be passed by the Legislature, and when such a law is passed it is apt to be promptly repealed, if enforced. In fact, a law clearly within the scope of legislative power, and with fair reasons in its favor, is quite sure to be repealed by the Legislature if it is unpopular only.

We had an example of this some thirty odd years ago, when the law taxing dogs was passed. The next Legislature was prompt. The repealing act appears on page 8 of the proceedings of that session. My sympathies were with the man who wanted his dogs, and wanted to be allowed to keep them without being made to feel that they were a burden to him.

Third, our mixed population. This is a reason peculiar to the South to be sure; but it strengthens the objections to the Initiative and Referendum. Arkansas can be just to all classes within her borders, without empowering them by direct vote to make and unmake her laws.

And still another reason: The people at large are quite as unsafe as any legislative body. This is proven by the manner in which towns, cities and counties, prior to 1861, in the middle Western States bankrupted themselves for the time by voting aid to the railroads. After the termination of the Civil War promoters began the exploiting of the South in the same manner. The people of Arkansas were protected against subsequently burdening themselves in this way by the statesmen who framed the Constitution of 1874-a body of delegates.

I have not felt any special interest in calling attention to the text of the amendment proposed, by which the Initiative and Referendum may become a part of the Constitution. The principle itself and its want of adaptabilitly to Arkansas were the things I felt like discussing. The particular language of the proposed amendment may, however, have some attention given it. I find a portion of it reads as follows: "The people of each municipality, each county, and of the State, reserve to themselves power to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, and also," etc.

It looks like this provision might lead to the greatest confusion. It seems to be quite broad enough to authorize a municipality, or a county, to propose a general law which should have effect all over the State, if anywhere, and it further seems that the adoption of the measure might be had in one county, or one

municipality, and not in the next. It would be an unfortunate condition of things to have the State with different regulations in different localities upon a subject which should be of uniform. application if worthy of existing at all. As the proposed amendment is written it also looks like it would be possible for a measure to be carried in a municipality and fail in the county. The portion of the amendment above quoted might be construed to have application only to local measures, but it does not read. that way, and the fact that it includes "amendments to the Constitution," seemingly, would forbid that construction.

The desire of the people of a municipality or county to have a certain rule of action prevail with them does not make it a local question. For example, if a county preferred a certain rule of action as to larceny it could hardly be said that the larceny was thereby made a local question.

8

This proposed amendment provides that a petition signed by per cent of the legal voters shall be sufficient to propose a measure; and that a petition signed by 5 per cent of the legal voters shall be sufficient to cause a legislative act to be referred to the

voters.

When one remembers the facility with which petitions are signed, it looks like the per cent required in each of these instances is altogether too low. A law passed by the Legislature, and every way meritorious, could, under this provision, be suspended by a petition signed by 5 per cent of the voters. Interests affected by such a law could very easily secure the signatures necessary to suspend its operation.

The tendency toward the use of the Initiative and Referendum, and toward the nomination of all officers by direct vote, including United States Senators and judges, is supposed to be attributable to a loss of confidence by the people in their delegates and representatives. This is no doubt true, but none the less it is a mistake, and an overlooking of the fact that somebody must be trusted. As a matter of fact, a large percentage of the voters who are disinclined to trust a delegate allow themselves to be led by the self-appointed, but not disinterested, leaders of a faction.

For Arkansas, and possibly for other States, it is now about to be realized that the primary plan for making nominations for political offices eliminates all men of moderate means. Unless

the candidate has money in considerable sums, or can have it raised for him, it is useless for him to offer for a State office. This of itself should be enough to condemn the plan. But a still greater reason why the plan should be abandoned is that it inevitably leads to a lower level of discussion, personalities and vituperation. There is no way to estimate the evils that result. The unavoidable effect, all over the State, is to lessen the dignity and prestige which should attend high official place; and it seems that it cannot be otherwise than true that candidates who have indulged in that course suffer some impairment of their self-respect.

There are some indications that high tide has already been reached in this matter of settling things by direct vote. The limited power of the voter in the commission form of city government is, apparently, the beginning of a return to safer methods, and within the last 20 days Alabama has decided no longer to nominate judges through the primary plan. The announcement also included an intimation that the convention plan might be returned to for all State offices.

