current coin, might be destroyed by subjecting that of the foreign coin to the different regulations of the different states.

The punishment of counterfeiting the public securities, as well as of the current coin, is submitted of course to that authority, which is to secure the value of both.

The regulation of weights and measures is transferred from the articles of confederation, and is founded on like considerations with the preceding power of regulating coin.

The dissimilarity in the rules of naturalization, has long been remarked as a fault in our system, and as laying a foundation for intricate and delicate questions. In the 4th article of the confederation, it is declared, "that the free inhabitants of each "of these states, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice "excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of "free citizens in the several states, and the people of each state, "shall in every other, enjoy all the privileges of trade and com"merce," &c. There is a confusion of language here, which is remarkable. Why the terms free inhabitants, are used in one part of the article; free citizens in another, and people in another; or what was meant by superadding "to all privileges and "immunities of free citizens,"" all the privileges of trade and "commerce," cannot easily be determined. It seems to be a construction scarcely avoidable, however, that those who come under the denomination of free inhabitants of a state, although not citizens of such state, are entitled, in every other state, to all the privileges of free citizens of the latter: that is, to greater privileges than they may be entitled to in their own state; so that it may be in the power of a particular state, or rather every state, is laid under a necessity, not only to confer the rights of citizenship in other states, upon any whom it may admit to such rights within itself, but upon any whom it may allow to become inhabitants within its jurisdiction. But were an exposition of the term "inhabitants" to be admitted, which would confine the stipulated privileges to citizens alone, the difficulty is diminished only, not removed. The very improper power would still be retained by each state, of naturalizing aliens in every other state. In one state, residence for a short time, confers all the rights of citizenship: in another, qualifications of greater importance are required. An alien, therefore, legally incapacitated for certain rights in the latter, may, by previous residence only in the former, elude his incapacity; and thus the law of one state, be pre

posterously rendered paramount to the law of another, within the jurisdiction of the other.

We owe it to mere casualty, that very serious embarrassments on this subject have been hitherto escaped. By the laws of several states, certain descriptions of aliens, who had rendered themselves obnoxious, were laid under interdicts inconsistent, not only with the rights of citizenship, but with the privileges of residence. What would have been the consequence, if such persons, by residence, or otherwise, had acquired the character of citizens under the laws of another state, and then asserted their rights as such, both to residence and citizenship within the state proscribing them? Whatever the legal consequences might have been, other consequences would probably have resulted of too serious a nature, not to be provided against. The new constitution has accordingly, with great propriety, made provision against them, and all others proceeding from the defect of the confederation on this head, by authorizing the general government to establish an uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States.

The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy, is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties live, or their property may lie, or be removed into different states, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question.

The power of prescribing, by general laws, the manner in which the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of each state, shall be proved, and the effect they shall have in other states, is an evident and valuable improvement on the clause relating to this subject in the articles of confederation. The meaning of the latter is extremely indeterminate; and can be of little importance under any interpretation which it will bear. The power here established, may be rendered a very convenient instrument of justice, and be particularly beneficial on the borders of contiguous states, where the effects liable to justice, may be suddenly and secretly translated in any stage of the process, within a foreign jurisdiction.

The power of establishing post-roads, must, in every view, be a harmless power; and may, perhaps, by judicious management, become productive of great public conveniency. Nothing which tends to facilitate the intercourse between the states, can be deemed unworthy of the public care.

PUBLIUS.

NUMBER XLIII,

BY MR. MADISON.

The same view continued.

THE fourth class comprises the following miscellaneous pow

ers:

1. A power to "promote the progress of science and useful "arts, by securing for a limited time, to authors and inventors, "the exclusive right to their respective writings and discove❝ries."

The utility of this power, will scarcely be questioned. The copy-right of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at common law. The right to useful inventions, seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases, with the claims of individuals. The states cannot separately make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of congress.

