no ship-builders; no timber-sheds; no railroads running from the sea-board up into forests of ship timber; nor any other of the facilities for building up a navy. All the materials for creating a navy there must be sent hence over that long, tedious, and dangerous route, which in war would be controlled and commanded by Great Britain.

"First standing in the middle of the great highway to California is the island of Bermuda. Ships from the southern ports bound to the other hemisphere pass on one side of this island, while those from the Northern States pass on the other side of it. It is a powerful position, amply pro vided with coals, munitions of war, and military stores of all sorts. A few steamers stationed as lookouts off that island would give intelligence of the approach, in war, of any fleet bound to California. Escaping here, the rockbound island of St. Helena, another centre of naval operations in the South Atlantic, stands on the wayside of our road to California. But getting safely by this, we next come to the Falkland Islands, another station upon which the British navy is perched right in the middle of our road. Es cape here would be a miracle; for at this point the tracks of all vessels come together preparatory to doubling the cape. But if the fleet for the succor of California should pass by this port without molestation, it would be only to encounter the storms and tempests of the cape, and there, in that inhospitable region, to buffet with the ancient and unsubsidized allies of that proud realm, as the winds of heaven were once styled by a British statesman; and, after all these dangers are passed, the haven we seek would still be three months off.

"The idea, therefore, of sending to our Pacific coasts any succor in time of war around Cape Horn, or of furnishing any navy supplies by such a route, is a mere chimerawholly and utterly impracticable.

"Taking this view of the subject, the committee propose to consider the means of naval defence which economy, true policy, and a sound forecast require should be provided for California and Oregon. Having determined that, they propose to recommend a plan for accomplishing it.

"As to the extent of the naval preparations which ought to be made in peace for the defense in war of any coast line, there is room for wide and honest differences of opinion, more especially as neither the time nor the motive of that war can be foreseen, nor can it be known who the other belligerent may be. But in this case and on this occasion, though some degree of preparation is necessary, that preparation involves no tedious undertaking nor extravagant appropriations.

"No respectable naval power is to be found on the shores or among the islands of the Pacific. There is not so much even as a dock-yard to be found, from one extent to the other of that vast ocean. The committee cannot learn, though inquiry has been made, that there is a single port in the Pacific ocean, or along its shores, that is at this time capable, with its own resources, of building or equipping so much even as a second class frigate. Maritime nations, as England, France, and Russia, have colonies there, but no naval stations of any consequence whatever.

"Hence it appears that the naval supremacy on the sea is easily acquired, and when once acquired and placed in hands as strong as those of the United States, it will not be likely soon to be wrested from them, or even to be disputed. In the event of war, Great Britain finding us unprepared or without naval resources in Califorma, would, by means of her stations and other facilities, send a force there superior to the small one now kept in commission, and so overpower us; at least, seeing that we were unprepared, she would be induced to make the attempt.

"But if at the breaking out of war she should see ships already built and lying in ordinary in our Pacific ports; if she should see there the means and facilities of equipment and repair-none of which she has; if she should also see, in connexion with this state of preparation, the Marblehead and other fishermen whom the war would throw out of emiployment, and of whom 12,000 are engaged in their hardy occupations, on the waters of the Pacific; if she should see there these very men, standing as a corps of reserve and ready to act, who, in Old Ironsides and other ships, gave her in the last war such cause of remembrance, she would no doubt be disposed to leave us alone in that quarter.

"As long as ships can be built on the Atlantic and delivered on the Pacific coast cheaper than they could be built there, true policy and economy require that they should be built here and sent there."

us avoid the errors of former laws, but never abandon a system which is intimately connected with our commercial prosperity. I shall, on a future occasion, go more fully into this subject, and content myself, for the present, with showing what a great advantage Great Britain would have in a war between the two countries, by using for war purposes the steam-ships now employed by that Government in carrying the mails all over the world.

In the event of such a war, Great Britain would arm her mail steamers and fill them with seamen to man the prize vessels they may capture. She has these steamers in all quarters of the globe. One large gun upon each would answer her purposes.

Her Mediterranean mail steamers would be ordered to the Straits of Gibraltar. Here they would capture every American vessel in the Mediterranean sea, and all vessels bound thither, and send them into Gibraltar for confiscation and safety.

Her Oriental steamers would be ordered to cruise off the Straits of Sunda, Gaspar, Macassar, and the Cape of Good Hope. This would enable them to capture nearly every American vessel in the East Indies. Their prizes would be sent to Singapore and Cape Town, or the Cape of Good Hope, for safety and confiscation. of Good for Plate stemmers would be ordered to cruise on the Equator, and they would capture all the vessels that escaped round the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn, as well as all vessels going to and from Rio de la Plate and the Brazils. Their prizes would be sent to the Falkland Islands, St. Helena, Jamaica, and other islands in the West Indies for safety and confiscation.

Her West India, Boston, and New York steamers would be ordered to cruise off the harbors of the United States, and their prizes would be sent to Bermuda and Halifax for safety and confiscation. Her Havre steamers would capture all vessels sailing to or from Europe.

Here

I now come to the North Pacific ocean. alone Great Britain has no fortified point where her prizes could be deposited for safety and confiscation. But she could soon remedy this defect. The Sandwich Islands are powerless, and contain some good harbors, and the past history of Great Britain shows that she would not hesitate to seize these islands, and make their harbors the asylum for her prizes. Thus her Pacific steamers would capture our whalers and merchant vessels in that ocean and send them to Biron's Bay, or some other harbor in the Sandwich Islands for safety and confiscation.

That this is no exaggerated statement of the power of the British Government in the event of a war with this country, is easy of demonstration had I the time to enlarge upon the subject. It should be borne in mind that her mail steamers are built with express reference to their use as war steamers. I am informed that simultaneously with their building armaments, are prepared and deposited at ports where they can, at short notice, be fitted to the vessels, and have them ready for war service.

The only point on the ocean, where we have any advantage over Great Britain, is in the North Pacific. As shown in the report I have just read, there she has no fortified harbors, naval depôts, or docks for the repair of vessels. Her steam marine is weaker there, than in any other part of the world. We have already more than a dozen steamers engaged in carrying the mails from Panama to California and Oregon. With a fully equipped navy-yard, and such a dock as this bill proposes to build, we could, in an incredibly short space of time, turn these steamers into vessels of war, and sweep the Pacific ocean, sending our prizes into San Francisco for safety and confiscation. With a knowledge of the fact that her whole Pacific commerce would be destroyed, and her East India possessions endangered, Great Britain would not engage in a war with this country, unless forced to do so by us. Although she could, as stated, cut up and destroy our commerce with other parts of the world, yet with ocean supremacy on the Pacific in our hands, it would be a question of the dismemberment of her empire. In the North, we would seize her North American possessions, and in the East we would destroy her dominion in Asia.