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the country and distributed them over its system.1 This is at least four times as many men as were usually hired in order to keep up its force. All this has meant less efficient transportation service and a deterioration in the railway plant. Locomotives have been used longer before sending them in for repairs because of the heavy traffic to be moved; once in the shop, they have received less efficient repairing, and have limped out only to return and repeat the process. Little wonder there should have been such a locomotive shortage during the severe winter of 1917-18.3

These features of the transportation situation have been of sufficient importance to account for the inability of the carriers to meet the demands made upon them in the last two years. There is danger, therefore, that the war will receive much more consideration than it deserves as a direct cause of the inadequacy of our transportation facilities. The items above mentioned have received much attention in the press, while other less conspicuous but more fundamental factors, because more permanent, have not received the serious con

1 Annual Report, 1917, p. 5. President Rea observed, "The employment and training of these men was costly and seriously hampered operations, because many of them remained only a short time in the service." Ibid., loc. cit.

The Railway Age, March 8, 1918, p. 490, states the number of new men hired by the Pennsylvania Railroad in 1917 as 177,000, and says " This is at least four times the number of men that had been taken on new in any previous year."

"The railways of the United States engaged in Interstate Commerce employ about 1,800,000 persons. If we include interurban and street railways, the number is increased to over two million. Now conceive, if you will, a great map of the United States on which each of these employees is represented by a tiny electric light. Some are moving along the familiar tangled lines indicating railway systems, but the greater number are stationary and grouped about the large terminals. Everywhere lights are being extinguished, sometimes by death, more often by the resignation or discharge of an employee; and everywhere new lights are appearing as new employees are hired. Five times a minute, 300 times an hour, 7200 times a day, employees are being lost and replaced. These figures are assumptions only, but they are conservative and probably far below the facts." From an article, " Mobilizing Intelligence on American Railroads," by Norman Collyer of the Southern Pacific Railway, in Railway Age, February 22, 1918, pp. 419-421.

See ibid., April 5, 1918, pp. 907, 908. Both the lack of men to do repair work and the character of the repair work done are reflected in the 1917 report of the Inspector of Locomotives to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

sideration to which they are entitled. Furthermore, in our regulation of railways in normal times, the charge which should be made for service has been emphasized. The character of the service itself has received too little attention. It is therefore pertinent to inquire to what extent the transportation facilities of this country were inadequate even before the world war; to try to discover the causes for this condition of affairs; to examine the consequences of such inadequacy; and, finally, to suggest wherein our regulation and control of railways in future should give more attention to the sufficiency and efficiency of the service. Such a study of our transportation system is of value whether, as a result of the war, we have government ownership, or whether the roads be returned to their owners.

The extent to which the American transportation system has failed at times in the past to meet the demands made upon it, is very difficult to measure. Statistics of so-called car shortage register in a general way the inability of the railroads to move traffic which is offered to them; but, as will appear later, the popular view is narrow in assuming that the inability of carriers to meet the demands made upon them is necessarily due to a shortage of equipment. In January, 1907, the American Railway Association began the publication of statistics of car shortage. Table I (Appendix, p. 175,

1 See statement of Commissioner McChord, before National Association Railway Commissioners. Proceedings, 1908, p. 15.

Fifty of the largest companies were chosen and asked to give facts concerning car shortages and car surpluses. The first report was made on January 2, 1907; the second on February 6, 1908. By that time the committee was so discouraged by the large car shortage that they did not make up another report until April, 1908. Then the American Railway Association met and instructed the committee to secure statistics every two weeks. These instructions were carried out after that with the exception of the period from October 15 to February 1, 1915, when the car surplusage was so great and railroad depression so marked that the American Railway Association temporarily discontinued the compilation as a matter of economy. After February 1, 1915, the statistics were compiled once each month by the Association. The U. S. Railroad Admin

infra) gives these statistics from January 2, 1907, through 1917. This table indicates the ability of the railroads to furnish equipment in various years and during certain seasons of the year. It will be observed from the column marked "Net Shortage" that conditions were acute in January and February of 1907; that the net shortage disappeared in July, 1907, and appeared again in September of that year and continued until the latter part of November. No net shortage appeared again until November of 1909, and then only to a minor extent. Not until the fall and winter of 1912 was there another net shortage, which was only a little less severe than that of the corresponding period of 1907, but it continued somewhat longer than in 1907. With the exception of a slight scarcity for about a month in the fall of 1913, no further net shortage appeared until the first of March, 1916. This continued for that month only; but was followed by another shortage beginning in September, which has continued since with varying degrees of intensity.

Examination of Table I and Chart I (based on data in Table I) shows that it is unusual for any car shortage to occur in the spring months and that it is heaviest during the autumn. The figures show that in April, 1908, there was a surplus of equipment of 413,338 cars; that from November, 1913, to March, 1916, there was a continuous surplus of equipment, the number reaching 200,000 even in the month of October, 1914, when the American Railway Association as an economy measure discontinued its statistics. When the Association resumed the colistration has not continued these statistics. See Proceedings National Association Railway Commissioners, 1908, p. 43. The figures in Table I have been taken from American Railway Association Bulletin No. 6, February 6, 1917, and from various later bulletins. Many valuable statistics also in Proceedings American Railway Association, vol. vii, pp. 522-575. See also House Report No. 1553, 64th Congress, 2nd Session, to accompany H. R. 20352, pp. 1-12.

1 Statistics as given in Table I have not been continued since the railroads were taken over by the government.

lection of statistics on February 1, 1915, the surplus amounted to over 279,000. The shortage after the spring of 1916, as is well known, was coincident with a heavy war traffic.

Statistics of car location indicate that certain sections of the United States suffer much more than others on account of car shortage. For example, box cars considerably in excess of ownership were on the lines serving what are known as New England, Southeastern,

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Trunk Line and Central Freight Association territories, represented on Map I as groups 1, 2, 3, and 4. All the other groups were deficient in this class of equipment in comparison with their ownership. Southern, Southeastern and Trunk Line territory, represented by groups 2, 4, and 5 on Map II, are the sections that had less

1 Car location statements are given in Proceedings of American Railway Association, vol. vii, pp. 524-575. More recent statistics were presented by F. B. Dow, attorney for Interstate Commerce Commission in Hearings on Senate Bill (636), May 3, 1917. Statistics formerly published by American Railway Association are now published bi-monthly by the U. S. Railroad Administration.

2 Maps from testimony of Dow, ibid., loc. cit.

[graphic]

MINOR

CARRIERS

ALL GROUPS

CAR LOCATIONS

Roman figures represent the number of cars on line in excess of ownership (EXCESS).

Boldface figures represent the number of cars owned in excess of the number on line (DEFICIENCY).

MONTHLY, NOVEMBER 15, 1916, TO APRIL 15, 1917

11, Canada.

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