April, 1822.

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The fourth section reduces the rank of the Quartermaster General, and dismisses the assistants; in short, disorganizes the whole department.

The third section is, if possible, still more objectionable. It changes the system of inspectors, confining the duties exclusively to the field officers of regiments and corps.

The field officers of regiments have important duties to perform. They are responsible for the discipline, military improvement, and efficiency of their respective commands. They are the immediate inspectors of their respective regiments, and are bound to hold themselves and their commands always prepared for active operations in the field. They are responsible for the execution of all orders emanating from higher authority within their commands, and cannot be withdrawn from them for the performance of other duties, without interrupting the channel of communication and execution of orders. To constitute them Inspectors of the Army, as this section proposes, is incompatible with their more important duties, and the constant inspections by districts; and a rotation throughout the whole army would keep the field officers of regiments in constant motion, a greater part of their time absent from their respective commands, and distract their attention from the only objects to which it ought to be unceasingly directed, to the serious injury of the discipline, improvement, and efficiency of the whole Military Establishment. Besides, sir, from the esprit du corps which exists in every army, the field officers of regiments would constitute a body of prejudiced inspectors, each partial to their own commands. The most perfect inspections are made by a distinct and independent branch of the general staff; a system which has been approved and introduced into most of the European armies, and has been adopted in the American service with the most beneficial results. It is only by a distinct branch of officers, without any partialities for particular corps, that proper inspections can be made, and the actual condition of the Army, whether it respects the improvement of the personel, or the quality and condition of the material, be faithfully presented to the Executive. Nothing contributes so effectually to the perfection of a military organization as a separation of the different departments of an army. Field officers of regiments should be answerable only for their diseipline and improvement. Impartial inspections by a distinct competent branch of the general staff, can alone determine how far these duties are faithfully discharged.

experience, necessary for the chief of that department, which can only, in time of peace, receive such an organization as will prepare it for the operations of war. The only difference to be made in time of war in this, as in all the departments of the Army, ought to be, the increased number of the inferior members.

It is essential to the organization of every branch of the Army, that there should be a chain of communication between the chief and the inferior officers. By dismissing the assistants, who rank only as Majors, the very imperfect link now existing between the chief of the Quartermaster's department and his subordinate officers, is entirely destroyed.

It must be known to every one at all conversant with the subject, that this department requires a sort of talent not often to be met with; that a just system of economy can only be enforced by active and experienced officers; and that it requires no ordinary degree of foresight, prudence, and knowledge of mankind, to conduct with ability the heavy and varied expenditures of the Quartermaster's department; a department which, in addition to certain regular defined duties, acts on every emergency, which must be prepared to make good every deficiency, so as to perfect the whole military system.

Few officers, properly qualified for the discharge of the duties of Quartermaster, will encounter the responsibilities devolving upon Assistant Deputy Quartermaster, without the prospect of future advancement. That organization is imperfect, and must operate unfavorably on the public service, which does not form a school for talent and ability in the inferior grades to qualify themselves for the more distinguished and extensively useful stations.

The Quartermaster's department possesses, in cies occur, the Assistant Deputies may be made some degree, such an organization. As vacanAssistant Quartermasters, with the rank of Majors, and from thence be promoted to be chiefs, if they are found to possess the requisite talent and ability.

chief to a Colonel, and confides the duties of that The bill destroys that organization, reduces the department to selections from the line, with no additional rank, and with very inadequate compensation for the responsibilities incurred.

The alleged motives for the changes proposed by this bill are-retrenchments in the expenditure of the Military Establishment. The amount to be saved by the provisions of the bill, are stated by the Paymaster General to be

The actual saving by the reduction of the general staff is but $22,207; and for this sum the whole military organization is to be disturbed, and the Peace Establishment rendered inefficient for the objects for which alone it ought to be maintained. The amount deducted from the pay of staff officers, so as to equalize it with that of the infantry, is too inconsiderable to authorize a change so unjust. Their duties expose them to increased expenses.

APRIL, 1822.

commanders, acquired at the cost of so much blood and treasure.

A striking illustration of what I have advanced may be drawn from the history of the wars that grew out of the French revolution. At the commencement of the revolution, the emigration of the nobility had left the French army almost without officers, the strong excitement of that moment armed thousands in the cause of their country, the citizens of the new republic flocked in crowds to defend the frontiers. Numbers and enthusiasm made up for the want of talent and experience in the commanders. They repelled the invaders, but with an immense loss of men when compared with that of the disciplined bands opposed to them, a loss almost incredible.

