be not only an inglorious, but an evil future to look forward to. No. It is England's duty not alone to girdle the globe with Anglo-Saxon peoples, but to transplant with them, as far as may be, Anglo-Saxon institutions. In a word, it is not merely AngloSaxons, but Englishmen, whom we should strive to reproduce beyond the Atlantic and Pacific. It is the English character we should labour to hand down to future ages, to form the stamina of future empires. And we may be sure of this, that the longer our colonies remain colonies, the longer, that is, that they continue to imbibe constant draughts of English influence, and to look up to England as "the head of the House," so much the better chance is there of the English character being deeply enough cut into their inhabitants to retain the impress through all ages. This is our idea of the true end of colonization: and, if it be the right one, then it is almost impossible that the colony can remain too long under the wing of the mother

country.

These are considerations which have been too frequently lost sight of in the discussion of this subject. But even when they have not been lost sight of, we hear the old argument brought forward that our colonists should be made men of, and that nothing strengthens and exalts the character so much as self-reliance, and discharge of the duty of self-defence. But, as far as self-defence is concerned, we must distinguish between two entirely different things, the helplessness which arises from a sense of dependence upon others, and the simple business-resolution not to pay money for an article as long as one can have it for nothing. No man can say the habit of looking to British troops for the defence of their country has practically made the Canadians unmanly. According to strict theory it ought to have done so: but it has not. Our British ancestors were really rendered helpless by the long tutelage of the Romans. But if every British soldier left Canada to-morrow, Canada would fight none the worse if she considered that fighting was her interest. In this one particular of the Militia Bill she may have shown us a touch of sharp practice. It may be that she would be doing better to take upon herself frankly the defence of her own hearths. It may be that we should have done better to make that stipulation originally. But, having omitted to do so, it would be dangerous to attempt it now. A condition that is submitted to with cheerfulness in the primary framing of a compact will often not be tolerated as a rule to be imposed hereafter. Men will do many things when their consent is asked which they will never do if it is not. We think it very likely, therefore, that Canada would resent any effort on the part of this country to impose the duty of self-defence upon her, however reasonable such a duty may be in itself. And so we work round to the old question, is it worth while to give offence to the Canadians for the sake of the money which they cost us? Whether we regard the case as one of English interests or of Canadian, our own answer is in the negative. The longer we keep Canada the better both for us and for the colonists.

With regard to the second point suggested by the late vote, namely, the defence of Canada from

invasion by the United States, it seems pretty generally agreed that the battle could never be fought, except partially, by English troops. At least 100,000 men would be required for such a purpose. But, as far as may be judged from the recent publication of Sir Carmichael Smith, the Canadian frontier is by no means difficult of defence, and a comparatively small number of British troops, if supported by the Canadian militia in possession of the fortified posts, could hold the invaders in check for a considerable period. In fact, a small number of English regulars in combination with militia and volunteers might play the same part in Canada that they are expected to play in England. Some thirty or forty thousand English soldiers, therefore, might form the backbone of the Canadian defence. But then, of course, the Canadians must behave rather differently from their recent Parliamentary decision. If they will only undertake to keep up a certain force of militia and volunteers, then it is by no means a mistake on our side to keep even so small a force as 12,000 men in the country. If they won't, then, of course, we cannot expose the flower of our own army to the chance of being captured or destroyed. We do not at all shun the expense of keeping a British army in Canada, if Canada in her turn will only meet us half-way. We do not agree with Mr. Adderley, that Canada should be obliged to pay directly for the services of British troops: but we do think she should be made to understand, courteously and indirectly, that we cannot possibly spare soldiers enough to insure her safety; that untrained levies merely come forward to be shot down; and that if she will not organize some kind of defensive force for herself, not all the resources of England, were England to do her very utmost, could possibly save her from disaster.

India.

T is curious to remark what a much greater hold small questions take upon our minds than large ones. To what extent we are to tolerate or to discourage poaching,-what is the best plan for embanking the river Thames,-and such questions as these, excite far more interest, and are much more keenly debated, than the great problems which we are more or less consciously working out in regard to our colonial and dependent Empires. To what extent, and upon what principles we are to undertake the defence of Canada,— and in what manner we are to govern India,—are questions upon which it is difficult to get men to think. Act we must, and we therefore have recourse to the scrambling policy of acting without thinking.

