Detroit-Detroit Board of Trade v. Grand T. Ry., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 701

(1888).

Hartford-Hartford & N. Y. T. Co. v. New York & N. E. R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 314 (1887).

Hartwell, Ga.-McMullan v. Richmond & D. R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 483 (1887).

Hot Springs, N. C.-Hot Springs v. Western N. C. R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 316 (1887).

Hudson, Minn.-Fulton v. Chicago, S. P., M. & O. Ry., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 375 (1887).

La Grange-Calloway v. Louisville & N. R. R., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 431 (1897).

Lincoln, Neb.-Lincoln Board of Trade v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 647 (1887); Lincoln Board of Trade v. Union Pac. Ry., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 702 (1888).

Marshallville, Ga.-Slappey v. Central R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 812

(1888).

Memphis-Re Louisville & N. R. R., 4 Int. Com. Rep. 157 (1892).

Milwaukee Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce v. Flint & P. M. R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 792 (1888).

Minneapolis-Re St. Louis Millers' Assoc., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 22 (1887). Myrick, Mo.-McGrew v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 630 (1901). New Orleans-New Orleans Cotton Exch. v. New Orleans, C. & T. P. Ry., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 648 (1887).

New York-New York Produce Exch. v. Baltimore & O. R. R., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 612 (1898).

Norfolk, Neb.-Johnson v. Chicago, S. P., M. & O. Ry., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 221 (1899).

Opelika, Ala.-Harwell v. Columbus & W. Ry., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 631, 1 I. C. C. 236 (1887).

Phillipstown-Allegheny R. C. P. Assoc. v. Allegheny Valley R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 604 (1887).

Providence Providence Coal Co. v. Providence & W. R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 363 (1887).

Savannah-Savannah Bureau of F. & T. v. Charleston & S. Ry., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 458 (1897).

Sioux City-Grain Shippers' Assoc. v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 158 (1899).

Tifton, Ga.-Tifton v. Louisville & N. R. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 160 (1902). Walla Walla-Evans v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 641

(1887).

West Virginia-National W. L. D. Assoc. v. Norfolk & W. R. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 87 (1901).

Wichita Wichita v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 507,

534 (1903); Wichita v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 569 (1905); Wichita v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 35 (1904).

Wilmington, N. C.-Hilton Lumber Co. v. Wilmington & W. R. R., 9 T. C. C. Rep. 17 (1901); Dewey v. Baltimore & O. R. R., 11 I. C. C. Rep. 475 (1905).

TOPIC B-SUBSTANTIALLY

SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES AND

CONDITIONS.

[See, generally, Chapter XIX.]

982. Substantial difference of conditions.

Circumstances which reasonably compel a carrier to make a difference in his rates between two places will prevent the difference from being illegal. Thus anything which increases the cost of service at a certain place will justify a higher rate. This was held in cases where the increased cost was caused by unusual grades and difficulty of operation: Brockway v. Ulster & D. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 21 (1898); by the necessity of crossing a river on a toll bridge: Freight Bureau v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 180 (1897); Commercial Club v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 386 (1897); and by heavy terminal charges. Rice v. Western N. Y. & P. Ry., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 298, 2 I. C. C. 389 (1888). So a higher rate may be maintained to a branch-line point than to neighboring stations on the main line. Lehmann v. Texas & P. Ry., 3 Int. Com. Rep. 706, 5 I. C. C. 44 (1891). Other circumstances than cost to the carrier may be considered. So where a station is situated over a mile from the business center of a city, free cartage is justified, though it is not given in a neighboring city where the station is near the business center. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Detroit, G. H. & M. Ry., 167 U. S. 633 (1897).

On the other hand, circumstances are not so dissimilar as to justify a preference because the city preferred has subscribed toward building the road. Lincoln Board of Trade v. Burlington & M. R. R. R., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 95, 2 I. C. C. 147 (1888). Or because the preferred city is much larger and has more important and extensive business interests than the other. Troy Board of Trade v. Alabama M. Ry., 4 Int. Com. Rep. 348, 6 I. C. C. 1 (1894). Nor is a preference permitted because the railroad is poor and will only thus be able to earn a proper return. Brewer v. Louisville & N. R. R., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 224 (1897). Or its line is long and circuitous and it is obliged to make the concession in order to share the traffic. Boston & A. R. R. v. Boston & L. R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 500, 1 I. C. C. 158 (1887).

