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Book II. well as the fame immaterial spirit, go to the making of farme man.

$9. Perfonal Identity.

THIS being premifed to find wherein perfonal identity confifts, we must confider what perfon ftands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reafon and reflection, and can confider itself as itfelf, the fame thinking thing in different times and places ; which it does by that confcioufnefs which is infeparable from thinking, and, as it feems to me, effential to it; it being impoffible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive. When we fee, hear, fmell, tafte, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do fo. Thus it is always as to our prefent fenfations and perceptions: And by this every one is to himfelf that which he calls felf; it not being confidered in this cafe, whether the fame felf be continued in the fame or divers fubftances: For, fince confcioufness álways accompanies thinking, and it is that that makes every one to be what he calls felf, and thereby diftinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in this alone confifts perfonal identity, i. e. the famenefs of a rational being: And as far as this confcioufnefs can be extended backwards to any paft action or thought, fo far reaches the identity of that perfon; it is the fame felf now it was then; and it is by the fame felf with this prefent one that now reflects on it, that that action was done.

§ 10 Confcioufnefs makes perfonal Identity. BUT it is farther inquired, whether it be the fame identical fubftance? This few would think they had reafon to doubt of, if thefe perceptions, with their confcioufnefs, always remained prefent in the mind whereby the fame thinking thing would be always confcioufly prefent, and as would be thought evidently the fame to itself. But that which feems to make the difficulty is this, that this confcioufncfs being interrupted always by forgetfulnefs, there being no moment of our lives wherein we have the whole train of all our palt ac tions before our eyes in one view, but even the best

memories lofing the fight of one part whilst they are viewing another; and we fometimes, and that the greatest part of our lives, not reflecting on our past Lives, being intent on our prefent thoughts, and in found, fleep, having no thoughts at all, or at least none with that confcioufnefs which remarks our waking thoughts; I fay, in all the fe cafes, our confcicufnefs being interrupted, and we lofing the fight of our past felves, doubts are raised whether we are the fame thinking thing, i. e. the fame fubftance or no; which, however reasonable or unreafonable, concerns not perfonal identity at all; the queftion being, what makes the fame perfon, and not whether it be the fame identical subftance, which always thinks in the fame perfon; which in this cafe matters not at all: Different fubftances by the fame confcioufnefs (where they do partake in it) being united into one perfon, as well as different bodies by the fame life are united into one animal, whofe identity is preferved, in that change of fubftances, by the unity of one continued life; for it being the fame confcioufnefs that makes a man be himfelf to himself, perfonal identity depends on that only, whether it be annexed only to one individual fubftance, or can be continued in a fucceffion of feveral fubftances: For as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any paft action with the fame confciouinefs it had of it at first, and with the fame confcioufnefs it has of any prefent action; fo far it is the fame perfonal felf; for it is by the confcioufnefs it has of its prefent thoughts and actions that it is felf to itself now, and fo will be the fame felf, as far as the fame confcioufnefs can extend to actions part or to come; and would be by distance of time, or change of substance, no more two perfons, than a man be two men by wearing other clothes to-day than he did yesterday, with a long or fhort fleep between; the fame confcioufnefs uniting thofe diftant aflions into the fame perfon, whatever fubftances contributed to their pro

duction.

$11. Perfonal Identity in Change of Subflances. THAT this is fo, we have fome kind of evidence in our

Book II. very bodies, all whofe particles, whilft vitally united to this fame thinking confcious felf, fo that we feel when they are touched, and are affected by, and confcious of good or harm that happens to them, are a part of our felves, i. e. of our thinking confcious felf. Thus the limbs of his body is to every one a part of himself he fympathifes and is concerned for them. Cut off an hand, and thereby feparate it from that confcioufnefs he had of its heat, cold, and other affections, and it is then no longer a part of that which is himself, ang more than the remoteft part of matter. Thus we fee the fubftance whereof perfonal felf confifted at one time, may be varied at another, without the change of personal identity a there being no queftion about the fame perton, though the limbs, which but now were a part of it, be cut off.

12. Whether in the Change of thinking Subftances i Bur the question is, whether if the fame fubftance which thinks be changed, it can be the fame perfon; or remaining the fame, it can be different perfons?