Here is this great topic of Indian finance, for instance, upon which, if upon anything, our statesmen and those who take an interest in politics ought to have an opinion; yet we huddle it up and get rid of it out of our sight as quickly as we can;

or,

if we are tempted to spend a few minutes upon. it, it is because there happens to be something like a personal quarrel in the case, and there is a laugh

had been insufficient to meet the charges upon it. "A chronic deficit," we are told by Mr. Laing, "continued with scarcely an intermission for twenty years, had added 50,000,000l. to the debt of India. That deficit had been increased by the effects of the mutiny, until in the three years from 1857 to 1860 it reached the enormous average of 12,000,000l." It was under these circumstances that the Home Government in 1859, finding the local members of Council unable to grapple with the difficulty, sent out Mr. Wilson to give them the aid of his expe

versy.

We have not space to enlarge upon the importance of governing India upon principles which will ensure the good-will of its inhabitants, will develope its magnificent resources, and will preserve it from financial disaster. Any one who casts even a cursory glance at that great country will see that it is capable of becoming our greatest source of strength, or our greatest element of weakness, according as we manage it well or ill. Neither need we point out the difficulties we have to encounter in consequence of the impossibility of calling in the aid of a local self-administering legislature. Taxation and representation cannot in this case go together. India must be governed by what to her is a foreign despotism. This is a disagreeable truth, but it is one we cannot dispute; the only point for us to consider is, how that despotism may on the whole be made most beneficent and advantageous to the people who have to live under it.

Now, it would seem that if local self-government cannot be had, the next best thing would be local government by authorities practically acquainted with the wants and the feelings of the governed; that is to say, by Governors and Councils residing in India. It would be desirable to select the ablest and best qualified men for these important posts; and, having done so, to leave them free to act according to their judgment and experience upon as many matters as possible; subjecting them to so much control from home as may restrain them from committing India to a course of action opposed to the general interests of the British Empire, but abstaining from petty interference upon matters of detail. And, inasmuch as India is rather an agglomeration of nations than a single nation, and the several Presidencies into which it is divided differ widely from one another, it would seem to be further desirable, while retaining the general control of one Supreme Council upon questions affecting the whole country, to leave to the local Councils in the Presidencies as much freedom as is found compatible with the good working of the whole machine. Such is, in truth, the theory of the constitution under which India is now governed. Let us see, by a glance at her recent financial administration, how far that theory has been carried into practice.

In the days of the Company's government the main sources of the Indian revenue were the landtax, the monopolies of salt and of opium, and some moderate customs' duties. For many years before the breaking out of the mutiny of 1857 this revenue

as a sort of Chancellor of the Indian Exchequer; he was a member of the Supreme Council, and one, as it were, of Lord Canning's Cabinet. He introduced many reforms in the mode of keeping the public accounts, in the system of currency, and in the management of the Treasury balances; he gave an impetus to the reduction of expenditure which had already commenced; and he proposed three new taxes. These were, first, an Income-tax of four per cent.; secondly, a Licence-tax upon trades and professions; and thirdly, an addition to the Customs' duties. The Licence-tax had already before his arrival been proposed in the Supreme Council. Sir Charles Trevelyan, the Governor of Madras, himself no mean authority on matters of finance, had strongly objected to this new tax, as likely to cause great discontent, and had expressed his firm belief that the deficit might be got rid of by the simple reduction of expenditure and by financial reforms. He renewed his protest when Mr. Wilson proposed an Income-tax; but the Supreme Council and the Home Government supported Mr. Wilson and recalled the Governor of Madras. The Act imposing the Income-tax and that increasing the Customs duties were passed; but Mr. Wilson's own career was here cut short, and he died, a victim to his exertions and anxieties in an unhealthy climate, before he could see the fruit of his labours.

His successor, Mr. Laing, went out at the close of 1860. When he landed in India he tells us that all was gloom and anxiety. The financial crisis was not over; confidence in the Government was shaken; the Europeans, whether civilians or military men, were discontented at the reductions which had been made; and both Europeans and natives were smarting under the Income-tax, the attempts to collect which were giving rise to serious disturbances. Lord Canning himself expressed to Mr. Laing his feeling as to the condition of things by saying, "Danger for danger, he would rather risk governing India with 40,000 troops without new taxes than with 100,000 with them." same time Mr. Laing perceived that the labours of Col. Balfour, and of his colleagues on the military commission, were likely to lead to more important reductions in the expenditure than Mr. Wilson had ventured to rely on; and, taking advantage of the experience of the past year, he appears to have urged upon Lord Canning some modifications of Mr. Wilson's plans in the sense of Sir C. Trevelyan's policy. At all events the Licence-tax was at once suspended, and hopes were held out that the Income-tax might in time be dispensed with.

