Waterland.... [4] Is not God conscious to all my thoughts, though I am not conscious of God's? Would Sherlock endure that I should infer: Ergo, God is numerically one with me, though I am not numerically one with God?... [5] Surely, never did argument vertiginate more. I had just acceded to Sherlock's exposition of the Trinity as the Supreme Being, his reflex act of self-consciousness and his love all forming one Supreme Mind; and now he tells me that each is the whole Supreme Mind, and denies that three, each per 9 the whole God, are not the same as three Gods! I grant that division and separation are terms inapplicable; yet surely three distinct though undivided Gods are three Gods. That the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are the one true God, I fully believe; but not Sherlock's exposition of the doctrine. [6] Three persons having the same nature are three persons; and if to possess without limitation the divine nature, as opposed to the human, is what we mean by God, why, then, three such persons are three Gods, and will be thought so till GREGORY NYSSEN can persuade us that John, James, and Peter, each possessing the human nature, are not three men. John is a man, James is a man, and Peter is a man; but they are not three men, but one man! S. T. COLERIDGE: Literary Remains; in Works, vol. v. pp. 389–94, 398-9.

The preceding observations are numbered to correspond with those from SHERLOCK, SO marked, in pp. 282-3 of the present work.

and

That there is but one God, the Scriptures everywhere assert; this is agreeable to reason, and the works of creation and providence which we behold; and the contrary supposition is most absurd and undesirable, and really involves in it infinite evil. God must be a self-existent Being, which is the same with existing necessarily; but necessary existence must be infinite. . . . Therefore there can be but one first Cause, who exists necessarily, and without beginning, for. there can be but one infinite Being. To suppose another, or a second, necessarily excludes the first; and to suppose the first, necessarily excludes the second and any other infinite Being. The same is evident from the consideration of the divine perfections. God is infinite power, infinite wisdom; but there cannot be two or more infinite wisdoms, &c., because this is a contradiction. Infinite power is all the power there is or can be, and is clearly inconsistent with another power distinct from that, which is also infinite. Moreover, if we make the impossible supposition that there are two or more infinite Beings, they

must be perfectly alike in all respects, or not. If not perfectly alike, and without any difference in any respect, then one or the other must be imperfect; for absolutely infinite perfection admits of no variation or difference; so that, if any two beings differ in any respect, they cannot both be absolutely perfect; therefore cannot both be God. But, if they are perfectly alike in every respect and every thing, then they are perfectly one and the same; and the supposition destroys itself, being a direct contradiction. And there can be no possible need of more than one God; and therefore, were this possible, it is not desirable. There can really be no more existence than one infinite Being, or any addition to infinite perfection and excellence; therefore no more can be desired, and nothing can be effected or done, more than he can do. In a word, he is all-sufficient, and no addition can be made to this, or even conceived. DR. SAMUEL HOPKINS: System

of Doctrines, chap. 3; in Works, vol. i. p. 61.

This demonstration of God's oneness is not made by its author in reference to any theory of three divine persons; but it may be well applied to all such propositions as convey the notion, that the Deity consists of several distinct, eternal, and equal or unequal intelligences, whether called persons or beings. Dr. HOPKINS here virtually refutes his own Trinitarian or Tritheistic views, as will be quoted in p. 290.

Whatever disclaimer may be made as to Tritheism, the comparison of individuality in the Godhead with that among men does essentially involve theoretical Tritheism. If not, then how could the Greeks be accused of polytheism, who believed in a common nature among the Dii majores? And if not, then we must come to the absurd conclusion of GREGORY of Nyssa, that it is catachresis when we speak of Peter and Paul and Barnabas as three men, because in truth they have but one common human nature. It is impossible to put the mind upon receiving such an incongruity, without its reluctating. It instinctively revolts.... Now and then, a zealous partisan of the Nicene Symbol-a BULL, a WATERLAND, a JONES of Nayland, or some writer of this cast has told us of three distinct consciousnesses, wills, and affections in the Godhead, and of the eternal "society" which must have always been in it. But the ears of intelligent Christians in general are not now open to these things. Yet still the unwary and unthinking are affected by them, and led unconsciously, it may be, into real Tritheism. . Of some of these definitions, i.e. those of MELANCTHON and MORUS and some others, it might be said, that the word "person," as applied to three different men, could

scarcely receive a more full and complete sense than is given it in respect to the Godhead. Tritheism in theory seems to be the unavoidable deduction from such definitions. . . . The theory of personality which represents three intelligent beings, distinct in such a full sense that each has his own individual consciousness, will, affections, purposes, &c., must amount to theoretical Tritheism; for such are the principal distinctions that exist between three individual men. . . . Any definition of personality in the Godhead which represents person to be ens per se, or substantia individua non sustentata in alia natura,

seems plainly and substantially to infringe on the idea that there is but one and numerically the same substance in the Godhead. I am not able to see why it does not clearly involve a logical contradiction. - MOSES STUART, in Biblical Repository, vol. v. p. 314; and vol. vi. pp. 84, 92–4.

For other valuable remarks on this tritheistic Trinity, STUART's supplementary note to his Second Letter to Channing (Miscellanies, pp. 60–2) may be consulted. They will be found applicable also to the theory of a Triune God presented in the following subsection; for, except in mere terms, there seems to be no difference whatever between a Trinity of distinct minds or beings and a Trinity of distinct persons, subsistences, or agents.

