ceived with refpect and fubmiflion by others; and it is looked upon as infolence for a man to fet up and adhere to his own opinion against the current stream of antiquity, or to put it in the balance against that of fome learned doctor, or other wife approved writer. Whoever backs his tenets with fuch authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the caufe, and is ready to ftyle it impudence in any one who shall ftand out against them. This I think may be called argumentum ad verecundiam.

§ 20. 2. Ad Ignorantiam.

SECONDLY, Another way that men ordinarily use to drive others, and force them to fubmit their judg ments, and receive the opinion in debate, is to require the adverfary to admit what they allege as a proof, or to affign a better. And this I call argumentum ad ig

norantiam.

21. 3. Ad Hominem.

THIRDLY, A third way is to prefs a man with confe quences drawn from his own principles or conceffions. This is already known under the name of argumentum ad hominem.

§ 22. 4. Ad Judicium.

FOURTHIY, The fourth is the ufing of proofs drawn from any of the foundations of knowledge or probability. This I call argumentum ad judicium. This alone of all the four brings true inftruction with it, and advances us in our way to knowledge. For, 1. It argues not another man's opinion to be right, because I out of respect, or any other confideration but that of conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It proves not another man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the fame with him, because I know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow that another man is in the right way, because he has fhown me that I am in the wrong. I may be modeft, and therefore not oppose another man's perfuafion; I may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better; I may be in an error, and another may show me that I am fo; this may dispose me, perhaps, for the reception of truth,

but helps me not to it; that must come from proofs and arguments, and light arifing from the nature of things themselves, and not from my fhamefacedness, ignorance, or error.

23. Above, contrary, and according to Reafon. By what has been before faid of reafon we may be able to make fome guess at the diftinction of things, into thofe that are according to, above, and contrary to reafon. 1. According to reafon are fuch propofitions whofe truth we can discover by examining and tracing those ideas we have from fenfation and reflection, and by natural deduction find to be true or probable. 2. Above reafon are fuch propofitions whose truth or probability we cannot by reason derive from thofe principles. 3. Contrary to reafon are fuch propofitions as are inconfiftent with, or irreconcileable to our clear and diftinct ideas. Thus the existence of one God is according to reafon; the existence of more than one God contrary to reafon; the refurrection of the dead above reafon. Farther, as above reafon may be taken in a double fenfe, viz. either as fignifying above probability, or above certainty; fo in that large fenfe alfo, contrary to reafon, is, I fuppofe, fometimes

táken.

§ 24. Reafon and Faith not oppofite. THERE is another use of the word reafon wherein it is oppofed to faith; which though it be in itself a very improper way of speaking, yet common ufe has so authorised it, that it would be folly either to oppose or hope to remedy it; only I think it may not be amifs to take notice, that however faith be opposed to reafon, faith is nothing but a firm affent of the mind; which if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good reason, and so cannot be oppofite to it. He that believes, without having any reafon for believing, may be in love with his own fancies, but neither feeks truth as he ought, nor pays the obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those difcerning faculties he has given him to keep him out of mistake and error. He that does

not this to the best of his power, however he fometimes lights on truth, is in the right but by chance, and I know not whether the luckiness of the accident will excufe the irregularity of his proceeding. This at leaft is certain, that he must be accountable for whatever mistakes he runs into ; whereas he that makes use of the light and faculties God has given him, and seeks fincerely to difcover truth by those helps and abilities he has, may have this fatisfaction in doing his duty as a rational creature, that though he should mifs truth, he will not mifs the reward of it; for he governs his affent right, and places it as he should, who in any cafe or matter whatsoever be lieves or difbelieves according as reafon directs him; he that does otherwife tranfgreffes against his own light, and mifufes thofe faculties which were given him to no other end but to fearch and follow the clearer evidence and greater probability. But fince reafon and faith are by fome men opposed, we will so confider them in the following chapter.

CHAP. XVIII.

OF FAITH AND REASON, AND THEIR DISTINCT PROVINCES.

I'

1. Neceffary to know their boundaries.

T has been above shown, I. That we are of necef fity ignorant, and want knowledge of all forts where we want ideas. 2. That we are ignorant, and want rational knowledge where we want proofs. 3. That we want general knowledge and certainty as far as we want clear and determined fpecific ideas. 4. That we want probability to direct our affent ia matters where we have neither knowledge of our own, nor teftimony of other men, to bottom our reafon upon.

From thefe things thus premifed, I think we may come to lay down the measures and boundaries between faith and reafon, the want whereof may poffibly have

been the caufe, if not of great diforders, yet at least of great difputes, and perhaps miftakes in the world. For till it be refolved how far we are to be guided by reason, and how far by faith, we fhall in vain difpute, and endeavour to convince one another in matters of religion.

$2. Faith and Reafon what, as contradiftinguished. I FIND every feet, as far as reafon will help them, make use of it gladly; and where it fails them, they cry out, It is matter of faith, and above reafon. And I do not see how they can argue with any one, or ever convince a gainfayer, who makes ufe of the fame plea, without fetting down ftrict boundaries between faith and reafon, which ought to be the firft point eftablished in all questions where faith has any thing to do.

Reason therefore here, as contradiftinguished to faith, I take to be the difcovery of the certainty or probability of fuch propofitions or truths which the mind arrives at by deduction made from fuch ideas, which it has got by the ufe of its natural faculties, viz. by fenfation or reflection.

Faith, on the other fide, is the affent to any propofition, not thus made out by the deductions of reason, but upon the credit of the propofer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication. This way of difcovering truths to men we call Revelation. 2W HE I

§ 3. No new fimple Idea can be conveyed by tradi tional Revelation.

FIRST, then I fay, That no man infpired by God can by anyrevelation communicate to others any new fimple ideas, which they had not before from fenfation or reflection; for whatsoever impreffions he himself may have from the immediate hand of God, this revelation, if it be of new fimple ideas, cannot be conveyed to another either by words or any other figns; because words by their immediate operation on us caufe no other ideas but of their natural founds; and it is by the custom of using them for figns that they excite and

revive in our minds latent ideas, but yet only fuch ideas as were there before; for words feen or heard recal to our thoughts thofe ideas only, which to us they have been wont to be figns of, but cannot introduce any perfectly new, and formerly unknown fimple ideas. The fame holds in all other figns which cannot fignify to us things, of which we have before never had any idea at all.

Thus, whatever things were discovered to St. Paul when he was wrapped up into the third heaven, whatever new ideas his mind there received, all the defcription he can make to others of that place is only this, that there are fuch things as eye hath not feen, nor ear beard, nor bath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. And fuppofing God fhould discover to any one, fupernaturally, a fpecies of creatures inhabiting, for example, Jupiter or Saturn, (for that it is poffible there may be fuch, nobody can deny) which had fix fenfes, and imprint on his mind the ideas conveyed to theirs by that fixth fenfe, he could no more by words produce in the minds of other men those ideas, imprinted by that fixth fenfe, than one of us could convey the idea of any colour by the founds of words into a man, who having the other four fenfes perfect, had always totally wanted the fifth of seeing. For our fimple ideas then, which are the foundation and fole matter of all our notions and knowledge, we muft depend wholly on our reafon, I mean cur natural faculties, and can by no means receive them, or any of them, from traditional revelation; I say, traditional revelation, in diftinction to original revelation. By the one, I mean that first impreffion which is made immediately by God on the mind of any man, to which we cannot fet any bounds; and by the other, thofe impreffions delivered over to others in words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our conceptions

one to another.