In the midst of this scene of carnage, and after two years of war, such men as Pichegru, Moreau, Kleber, and others, were distinguished from the crowd; but their military education was formed at the expense of torrents of blood. About this period the army of the Republic, exhausted by the immense losses they had suffered, required to be recruited; but the citizens, discouraged by the pro

The amount proposed to be saved by the ninth section is, in fact, merely a reduction in the number of rank and file in service. I have, however, no objection to it.

The amount to be saved by dismissing the ordnance men is conjectural. In my opinion that measure will augment the expense of that branch of the service. Hired labor must be resorted to at an increased cost; but, as that subject is now before the committee we shall not dwell upon it.

The present staff and officers of the Army are, as I have before observed, organized at the minimum, and ought rather to be increased than diminished. I am in favor of a numerous staff, and of maintaining, in time of peace, more officers than are absolutely requisite for the duties of their respective commands, with a view to the organization of a more numerous army in time of war. I am aware that military writers were divided on this question. I say were, for all modern writers, since the art has been perfected, åre united in favor of maintaining constantly what the French technically call frames of an army-what we call the skeleton of an army.

Of all the elements that compose an army, the soldier is the only one that can be created in a short time. It is mere technical knowledge he requires, and that very limited. The instruction necessary to form an officer is totally different. It requires not only time and application, but experience, which is to be gained only in the field. It is hardly necessary to recall to the recollection of gentlemen in this Hall, the disasters and disgrace which attended our arms at the commencement of the last war. They are to be traced to the want of organization of the Army-to that defective system to which gentlemen wish to bring us back-and to the inexperience of our officers. The glorious manner of its termination can be attributed only to the talent and experience of our

cers, as the only means in their power to repel the enemy, refused to march to the frontier. Government was compelled to resort to a requisition, and the conscription grew out of these causes.

The advantages of a well-organized staff, and of possessing the frames of an army, are illustrated in an equally striking manner by those wars.

After the destruction of the great French army in Russia, and after the retreat from Moscow, it was reduced to 25,000 men, which took a position behind the Saal. But France possessed a number of experienced officers of every grade, and a well organized staff. In less than six months a new army of 150,000 men was formed of young soldiers, but commanded by experienced officers. This army of recruits was marched into Germany

-was arrayed against the veteran bands of Russia and Prussia, flushed, as they were, with victorybeat them at Lutzen, at Bautzen, and at Wurtzen took up their position on the Óder, and obliged the enemy to conclude an armistice.

These examples ought to warn us of the dangers to which a country is exposed by a defective organization of the military establishment, and convince us of the advantages to be derived from its perfect organization and from a well appointed staff.

If then, this bill be calculated, as I think I have proved, to destroy the organization of the Armyto make it unfit for the only object for which it ought to be maintained-to render it inefficient in time of war, and in that event to involve us again in all the disasters and difficulties attendant on a defective system, I hope the Committee will unhesitatingly reject it.

Mr. STERLING, of New York, rose and remarked, that he had paused, in expectation that some of the friends of the bill would come forward to defend it. But he had waited in vain, and he felt it a duty incumbent upon him to express his sentiments on the subject. He could not agree with

the gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. TATNALL,) that there existed in this country against the Army a general prejudice. The assertion operated as a libel on the people of this nation. He could not believe it possible that they were so lost to gratitude, and the best feelings of the human heart, as to look with an averted eye upon the heroes that defended them in the hour of peril. If there ever was a set of men who deserved the good will and lasting regard of their countrymen, it was the remnant of the Army that has survived the cold and calculating policy that has assailed them. They are covered with honorable scars, and however little their worth may be valued by some, it is a mistaken idea that it is not appreciated by the nation. The question at present is, not whether we shall disband the Army, but whether we shall cut off the heads of that army. It is not whether we shall introduce a graduated system of reduction, but whether we shall lop off the limbs which give it life and energy. And for what? To save a little money. I, too, said Mr. S., am in favor of saving money, but not at the expense of the safety and independence of my country. I, too, am in favor of reform, but it is that reform which builds up, not that which prostrates and destroys. Mr. S. was opposed to the bill, because it introduced into our system, and indicated in our Government, a fluctuating, and, of course, a pernicious policy. What had been the course of our policy in relation to this subject? After the war it was necessary to reduce, and a salutary reduction was made, to ten thousand men. The force thus retained was respectable and efficient-it was popular. We had not then forgotten their services, or the safety of our country. But soon the sufferings and alarm we had endured faded from our recollection. Danger receded, and the tone of the country relaxed. In 1816, it was deemed expedient to reorganize the staff of the Army-it was reduced. In 1818, a further amputation took place. The danger still receding, and the solicitudes of the past being less fresh in the mind, some began to think the Army unpopular; and hence, in 1821, it was again reduced. After all these ordeals, the nation did believe that the Army might rest, for a while at least. Those gallant officers who were still retained, and who had not yet been compelled to seek for employment in the departments of civil life, had reason to expect that they would not be disturbed. But what do we find? Not twelve months had elapsed, before this little band was attacked by resolution after resolution on your table. Mr. S. would by no means doubt the correctness of the motives that had led to their introduction; but he did not believe that such were the temper and feeling of the nation. He did not believe they were in favor of that fluctuating and unsettled policy which builds up one day, and tears down the next-which begins in folly and ends in weakness. It was a policy at war with every sound maxim of legislation, and with all those wholesome rules of government which teach us to confirm its strength by placing it on the most firm and substantial basis. It was ruinous to the Army, and subversive of all discipline, and opposed to

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all correct and economical administration. shows a fickleness and instability in Congress, injurious to its character, and destructive of the confidence of the nation. It destroys all stability and permanency in your Military Establishment. No system of defence can be a good one, unless it is bottomed upon a stable and permanent basis. This wavering policy is destructive to military science, disheartening to all military pride and ambition, and is calculated to drive from your Army the best talents and the most useful acquirements. It savors of persecution and injustice towards those who have fought and bled for the country, and who merit a better fate than is held out to them by these persevering and repeated attempts to shift them off, and throw them upon the world, unfitted by habit to mingle in its toils, and gain a support by its occupations.

"An

But he (Mr. S.) had another objection to this bill. It was presented too early. The period since the last reduction was too short to have fairly tested the experiment, or proved the policy of the old system or of the new. Even the principles of the last reduction were not yet settled, as was well known and fully understood. And still we are again called on to apply the pruning knife, and thrust these men, who have fought our battles, into private life. Is it right in respect to them? Mr. S. contended it was unjust, ungrateful, and oppressive, and he would express the views on which that sentiment was founded. It was unjust, because they will have been deceived should this bill pass. The very title of the act was act to reduce and fix the Military Peace Establishment"-not an act to reduce and unfix it; to set it in motion and to render it uncertain. It was not, indeed, a contract-but it held out good reasons to expect that the establishment was fixed upon a basis as permanent as peace. If this kind of policy then was unjust, it was also ungrateful. Mr. S. was aware, he observed, that it was contended by some, that the principles of gratitude had nothing to do with the policy of Government. To this doctrine, said Mr. S., I cannot assent. Gratitude is not only a correct and noble feeling, but was consistent with the soundest policy, of which this country had set the most splendid examples. If there are any of the corps of officers you purpose to disband, and such there are, whose blood flowed to secure and save your country, is he not entitled to your gratitude? And what but that principle has induced you to pay the pensioners of the Revolutionary war? Rome and Greece raised monuments to their departed heroes, and will you not do justice to the living? Shall we bear, and justly bear, the scorn and sneer of princes and despots, who reproach republics with ingratitude? This wavering policy operates oppressively upon the officers proposed to be reduced and upon one of my constituents (said Mr. S.) upon the commander-in-chief, it bears with a heavy hand. It aims at him a severe and undeserved blow. His situation is peculiar, and demands from his country, not a cold and unfeeling course of policy, but its sympathy and consolation. The hand of affliction is now upon him. The

God of Heaven has seen fit to visit him with a calamity severe and dreadful. And is this the moment for his country to forsake him? Whence has this affliction befallen him? Under Providence, it has originated from his exposures, his sufferings, and his toils, on the Niagara frontier. He there took a disorder which never left him until a more dreadful one set in. In the midst of this affliction, and when health and hope begin to open upon him-when just recovering from the almost fatal stroke, shall he be abandoned, and stripped of honors acquired by his blood, and of emoluments richly earned by the greatest personal and pecuniary sacrifices? I say pecuniary, said Mr. S., as well as personal-for true it is, that, devoting himself to his country and his profession, his private affairs were confided to other hands, and the result is deep and heavy embarrassment. Yes, sir, a handsome estate is deeply encumbered, and the effect of your policy may be to strip from him the remnant of his savings from a life of toil, of enterprise, and the most persevering industry.

