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referred, the necessity for orderly, constitutional government in the new Republic. Speaking in the very place in which the revolutionary junta of thirteen months before had been organised, he began his address by congratulating the people upon the facts that that junta did not establish a dictatorship, but opened the way to a constitutional government, elected by the people, and that in electing that government the people chose not soldiers but civilians as its members. "In a republic, and in a peaceful republic," he said, "the army must always be the instrument of the civil power. and you have, therefore, indicated that you do not propose that this community shall be governed by the sword, but by reason and by law."

I know not whether that was meant to be, what to many it seemed, a bold reference to the Huertas episode. I have little doubt that many, if not all, of the Panamans regarded it as such, and there had been rumours earlier in the day that the friends of General Huertas meant to disturb the meeting with a hostile counter-demonstration. What I know is that not a hand nor a voice was raised in hostile demonstration, but the words I have quoted were acclaimed with a universal frenzy of enthusiasm, until the fronds of the towering palms and the gray façade of the old Cathedral seemed to vibrate together with its tumultuous stress. There was a like outburst of applause at the straightforward and manly acknowledgment that a mistake had been madewhich had now been rectified-in the executive order applying the Dingley tariff to the Canal Zone against the rest of the territory of Panama, a mistake for which the speaker did not hesitate to assume responsibility. And, finally, for the third time, "the cheering rose with a mighty swell" to a supreme climax of enthusiasm when the Secretary ended his speech with the vibrant cry of "Viva la Republica de Panama!"

That was the end. The business was done, and even the shouting was over. If it be asked what had been accomplished, the answer is, much. The new agreement was not

a treaty, nor a revision or modification of the Hay-BunauVarilla Treaty, which remained intact. It was an agreement relating to some details of interpretation of the treaty, chiefly concerning customs and postal service, put into effect by an executive order of the American Government. But there was something more important than even that executive order; that was, the impression produced upon the government and people of Panama and the sentiments and relations established between the two countries. I have said Secretary Taft and his party were received with cordiality and with confidence, and that is quite true. It is equally true that before he was commissioned to go thither there were widespread feelings of suspicion of American motives and purposes and a discontent with American relations. Those feelings were doubtless unfounded, or were founded upon misapprehension, misunderstanding, and misrepresentation; the last, I am afraid, too often wilful. Men in the United States, as well as in Panama, for factional, sordid, or other unworthy motives, had maligned the American Government and had represented it as seeking not merely to construct a canal but to plant a colony and to achieve a forcible conquest. Those tales were false, but how were the Panamans to be assured of the truth?

There was only one way, and it was wisely and opportunely adopted by President Roosevelt in sending Secretary Taft upon this mission of explanation and reassurance. The mere announcement of that appointment effected a marked change. The Panamans were quickly convinced that the policy of the United States was one of reason and justice, and not of arrogance and force. This conviction was strengthened by the attitude of the American authorities in the Huertas episode, for, while there were those who wildly declared that the retirement of General Huertas and the disbanding of the Panaman army would be quickly followed by American conquest and annexation, and that the American Government was intriguing to that end, most men of thought and discretion realised the absurdity of such

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views. They saw that if the United States were bent upon the conquest of Panama, General Huertas and his 250 soldiers would be scarcely so much as a straw in the way. More than that, however, they saw that the United States was aiming at the support, and not the suppression, of Panaman independence, and they presently testified, as did President Amador himself, that American intervention, or the promise of it, was not the spoliation but the strengthening, not the destruction but the salvation, of the young Republic.

There were, I remember, some reports extant in the United States that the news of President Roosevelt's reëlection had not produced a favourable impression in Panama. They were entirely untrue. The fact is that the news of the result of the election was received there-not only by Americans but by the Panamans-with enthusiastic and practically universal rejoicing. The American Legation was literally overwhelmed by the multitude who thronged thither to express in person their congratulations and their joy, while the city was given up to music, fireworks, parades, and speechmaking. This was the more significant, coming, as it did, upon the very heels of the Huertas incident. Panamans saw that the Roosevelt administration had saved their republic from revolution and was sending a distinguished mission to assure it of justice. Why should they not exult in the retention of that administration in power? Thus favourably disposed were the Panamans toward Secretary Taft upon his arrival. His every word and act during his stay confirmed them in that disposition. Finally, the terms of the executive order issued by him as the result of the conferences between him and President Amador vindicated their confidence and satisfied their expectations. Before he came and before that order was issued they did not know how the United States would execute the canal treaty. After that, they did know, and they were well pleased. It is not too much to say that 90 per cent. of the intelligent people of Panama were not only satisfied, but profoundly gratified with the result of Secretary Taft's mission.

Thus the differences between the United States and Panama were settled. Will they remain settled? Prophecies are rash. We must remember the temptations and the opportunities of party politics. In the United States we have, in all ages of the Republic, seen men unworthily ready and eager to compromise our foreign relations for the sake of factional advantages in domestic affairs. We cannot expect Panamans to be better in that respect than we. The relations of the Isthmian republic with the United States afford an easy issue of factional dissension, and it is possible that they will be thus used. Time, however, is on our side, and on the side of the existing status. Every month that passes will reveal more clearly to the Panamans the hollowness of their fears and suspicions and the substantial reality of the benefits arising from their connections with the United States. It has been said of some communities that they did not care for and did not appreciate the sanitary and other improvements introduced by American administrators. That must not be said of Panama. The people realised their need of a water-supply, of a sewer system, of better paved and cleaner streets, and of the other works which American administrators have now performed or upon which they are now engaged. They wanted these things. They appreciate them, and their enjoyment of them will confirm their approval of and adherence to the compact under which they have been provided. If to these things we add the consideration and the sympathy which are the due of each nation to and from each other, if we keep it continually clear to the Panaman mind that we are building a canal and not a colony, a highway of commerce and not a wall of exclusion, it will not be difficult to maintain the relations of mutual confidence and mutual benefit which so happily were established.

CHAPTER XV

ISTHMIAN POLITICS

ALTHOUGH auspiciously begun, the career of the Isthmian republic was not destined to be one of unmarred harmony. Within its first year there arose the two serious crises in its affairs which I have already described; one of them an attempt at military revolution and the other a controversy with the United States. There also came a deplorable rise or revival of partisanship and factional animosities in the Republic. At first these were held in abeyance, and were vainly supposed by some to have been extinguished. The stress of the revolution and the fervour of patriotic enthusiasm moved men to sink all party differences, and, as I have said, the composition of the government and the design of the flag indicated a union of hearts and minds. That era of harmony did not long endure, however; nor was it reasonably to be supposed it would. "Cælum, non animum, mutant, qui trans mare currunt." How little do they change their minds, then, who do not even cross the sea and change their scene, but merely pull down one flag and raise another in its place! The people of Panama had for years been subject to the partisan passions which were so marked a feature of Colombian political life. It was simply impossible that they should be intellectually, morally, and spiritually transformed by the act of establishing their independence. A revolution could be effected in a day. Complete conversion of national character would be a matter of years or generations, if, indeed, it were ever effected. Nor should we, the proud, impute to them the fault. Note our own experience. Even in the throes of our Revolution, partisan rivalries and animosities were implacable, savage, and mischievous, and with the return of peace and the complete