was compelled to suffer his advance to fall back upon the main lines. The massed rebel troops charged in heavy columns upon Harrow's division, exposed to a heavy artillery fire. Through that they came on in gallant style, up the hill to our very works, only to meet and break before a fire our troops had withheld until they had point blank range. Again they returned and were again repulsed. They next tried Osterhaus, and were again repulsed. It was thought they were contented, but not so. Many have heard of "General Sweeney," formerly Colonel of the 52d Illinois, subsequently of Fenian notoriety. He lost his right arm in Mexico. He was in command of a division of the 16th Army Corps, and was next to receive the shock of the rebel charge. He had met it before, when his desperate resistance at Stone River went far to save the day from ruin, and whose companions had given him the expressive designation of "Bull-dog Sweeney." Sweeney met the twice repulsed columns and beat them back in broken disordered masses. For twelve days had these battle-skirmishes gone on, and that with almost uniform success to us. Again the order was given to McPherson to close up on Thomas, occupying Thomas' position. before New Hope. Thomas and Schofield moved a corresponding distance to their left, and swung round occupying the woods leading to Allatoona and Ackworth. Stoneman's cavalry advanced into Allatoona at the east and General Garrard's at the west end of the pass. The infantry closed up, Allatoona pass was turned, Sherman's second stage was reached in success, and another long stride taken toward the end. He ordered rebuilt the Etowah railway bridge, and decided to leave Johnston in his strongly entrenched position at New Hope, and move upon the railway at Ackworth, when Johnston gave up his position and fell back to Lost Mountain. Our army moved to Ackworth, reaching the railway on the 6th. On the 7th the confederate right extended past the railway and over the Ackworth and Marietta road. Allatoona Pass, the commanding General found admirably adapted as a secondary base, and put it in order as such, providing for its defense. At Ackworth General Blair came up with two divisions of the 17th Army Corps and one brigade of cavalry for Garrard's division, these bringing the invading column up to about its original strength. PROSPECT BIG SHANTY SHERMAN'S DESCRIPTION OF SCENERY-HIS FORCES—OPERA- ING AN ECLECTIC DETACHMENT-ONE HUNDREDTH-EIGHTY-EIGHTH-SEVENTY-FOURTH THER Sherman says in his report, HERE was sharp work ahead. On the 9th of June, our communications in the rear being secure and supplies ample, we moved forward to Big Shanty." Before him was an army, inferior to his own in numbers, but in positions assumed in the Switzerland of the Southwest, among mountains of rugged grandeur, streams of rapid volume and dense vinetangled woodland, with the ablest Southern captain save Lee at its head, assisted by Polk, Hardee, Cleburn the Western Stonewall Jackson, Forrest the cavalry brigand, Hood the daring, dashing leader, soon to be in command, Wheeler and others. The eye of General Sherman took in the grandeur and the difficulty of the situation. He says: "Kenesaw, the bold and striking twin mountain, lay before us, with a high range of chestnut hills, trending off to the Northeast, terminating, to our view, in another peak, called Brushy Mountain. To our right was the smaller hill called Pine Mountain, and beyond it, in the distance, Lost Mountain. All these, though links in a continuous chain, present a sharp, conical appearance, prominent in the vast landscape that presents itself from any of the hills that abound in that region. Kenegaw, Pine Mountain and Lost Mountain form a triangle, Pine Mountain the apex, and Kenesaw and Lost Mountain the base, covering perfectly the town of Marietta and the railroad back to the Chattahoochee. On each side of these peaks the enemy had his signal stations. The summits were covered with batteries; the spurs were alive with men, busy in felling trees, digging pits and preparing for the grand struggle impending. "The scene was enchanting, too beautiful to be disturbed by the harsh clamors of war, but the Chattahoochee lay beyond, and I had to reach it." He thus states the disposition of his forces: "On approaching close to the enemy, I found him occupying a line full two miles long, more than he could hold with his force. General McPherson was ordered to move toward Marietta, his right on the railroad, General Thomas on Kenesaw and Pine Mountain, and General Schofield off toward Lost Mountain; General Garrard's cavalry on the left, General Stoneman's on the right, and General McCook looking to our rear and communications." By the 11th of June the Federal forces were up, and Sherman commenced operations with a view to break the rebel line between Kenesaw and Pine Mountains. McPherson commanded the railroad line between Allatoona and Kenesaw. Hooker was on the right, General Howard on the left and front of the enemy, and General Palmer between it and the railroad. The 13th and 14th were rainy days, rendering anything more than artillery practice impossible. On the morning of the 14th the 4th Corps moved forward in the center, closing up well on Hooker. A correspondent of the New York Herald thus details an important incident occurring on the 14th: "Skirmishers were thrown out in order to cover the advance of our lines, and a few sections of artillery were placed in position. The skirmishing was pretty brisk toward evening, and the batteries opened a dropping fire on the rebel position. Sherman rode up to a battery and turned his glass toward Pine Mountain. “After taking a good view he turned to the officer in command, saying 'Captain Simonson, can you send a shell right on the top of that knob? I notice a battery there and several General officers near it.' "I'll try, General.' "The Captain fired, and the General looked on with his glass. "Ah, Captain, a little too high; try again with a shorter fuse;" and up went the glass to his eye. Away went the shell, tearing through Bishop Polk in its course. "That will do' said Sherman, shutting down his glass. "It is said that Johnston and Hardee were on their horses beside Polk when he fell, and when the first shell came they said 'it is safer to alight.' Polk smiled and still staid surveying our position, and thus met his death. We knew that night that he was killed, for our signal officers had discovered the system of rebel signals, which enabled them to read the dispatches along the enemy's lines.' Lovell succeeded him in command. 