At the

Three years have now elapsed since Mr. Wilson

left England for India to staunch a deficit of 12,000,000l. a-year; and three successive budgets have been brought forward in that period. The first, Mr. Wilson's own, was a budget of heavy taxation, a courageous, and, we believe, a necessary effort to grapple with a mighty evil, but an effort itself involving no slight risk. The second was a hopeful, waiting, budget, in which disappointments had to be confessed and difficulties to be stated, but in which a step was made in the direction of the mitigation rather than the increase of taxes. We have now the third before us; and the change is marvellous. It is no longer a question of a deficit, but of a surplus; no longer a choice of new taxes, but of remissions of taxes. Mr. Laing estimates that the revenue of 1862-3 would, if no change were made, exceed the expenditure by 1,428,000l.; and he finds himself in a position to propose at once to remit that portion of the Income-tax which was the most galling and the least productive, and those additional duties upon manufactured goods which fell so heavily upon English industry; and at the same time to devote a larger share of the public revenue to the two great wants of India,-the education of the people, and the improvement of the roads, and other works required for developing the immense natural resources of the country. It would be difficult to find a more remarkable instance of success in the whole history of financial operations; and it would be natural to expect that those who have conducted India through such a crisis to such a result would have received the meed of warm applause from the statesmen of England. But this has not been their lot. Sir Charles Wood, if we may judge from his despatches, is one of those who cannot see great results because he is so engrossed by the small points of detail which have attracted his attention. It appears that there is an arrangement with certain railway companies under which payments are made to the Indian Government in England and by the Indian Government in India on railway account; and that by some oversight the rupee is taken at value of Is. 1od. in the one case, while it is really worth 25., and has to be taken accordingly in the other case; so that the Indian Government at present loses twopence upon each rupee thus passing through its hands. The loss in the present year amounts to some 458,000l. Upon this a controversy arises. Sir C. Wood says this is a loss which should be charged to income; Mr. Laing says it should be charged to capital. This is one point at issue. Another is, whether certain casual receipts, repayments from the Home Government to the Indian treasury, ought or ought not to be reckoned as part of the income of the year. The disputed receipts amount to about 529,000l., against which, however, Mr. Laing sets off a sum of 489,000l. for casual disbursements, which he regards as equally exceptional. Into this controversy we do not propose to enter. Sir Charles Wood may be technically right, and Mr. Laing may have somewhat over-estimated his surplus. But when we find Sir C. Wood permitting himself, on the ground of this difference of opinion, to write despatches to the Supreme Council of India, condemning the measures which they have thought it necessary to take for the reduction of

oppressive and injurious taxation, and forbidding the application of the funds they had proposed to devote to the promotion of education, and the extension of public works, in the country of whose necessities they are supposed to be the best and only fitting judges, it is hard to say whether the spectacle be more lamentable or ridiculous. It may be difficult to say how India should be governed; but, if this is a fair sample of Sir C. Wood's usual practice, he is evidently bent upon showing us how far the present system falls short of perfection. The loss of Lord Canning, who would have thrown so much light upon this important problem, is a calamity indeed both to India and to England; but we trust that there will be found men in both Houses of Parliament who will take an early opportunity in the next Session of calling attention to the anomalies of this plan of "double government,' and of urging the importance of its speedy reconsideration.

The Bishop of Bath and Wells

and Mr. Lingen.

"

HE bishops are in a difficulty. One evidence, out of many, is the letter of the Bishop of Bath and Wells to Mr. Lingen, with that gentleman's answer.

Now everybody who has observed the relations between the National Church and the Committee of Council for "Education" knew very well that the difficulty was coming; nay, that it had actually come long before the bishops gave public sign of its presence. They knew more; they knew that it was such a difficulty as, in the end, makes a dead-lock, however it may be disguised and put aside for a time. There is always a point at which a loose or latitudinarian policy becomes aggressive upon a Church: aggressive in such sort that the Church is brought to bay, and even bishops have no choice but to turn round and fight. The weakness of the defence is that the fact of this point having been reached steals into the Episcopal mind late in the day; bringing with it unpleasant reminiscences of bad generalship and of something very like cowardice in the earlier part of it.

But, anyhow, the point has been reached now, even by confession of bishops. It was, as a fact, reached long ago when bishops did not confess; and not only said soft and pleasant things of their opponents, but helped them with all their influence. When, some fourteen years ago, the Committee of Council refused to allow a Management Clause E, under which schools with no other managing body than the clergyman of the parish might freely receive aid from the Parliamentary Grant; and when the Committee of the National Society, which includes all the bishops, and is the channel by which their judgment in these matters reaches the public, helped the Committee of Council to establish this most inequitable refusal, the foundation was securely laid upon which every successive course of the aggression building has been added from time to time in natural order.

