ABANDONMENT.-See COMMON CARRIER, 1.
ACCEPTANCE.-See ESTOPPEL, 3.
ACCIDENT INSURANCE.-See INSURANCE, 3.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT.
1. ADOPTION VALIDATES VOID DEED.-A widow by re-acknowledging
a deed executed by her while married, and therefore void, gives it
full validity and force. Riggs vs. Boylan, 445.
2. RE-SIGNATURE NOT ESSENTIAL.-It is not necessary that she re-sign
the deed; it is sufficient that she acknowledge it to be her deed. Id.
ADMIRALTY.
1. JURISDICTION.—A person who in one state advances money to release
a boat belonging in another state from the possession of the marshal
for the former state, has a lien upon the money so advanced which
he can enforce in rem in a court of admiralty. The Hoyle, 234.
2. AFFIDAVIT.-There is no rule in admiralty, in the District Court for
Indiana, requiring that libels in rem in civil causes shall be support-
ed by the affivavit of the libellant. Id.
3. Libels in civil actions in rem need not state the occupation and resi-
dence of the libellant.
4. JURISDICTION ON OHIO RIVER.-The admiralty jurisdiction of the
national courts extends over the river Ohio. The Lewellen, 156.
5. POWER OF CONGRESS.-The power granted by the Constitution to
Congress "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among
the several states," includes the authority, not only to pass laws reg-
ulating trade, but also navigation and intercourse. Id.
6. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION.-The United States district courts have ex-
clusive original jurisdiction of all civil causes of admiralty and mari.
time cognizance. Id.
7. The act of July 4, 1864, must be regarded as a navigation law. Id.
8. NEGLECT TO PUT SYNOPSES OF LAWS ON STEAMER-PENALTY.—A pro-
ceeding in rem is the proper mode of prosecution for the violation
of the 8th section of the act of July 4, 1864, charging a neglect to
post up in conspicuous places in a steamer, synopses of the laws re-
lating to the carriage of passengers, as required by that section. Id.
9. PRACTICE-SEIZURE.-In proceedings in rem against vessels for pen-
alties and forfeitures under acts of Congress, it is a general rnle that
a seizure of the vessels must precede the filing of the libel, in order
to give jurisdiction to the court; and that consequently such prece-
dent seizure must be averred in the libel. But if, under the act of
Congress, the owners execute delivery bonds, they thereby waive the
objection of the want of a prior seizure. Id.
10. DUTY OF STEAMER AS TO POSTING SYNOPSES OF LAWS.-The act of
July 4, 1864, requiring that two copies of the synopsis of the laws re-
lating to passengers on steamers, shall be posted up in every licensed
and enrolled vessel carrying passengers, one copy thus posted up is
no defense against a prosecution for a violation of the act. Id.
11. Held, also, that if the owners of the steamer could not procure copies
of the synopsis elsewhere, they were bound, at their peril, to apply
for them to the Secretary of the Treasury; and that if they failed to
do so, and proceeded on a voyage without the copies, the penalty
was thereby incurred. Id.
12. DELIVERY FROM WAREHOUSE-WHEN COMPLETE.
wheat from a warehouse through a pipe into a vessel, the duty of
the warehouseman is complete, and his liability ended, with the dis-
charge of the wheat into the pipe. The R. G. Winslow, 13.
13. MASTER'S DUTY IN LOADING.-The duties of the master extend to all
that relates to the loading of the cargo, and the vessel is liable for
his faithful performance. It is his business to arrange the pipe and
trim the vessel.
14. For any wheat lost by the careening of the vessel and consequent
parting of the pipe, the vessel is liable. Id.
15. NAME ON STEAMER.-For a violation of the act of Congress of May
5, 1864, requiring steamers to have their names painted conspicuous-
ly on their wheel and pilot houses, the proper remedy is a proceed-
ing in rem. The Lewellen, 167.
16. PENALTY. This act should not be interpreted as giving the same form
of remedy as that of December 31, 1792, but only as giving the same
amount of penalty. Id.
17. PRACTICE-DELIVERY BOND.-The execution of a delivery bond un-
der the act of March 3, 1847, is a waiver of the objection that a seiz-
ure of the vessel should precede the filing of the libel, and that no
seizure had been made. Id.
18. COLLISION WITH VESSEL AT DOCK.-A canal-boat moored at a certain
dock by the order of the harbor-master is lawfully there, even
though it be at a narrow place in the river. The Monitor, 503.
19. DUTY OF TUG.-A tug with a tow must maneuver cautiously and pru-
dently; and suction of the water from a passing vessel is one of those
natural incidents which she must guard against. Id.
20. COLLISION.-What degree of care must be used on rivers in the navi
gation of steamboats, in order to avoid collisions? The Morning
Star,
21. TOW-BOAT DOES NOT VIOLATE HER LICENSE BY CARRYING A SINGLE
PASSENGER.-Uuder the navigation laws of the United States re-
quiring different licenses for passenger boats and tow-boats, a boat
licensed as a tow-boat does not violate those laws by carrying a
single passenger, and does not, for that cause, lose her redress for an
injury done her by a collision. Id.
