with those to other places in the same part of the country, in order to prevent unjust discrimination. Boards of Trade Union v. Chicago, M. & S. P. Ry., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 608 (1887); Detroit Board of Trade v. Grand Trunk Ry., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 199, 2 I. C. C. 315 (1888); Re Tariffs of Transcontinental Lines, 2 Int. Com. Rep. 203, 2 I. C. C. 324 (1888); Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce v. Flint & P. M. R. R., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 393, 2 I. C. C. 553 (1889); Manufacturers' & J. Union v. Minneapolis & S. L. Ry., 3 Int. Com. Rep. 115, 4 I. C. C. 79 (1890); Lynchburg Board of Trade v. Old Dominion S. S. Co., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 632 (1896); Phillips v. Louisville & N. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 93 (1898). This discrimination may be made in other charges as well as transportation charges; for instance, demurrage charges. Pennsylvania Millers' State Assoc. v. Philadelphia & R. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 531 (1900).

The prejudice is not illegal unless it is undue. New York Produce Exch. v. Baltimore & O. R. R., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 612 (1898). And whether this is the case is a question of fact. United States v. Tozer, 39 Fed. 369, 2 Int. Com. Rep. 597 (1889). In passing upon the question, it is not only legitimate, but proper, to take into consideration, besides the mere differences in charges, various elements, such as the convenience of the public, the fair interest of the carrier, the relative quantities or volume of the traffic involved, the relative cost of the services and profit to the company, and the situation and circumstances of the respective customers with reference to each other. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & O. R. R., 145 U. S. 263, 36 L. Ed. 699, 12 Sup. Ct. 844, 4 Int. Com. Rep. 92 (1892); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago G. W. Ry., 141 Fed. 1003 (1905); Lincoln Board of Trade v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 98, 2 I. C. C. 155 (1888); Tifton v. Louisville & N. R. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 160 (1902).

In order to violate the Act, the prejudice alleged must result from the act of the carrier charged with it. Wilmington Tariff Assoc. v. Cincinnati, P. & V. A. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 118 (1902). A carrier cannot be said to discriminate against a town which it does not reach. Eau Claire Board of Trade v. Chicago, M. & S. P. Ry., 4 Int. Com. Rep. 65, 5 I. C. C. 264 (1892); nor is it responsible for rates made by a connecting road. Crews v. Richmond & D. R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 703, 1 I. C. C. 401 (1888).

§ 974. Distance as a factor in the rate.

In comparing rates from two points to a common destination, distance is the first factor to consider, though it is not controlling or always the most important. As has often been stated, rates are not made on a toumile basis, and they cannot be expected to bear an exact proportion to the distance. La Crosse M. & J. Union v. Chicago, M. & S. P. Ry., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 9, 1 I. C. C. 629 (1888); Business Men's Assoc. v. Chicago, S. P. M. & O R. R., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 41, 2 I. C. C. 52 (1888); Business Men's Assoc.

v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 48, 2 I. C. C. 73 (1888); Lincolu Board of Trade v. Burlington & M. R. R., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 95, 2 I. C. C. 147 (1888); Poughkeepsie Iron Co. v. New York C. & H. R. R. R., 3 Int. Com. Rep. 248, 4 I. C. C. 195 (1890); James & M. B. Co. v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry., 3 Int. Com. Rep. 682 (1891); Board of Railway Comrs. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 304 (1899). If, however, the localities are neighboring ones and the conditions substantially the same distance should govern. James v. East Tenn., V. & G. R. R., 2 Int. Com Rep. 609, 3 I. C. C. 225 (1889); Eau Claire Board of Trade v. Chicago M. & S. P. Ry., 4 Int. Com. Rep. 65, 5 I. C. C. 264 (1892); Hill v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 343 (1895); Brewer v. Louisville & N. R. R., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 224 (1897); Re Alleged Violations of Act, 8 I. C. C. Rep. 290 (1899). In any case the relative difference should not be arbitrary or unreasonable. Toledo Produce Exch. v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. R., 3 Int. Com. Rep. 830, 5 I. C. C. 166 (1891); Gerke Brew. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 4 Int. Com. Rep. 267, 5 I C. C. 596 (1893); Rea v. Mobile & O. Ry., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 43 (1897). The comparative distance should be tested by the distance over the shortest available routes from the place of shipment to the points in question. Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 481 ›(1898). Ante, §§ 622-632.