99 On the 15th Pine Mountain was found to be abandoned. Thomas and Schofield advanced to find him entrenched strongly along the line of rugged hills between Kenesaw and Lost Mountain. During the operations of the 15th and 16th, Sherman desired to ascertain the strength of some rebel batteries, known to be posted on their right flank commanding the Marietta road, and suspected to be of great strength, but no amount of shelling or sharpshooting would induce them to uncover. The General ordered out a locomotive, had steam raised to full head, attached three cars and ordered it started full speed toward Marietta. With a scream it plunged away, screaming and snorting as though bound for Atlanta with the latest news. The enemy started-they supposed it a desperate attempt to run a body of men past them into Marietta to assail their rear, and instantly their batteries were ablaze, right and left, throwing shot and shell. Sherman smiled grimly, and walked away-he had drawn the fire and ascertained the rebel strength, and it was clear an assault could not be made. The weather was tempestuous, but our forces pressed onward slowly but surely. On the 17th the enemy abandoned Lost Mountain with the long line of admirable breast-works connecting it with Kenesaw Mountain. Still the pressure on the rebel line continued. We quote again from Sherman's report: "We continued to press at all points, skirmishing in dense forests of timber and across most difficult ravines, until we found him again strongly posted and entrenched, with Kenesaw as his salient, his right wing thrown back to cover Marietta, and his left behind Nose's Creek, covering his railroad back to the Chattahoochee. This enabled him to contract his lines and strengthen them accordingly. "From Kenesaw he could look down upon our camps and observe every move ment, and his batteries thundered away, but did us little harm, on account of the extreme hight, the shot and shell passing harmlessly over our heads as we lay close up against his mountain town. During our operations about Kenesaw, the weather was villainously bad, and the rain fell almost continuously for three weeks, rendering our narrow wooded roads mere mud galleys, so that a general movement would have been impossible, but our men daily worked closer and closer to their entrenched foe, and kept up an incessant picket firing galling to him. Every opportunity was taken to advance our general lines closer and closer to the enemy. "General McPherson watching the enemy on Kenesaw and working his left forward, General Thomas, swinging, as it were on a grand left wheel, his left on Kenesaw connecting with General McPherson, and General Schofield all the time working to the south and east along the old Sandtown road. On the 22d General Hooker had advanced his line, with General Schofield on his right, the enemy, Hood's corps, with detachments from the others, suddenly sallied and attacked. The blow fell mostly on General William's division of General Hooker's corps, and a brigade of General Hascall's division of General Schofield's army. “The ground was comparatively open, and although the enemy drove in the skirmish lines, an advanced regiment of General Schofield, sent out purposely to hold him in check until some preparations could be completed for his reception, yet when he reached our line of battle he received a terrible repulse, leaving his dead, wounded, and many prisoners in our hands. This is known as the affair of the Kulp House.' Although inviting the enemy at all times to commit such mistakes, I could not hope for him to repeat them after the examples of Dallas and the 'Kulp House,' and upon studying the ground, I had no alternative in my turn but to assault his lines or turn his position. Either course had its difficulties and dangers. And I perceived that the enemy and our own officers had settled down into a conviction that I would not assault fortified lines." The severest criticism which assailed the course of General Sherman at any point between Chattanooga to Raleigh has concentrated upon the Kenesaw assault. It was a failure, frankly so conceded, yet had it been a success, it had been lauded, as was the assault on Mission Ridge. If it had succeeded the results would have been ample repayment. It cost immensely in life, and added to the countless bereavements already sustained. It is better that the gallant leader shall say to the people, to the fathers, mothers, sisters and wives of those who fell what he has said to the Government. His official report says: "All looked to me to outflank.' An army to be efficient must not settle down to one mode of offense, but must be prepared to execute any plan which promises success. I waited, therefore, for the moral effect, to make a successful assault against the enemy behind his breastworks, and resolved to attempt it at that point where success would give the largest fruits of victory. The general point selected |