22. DUTY OF TUG IN A FOG.-A steam tug is not within the rule pre-
scribed by the board of supervising inspectors under the act of Con-
gress requiring a steamer when running in a fog to sound her fog
whistle. But it may often be her duty to do so under general prin-
ciples of admiralty law. Id.
23. RULES PRESCRIBED BY BOARD OF SUPERVISING INSPECTORS NOT EX-
CLUSIVE.—The rules prescribed by the board of supervising inspec-
tors touching necessary care in navigation are not exclusive. Under
the general maritime law there are many other rules equally imper-
ative. Id.
24. NEGLIGENCE-APPORTIONMENT.-If the navigators of a vessel by
their negligence directly contribute to her injury by a collision, her
owner cannot recover the full amount of his loss. If both boats are
in fault, the damage is apportioned. Id.
25. LOOKOUT.-It seems that, in navigating our rivers, a lookout at the
stern of the vessel is not required, except when she is backing. Id.
26. ESTIMATING DAMAGES.-In measuring damages in a case of collision,
all the direct and immediate consequences should be considered. Id.
27. DAMAGES FOR DETENTION.-In settling the amount of the damages
in a case of collision, the detention of the injured vessel while un-
dergoing repairs ought to be regarded. Id.
28. A steamer, while towing four barges laden with goods, suffered an
injury by a collision with another steamer. The libel did not state
to whom the barges and goods they carried belonged. Held, that
the libellant could not recover for the delay to the barges and their
lading occasioned by the collision. Id.
29. INTEREST-WHEN ALLOWED.-On damages sustained by a collision,
interest should be allowed from the day on which the injury hap-
pened till the day when judgment is rendered. Id.
30. DUTY OF TUG-Tow.-The measure of a tug's duty is reasonable dili-
gence and ordinary skill. The tug is not an insurer of the safety of
the tow nor held to the highest nautical skill. The Tug Mosher, 274.
31. KNOWLEDGE OF CHANNEL.-The tug is bound to know the ordinary
proper channel, but the responsibility is changed where the channel
is shifting. Id.
32. A schooner having taken the chances of entering, in a storm, a har
bor with a shifting channel, the tug is not to be held responsible, in
the absense of proof of negligence, if the schooner touches some
ridge of sand. Id.
33. DUTY AFTER STRANDING.-The tug is only bound to employ those
means consistent with her own safety; she is not obliged to lay by
the tow when that would endanger herself. Id.
34. LIABILITY OF CITY FOR OBSTRUCTIONS IN RIVER.-If a city under-
takes to remove obstructions from a river, which it is under no le-
gal obligation to remove, and abandons the work without having
changed the status of the obstruction, it does not become liable for
subsequent damages caused by such obstruction. The city by as-
suming such a work does not assume any new liability.
vs. City of Chicago, 18.
USTIFICATION BY SURETY.-The affidavit of the surety on an appeal bond,
as to his responsibility, where he does not personally appear, is not
sufficient; there must be independent evidence of his responsibility.
Hobson vs. Johnson, 505.
ARREST.-See PRACTICE, 15-17-BANKRUPTCY, 37.
ASSESSMENT.-See TAXATION.
ASSIGNEE.-See PAYMENT, 3-JUDGMENT, 2-BILLS, NOTES AND
CHECKS, 9.
ASSIGNEE IN BANKRUPTCY.-See BANKRUPTCY, 4, 5, 12, 17.
ASSIGNMENT.-See BILLS NOTES AND CHECKS, 9.
1. JUDGMENT-How ASSIGNABLE.—In Indiana judgments are assignable
by indorsement on the records of them, attested by the clerk. Cav-
ender vs. Grove, 269.
2. PAYMENT TO ASSIGNOR.-Judgment may be assigned otherwise than
of record. But in such case any payment or satisfaction of the
judgment made to the assignor before the defendant has notice of
the assignment, is valid. Id.
SALE UNDER ATTACHMENT.-Under the statutes of Indiana of 1838, in a
proceeding in foreign attachment where there was only constructive
notice to the defendant, and where he did not appear to the action,
no personal judgment could be rendered against him. In such a case,
the judgment should have been simply for a sale of the property at-
tached. And the only writ that could issue on such a judgment was
a venditioni exponas. A sale on a fieri facias issued on such a judg-
ment is void. Wyman vs. Russell, 307.
ATTACHMENT FOR CONTEMPT.-See PRACTICE, 10-18.
ATTORNEY'S FEES.-See FEES.
1. PLEDGE.-To render a pledge valid, the thing pledged must, in gener-
al, be delivered to the pledgee. But to this rule there are exceptions.
In re Wiley, 171.
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