975. Group rates.

Group rates, by which neighboring stations are grouped with a competitive point and take the same rates, and the Southern system of basingpoints, by which non-competitive stations take the rate to the nearest competitive point plus the local rate thence, are legal, and do not unduly prejudice the non-competitive points. Ante, §§ 633-638. The system of basing-points was held illegal by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Hamilton v. Chattanooga, R. & C. R. R., 3 Int. Com. Rep. 482, 4 I. C. C. 686 (1890); Perry v. Florida, C. & P. R. R., 3 Int. Com. Rep. 740, 5 I. C. C. 97 (1891); Hill v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 343 (1895); Gustin v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 277 (1899); Hampton Board of Trade v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 503 (1900). The Supreme Court has, however, held that practice legal. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. R., 190 U. S. 273, 47 L. Ed. 1047, 23 Sup. Ct. 687 (1903).

976. Difference between through and local rates.

Since a rate for a longer haul may properly be lower in proportion than the rate for a shorter haul, it follows that a through rate over several roads may be proportionally smaller than the local rate over one of the roads; and in the division of a through rate one road may therefore properly accept a smaller amount than it would charge for a carriage only to

or from its terminus. This is not an undue preference against the terminus of its own line. Parsons v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 63 Fed. 903, 11 C. C. A. 489 (1894), affirmed 167 U. S. 447, 42 L. Ed. 231, 17 Sup. Ct. 857 (1897); Tozer v. United States, 52 Fed. 917, 4 Int. Com. Rep. 245 (1892); (C. C.); Crews v. Richmond & D. R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 703, 1 L. C. C. 401 (1888); McMorran v. Grand Trunk Ry., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 604, 3 I. C. C. 252 (1889). And, therefore, the inland portion of export rates may, without due discrimination, be less than the domestic rate. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 197; Kemble v. Boston & A. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 110 (1899); Re Export and Domestic Rates, 8 I. C. C. Rep. 214 (1899); modifying the view earlier expressed in Detroit Board of Trade v. Grand Trunk Ry., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 199, 2 L. C. C. 315 (1888); New York Produce Exch. v. New York, C. & H. R. R., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 553, 3 I. C. C. 137 (1889).

As between two points on a connecting line, it would seem that the carrier should not discriminate, but accept the same amount as its share of the through charge on each. Calloway v. Louisville & N. R. R., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 431 (1897). And similarly if a lower through or export rate is allowed to one station on a railroad a similar rate should be allowed to other stations. Re Export and Domestic Rates, 8 I. C. C. Rep. 214 (1899); Chicago F. P. C. Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 316 (1899).

8977. Equalizing advantages.

A carrier had no right to concern itself with the advantages of one point on its line as against another, or to adjust its tariff so as to equalize the natural advantages between the two places. Localities should not be deprived, through a carrier's adjustment of relative rates, of advantages resulting from their favorable location in respect of cost of raw material supplied from a common source, or of distance to the common market for the finished product, nor of the competitive advantages which the enterprise of its citizens has secured, and upon the strength of which business conditions have grown up. Crews v. Richmond & D. R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 703, 1 I. C. C. 401 (1888); Eau Claire Board of Trade v. Chicago, M. & S. P. Ry., 4 Int. Com. Rep. 65, 5 I. C. C. 264 (1892); Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce v. Great Northern R. R., 4 Int. Com. Rep. 230, 5 I. C. C. 571 (1892); James v. Canadian Pac. R. R., 4 Int. Com. Rep. 274, 5 I. C. C. 612 (1893); Daniels v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 458 (1895); Commercial Club v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 647 (1895); Freight Bureau v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 180 (1897); Danville v. Southern Ry., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 409 (1900); Wichita v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 35 (1904); Central Y. P. Assoc. v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. R., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 193 (1904).

On the other hand, the carrier must not for his own interest disturb the natural advantages of a locality and bar it from competing with other places. Thus, when a carrier makes rates to two competing markets, which

give the one monopoly over the other, because it can secure reshipments from the favored locality and none from the other, it goes beyond serving its fair interest, and disregards the statutory requirement of relative equality as between persons, localities and particular descriptions of traffic. Savannah Bureau of Freight & Transp. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 377 (1899).

