the particular figures we meet with have or have not a right to the name circle, and fo to show which of them, by having that eflence, was of that species. And though there neither were nor had been in nature fuch a beaft as an unicorn, or fuch a fish as a mermaid; yet fuppofing those names to ftand for complex abstract ideas that contained no inconfiftency in them, the effence of a mermaid is as intelligible as that of a man, and the idea of an unicorn as certain, steady and permanent as that of a horse. From what has been faid, it is evident, that the doctrine of the immutability of effences proves them to be only abstract ideas; and is founded on the relation established between them and certain founds as figns of them, and will always be true as long as the fame name can have the fame fignification.

20. Recapitulation.

To conclude, this is that which in fhort I would fay, viz. That all the great bufinefs of genera and Species, and their effences, amounts to no more but this; that men making abstract ideas, and fettling them in their minds with names annexed to them, do thereby enable themselves to confider things, and difcourfe of them, as it were in bundles, for the easier and readier improvement and communication of their knowledge; which would advance but flowly, were their words and thoughts confined only to particulars.

CHAP. IV.

OF THE NAMES OF SIMPLE IDEAS.

1. Names of fimple Ideas, Moles and Subflances, have each fomething peculiar.

TH

HOUGH all words, as I have fhown, fignify nothing immediately but the ideas in the mind of the speaker; yet upon a nearer furvey we fhall find that the names of fimple ideas, mixed modes (under which I comprise relations too), and natur il fut dances, and each of them, have fomething peculiar and different from the other. For example:

$2. 1. Names of fimple Ideas and Substances intimate real Exiftence.

FIRST, The names of fimple ideas and fubftances, with the abftract ideas in the mind, which they immediately fignify, intimate alfo fome real exiflence, from which was derived their original pattern. But the names of mixed modes terminate in the idea that is in the mind, and lead not the thoughts any farther; as we fhall fee more at large in the following chapter.

3. 2. Names of fimple Ideas, and Modes fignify always both real and nominal Effence.

SECONDLY, The names of fimple ideas and modes, fignify always the real as well as nominal effence of their fpecies. But the names of natural fubftances fignify rarely, if ever, any thing but barely the nominal effences of thofe fpecies, we fhall fhow in the chapter that treats of the names of fubftances in particular.

§4. 3. Names of fimple Ideas undefinable. THIRDLY, The names of fimple ideas are not capable of any It has definitions; the names of all complex ideas are. not, that I know, been yet obferved by any body, what words are, and what are not capable of being defined; the want whereof is (as I am apt to think) not seldom the occafion of great wrangling and obfcurity in mens difcourfes; whilft fome demand definitions of terms that cannot be defined, and others think they ought to rest satisfied in an explication made by a more general word, and its reftriction (or to speak in terms of art, by a genus and difference); when even after such definition made according to rule, those who hear it, have often no more a clear conception of the meaning of the word than they had before. This at least I think, that the fhowing what words are, and what are not capable of definitions, and wherein confifts a good definition, is not wholly befides our prefent purpose; and perhaps will afford fo much light to the nature of these figns, and our ideas, as to deferve a more particular confideration.

$5. If all were definable, it would be a procefs in infinitum. I WILL not here trouble myself, to prove that all terms

151 are not definable from that progrefs, in infinitum, which it will visibly lead us into, if we fhould allow that all names could be defined; for if the terms of one definition were still to be defined by another, where at last fhould we stop? But I fhall, from the nature of our ideas, and the fignification of our words, fhow, why fome names can, and others cannot be defined, and which they are.

6. What a Definition is.

I THINK it is agreed, that a definition is nothing else, but the bowing the meaning of one word by feveral other not fynonymous terms; the meaning of words being only the ideas they are made to ftand for by him that ufes them. The meaning of any term is then fhowed, or the word is defined, when by other words, the idea it is made the fign of, and annexed to in the mind of the fpeaker, is as it were reprefented or fet before the view of another, and thus its fignification afcertained. This is the only use and end of definitions, and therefore the only measure of what is or is not a good definition.

§ 7. Simple Ideas why undefinable.

