We remained at Knoxville but a few days, and after taking such measures as were necessary for the safety of that region Grant set out on horseback with his staff and orderlies by the way of Strawberry Plains, Cumberland Gap, Barbersville, and Loudon to Lexington, Kentucky, where we arrived on the 10th of January, 1864. The General and his party received every mark of respect from the loyal people of that region. At Lexington he had his first popular ovation, where Leslie Coombs made every effort to induce him to make a speech, but the General persistently declined to say a single word. The controversy was finally settled by his mounting a chair and showing himself to the crowd. He was, however, deeply gratified at the good feeling of the people and especially at the favor extended to him by the ladies of the city, and at the evidences of the many loyal families of that beautiful region.

At Lexington we took train for Louisville and Nashville, where the next day we established headquarters for the winter.

XII

TEN WEEKS IN THE WAR DEPARTMENT AS CHIEF OF CAVALRY BUREAU

Grant, Lieutenant General-Rawlins married-Chief-ofstaff-Report to Secretary of War for duty-Prepare new regulations-Horse contractors-Duties of new position-Andrew Johnson's cavalry regimentsParting with Secretary Stanton.

Grant's headquarters were now concentrated in an eligibly situated, pleasant, and capacious house at Nashville, and all his officers settled down for a comfortable winter, as was then the custom. The armies under his command remained separate and distinct, and this minimized the work of the various departments and left the higher staff officers comparatively free to consider and discuss plans for the future. The first thing in hand was to testify to Rawlins' new wife the high regard in which his brother officers held him. This was done by a purse of $250, which was invested in spoons, forks, cream jug, sugar bowl, and napkin rings for Mrs. Rawlins as a wedding present. This little diversion ended, we turned our thought more earnestly than ever to the future campaign as though the sole responsibility was on us. Every conceivable movement from the Military Division of the Mississippi was con

sidered. All the important cities, strongholds, depots, manufacturing centers, lines of communication, and military bases, together with such information as could be got, were passed in review night after night, not only between ourselves, but with General Grant. The weight of opinion seemed to favor a general advance from Chattanooga against Atlanta and this was finally settled upon as promising the greatest advantage to the Union cause. Grant, having become the center of all eyes and the hero of the public as the only successful general so far produced by the war, was advanced March 2, 1864, to the rank of lieutenant general and put in command of all our armies, and this in turn necessarily produced a corresponding change in the work of the staff.

I had served sixteen months with him through two great campaigns, and during most of the time had been the only regular officer in daily contact with him. As I have frankly said elsewhere, I joined him with some lack of faith in both his habits and his character, but my opinion of his real worth grew constantly more favorable. I found him modest and unpretentious, but with an even temper and exceedingly sound judgment. He was not then and never became what regular officers regarded as a first-class technical or theoretical soldier. He dealt with large things in a large way, and left details of every sort as far as possible to those below him. He had great faith in both Sherman and McPherson and, therefore, habitually left them absolutely free to manage such movements as he directed them to make in their own way. He had no great confidence in the average political general, but here

and there men from civil life like Logan, Crocker, John E. Smith, Morgan L. Smith, and Gresham won his entire confidence. He looked upon Logan as a brave, ambitious, and competent officer, but regarded him as a habitual grumbler who claimed to be doing all the work and getting less than half the praise to which he was justly entitled. Both Sherman and McPherson were credited by the country at large and especially by the professors at West Point with supplying him with brains. Many thought that they formulated as well as executed his plans, but to those of us on the inside this claim was not only baseless but absurd. Sherman was a talented, talkative man, widely read in military science and military history, and had brilliant views on all subjects, but his critical mind was destructive rather than constructive. He had opposed the great turning movement of the Vicksburg campaign, but had cooperated loyally to make it a success. He had won Grant's confidence and support by giving him sympathy and encouragement in the Corinth campaign. They both had the highest respect for C. F. Smith, who was commandant while they were cadets at West Point, and they never quite got over the sense of awe which they felt in his presence when they were boys and he the ideal soldier of the regular army. Sherman expressed only the popular opinion when he declared that neither he nor Grant would have ever been heard of but for the untimely death of that admirable officer. This may not have been altogether true, for Grant at least outranked them both from the start and in the exercise of his functions had the constant aid of a very strong adlatus and adjutant. I refer of course to Rawlins,

who showed himself from the first to be a vigorous, virile, aggressive character who commanded attention wherever he appeared. As we have seen, he had no technical military knowledge whatever, but his intimate relations with Grant from the time he joined the staff put him at the very center of influence and responsibility, and in the emergencies of Grant's military life gave him not only the last word, but in more than one instance the controlling one. Withal his place was difficult to fill. Conscious of his own shortcomings as a military expert, he necessarily fell back upon common sense and the simple obligations of daily life as the best guides in counseling his chief. He was the one man who never feared to offer his opinions or to advocate them with all his might, whether they were sought for or not. He asserted from the first conversation he ever had with me that Grant was "a good man," and that we could "win with him if we could stay him from falling". Certain it is that he was never rebuffed and that the leading officers found in him a safe and direct channel through which they could always reach their common chief with the most delicate suggestion after it had received Rawlins' consideration and approval. He was as far from being a sycophant or a time-server as any man I ever knew, but, eliminating and effacing himself and his personal interests absolutely, he never failed to speak out with fearlessness and independence when he thought the interests of his chief or of the country required it. In this he was habitually respectful, but, as has been shown, there were occasions when he did not hesitate to express his most "intense vehemence on the subject matter" in tone and