And so inequality in treatment of shippers and localities is indefensible where it has no other justification than the diversion by the carrier of through traffic from a shorter route over which it participates in carriage, so as to secure for itself greater aggregate revenue through a long haul by a different route, over which it is also engaged in transportation. Colorado . & I. Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 488 (1895). Nor can railways create artificial differences in market conditions by an arbitrary differential in rates, whereby the product of one section of the country is assigned to one market, and the product of another section of the country to another market. Re Export Rates from Points East and West of Miss. River, 8 I. C. C. Rep. 185 (1899). Ante, §§ 538-542.

978. Discrimination against staple industry of a locality. Prejudice against a locality may arise from rates which while not directed against any particular place have the result of injuring a staple industry of a place. Thus this section is violated and Chicago is prejudiced by an unduly high relative rate on live hogs as against packinghouse products. Chicago Board of Trade v. Chicago & A. R. R., 3 Int. Com. Rep. 233, 4 I. C. C. 158 (1890); Chicago L. S. Exch. v. Chicago G. W. Ry., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 428 (1905). Duluth is prejudiced by a higher rate on shingles than on lumber. Duluth Shingle Co. v. Duluth S. S. & A. Ry., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 489 (1905). Kansas and Missouri River points are prejudiced by a differential against corn products in favor of corn. Board of Railway Comrs. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 304 (1899); In re Rates in Corn & Corn Products, 11 I. C. C. Rep. 212 (1904). So the localities in Official Classification Territory wherein hay and straw are produced were discriminated against by the act of several carriers in advancing those commodities from the sixth to the fifth class, and thereafter charging fifth class rates for transportation. National Hay Assoc. v. Lake Shore & Michigan S. R. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 264 (1902).

§ 979. Milling or compressing in transit.

A carrier may grant to a shipper the right to stop in transit to mill or clean his grain, compress his cotton, or even to search for a local market, and then pursue the journey again, and charge a through rate for the whole transit; and this practice does not unduly prejudice other points. Cowan v. Bond, 39 Fed. 55, 2 Int. Com. Rep. 542 (1889); Listman Mill

Co. v. Chicago, M. & S. P. Ry., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 47 (1898); Re Alleged Unlawful Rates, 8 I. C. C. Rep. 121 (1899); Re Rates and Practices of Mcbile & O. Ry., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 373 (1903); St. Louis H. & G. Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 11 I. C. C. Rep. 486 (1905). In order that this privilege may be legal, the agreement for through carriage must be made at the time of the original shipment. Re Alleged Unlawful Rates, 7 I. C. C. Rep. 240 (1897). And the privilege must be extended to all shippers in a certain section of the country, else that place to which the privilege is not given will be unduly prejudiced. Commercial Club v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 6 I. C. C. 647 (1896); Koch v. Pennsylvania R. R., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 675 (1905).

$980. Discrimination in facilities.

Discrimination against localities may be made in facilities for traffic, as well as in rates. Thus if the time allowed at terminals for loading or unloading is reasonable, and that allowed at interior points is unreasonably small, then an undue prejudice to the interior points may result. Pennsylvania Millers' State Assoc. v. Philadelphia & R. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 531 (1900). So discrimination may result from an unfair distribution of cars in favor of a station. Hawkins v. Wheeling & L. E. Ry., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 212 (1902). From delaying to furnish cars at a station. Hawkins v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 207 (1902). From an unusually early hour of closing the freight station in a certain city. Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce v. Baltimore & O. R. R., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 378 (1905). But there is no discrimination against localities by an arrangement among carriers dividing the traffic of transporting immigrants from Atlantic ports westward in agreed proportions, where the immigrants are transported at domestic published rates. Re Transportation of Immigrants from New York, 10 I. C. C. Rep. 13 (1904).

§ 981. Instances of local discrimination.

The Commission has considered and passed upon claims of local discrimination made by the following localities:

Biloxi-Dunbar v. Louisville & N. R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 592 (1887). Boston-Re Export Trade of Boston, 1 Int. Com. Rep. 18, 23, 25 (1887); Re Fitchburg R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 26 (1887); Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston & A. R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 604 (1887).

Buffalo-Re Grand Trunk Ry., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 496 (1889).
Danville-Danville v. Southern Ry., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 409 (1900).

Dawson-Dawson Board of Trade v. Central of Georgia R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 142 (1899).

Delaware-Delaware State Grange v. New York, P. & N. R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 649 (1887).

Denver-Kindel v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 608 (1900), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 606 (1903).