ceived for true. The entertainment the mind gives this fort of propofitions, is called belief, affent, or opinion, hich is the admitting or receiving any propofition for ue, upon arguments or proofs that are found to per fuade us to receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is fo. And herein lies the difference between probability, and certainty, faith and knowledge, that in all the parts of knowledge there is intuition; each immediate idea, each ftep has its vifible and certain connection; in belief, not fo. That which makes me believe, is fome:thing extraneous to the thing I believe; fomething not evidently joined on both fides to, and so not manifeftly fhowing the agreement or difagreement of thofe ideas that are under confideration.

§4. The Grounds of Probability are two; Conformity with our own Experience, or the Teftimony of others experienced.

PROBABILITY then, being to fupply the defect of our knowledge, and to guide us where that fails, is always converfant about propofitions, whereof we have no certainty, but only fome inducements to receive them for true. The grounds of it are, in fhort, thefe two following:

First, The conformity of any thing with our own knowledge, obfervation, and experience.

Secondly, The teftimony of others, vouching their obfervation and experience. In the teftimony of others is to be confidered, 1. The number. 2. The integrity. 3. The fkill of the witneffes. 4. The defign of the author, where it is a teftimony out of a book cited. 5. The confiftency of the parts, and circumftances of the relation. 6. Contrary teftimonies.

§ 5 In this all the Agreements pro and con, ought to be examined before we come to a judgment. PROBABILITY wanting that intuitive evidence, which infallibly determines the understanding, and produces certain knowledge, the mind, if it would proceed rationally, ought to examine all the grounds of probability, and fee how they make more or lefs, for or against any propofition, before it affents to or diffents from it; and upon a due

Book IV. balancing the whole, reject, or receive it, with a mort or lefs firm affent, proportionably to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability on one fide or th other. For example:

If I myself fee a man walk on the ice, it is paft bability, it is knowledge: but if another tells me he f a man in England, in the midst of a tharp winter, wak upon water hardened with cold, this has fo great con formity with what is ufually obferved to happen, that! am difpofed by the nature of the thing itself to affent to it, unless fome manifeft fufpicion attend the relation d that matter of fact. But if the fame thing be told to one born between the tropics, who never faw nor heard of any fuch thing before, there the whole probability relies on teftimony; and as the relaters are more in number, and of more credit, and have no intereft to speak con trary to the truth, fo that matter of fact is like to find more or lefs belief. Though to a man, whofe experience has been always quite contrary, and has never heard of any thing like it, the most untainted credit of a witness will scarce be able to find belief, as it hap pened to a Dutch ambaffador, who entertaining the king of Siam with the particularities of Helland, which he was inquifitive after, amongst other things told him, that the water in his country would fometimes in cold weather be fo hard, that men walked upon it, and that it would bear an elephant if he were there; to which the king replied, Hitherto I have believed the frang things you have told me, because I look upon you as a fiber fair man, but now I am fure you

lie.

§6. They being capable of great l'ariety. UPON thefe grounds depends the probability of any pro pofition; and as the conformity of our knowledge, as the certainty of obfervations, as the frequency and conftancy of experience, and the number and credibility of teftimonies, do more or lefs agree or difagree with it, fo is any prepofition in itfelf more or lefs probable. There is another, I confefs, which though by itself it be no true ground of probability, yet is often made ufe of for one, by which men molt commonly regulate their af

fent, and upon which they pin their faith more thin any thing elle, and that is the opinion of others; though there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on, nor -I more likely to mislead one, fince there is much more falfehood and error, among men, than truth and knowJedge, and if the opinions and perfuafions of others whom we know and think well of be a ground of affent, men have reafon to be heathens in Japan, Mahometans in Turkey, Papifts in Spain, Proteftants in England, and Lutherans in Sweden. But of this wrong. ground of affent, I thall have occafion to fpeak more at large in another place.

$1. Our Affent ought to be regulated by the Ground's
of Probability.