§ 9. THE TRINITY OF DISTINCT PERSONS, SUBSISTENCES, OR AGENTS.

We should carefully study and duly be affected with that gracious consent, and as it were confederacy, of the glorious Three, in designing and prosecuting our good; their unanimous agreement in uttering those three mighty words of favor to mankind, Faciamus, Redimamus, Salvemus, "Let us make man out of nothing; Let us recover him from sin and perdition; Let us crown him with joy and salvation.” We should with grateful resentments observe them conspiring to employ their wisdom in contriving fit means and methods to exert their power in effectual accomplishment of what was requisite to the promoting of our welfare, . . in prosecution of that gracious design which their joint goodness had projected for us. . . . We should set our mind on God the Father, before the foundation of the world from all eternity, . . resolving to send his own dear Son from his bosom, to procure and purchase the redemption of mankind; ... then actually sending his only Son, and clothing him with human flesh; ... also sending and bestowing his Holy Spirit to dwell in them [who obey Christ]. DR. I. BARROW: Def. of the Blessed Trinity; Works, vol. ii. pp. 157–8.

[By "person"] I certainly mean a real person, an hypostasis; no mode, attribute, or property. . . . Each divine person is an individual intelligent agent; but, as subsisting in one undivided substance, they are all together, in that respect, but one undivided intelligent agent. ...The church never professed three hypostases in any other sense but as they mean three persons. DR. DANIEL WATERLAND: Vin

dication of Christ's Divinity, pp. 350–1.

speaks to the The three per

The Scriptures teach us that there are three in this one God, not three Gods, for this would be a contradiction; but that this infinite Being exists in such a manner as to be three distinct, subsistences or persons, and yet but one God. These three are spoken of or addressed in the Scriptures in such terms as are used to denote a distinct personality, such as I, thou, he, or him. Thus the Father speaks of himself and the Son; and thus the Son Father, and of him, and of the Holy Spirit. sons in the Godhead form an infinitely high, holy, and happy society, the original and perfect pattern of all true love, friendship, and happiness. Jesus Christ, the Mediator, is the medium by which the society of the redeemed in heaven will be united to the infinitely more excellent and perfect society, the eternal Trinity of persons, who dwell in the infinitely high and holy place, far beyond the reach or comprehension of creatures; from whom the same benevolence and social love is shed down through the Mediator on these redeemed ones, forming them into one most happy society, in union with the blessed Trinity, and so as to be a little image of the Deity, — the Three in One, and One in Three. DR. SAMUEL HOPKINS: System of Doctrines, chaps. 3 and 13; in Works, vol. i. pp. 62, 65, and vol. ii. pp. 58–9.

The Scripture represents the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as distinctly possessed of personal properties. The Father is represented as being able to understand, to will, and to act, of himself; the Son is represented as being able to understand, to will, and to act, of himself; and the Holy Ghost is represented as being able to understand, to will, and to act, of himself. According to these representations, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are three distinct persons, or agents. Accordingly, they speak to and of each other as such.... Thus the Scripture leads us to conceive of the one living and true God as existing in three distinct persons, each of whom is possessed of all personal properties, and is able to understand, to will, and to act, as a free, voluntary, almighty agent. Hence the Scripture represents the

three persons in the sacred Trinity as absolutely equal in every divine perfection. . . . . . If there be but one God, then it necessarily follows that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not three Gods, but only three persons in one self-existent, independent, eternal Being. The three persons are not one person, but one God; or the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are three in respect to their personality, and but one in respect to their nature and essence. . . . We find no difficulty in conceiving of three divine persons. It is just as easy to conceive of three divine persons as of three human persons. No man perhaps ever found the least difficulty in conceiving of the Father as a distinct person from the Son, nor in conceiving of the Son as a distinct person from the Holy Ghost, nor in conceiving of the Holy Ghost as a distinct person from both the Father and Son; but the only difficulty in this case lies in conceiving these three persons to be but one. And it is evident that no man can conceive three divine persons to be one divine person, any more than he can conceive three angels to be but one angel; but it does not hence follow that no man can conceive that three divine persons should be but one divine Being. For, if we only suppose that "being" may signify something different from " person" in respect to Deity, then we can easily conceive that God should be but one Being, and yet exist in three persons. The doctrine of the Sacred Trinity, as represented in Scripture, gives us a clear and striking view of the all-sufficiency of God. Since he exists in three equally divine persons, there is a permanent foundation in his own nature for the most pure and perfect blessedness. Society is the source of the highest felicity; and that society affords the greatest enjoyment which is composed of persons of the same character, of the same disposition, of the same designs, and of the same pursuits. The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, who are three equally divine persons in the one living and true God, are perfectly united in all these respects; and therefore God's existing a Trinity in Unity necessarily renders him the all-sufficient source of his own most perfect felicity. . . . . . We have as clear an idea of these three divine persons as of three human persons. There is no mystery in the personality of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, though there is a profound mystery in their being one God. DR. N. EMMONS: Works, vol. iv. pp. 107–8, 110–11, 114–15, 125.

This is perhaps as plain and intelligible a statement of the doctrine of an hypostatic Trinity as can be found anywhere; and is the less repulsive from its omission of the palpably inconsistent notions of eternal generation and procession which have been inculcated in so many creeds and confessions.