until the bare repetition of it has almost, of itself, forced it upon the minds of the greater mass of nominal Christians. . . . Such suggestions are the usual and the last refuge of those who feel that they are driven from the field of reasoning and argument. They have this advantage, that they are in their alleged form so indefinite and airy, that you cannot easily find out their true nature, so as to know where or how you can bring forward what is sensible and palpable in opposition to them. They satisfy mystics better than argument or reason would; because they obviously suit that trait in their character which is the predominating and influential one. Hence the final retreat, the sanctum sanctorum of those who have fled from the battle-fields of reason and exegesis and argument, is always found to be in mystery. Procul, procul, este profani! Meantime, as a Protestant, I must think that it becomes us, on such a point, to be able to give a reason for the faith that is in us. No outcry of this nature can induce a man of sober judgment to abandon his position. It is the never-failing resort of those who have nothing better to say, to betake themselves to crying out, "Mystery! awful mystery! It would be profanation to make even an attempt at investigation or explanation." Faith

I repeat it, I would God it might sink deep into every Christian heart! faith is believing what is revealed, not believing what is unrevealed and impossible. There may be there are - mysteries, many and great, which belong to things and truths connected intimately with the gospel.... But no true gospel mystery involves a contradiction or an absurdity. — MOSES STUART, in Bibliotheca Sacra for May, 1844; vol. i. pp. 267-8 and 278-9.

Sentiments such as these, though specially opposed to the doctrine of Christ's real bodily presence in the Lord's Supper, are well suited to exhibit the influence, in general, of a love for the mystical or the mysterious in foreclosing the mind against all appeals to reason, and a rational interpretation of Scripture.

I should not deem it necessary to say more, did I not know what is the mournful effect upon the human mind of being trained for ages to disregard the most sacred and fundamental intellectual and moral intuitions, under the plea of faith and mystery. The mind seems to be paralyzed and stunned, as if it had been smitten down by a blow, and cannot again, in that particular, re-act and rally, and recover the use of its powers. Such an effect has been extensively produced on the human mind for ages by this result of the discussion under Augustine; for, when the plea of any great moral or intellectual intuitions has

been once heard, and, after long, earnest, and full debate, rejected, and the course of thought has afterwards rolled on in disregard of them for subsequent centuries under the guidance of ecclesiastical authority, and of the original arguments, in one deep channel, it becomes almost impossible to restore the human mind to the vantage-ground on which it stood when the original conflict began. DR. EDWARD BEECHER : Conflict of Ages, pp. 305-6.

§ 5. IMPATIENCE OF DOUBT, AND AVERSION TO TROUBLE.

Another error is an impatience of doubt, and haste to assertion without due and mature suspension of judgment. For the two ways of contemplation are not unlike the two ways of action commonly spoken of by the ancients: the one plain and smooth in the beginning, and in the end impassable; the other rough and troublesome in the entrance, but after a while fair and even. So it is in contemplation : if a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but, if he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties. LORD BACON: Advancement of Learning, book i.; in Works, vol. i. p. 173.

Christianity being at this time divided into several sects, whereof some must necessarily be in an error, may we not therefore place in the number of the lazy those persons who, full of all other things but the love of the truth, have never carefully examined which of these sects is most conformable to the sentiments of the apostles? I own that divers other motives might lead them to remain, without knowing why themselves, in that party wherein they happened to be born, and to condemn all others without vouchsafing to examine their tenets; but, if you remark it well, it will appear that one of the principles which occasion this conduct is a certain lazy aversion to the trouble of searching after the truth in matters of this kind.

Causes of Incredulity, pp. 101-2, Lond. 1697.

LE CLERC:

Any serious employment of the understanding is inconsistent with habitual indolence. Discussion and inquiry are always laborious. Time and patience and pains are necessary to separate truth from falsehood,

to collect and to compose the arguments on each side. Prejudices arising from temper, from education, from interest, and from innumerable other causes, are not easily overcome; and, when a ray of reason breaks through them, resolution is wanted to follow steadily its guidance and yet without this labor we forfeit all the use and benefit

of our understanding. If we snatch the first appearances, and sit down contented with them, to what purpose is it that we are able to investigate hidden truths? What avails our faculty of judging, if we suffer each thin pretence to conceal them from us? It might be expected, that they who entertain every wandering opinion without examination should dismiss it without regret on the arrival of a new guest. But the fact is otherwise. This kind of levity is attended with obstinacy. The same disposition which leads men into error makes them unwilling to correct it: a state of doubtfulness is a state of uneasiness. The mind, therefore, hastens to the end of its journey; but to trace its steps back again, and examine all the windings by which the truth may have escaped, is to the indolent an intolerable labor. DR. WILLIAM SAMUEL POWELL: Discourses, No. I. pp. 6, 7.

Some people have so strong a propensity to form fixed opinions on every subject to which they turn their thoughts, that their mind will brook no delay. They cannot bear to doubt or hesitate. Suspense in judging is to them more insufferable than the manifest hazard of judging wrong; and therefore, when they have not sufficient evidence, they will form an opinion from what they have, be it ever so little; or even from their own conjectures, without any evidence at all. Now, to believe without proper evidence, and to doubt when we have evidence sufficient, are equally the effects, not of the strength, but of the weakness, of the understanding. DR. GEORGE CAMPBELL: The Four Gospels, Diss. xii. part v. sect. 9.