If a factional majority should, through the Initiative and Referendum, control the legislative department, and through primary elections, control the executive department, it is quite clear that in name only would separate departments of government exist. Under such a state of affairs minorities would get such protection, ordinarily, as the majority was willing to accord, and no more. At any rate, this would be true of political questions over which courts would have no jurisdiction. As to matters of life, liberty and property, members of the minority could still appeal to the courts and have protection. The courts we have as a last resort. They are the safeguard of all our institutions -regardless of the manner of the selection of the members. The chief cause of their worth and eminence lies, however, in the fact that the judges were lawyers first.

ASSIGNMENTS OF FUTURE WAGES AS AGAINST

PUBLIC POLICY.

BY HARRY M. TRIEBER, LITTLE ROCK, ARK.

I wish to use the fifteen minutes allotted to me in advancing an act of the Legislature that I believe is demanded by public policy. I propose an act making void assignments of wages to be earned in the future. There is no decision of our Supreme Court declaring that such assignments are valid in the absence of a statute to the contrary, but other jurisdictions have almost uniformly so held, and it is generally considered in this State that assignments of future wages are valid. In all probability our Supreme Court would follow the settled law on the subject should the point be brought before the court for decision. Unfortunately the law became crystalized at a time when it was not clearly realized that society is under an obligation to protect its members even from themselves. At that time the right to contract was considered almost sacred. Today it is recognized that the right to contract is not absolute in respect to every matter, but may be subject to and give way before the restraints demanded by the safety and welfare of the State. Some of the early cases that leaned so far to protect "the freedom of the individual" read today like grim irony. The public intelligence and recognition of the duties owed the State have undoubtedly quickened. It is too late, however, to hope for the law as to assignments of future wages to be changed by decision of the courts, and we must now look to the Legislature. The judicial attitude is that it is the legislative, and not the judicial, power of the State that must control and give shape to its public policy. That power does not pertain to the courts. They can only observe that policy and apply it to cases as they arise, without changing or obstructing it.

The statute I propose, making void assignments of wages to be earned in the future, would be of benefit to employers as well as employees. At common law there is a well-established exception to the doctrine that assignments of future wages are valid; the assignment of salaries to be earned by public officers has always been declared to be against public policy. The reasoning upon which this exception is based is

that the public service would tend to become less efficient if the public officers could not themselves receive the compensation for their services. In lesser degree this reasoning applies to all laborers as it does to public officers, for an assignment removes the strongest incentive to faithful service-the expectation of pecuniary reward in the near future.

Beneficial as the act would be to employers, it is with especial reference to wage-earners that I urge the act. I have not the statistics of the number of ordinary laborers and employees, but it must be that a large portion of the citizens of this State fall within the classification of wage-earners. A large proportion of the persons who would be affected by the statute are dependent upon their daily or weekly wages for the maintenance of themselves and their families. Delay of payment or loss of wages results in deprivation of the necessities of life, suffering, inability to meet just obligations to others, and, in many cases, may make the wage-earner a charge upon the public. When a man who has no other source of income draws upon his future prospects of wages to supply present needs, the time must inevitably come to him when he has not the means wherewith to live. The bankruptcy or insolvency laws are powerless to assist such a man. The assignment of a laborer's wages is a lien on the same so long as he remains in the employ of the master, and until the indebtedness secured thereby is paid. A discharge of a debtor in bankruptcy or insolvency has but the effect of a personal release, and does not exonerate the effects of the debtor to which a valid lien has attached, and which is not expressly annulled by the provisions of the bankruptcy or insolvency act. The wage-earner brought to the end of his tether, may in one way only destroy the assignment as security by quitting his employment-and new employment is not always to be secured at once by an unskilled laborer.

We must recognize, moreover, that the situation of wageearners renders them peculiarly liable to imposition and injustice at the hands of employers, unscrupulous tradesmen and others, certain lawyers among them, I regret to add, who are willing to take advange of their condition. Where future wages may be assigned, the temptation to anticipate their payment and to sacrifice them for an inadequate consideration is often very great. Such assignments, in many cases, leave the