Even if a preference is justified, the amount of it must be no greater

than is required by the conditions. Brady v. Pennsylvania R. R., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 78, 2 I. C. C. 131 (1888).

§ 983. Competition.

It is now well settled that competition with other carriers at a certain point justifies a lower rate at that point than at neighboring non-competitive points. The Interstate Commerce Commission at first allowed this with some reluctance, though on the whole, following the English authorities, they allowed it to be considered; but the matter is now settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court, which allow competition full play. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 184, 16 Sup. Ct. 700, 40 L. Ed. 935, B. & W. 424 (1896); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland Ry., 168 U. S. 144, 18 Sup. Ct. 45, 42 L. Ed. 414, B. & W. 433 (1897); Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Behlmer, 175 U. S. 648, 20 Sup. Ct. 209, 44 L. Ed. 309 (1900); East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 181 U. S. 1, 21 Sup. Ct. 516, 45 L. Ed. 719 (1901); Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. 666, 40 L. Ed. 940 (1896); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 190 U. S. 273, 23 Sup. Ct. 687, 47 L. Ed. 1047 (1903); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 120 Fed. 934, 57 C. C. A. 224 (1903); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, P. & V. R. R., 124 Fed. 624 (1903); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago G. W. Ry., 141 Fed. 1003 (1905); Savannah Bureau v. Charleston & S. Ry., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 458 (1897); Cattle Raisers' Assoc. v. Fort Worth & D. C. Ry., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 513 (1898); Ulric & Lake Shore & M. S. R. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 495 (1903); Wichita v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 558 (1903); Wichita v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 9 I. C. C. 569 (1903); G. C. Pratt Lumber Co. v. Chicago, I. & LR.y., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 29 (1904); Chattanooga Chamber of Commerce v. Southern Ry., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 111 (1904); Aberdeen Group Com. Assoc. v. Mobile & O. Ry., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 289 (1904); Charlotte Shippers' Assoc. v. Southern Ry., 11 I. C. C. Rep. 108 (1905); Spiegle v. Chesapeake & O. Ry., 11 I. C. C. Rep. 367 (1905); Griffin Grocery Co. v. Southern Ry., 11 I. C. C. Rep. 522 (1906). But the amount of discrimination must be no greater than is necessary to meet the competition, the lower rate must be remunerative and the higher rate reasonable. Grain Shippers' Assoc. v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 158 (1899); Holdzkom v. Michigan Cent. R. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 42 (1901); Marten v. Louisville & N. R. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 581 (1903); Gardner v. Southern Ry., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 342 (1904); Mershon S. P. & Co. v. Central R. R., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 456 (1905); Lehmann-Higginson Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 460 (1905); Cannon Falls F. E. Co. v. Chicago G. W. Ry., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 650 (1905). Efforts have been made to limit this rule, as by estimating the

force of the competition, but they seem to have been unsuccessful. See George Tileston Milling Co. v. Northern Pac. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 346 (1899). As between two points where there is free competition there must be no discrimination. Dawson Board of Trade v. Central of Georgia R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 142 (1899); Hilton Lumber Co. v. Wilmington & W. R. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 17 (1901).

TOPIC CLONG AND SHORT HAUL.

[See, generally, Chapter XXV.]

§ 984. General principles governing the section.

The statute forbids the charge of greater rate for longer haul in all cases unless the circumstances are shown to be substantially similar. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Texas & P. Ry., 31 Fed. 862 (1887); Re Southern R. & S. Assoc., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 278 (1887); Calloway v. Louisville & N. R. R., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 431 (1897). It is not a violation of the act to charge the same for the short as for the longer haul. Milk Producers' Assoc. v. Delaware L. & W. R. R., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 92 (1897). The charge is for transportation; demurrage charges are not included in this section. Pennsylvania Millers' State Assoc. v. Philadelphia & R. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 531 (1900). Nor is it to be determined by the proportion of a through rate received. Imperial Coal Co. v. Pittsburgh & L. E. Ry., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 436 (1889).

