are very confused or very unsteady, or perhaps none at all; who can wonder, I fay, that fuch thoughts and reafouings end in nothing but obfcurity and mistake, without any clear judgment or knowledge?

$5. Obftinacy.

THIS inconvenience, in an ill ufe of words, men fuffer in their own private meditations: But much more manifeft are the diforders which follow from it, in converfation, difcourfe, and arguings with others; for language being the great conduit whereby men convey their difcoveries, reafonings, and knowledge from one to another, he that makes an ill ufe of it, though he does not corrupt the fountains of knowledge, which are in things. themselves, yet he does, as much as in him lies, break or flop the pipes whereby it is diftributed to the public ufe and advantage of mankind. He that ufes words. without any clear and fteady meaning, what does he but lead himself and others into errors? And he that defignedly does it, ought to be looked on as an enemy to truth and knowledge. And yet who can wonder, that all the fciences and parts of knowledge have been fo overcharged with obfcure and equivocal terms, and infignificant and doubtful expreffions, capable to make the most attentive or quick-fighted very little or not at all the more knowing or orthodox, fince fubtilty, in those who make profeffion to teach or defend truth, hath paffed fo much for a virtue; a virtue, indeed, which confifting for the most part in nothing but the fallacious and illufory use of obfcure or deceitful terms, is only fit to make men more conceited in their ignorance, and obftinate in their errors.

6. And Wrangling.

LET us look into the books of controverfy of any kind; there we fhall fee, that the effect of obfcure, unsteady or equivocal terms, is nothing but noife and wrangling about founds, without convincing or bettering a man's understanding; for if the idea be not agreed on betwixt the speaker and hearer for which the words ftand, the argument is not about things, but names. As often as fuch a word whofe fignification is not afcertained be

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Book III. twixt them, comes in ufe, their understandings have no other object wherein they agree, but barely the found; the things that they think on at that time, as expreffed by that word, being quite different.

$7. Inftance-Bat and Bird.

WHETHER a bat be a bird or no, is not a question; whether a bat be another thing than indeed it is, or have other qualities then indeed it has, for that would be extremely abfurd to doubt of: but the question is, 1. Either between thofe that acknowledged themselves to have but imperfect ideas of one or both of those forts of things, for which thefe names are fuppofed to ftand; and then it is a real inquiry concerning the nature of a bird or a bat, to make their yet imperfect ideas of it more complete, by examining whether all the fimple ideas to which, combined together, they both give the name bird, be all to be found in a bat: but this is a question only of inquiries not difputers, who neither affirm, nor deny, but examine. Or, 2. It is a queftion between difputants, whereof the one affirms, and the other denies, that a bat is a bird; and then the queftion is barely about the fignification of one or both of thefe words, in that they not having both the fame complex ideas, to which they give these two names, one holds, and the other denies, that these two names may be affirmed one of another. Were they agreed in the fignification of thefe two names, it were impoffible they fhould difpute about them, for they would prefently and clearly fee (were that adjusted between them) whether all the fimple ideas of the more general name bird, were found in the complex idea of a bat or no; and fo there could be no doubt, whether a bat were a bird or no. And here I defire it may be confidered and carefully examined, whether the greatest part of the difputes in the world are not merely verbal, and about the fignification of words; and whether, if the terms they are made in were defined, and reduced in their fignification (as they must be where they fignify any thing) to determined collections of the fimple ideas they do or fhould stand for, those difputes would not end of themselves, and immediately va

nish. I leave it then to be confidered, what the learning of difputation is, and how well they are employed for the advantage of themselves or others, whose business is only the vain oftentation of founds; i. e. those who fpend their lives in difputes and controverfies. When I fhall fee any of thofe combatants ftrip all his terms of ambiguity and obfcurity (which every one may do in the words he uses himself), I fhall think him a champion for knowledge, truth, and peace, and not the flave of vain glory, ambition or a party.

§ 8. 1. Remedy, to ufe no Word without an Idea. To remedy the defects of speech before-mentioned to fome degree, and to prevent the inconveniences that follow from them, I imagine the obfervation of these following rules may be of ufe, til! fomebody better able fhall judge it worth his while to think more maturely on this matter, and oblige the world with his thoughts on it.

