The Monitor.

bankrupt has concealed this property) there must have been on his part a voluntary concealment of property; that is to say, he must have had the property, knowing that he had it, and he must have concealed it. The language of the law means to hide, to secrete. I apprehend that there can be no doubt that where a man owns property of which he has no knowledge, as often happens, that the fact that he did not put it in his schedule would not prevent his discharge.

There being no other ground of opposition, the discharge will be issued.

Consult In re Robert H. Shoemaker, ante page 245, and notes to same. [Reporter.

THE MONITOR.

DISTRICT COURT.-NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.—

JULY, 1868.

IN ADMIRALTY.

1. COLLISION WITH VESSEL AT DOCK.-A canal-boat moored at a cer. tain dock by the order of the harbor-master is lawfully there, even though it be at a narrow place in the river.

2. DUTY OF TUG.-A tug with a tow must maneuver cautiously and prudently; and suction of the water from a passing vessel is one of those natural incidents which she must guard against.

DRUMMOND, J.-The canal-boat Preston, which the libellant owned, was, at the time of the collision, at the dock below the tunnel passage, as it is called, in the Chicago river, at Washington street, or was in the act of getting to the dock. On the part of the libellant's witnesses it is asserted that

The Monitor.

the canal-boat was at the dock below the tunnel passage. On the part of the defense several of the witnesses state that the canal-boat was in the passage when the Monitor, having in tow the bark John Bell, came up the river, and the John Bell came in collision with the canal-boat.

Whichever hypothesis be true,-whether she was in or below the passage moored at the dock,-I think that the libellant is entitled to recover, because the canal-boat had a right to pass down through the tunnel passage, and it had a right to be moored at the dock, because the harbor-master had given express instructions for mooring the canal-boat at that place; therefore, the canal-boat was in a lawful position, or acting lawfully, and it was the duty of the Monitor to avoid coming in collision. If the canal-boat was in the passage they should have held up entirely, or should have gone so slowly as to have rendered the collision of no consequence; or if she was at the dock, of course it was the duty of the Monitor to avoid the collision.

Which is liable? I confess that I have not seen anything in the evidence to satisfy me that there was any fault on the part of the John Bell. Taking the proof as it is, she followed the Monitor in tow.

The collision might have been the result, as it is claimed, of the suction of the water forced by the passage of the Bell; but that is one of those natural incidents which the tug was bound to guard against just as much as anything else in such a narrow passage, and it is a lesson which these tugs must learn if this court can teach it to them,-that they, in going through these dangerous, critical places, must use greater precautions than they do; and there is nothing that will teach them except compelling them to pay. It was clear to those who had charge of the tug that there was a canal-boat there. It was in open daylight. There was nothing to prevent them from seeing what was there, and instead of taking care to guard against it. they rushed headlong at an ordinary rate of speed, and let the weakest take care of

Hobson vs. Johnson.

herself. That is a rule that will not do in such a narrow thoroughfare as the Chicago river, and especially when they were tunneling the river. The tugs must be more careful. It is not a question whether they will get through with a tow and be ready five, ten, or fifteen minutes sooner to take another, but when they are engaged in their business they must do it carefully, cautiously, and prudently, with regard to the rights of others. I have no doubtof the liability of the tug. Decree for Libellant.

As to the caution required of a tug moving in a crowded harbor, see The Little Giant, Vol. 2 of this Series, 23, and The Alleghany, Id., 29.—[Reporter.

HOBSON vs. JOHNSON.

CIRCUIT COURT.-NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.-OCTOBER,

1868.

JUSTIFICATION BY SURETY.-The affidavit of the surety on an appeal bond, as to his responsibility, where he does not personally appear, is not sufficient; there must be independent evidence of his responsibility.

Defendant's attorney presented an appeal bond signed by himself and sureties, all resident in Lee county, Illinois.

DRUMMOND, J.-Where a bond is given by a person at a distance it should be accompanied by the certificate of an officer who has knowledge of the party. It is not sufficient to present the affidavit of the surety. If counsel will satisfy me of the responsibility of the parties by any one the court can examine as to their pecuniary condition, then I would accept the bond. I have never been in the habit of accepting a

In re O'Mara.

bond upon the affidavit of the surety, unless there is no objection. If there is objection made, there must be independent evidence - evidence of a reliable person who is acquainted with the pecuniary circumstances and condition of the parties.

In re MICHAEL O'MARA.

DISTRICT COURT.-NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.-OCTOBER, 1868.

IN BANKRUPTCY.

Where a bankrupt is under arrest under process from a state court, he should make application to that court, before coming into the court of bankruptcy to obtain his release. This practice is less likely to produce

conflict of jurisdiction.

Motion to discharge the bankrupt from arrest on ca. sa. issued from the Circuit Court of Cook County.

DRUMMOND, J.-I do not at present feel inclined to make an order in the case. I wish, in all cases, to avoid a conflict. of jurisdiction. Where a man is arrested under the authority of a state court, the application should in the first instance be made in the state court for his discharge, not only on grounds that the state law will warrant, but on the ground that the bankrupt law authorizes his discharge. It is not necessary that the party should apply here. I suppose that the bankrupt law applies to all courts. I do not like to have

Bank of Danville vs. Travers.

any conflict of jurisdiction.

I was obliged in one instance, where an application was made to a state court and refused, to grant an order; but that was done by consent when the court intimated an opinion upon the subject.1

The question is suspended, so that the counsel may renew upon notice.

BANK OF DANVILLE vs. ELIZA TRAVERS.

CIRCUIT COURT.-NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.-DECEMBER, 1868.

IN CHANCERY.

A motion to suppress depositions for irregularity comes too late when they have been on file for three years.

Motion to suppress depositions for insufficiency of the notarial certificate, the depositions having been returned and opened in July, 1865.

J. H. Knowlton, for the motion.

DRUMMOND, J.-I think after a cause is set down for hearing, and the deposition has been on file for three years, it is too late to move to exclude it on a technical ground.