The Sounding chapter, as they are the founda-
HE grounds of probability we have laid down in

tions on which our affent is built, fo are they alfo the
meafure whereby its feveral degrees are, or ought to be
regulated; only we are to take notice, that whatever
grounds of probability there may be, they yet operate
no further on the mind, which fearches,after truth, and
endeavours to judge right, than they appear, at leaft
in the first judgment or fearch that the mind makes. I
confefs, in the opinions men have, and firmly ftick to
in the world, their affent is not always from an actual
view of the reafons that at fitst prevailed with them; it
being in many cafes almoft impoffible, and in molt very
hard, even for thofe who have very admirable memo
ries, to retain all the proofs, which upon a due exami-
nation made them embrace that fide of the question.
It fuffices that they have once with care and fairness
fifted the matter as far as they could, and that they
have fearched into all the particulars that they could.
imagine to give any light to the question, and with the
belt of their kill caft up the account upon the whole
evidence; and thus having once found on which fide

Book IV. the probability appeared to them, after as full and ex an inquiry as they can make, they Jay up the conclu fion in their memories as a truth they have difcovered; and for the future they remain fatisfied with the te mony of their memories, that this is the opinion, tha by the proofs they have once feen of it, deferves fucki degree of their affent as they afford it.

2. Thefe cannot always be actually in view, and th we must content ourselves with the remembrance that we once faw ground for fuch a degree of Affent. THIS is all that the greatest part of men are capable of doing, in regulating their opinions and judgments; u lefs a man will exact of them, either to retain diftinda in their memories all the proofs concerning any proba truth, and that too in the fame order and regular de duction of confequences in which they have formerly placed or feen them, which fometimes is enough to fi a large volume upon one fingle queftion; or elfe they muft require a man, for every opinion that he embraces, every day to examine the proofs, both which are impo fible. It is unavoidable, therefore, that the memory be relied on in the cafe, and that men be perfuaded of four. ral opinions, whereof the proofs are not actually in the thoughts, nay, which perhaps they are not able actually to recal. Without this, the greateft part of men mat be either very sceptics, or change every moment, and yield themfelves up to whoever, having lately ftudiod the queftion, offers them arguments, which, for want of memory, they are not able prefently to answer. $3. The ill confequence of this, if our former Judg

ment were not rightly made.

I CANNOT but own, that mens licking to their pe judgment, and adhering firmly to conclufions formerly made, is often the caule of great obtinacy in error and miftake; but the fault is not that they rely on that memories for what they have before well judged, but becaufe they judged before they had well examined. ! May we not find a great number (not to fay the greatest part) of men, that think they have formed right judgments of feveral matters, and that for no other reason,

but because they never thought otherwife? that imagine themfelves to have judged right, only becaufe they ⚫ never questioned, never examined their own opinions? which is indeed to think they judged right, because they never judged at all; and yet thefe of all men hold their opinions with the great ft ftiffness; those being generally the most fierce and firm in their tenets, who have leaft examined them. What we once know, we are certain is fo, and we may be fecure that there are no latent proofs undiscovered, which may overturn our knowledge, or bring it in doubt; but in matters of probability, it is not in every cafe we can be fure that we have all the particulars before us that any way concern the question, and that there is no evidence behind, and yet unfeen, which may caft the probability on the other fide, and outweigh all that at prefent feems to preponderate with us. Who almoft is there that hath the leifure, patience, and means, to collect together all the proofs concerning moft of the opinions he has, fo as fafely to conclude that he hath a clear and full view, and that there is no more to be alleged for his better. information? and yet we are forced to determine ourfelves on the one fide or other. The conduct of our lives, and the management of our great concerns, will not bear delay, for thofe depend, for the most part, on the determination of our judgment in points wherein. we are not capable of certain and demonstrative knowledge, and wherein it is neceflary for us to embrace the one fide or the other.

§4. The right ufe of it, mutual Charity and Forbear

ance.

SINCE, therefore, it is unavoidable to the greatest part of men, if not all, to have feveral opinions, without certain and indubitable proofs of their truths, (and it carries too great an imputation of ignorance, lightnefs, or folly, for men to quit and renounce their former tenets prefently upon the offer of an argument, which they cannot immediately answer, and thow the infufficiency of) it would methinks, become all men to maintain peace, and the common offices of humanity and friendship, in the