First, A man fhould take care to use no word without a fignification, no name without an idea for which he makes it ftand. This rule will not feem altogether needless to any one who fhall take the pains to recollect how often he has met with fuch words, as inftinet, fympathy, and antipathy, &c. in the difcourfe of others, fo made use of, as he might eafily conclude, that those that used them had no ideas in their minds to which they applied them, but fpoke them only as founds, which ufually ferved inftead of reafons on the like occafions. Not but that these words, and the like, have very proper fignifications in which they may be used; but there being no natural connection between any words and any ideas, these, and any other, may be learned by rote, and pronounced or writ by men who have no ideas in their minds to which they have annexed them, and for which they make them ftand; which is neceffary they fhould, if men would. fpeak intelligibly even to themfelves alone.

§ 9. 2. To have diftinct Ideas annexed to them in Modes.

SECONDLY, It is not enough a man ufes his words as figns of fome ideas; thofe ideas he annexes them to, if they be Limple, mult be clear and diftin&t; if complex must be de L6

terminate, i. e. the precife collection of fimple ideas fettled in the mind with that found annexed to it, as the fign of that precife determined collection, and no other. This is very neceffary in names of modes, and especially moral words, which having no fettled objects in nature from whence their ideas are taken, as from their original, are apt to be very confuled. Justice is a word in every man's mouth, but most commonly with a very undetermined loofe fignification; which will always be fo, unlefs a man has in his mind a distinct comprehenfion of the component parts that a complex idea confifts of; and if it be decompounded, must be able to refolve it still on, till he at last comes to the fimple ideas that make it up; and unless this be done, a man makes an ill use of the word, let it be juftice, for example, or any other. I do not fay, a man needs ftand to recollect and make this analyfis at large, every time the word juftice comes in his way; but this at least is neceflary, that he have fo examined the fignification of that name, and fettled the idea of all its parts in his mind, that he can do it when he pleafes. If one who makes his complex idea of justice to be fuch a treatment of the perfon or goods of another as is according to law, hath not a clear and diftinct idea what law is, which makes a part of his complex idea of juftice, it is plain his idea of juftice itfelf will be confufed and imperfect. This exactnefs will perhaps be judged very troublefome, and therefore most men will think they may be excufed from fettling the complex ideas of mixed modes fo precifely in their minds;. but yet I muft fay, till this be done, it must not be wondered that they have a great deal of obfcurity and confufon in their own minds, and a great deal of wrangling. in their difcourfes with others.

10. And conformable in Subftances.

IN the names of fubflances, for a right ufe of thein, fomething more is required than barely determined ideas. In thefe the names must also be conformable to things, as they exift; but of this I fhall have occafion to speak more at large by and by. This exactnefs is abfolutely neceffary in inquiries after philofophical knowledge, and in con

troverfies about truth; and though it would be well too, if it extended itself to common converfation, and the ordinary affairs of life, yet I think that is fcarce to be expected. Vulgar notions fuit vulgar difcourfes; and both, though confufed enough, yet ferve pretty wel the market and the wake. Merchants and lovers, cooks and tailors, have words wherewithal to difpatch their ordinary affairs; and fo, I think, might philofophers and difputants too, if they had a mind to understand, and to be clearly understood.

11. 3. Propriety.

THIRDLY, It is not enough that men have ideas, determined ideas, for which they make thefe figns ftand; but they must alfo take care to apply their words, as near as may be, to fuch ideas as common ufe has annexed them to. For words, efpecially of languages already framed, being no man's private poffeffion, but the common meafure of commerce and communication, it is not for any one at pleasure to change the ftamp they are current in, nor alter the ideas they are affixed to; or at least, when there is a neceflity to do fo, he is bound to give notice of it. Mens intentions in fpeaking are, or at least should be, to be understood, which cannot be without frequent explanations, demands, and other the like incommodious interruptions, where men do not follow common ufe. Propriety of fpeech is that which gives our thoughts entrance into other mens minds with the greatest eafe and advantage, and therefore deferves fome part of our care and study, especially in the names of moral words. The proper fignification and ufe of terms is best to be learned from thofe, who in their writings and difcourfes appear to have had the clearest notions, and applied to them their terms with the exacteft choice and fitnefs. This way of ufing a man's words according to the propriety of the language, though it have not always the good fortune to be understood, yet most commonly leaves the blame of it on him, who is fo unskilful in the language he speaks, as not to understand it, when made ufe of as it ought to be,