THIS being premifed, I say, that the names of fimple Ideas, and those only, are incapable of being defined; the reafon whereof is this, that the feveral terms of a definition, fignifying feveral ideas, they can altogether by no means reprefent an idea which has no compofition at all and therefore a definition, which is properly nothing but the fhowing the meaning of one word by feveral others not fignifying each the fame thing, can in ther names of fimple idea have no place.

8. Inftances Motion.

THE not obferving this difference in our ideas, and their names, has produced that eminent trifling in the schools, which is fo eafy to be obferved in the definitions they give us of fome few of thefe fimple ideas; for as to the greatest part of them, even those mafters of definitions were fain to leave them untouched, merely by the impoffibility they found in it. What more exquifite jargon could the wit of man invent, than this definition, the act of a being in power, as far forth as in power? which

would puzzle any rational man, to whom it was not already known by its famous abfurdity, to guess what word it could ever be fuppofed to be the explication of. If Tully afking a Dutchman what beweeginge was, fhould have received this explication in his own language, that it was actus entis in potentia quatenus in potentia; I afk, whether any one can imagine he could thereby have understood what the word beweeginge fignified, or have gueffed what idea a Dutchman ordinarily had in his mind, and would fignify to another, when he used that found?

$9.

NOR have the modern philofophers, who have endeavoured to throw off the jargon of the fchools, and fpeak intelligibly, much better fucceeded in defining fimple ideas, whether by explaining their caufes, or any otherwife. The atomifts, who define motion to be a paffage from one place to another, what do they more than put one fynonymous word for another? For what is paffage, other than motion? And if they were asked what paffage was, how would they better define it than by motion? For is it not at leaft as proper and fignificant to fay, paffage is a motion from one place to another, as to fay, motion is a paffage, &c.? This is to tranflate and not to define, when we change two words of the fame fignification one for another; which when one is better underflood than the other, may ferve to difcover what idea the unknown ftands for, but is very far from a definition; unlcfs we will fay every English word in the dictionary is the definition of the Latin word it anfwers, and the motion is a definition of motus. Nor will the fucceffive application of the parts of the fuperficies of one body to thofe of another, which the Cartefians give us, prove a much better definition of motion, when well examined.

§ 10. Light.

THE act of perfpicuous, as far forth as perfpicuous, is another peripatetic definition of a fimple idea; which, though not more abfurd than the former of motion, yet betrays its ufeleffness and infignificancy more plainly, because experience will eafily convince any one, that it cannot

make the meaning of the word light (which it pretends to define) at all understood by a blind man. But the definition of motion appears not at firft fight so useless, because it efcapes this way of trial; for this fimple idea, entering by the touch as well as fight, it is impoffible to fhow an example of any one, who has no other way to get the idea of motion, but barely by the definition of that name. Those who tell us, that light is a great number of little globules, ftriking brifkly on the bottom of the eye, fpeak more intelligibly than the fchools ; but yet thefe words ever fo well understood would make the idea the word light ftands for, no more known to a man that understands it not before, than if one should tell him, that light was nothing but a company of little tennis balls, which fairies all day long ftruck with rackets against fome mens foreheads, whilst they paffed by others. For granting this explication of the thing to be true, yet the idea of the caufe of light, if we had it ever fo exact, would no more give us the idea of light itself, as it is fuch a particular perception in us, than the idea of the figure and motion of a fharp piece of fteel would give us the idea of that pain which it is able to cause in us for the cause of any fenfation, and the fenfation itself, in all the fimple ideas of one fense, are two ideas ; and two ideas fo different and distant one from another, that no two can be more fo. And therefore fhould Des Cartes's globules ftrike ever fo long on the retina of a man who was blind by a gutta ferena, he would thereby never have any idea of light, or any thing approaching it, though he understood what little globules were, and what ftriking on another body was, ever fo well; and therefore the Cartefians very well diftinguish between that light which is the caufe of that fenfation in us, and the idea which is produced in us by it, and is that which is properly light.

11. Simple Ideas why undefinable, farther explained. SIMPLE ideas, as has been fhown, are only to be got by: thofe impreffions objects themselves make on our minds, by the proper inlets appointed to each fort. If they are. not received this way, all the words in the world, inade