In a state of things such as this is there are

always certain stages at which the hardship and | grievance of conscience originally inflicted upon the Church through the weakness of the defence is developed more prominently and more offensively. Such stages, again, always follow upon some further marked development of that weakness. The stage which we have reached in 1862 is described very plainly in the letter of the Bishop of Bath and Wells, first published in the Times of August 7, 1862. It remains to inquire a little into the last development of weakness which has preceded it, and out of which it has naturally sprung.

For it is the primary basis of the Church and State Review that the Church can only suffer harm or loss by her own fault: that is to say, either by the fault of those who administer her affairs, or by the fault of Churchmen generally in not keeping the administrators straight when they are going crooked. The blame has commonly to be shared between the two, and the present is a memorable instance of participation.

We are not, therefore, going to assail the Committee of Council. The Committee which we assail is the Committee of the National Society. The people who want telling, and rousing to something like a sense of what is at stake, are the members of the National Society. The Committee of Council are but acting according to their own position and their own lights. They cannot be supposed to have any particular preference for the religion of the Church of England, or for any religion beyond that which any "denomination" may make for itself. It would be to do them great injustice, in the face of their repeated protestations, to suspect them any such preference. Besides, they are, in one sense, an economical body; and it is their business, without having regard to what the religion of a school may be, so long as there is something in it which is of a religious aspect, to do schools as cheaply as they can. Now it is much cheaper to help one school in a place, having, by a stringent use of the argumentum ad crumenam, forced all denominations" into it, than to help many schools in the same place, respecting scrupulously the form of faith professed in each, and, on this account, dealing with them separately.

of

This is the position of the Committee of Council, and their quasi-religious and economical policy. It discards, of necessity, all idea even of dogmatic religion, creeds, Church authority, and the like. It deals only with every individual man as drawing his religion out of the Bible after the fashion which best pleases himself. We do not say it is a Scriptural position: we do not say it is a good position: we do not say that it is one worthy of an English Government; or consistent with the fact of the existence of a National Church. We only state the case as it is, and leave it for the consideration of Churchmen, and others who do believe that there is such a thing as Necessary Truth.

Then it

above, first published some fourteen years ago. There have been sundry editions since, with appendices to each. But it was not till the year 1860 that the editio palmaria saw the light. was that the Committee of the National Societyas it would appear, under the guidance of their Secretary-inverting, by a very remarkable process of adjustment, the system which they had it in charge to keep upright; taking out the very vitals of the Charter and the terms of Union, to see, as we suppose, by way of experiment, whether it be possible for the Charter and the terms of Union to survive under the operation; refusing to admit into Union, as unworthy of that privilege, one kind only of Church school, and that the one kind of Church school which the Charter and terms of Union contemplated-then it was that the Committee of the National Society and their Secretary invited the Committee of Council to perpetrate their last aggression; and by the invitation put the copingstone to many stories of showy building, the whole of which they are now surprised to find tumbling about their ears.

Hinc ille lacryma. Hence the speeches and the letters of bishops. We are glad to see them at last, because it is an indication that they are troubled in their minds: not at ease about the position which they have so largely contributed to establish. But it is not speeches and letters, finding fault with others, that will mend the mischief. The mischief is at home. The mending must begin within. If the Committee of the National Society, with their Secretary, will learn logic, and do justice; if they will not incite the Committee of Council to impose conscience clauses by one document and protest against the imposition by another; if they will not profess to respect conscience by one minute and do it the utmost violence by another, the breach which they have helped the Committee of Council to make in our walls will be repaired. But who supposes that it is possible to contend successfully against a steady and consistent policy, however vicious in itself, by the policy of compromise, of contradictory counsels and failing hearts; or who, whether opponent or friend, has any respect for, or attaches any value to, the feeble and desultory efforts of a divided house; when those who should be one, some of them inflict, and others suffer, a great and crying grievance; when expostulation is met by misrepresentation, and remonstrance by tricks of office? Who imagines that a blessing will attend a policy which does dishonour to the primary function of a Church, that of declaring and delivering The Truth as it has been received?

We will state the case for the information of those who do not know it.

1. A, clergyman or layman, desires to found a school" for the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church."

2. A desires to place the school in Union with the National Society for the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church."

3. A desires this for two reasons:—first, because his object is identical with that of the Society; secondly, because, while prepared to find nine-tenths of the money wanted, he wishes his school to have its share of the funds of the Society, of the Diocesan Board, and of the Parliamentary Grant.

