ing already crossed the Rappahannock, was advancing towards the Rapidan, a bridge of boats was established by force at the same point where, on the 13th of December preceding, Franklin had passed the river, and the Sixth Corps (Sedgwick), after having driven back the enemy's sharpshooters, advanced into the plain below Fredericksburg. A little further down, the First Corps (Reynolds) did the same thing, and, finally, the Third Corps (Sickles) took position in reserve, ready to cross over in its turn if necessary. This was the force designed to hold the enemy in his intrenchments by the menace of an immediate attack, or to pursue him, if, discovering the danger which threatened him, he should abandon his position.

During that day the demonstration succeeded to our best wishes. The enemy appeared only to prepare his defence on the side where it was not intended to attack him.

The next day, the 30th, the Confederates not stirring, Hooker called the Third Corps to Chancellorsville. We started immediately, making a forced march in order to arrive in time for the decisive attack. That night we made our fires at a short distance from the bridge across which the Second Corps had marched in the morning.

So there, on the 30th, at night, the Confederates, still motionless in their positions in rear of Fredericksburg, prepared for an attack on their right, indicated by the movements of the two corps of Sedgwick and Reynolds, while in rear of their left four other corps were already united, and about to be joined by a fifth. On one side, Sedgwick, with forty thousand men, including Gibbon's division of the Second Corps, which, having its camp in full view of the enemy, had not yet moved; on the other, Hooker, with about seventy thou

sand men in a position which seemed an assurance, in advance, of a victory. "Now," said he, in an order of the day to the army, "the enemy must flee shamefully or come out of his defences to accept a battle on our ground, where he is doomed to certain destruction!" And every one repeated, "He is in our power!" Nobody doubted that, before two days, all our past reverses would be effaced by the annihilation of Lee's army.

CHAPTER XXI.

CHANCELLORSVILLE.

First encounter with the enemy - Capital fault — Defensive position of the army - Advance position of the Third Corps - Engagement of Birney's division -Jackson's attack on the right — Rout of the Eleventh Corps - Counter charge of Berry's division - Death of Major Keenan — Artillery saved by General Pleasonton - Night encounter — Episodes - Death of Stonewall Jackson - Renewal of the battle — Accident to General Hooker - Remarks on the position Bayonet charge - Movement backward - Sedgwick carries Fredericksburg Heights Combat at Salem - The Sixth Corps at Banks Ford General retreat.

WHAT Hooker called "our ground" to give battle on was about half-way from Chancellorsville to Fredericksburg, outside of that region covered with almost impenetrable woods, where we were at that time. On that side the country was open and favorable for the manoeuvring of an army. It was then important to get there at the earliest possible moment. Two broad roads led to it, coming together near a church called Tabernacle, while a third road, running near the river, led to Banks Ford. By these three roads, Hooker renewed his movement in advance, on Friday morning, May 1. Slocum, with the Twelfth Corps, held the right by the plank road; Sykes, with a division of the Fifth Corps, supported by Hancock's division of the Second Corps, advanced in the centre, along the principal road, called the Macadamized road (although it was not); and Meade led the column composed of Humphreys' and Griffin's divisions along the road near the river. The three other corps, the Second, the Third, and the Eleventh, were to follow the movement, so as to come

into line of battle outside of the forest, at two o'clock in the afternoon.

But before Hooker had left Chancellorsville Lee had started to meet him. Informed, the evening before, of the true state of affairs, he had collected his forces in all haste, and, leaving behind him only Early's division reenforced by one brigade, he had hurried forward all the rest at midnight, in the direction of Chancellorsville. Between ten and eleven o'clock in the morning, his advance guard encountered our cavalry skirmishers, and forced them back. But behind them Sykes had already deployed his division. He charged the enemy resolutely, drove them back in his turn, and established himself in the position which had been assigned to him by his instructions.

Everything went well with us. On the right, Slocum had encountered no opposition; on the left, Meade had arrived in full view of Banks Ford, without the least obstacle. He had only to form promptly in order of battle. The corps in the rear would have had time to get into line while the enemy made his disposition on his side, on the ground where General Hooker had "devoted him to certain destruction."

Well, as if Heaven wished to take up that arrogant defiance to adverse fortune, it was at this time and at this very place that General Hooker virtually lost the battle of Chancellorsville by an error as unexpected as inexplicable.

Instead of supporting Sykes' division strongly, and pushing his forces forward, he hurriedly sent the order to the three columns to return to the positions they had occupied the night before. Amongst the generals who were in position to judge for themselves, I know not one who considered the measure otherwise than deplorable. Couch, before withdrawing Hancock's division,

sent to pray the general-in-chief to countermand the order; Warren, who commanded the corps of topographical engineers, and who was in the advance, hurried himself to headquarters with the same errand. Nothing availed. The decision was maintained. The columns fell back uneasy, astonished above all that the first order given by Hooker as general in command in front of the enemy was to retreat without fighting. That did not at all resemble Hooker commanding a division.

The position which we voluntarily abandoned to the enemy was excellent; the position which we took in place of it was detestable. In the first, we could deploy and fight, well connected together on a crest of ground running in the direction of our lines; in the second, we were as if penned up in the midst of natural obstacles, on low and flat ground, which neutralized any advantage in numbers by the difficulty of movement. In the first, we barred to the enemy the only three routes by which he could penetrate into the Wilderness; in the second position, we gave up to him the plank road, and it will soon be seen what use he made of it against us. Finally, in the first case we preserved all the material and moral advantage of the offensive; in the second, we subjected ourselves to all the disadvantage of a defensive accepted without necessity, as it was without preparation.

The enemy took possession immediately of the position which we so benevolently abandoned to him. He planted his guns there, and followed our retreating troops closely. The afternoon was passed on his side in feeling of our lines at several points by direct demonstrations; on our side, by protecting ourselves by abatis, by regulating the position of the different corps, and awaiting events.

Towards four o'clock, the Third Corps, which had