The question whether a haul is shorter or longer should be determined by the length of the shortest route in each case. Ulric v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 495 (1903). See Hill v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 343 (1895).

Though the long and short haul section does not apply because of dissimilar circumstances the preceeding sections of the act apply. Re Louisville & N. R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 278 (1887).

That there is a greater market for the commodity at the longer than at the shorter distance point does not create a substantial dissimilarity in circumstances and conditions. Fewell v. Richmond & D. R. R., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 354 (1897). Nor do joint tariffs nor an arrangement by the carriers with a wagon transportation company extending through lines to points not reached by railroads. Cary v. Eureka Springs Ry., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 286 (1897). But where two railroad companies owning connecting lines of road unite in a joint through tariff, they form for the connected roads a new and independent line, and the through tariff on the joint line is not the standard by which the separate tariff of either company is to be measured in determining whether such separate tariff violates the long and short haul clause. Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Osborne, 52 Fed. 912, 3 C. C. A. 347 (1892) reversing Osborne v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 48 Fed. 49 (1891). and Junod v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 47 Fed. 290 (1891); United States v. Mellen, 53 Fed. 229 (1892).

§ 985. Competition.

As is the case with section 3 of the act (ante, § 983), competition constitutes a dissimilar circumstance and justifies a less charge for the longer than for the shorter haul. This has been so thoroughly established by the decisions of the Supreme ourt that the earlier holdings of the Commission are unimportant. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland Ry., 168 U. S. 144, 42 L. Ed. 414, 18 Sup. Ct. 45, B. & W. 433 (1897); East Tenn. V. & G. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 181 U. S. 1, 45 L. Ed. 719, 21 Sup. Ct. 516 (1901); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Clyde S. S. Co., 181 U. S. 29, 45 L. Ed. 729, 21 Sup. Ct. 512 (1901); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. R., 190 U. S. 273, 47 L. Ed. 1047, 23 Sup. Ct. 687 (1903); Ex parte Koehler, 31 Fed. 315 (1887); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Southern Ry., 105 Fed. 703 (1900); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Southern Ry., 122 Fed. 800 (1903); Rocky Hill Buggy Co. v. Southern Ry., 11 I. C. C. Rep. 229 (1905).

The competition may be that of other carriers subject to the act. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Clyde S. S. Co., 181 U. S. 29, 45 L. Ed. 729, 21 Sup. Ct. 512 (1901). And it is effective for the purpose, though there was once competition at the non-competitive point which has been prevented by a consolidation of the railroads at that point. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Southern Ry., 117 Fed. 741 (1902). The competition must be real and substantial. East Tennessee V. & G. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 181 U. S. 1, 45 L. Ed. 719, 21 Sup. 516 (1901). The question will be found fully discussed elsewhere (ante, §§ 854-861.)

§ 986. Relief from operation of the section.

The power given by the statute to the Commission to give relief from the long and short haul clause has been made practically useless by the decisions of the courts that where dissimilar circumstances exist it is not

necessary to apply to the Commission for relief. East Tenn. V. & G. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 181 U. S. 1, 45 L. Ed. 719, 21 Sup. Ct. 516 (1901); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 50 Fed. 295 (1892), appeal dismissed 81 Fed. 1005, 26 C. C. A. 685 (1896). The application has accordingly been made of late years only in extraordinary cases, such as failure of crops. Re Fremont E. & M. V. R. R., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 293 (1895); World's Fair, Re Rome, W. & O. R. R., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 328 (1895). Sudden resort to the Klondike. Re Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 593 (1898). No general rule can be laid down for such cases. Re Cincinnati, H. & D. R. R., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 323 (1895).

The act does not authorize the Commission to require exceptions. Thatcher v. Fitchburg R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 356 (1887).