4. A cannot, in his conscience, found a school of which it is not the rule that every child shall be taught the Catechism of the Church of England. A regards this as the necessary basis of " Education in the Principles of the Established Church." A knows that this is the form of school contemplated by the founders of the National Society, and provided for by the Charter and by the terms of Union. A knows, further, that no subsequent modification of the terms of Union can be alleged as excluding this form. A knows, further, that a primary principle of the Church is involved in its admission or exclusion. A, accordingly, proposes to insert in the trust-deed a provision to the above effect.

5. A applies to the office of "the National Society for the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church;" states his case, and his desire to be in Union.

6. A is told in reply that the constitution of his school, as proposed by him to be ascertained and fixed by the trust-deed, is "incompatible with Union" with " the National Society for the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church."

7. A's school is therefore excluded from Union with "the National Society for the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church," -being the only form of Church school which is so excluded-and loses all grants.

This is the case.

The War in America.

affirm, the extreme unhealthiness of that city should compel the Confederates to evacuate it, in which case we presume that even General McClellan would not be very desirous of occupying it. While the Confederate navy, though hardly consisting of more than a single ship, has reassumed its mastery of the Federal fleet, and threatens to deprive the Federal army also of the greater portion of the advantages which it has gained in Louisiana, the maintenance of which depends on the support which it can receive from its accompanying flotilla. At the same time battle and disease are so thinning the Federal ranks that the President is forced to call for reinforcements on a gigantic scale to which history affords no parallel; and, as the volunteers whom he invites are slow to come in, to announce a project of completing the required numbers by draughts from the militia in a manner which differs but little from conscription. We also learn at the same time that money, at least that which in the old country we understand by money, gold and silver, has totally disappeared; and that, since everything connected with this war is on a gigantic scale, the Federal Government is supplying the place of the precious metals by an absolutely boundless issue of notes, ascending by a half-penny scale; and discernible, like our own postage-stamps, by a diversity of colours, the infinite variety of which, to mark the distinction between notes of a hundred different values, will afford no small scope for the ingenuity of colour-makers. At present we are only told that half-penny notes are blue; three-halfpenny notes, pink; those for two-pence-half-penny, chocolate, and so on: but shades of corresponding dignity and magnificence for dollars and pounds will, doubtless, soon be invented: and by means of the tricks to be performed by a commercial and political kaleidoscope such as this the Government at Washington proposes to carry on the war. hardly to be wondered at that circumstances such as we have enumerated should be beginning to cause some difference of opinion in the Northern States as to the advisability of continuing the struggle, and also as to the capacity of those to whom the conduct of the struggle is entrusted. And, accordingly, we find in some districts quiet people are beginning to wish for European intervention: while persons less moderate are openly denouncing the war, or the ability of the generals and ministers. The Government so denounced is, however, at least able to cope with its internal enemies: the quiet people are tarred and feathered as a gentle hint to mind their own business: the less moderate are either at once deported to join the army by the warrant of the Secretary of State, or formally prosecuted before the law tribunals. Perhaps it was with a view to discountenance such grumblers more authoritatively and more effectually that President Lincoln himself attended a war meeting lately held at Washington, which passed a series of resolutions, some of which are almost ludicrous in their disinterested ferocity. It was resolved by a large majority that, "rather than witness a dissolution of the Union, we would prosecute the war until our towns and cities should be desolated, and we and all that are dear to us should have

HREE months ago we offered an opinion respecting the issue of the civil war raging in North America, which, though doubtless shared by many of our countrymen at the time, was not then what it has since become, the universal opinion. And, were it not for the extent to which the passions of men actually engaged in any conflict blind them to everything save the result which they hope to compass, we might marvel that the same conclusion is not by this time accepted in America as unanimously as in Europe. We laboured under this difficulty in forming our judgment, that the facts on which we founded it, (though in truth we relied as much on general principles as on any circumstances or events of the contest,) were furnished to us solely by one party, and that, too, the party on whose wishes and expectations and claims we were pronouncing an adverse judgment. We are still in the same difficulty: our intelligence, such as it is, still comes almost exclusively from the Federals; and yet the impression of the utter impossibility of their triumph is only confirmed by every succeeding mail. Their own newspapers are forced to confess that they have been totally defeated in by far the greatest battle that has taken place since the commencement of the contest: that they have been forced to raise the siege of Vicksburg: and likewise to abandon all hope of entering Richmond, unless indeed, as some

See Memorandum of July 23, 1860. Monthly Paper for Sep

tember, 1860, p. 257.

It is

perished with our possessions. Let the Union be