And to this I answer, first, This can be no question at all to thofe who place thought in a purely material animal conftitution, void of an immaterial fubftance; for whether their fuppofition be true or no, it is plain they conceive perfonal identity preferved in fomething elfa than identity of fubftance; as animal identity is preferved in identity of life, and not of fubftance: And therefore, those who place thinking in an immaterial fubftance only, before they can come to deal with thefe men, muft fhow why perfonal identity cannot be preferved in the change of immaterial fubftances, or varica ty of particular immaterial fubftances, as well as animal identity is preferved in the change of material fabftances, or variety of particular bodies; unless they will fay, it is one immaterial fpirit that makes the fame life in brutes, as it is one immaterial fpirit that makes the fame perfon in men; which the Cartefians at least will not admit, for fear of making brutes thinking things too.

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Vol 7 mi va ve§ 13. j

BUT next, as to the first part of the question, whether if the fame thinking fubftance (fuppofing immaterial fubftances only to think) be changed, it can be the famè perfon? I anfwer, That cannot be refolved but by those who ki w what kind of substances they are that do think, and whether the confciousness of pait actions ean be transferred from one thinking fubftance to another grant, were the fame confcioufnefs the fame individual action, it could not; but it being but a prefent reprefentation of a past action, why it may not be pof. uble that that may be reprefented to the mind to have been, which really hever was, will remain to be fhown. And therefore, how far the conscioufnefs of paft ac tions is annexed to any individual agent, fo that another cannot poffibly have it, will be hard for us to de termine, till we know what kind of action it is that cannot be done without a reflex act of perception accompanying it, and how performed by thinking fub-ftances, who cannot think without being confcious of it.. But that which we call the fame confcioufnefs, not being. the fame individual act, why one intellectual fubftance may not have reprefented to it, as done by itfelf, what it never did, and was perhaps done by fome other agent; why, I fay, fuch a representation may not pos fibly be without reality of matter of fact, as well as feveral representations in dreams are, which yet, whilft dreaming, we take for true, will be difficult to con-clude from the nature of things; and that it is never fo, will by us, till we have clearer views of the nature of thinking fubftances, be beft refolved into the goodnefs of God, who, as far as the happiness or mifery of any of his fenfible creatures is concerned in it, will not by a fatal error of theirs transfer from one to another that confcioufnefs which draws reward or punishment with it. How far this may be an argument against those who would place thinking in a fyftem of fleeting animal fpirits, I leave to be confidered. But. yet to return to the queftion before us, it must be allowed, that if the famé confciousness (which, as hass

been fhown, is quite a different thing from the fame numerical figure or motion in body) can be transferred from one thinking fubitance to another, it will be poffible that two thinking fubftances may make but one perfon; for the fame confcioufnefs being preferved, whether in the fame or different fubftanc, the perfonu al identity is preferved.

$14.

As to the fecond part of the queftion, whether the fame immaterial fubftance remaining, there may be two diftinct perfons? which queftion feems to me to be built on this, whether the fame immaterial being, being confcicus of the actions of its paft duration, may be wholly ftripped of all the confcioufnefs of its paft exiftence, and lofe it beyond the power of ever retrieving again, and fo as it were beginning a new account from a new period, have a confcioufnefs that cannot reach beyond this new ftate? All thofe who hold pre-existence are evidently of this mind, fince they allow the foul to have no remaining confcioufnefs of what it did in that pre-exiftent ftate, either wholly feparate from body, or informing any other body; and if they fhould not, it is plain experience would be against them: So that perfonal identity reaching no farther than confcioufnefs reaches, a pre-exiftent fpirit not having continued fo many ages in a ftate of filence, muft needs make different perfons. Suppofe a Chriftian Platonist, or Pytha gorean fhould, upon God's having ended all his works of creation the feventh day, think his foul hath exifted ever fince; and fhould imagine it has revolved in feveral human bodies, as I once met with one, who was perfuaded his had been the foul of Socrates (how reafonably I will not difpute; this I know, that in the poft he filled, which was no inconfiderable one, he paffed for a very rational man, and the prefs has fhown that he wanted not parts or learning): would any one fay, that he being not confcious of any of Secrates's actions or thoughts, could be the fame perfon with Secrates? Let any one reflect upon himself, and conclude that he has in himself an immaterial fpirit, which is that which

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