Mr. S. was opposed to the bill therefore, because he contended it was impolitic to destroy the office of Major General. That officer was a constituent of the present system, and cannot be removed without deranging and injuring its organization. Our Army, said Mr. S., affords a command equal to that of a Major General, and our forces being scattered throughout numerous posts, strengthens, instead of weakening the argument to retain him. In point of economy, we should lose by abolishing this office. The occasional inspection of an officer of such a grade, so nearly connected with the Government, and to whom the whole Army will look up, will have a powerful influence to preserve discipline, order, and economy, in money and in property. It will save more than the extra expense of the office. If our Army was to be organized on military principles, he contended that this office was essential to its correct regulation and discipline. It was impossible for the Secretary of War to be familiar with all the minutia and details of the Army. By this officer he can be aided in the most effectual and useful manner, and freed from an intolerable burden, which is inconvenient, if not incompatible with the discharge of his other numerous and pressing duties. But this is not all. Your Secretary of War often changes. This deranges and confuses the whole system, unless you have an officer of high grade upon a permanent footing, acquainted with the details of the Army, and responsible for them. This office was also a just reward for high and distinguished services. It excites emulation, and ambition, and gives to the aspirant for military fame something to fix his eye, and stimulate his zeal. It makes the Army more respectable, and adds to the character and dignity of the nation. For these and other reasons, Mr. S. hoped that officer would be retained.

He would not dwell long upon the expediency of disbanding the other officers, as proposed by the bill. That subject had been so fully discussed by the gentlemen who had preceded him, (Messrs. TATNALL and POINSETT,) that he would forbear

APRIL, 1822.

to comment particularly upon them. He briefly reviewed the duties, &c., of the adjutant, surgeon, and inspectors general, and he thought it unwise to legislate out of office men of such distinguished talents and services, without very strong and palpable reasons. In respect to the latter, it was an office as old as the Government, and the substitute proposed was, in his opinion, extremely faulty. It was an office of detail and minutiæ, and required great skill and attention. Two were necessary on account of the posts being so scattered, and the difference between the inspection of infantry and artillery. These inspectors, he observed, travel from one part of the Union to the other, and make to the Government very valuable reports, but the mode of inspecting by field officers was peculiarly improper. They were interested to conceal all the defects in their own regiments, and collusion might easily take place. And would they, he asked, report their own faults and errors? Besides, if they inspect any regiments but their own, they must necessarily leave the latter destitute. If the object is to dispense with the department, then abolish them and save their salaries, and not transfer them where the duties cannot and will not be performed. Mr. S. presented a variety of other considerations with respect to this subject, and thought that the adoption of the proposed plan would go far to ruin the Army. With respect to the office of surgeon general, the object was to save $1,800; and what would be the probable result? You destroy the best arranged part of the Army. You introduce disorder, waste, and confusion, in the place of system and economy. There was no department better organized, or in finer condition, or which has been more fortunate in its results than this. By a renovation of the system, there has been a reduction made in the expenditure, from about seven to three dollars per man. And how has this been accomplished? By introducing system, and order, and responsibility. The Surgeon General is the efficient head of the department. He has now the sole responsibility of purchasing and distributing the medical stores. He knows all the posts where the troops are stationed the climates, the diseases, and the wants. He can tell whether the medicines are suitable for this or that post; the proper quantity and quality; and, with his extensive knowledge of the country and market, can purchase at the lowest prices and at the most suitable places. He is responsible for the whole, and hence the great reduction of expenditure. And shall we now go back to what is essentially the old and wasteful system? Under that, the surgeons of each post made their requisitions for medical stores at their discretion, and the commissary general of purchases directed the supply accordingly. Here was room for waste, and ignorance, and fraud, and by the bill the responsibility will be divided, which must necessarily lead to similar results. Under the present system there had been no defalcations, no lost vouchers. The surgeon general and commissary general have no money, but it goes directly from the Treasury into the hands of those of whom the purchases were made. Mr. S. was opposed to the bill be