and general knowledge of organizations and the different arms; and in our armies there should be special inspectors of cavalry and artillery-all empowered, as officers of the staff, to correct all disarrangements, as a well-digested system of regulations should prescribe. There is no department of the military service by which a more salutary influence could be produced than by the inspector general's, thoroughly reorganized and set to work.

Fourth: The Quartermaster's Department is sadly in need of internal regulation. Meigs is a very able man, but lacks practical experience.

Fifth The Commissary Department approaches nearer to efficiency than any I know.

Sixth: The strength of the Engineer Department is simply frittered away by the double organization, and the dead-heads upon both. With more talent than any other corps in the service, it has less influence. Neither branch of it is used as it should be; not one-half the work of which they are capable is exacted, and, finally, they are not strong enough by half in officers, nor a tenth part in engineer soldiers.

Seventh: The Ordnance is a little better off, but is also paralyzed. It should have more vigor, more officers, more men, and more facilities for manufacturing munitions of

war.

Eighth A well-regulated Staff is the soul of military organization. With these improvements, the line would at once be elevated greatly, both in spirit and efficiency, but by a judicious system of examinations and reward for meritorious conduct in officers and privates, many worthless men would be turned out of service and many useful ones inspired with new vigor and ardor.

Ninth: During the English revolution in the time of the Charles', for the first two years, Parliament scattered money with a lavish hand-everything was bought in the army-patriotism, valor, public spirit-all had their price. As a consequence, the Cavaliers, under Prince Rupert, and

the dashing courtiers conquered in every battle. It was not till Cromwell and Hampden arose, with their organized regiments, that the principles of the revolution began to make head against the fiery valor of the Cavaliers. The army was reorganized. The "Ironsides" and the New Model Army became renowned in the world's history for manly and invincible courage; they always conquered. The analogy between then and now, in principles and facts, is too striking for me to trace it further. Must we not profit by history? Is not the lesson plain? Organize and concentrate. Organize by building upon the old basis, rather than attempting to lay the foundations anew. Fill up the old regiments; weed out inefficient officers, fill the vacancies by meritorious officers and non-commissioned officers-adopt a system. Let the anomaly of two distinct armies be destroyed; let us return to the traditions of the Government with reference to our standing army. Let it be expanded by merging the entire volunteer army with it. Give each regiment a portion of the National Army in name as well as in fact. Regulate the promotions so as to get a homogeneous, united, spirited army. As for the details of what I propose I will not go into them, but simply say that a far better arrangement than that of adding a simple new regiment to the volunteer army would be to expand as many as necessary to two or three battalions. In this way the new levy of 300,000 men of July last could be thoroughly incorporated with the present forces in a few weeks.

Tenth: With a remark in reference to a system of reserves, I will close. Should the army be reorganized as I suggest, the drafts would then be made for the general service and could be kept at general depots for instruction, till needed to fill up the vacancies; thus vacancies could be filled promptly in those regiments which required it most. Under the present system some of the regiments which have been kept out of harm's way are overflowing with men, because recruiting happens to be brisk in the

states from which they come; while other regiments which have been decimated by disease and battle are rendered almost useless because recruiting happens to be slow in their states, or because new regiments are organized rather than old ones filled up.

The prominent ideas of this plan are: First, a wellregulated Staff; second, a well-organized homogeneous army, to be formed by a union of the volunteer and regular armies, on a proper and equitable basis, and, third, a proper and efficient system of reserves and recruitingall so combined as to stimulate merit, zeal, courage, and a national spirit of devotion and constancy.

It is only by some such system that we can possibly continue the war to a successful issue. It is absolutely necessary, in point of economy as well as of military efficiency.

New life,

These can

We have

The war has been conducted too far already upon the principle of main-strength and awkwardness. new vigor and unity must be infused into it. only be secured by organization and discipline. the old question among military men to decide, which is most to be depended upon-enthusiasm or discipline? Without undertaking to say which of these virtues is best, I will simply remark: the rebels are certainly superior to us in the former, equal to us in the latter, and far ahead of us in unity of action and purpose. To conquer them, then, it is clear we must have something beside simple superiority of numbers and material; and have them, too, elsewhere than at home, or in the depots, arsenals and storehouses. The military and true principle is that numbers, discipline and material avail nothing except when arrayed upon the vital point at the vital moment.

These truths will be recognized yet, before this war is terminated. The rebels understand them now.

It may be here observed that while the Union cause signally triumphed in the end without a reor

ganization of the Union army on a national basis or a prompt and effective enforcement of the conscription, it is none the less true that some such reorganization as that recommended by me would have promptly put it on a far more effective and economical basis than it ever reached. This, as well as the extravagant wastefulness of our system is conclusively shown by General Upton in his admirable work on "The Military Policy of the United States," published at the Government Printing Office, Washington, 1904.

IX

SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN TO CENTRAL ALABAMA

Headquarters in Vicksburg-Rawlins and Grant-Grant visits New Orleans-Season of rest-Inspection tour -Army wastes summer-Grant and staff ordered to Chattanooga-Military Division of the Mississippi.

Immediately after the surrender of Vicksburg, Sherman, reinforced by McPherson, was sent to drive Johnston out of Mississippi, but the weather was extremely hot, the roads dusty, water scarce, and foraging poor. Consequently his columns, after reoccupying Jackson, went but a few miles beyond that place and there gave up the pursuit. Instead of following Johnston and pushing into central Alabama, as had been expected, he halted on the excuse that no water could be found in eastern Mississippi, and without even arranging to hold Jackson as an advanced post and rallying place for the Union sentiment of the state he left everything to the enemy and within three weeks was again in his old camp on the Big Black.

I had predicted this conclusion of the campaign to Rawlins and Grant. I contended that Sherman ought to be able to go where Johnston went. I urged that the time and conditions were favorable