2. "To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, "over such district, (not exceeding ten miles square,) as may "by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of congress, "become the seat of the government of the United States; and "to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the con"sent of the legislature of the states, in which the same shall be, "for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards, and "other needful buildings."

The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of government, carries its own evidence with it. It is a power exercised by every legislature of the union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its general supremacy. Without it, not only the public authority might be insulted, and its proceedings be interrupted with impunity, but a dependence of the members of the general government on the state comprehending the seat of the government, for protection in the exercise of their duty, might bring on the national councils an imputation of awe or influence, equally dishonourable to the government, and dissatis

factory to the other members of the confederacy. This consid eration has the more weight, as the gradual accumulation of public improvements at the stationary residence of the government, would be both too great a public pledge to be left in the hands of a single state, and would create so many obstacles to a removal of the government, as still further to abridge its necessary independence. The extent of this federal district, is sufficiently circumscribed, to satisfy every jealousy of an opposite nature. And as it is to be appropriated to this use, with the consent of the state ceding it; as the state will no doubt provide in the compact for the rights and the consent of the citizens inhabiting it; as the inhabitants will find sufficient inducements of interest, to become willing parties to the cession; as they will have had their voice in the election of the government, which is to exercise authority over them; as a municipal legislature for local purposes, derived from their own suffrages, will of course be allowed them; and as the authority of the legislature of the state, and of the inhabitants of the ceded part of it, to concur in the cession, will be derived from the whole people of the state, in their adoption of the constitution, every imaginable objection seems to be obviated.

The necessity of a like authority over forts, magazines, &c. established by the general government, is not less evident. The public money expended on such places, and the public property deposited in them, require, that they should be exempt from the authority of the particular state. Nor would it be proper, for the places on which the security of the entire union may depend, to be in any degree dependent on a particular member of it. All objections and scruples are here also obviated, by requiring the concurrence of the states concerned, in every such establish

ment.

3. "To declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder "of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except "during the life of the person attainted."

As treason may be committed against the United States, the authority of the United States ought to be enabled to punish it; but as new fangled and artificial treasons, have been the great engines by which violent factions, the natural offspring of free governments, have usually wreaked their alternate malignity on each other, the convention have, with great judgment opposed a barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a constitutional definition of the crime, fixing the proof necessary for con

viction of it, and restraining the congress, even in punishing it, from extending the consequence of guilt beyond the person of its author.

4. "To admit new states into the union; but no new state "shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other "state; nor any state be formed by the junction of two or more "states, or parts of states, without the consent of the legislatures "of the states concerned, as well as of the congress."

In the articles of confederation, no provision is found on this important subject. Canada was to be admitted of right, on her joining in the measures of the United States; and the other colonies, by which were evidently meant the other British colonies, at the discretion of nine states. The eventual establishment of new states, seems to have been overlooked by the compilers of that instrument. We have seen the inconvenience of this omission, and the assumption of power into which congress have been led by it. With great propriety, therefore, has the new system supplied the defect. The general precaution, that no new states shall be formed, without the concurrence of the federal authority, and that of the states concerned, is consonant to the principles which ought to govern such transactions. The particular precaution against the erection of new states, by the partition of a state without its consent, quiets the jealousy of the larger states; as that of the smaller is quieted by a like precaution, against a junction of states without their consent.

5. "To dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations, "respecting the territory or other property belonging to the Unit"ed States, with a proviso, that nothing in the constitution "shall be so construed, as to prejudice any claims of the United "States, or of any particular state."

This is a power of very great importance, and required by considerations, similar to those which show the propriety of the former. The proviso annexed, is proper in itself, and was probablp rendered absolutely necessary, by jealousies and questions concerning the western territory, sufficiently known to the public.

6. "To guarantee to every state in the union a republican "form of government; to protect each of them against invasion; "and on application of the legislature, or of the executive 66 (when the legislature cannot be convened,) against domestic "violence."

In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican members, the superintending governinent