There is a strong tendency in human nature to save itself from the trouble of inquiry and the uneasiness of doubt. We do not like to be left for a moment in uncertainty or suspense; we are impatient of the labor of examining things for ourselves; we are alarmed at the danger of mistake, and uneasy under the sense of personal responsibility; and so we are disposed beforehand to accept a guide in religion, who shall constantly claim the power of conducting us with unerring skill, and who shall tell us that we have nothing to do but follow him. ARCHBISHOP WHATELY: Cautions for the Times, p. 103.

We make sweeping assertions, disposing of whole classes of subjects at a word, or we take a general principle which is perhaps true in the main, and carry it out to extremes, to which it cannot fairly extend. We do this either from the influence of an almost universal tendency of the human mind to love sweeping generalities, or else because it is troublesome to pause and reflect, and ascertain exceptions. In fact, a reflecting man will often detect himself believing a proposition merely

because, when expressed, it sounds antithetic and striking, or because it is comprehensive and distinct, and, right or wrong, presents a convenient solution for whole classes of difficulties. The human mind will, in a word, run into almost any belief, by which it may be saved the labor of patient thought, and at the same time avoid the mortification of acknowledging its ignorance. JACOB ABBOTT: The Cornerstone, p. 302.

§ 6. PARTY SPIRIT AND PERSONAL INTEREST.

Another great cause of confidence in false conceits is the bias of some personal interest prevailing with a corrupted will, and the mixture of sense and passion in the judgment. For as interested men hardly believe what seemeth against them, and easily believe that which they would have to be true; so sense and passion, or affections, usually so bear down reason that they think it their right to possess the throne. RICHARD BAXTER: Knowledge and Love Compared ; in Practical Works, vol. xv. pp. 157–8.

Self-conceit ... promotes indolence and obstinacy. For why should he toil any longer in the mines of knowledge who is already possessed of their most valuable treasures? how can he submit to try his opinions by the judgment of others who is himself the fittest to decide? This temper, when the mind is conversant with points of the highest nature, such as relate to religion and government, will show itself in violent bigotry. What indeed is this, but an obstinate adherence to illgrounded notions; with a conceit, that we only, and those of our own sect or party, are the favorites of God and the friends of mankind, and that all who differ from us are weak or wicked? Want of industry to examine our own tenets, of candor to listen to those of others, and of modesty in judging of both, lays a sure foundation for this vice; which can never be removed but by another thing equally wanted, an extensive acquaintance with the world. This would certainly convince us, that among persons of every denomination some may be found of excellent understandings and distinguished virtue. DR. WILLIAM SAMUEL POWELL: Discourses, No. I. p. 8.

When a strong prejudice against any description of persons is deeply rooted in the general body of a people, and both their understandings and their feelings are inveterately convinced of its justice. the eradication of it requires length of time: no powers of reason or eloquence can remove it on a sudden, or even without incessant repe

tition of effort. This is particularly the case in all questions of a complicated nature, upon which the feelings and passions of men have been long and violently agitated, and both religious and political parties have been deeply engaged. CHARLES BUTLER: Reminiscences, page 277.

Truth and error, as they are essentially opposite in their nature, so the causes to which they are indebted for their perpetuity and triumph are not less so. Whatever retards a spirit of inquiry is favorable to error; whatever promotes it, to truth. But nothing, it will be. acknowledged, has a greater tendency to obstruct the exercise of free inquiry, than the spirit and feeling of a party. Let a doctrine, however erroneous, become a party distinction, and it is at once intrenched in interests and attachments which make it extremely difficult for the most powerful artillery of reason to dislodge it. It becomes a point of honor in the leaders of such parties, which is from thence communicated to their followers, to defend and support their respective peculiarities to the last; and, as a natural consequence, to shut their ears against all the pleas and remonstrances by which they are assailed. Even the wisest and best of men are seldom aware how much they are susceptible of this sort of influence; and while the offer of a world would be insufficient to engage them to recant a known truth, or to subscribe an acknowledged error, they are often retained in a willing captivity to prejudices and opinions which have no other support, and which, if they could lose sight of party feelings, they would almost instantly abandon. . . . It is this alone which has ensured a sort of immortality to those hideous productions of the human mind, the shapeless abortions of night and darkness, which reason, left to itself, would have crushed in the moment of their birth. — ROBERT HALL: Terms of Communion; in Works, vol. i. p. 352.

§ 7. THE SPECULATIONS OF VANITY AND THE LOVE OF SINGULARITY.

Such as reject sentiments generally received, or at least received by a great number of persons, should take care that the love of singularity, rather than a demonstration that others are mistaken, has made them quit the beaten road. It is true, indeed, that the multitude of those who embrace a certain opinion is not a good proof of the truth of it; but, on the other hand, it is no cogent argument that a thing is false because many people believe it. LE CLERC: Causes of Incredulity, p. 30.