§ 673. Ticket entitles passenger to carriage for a single jour

ney.

For the reason that the journey is an entirety, the ticket with which a passenger pays his fare is good only for the single journey on which the passenger is then engaged. It is good for any journey which is included within its terms, thus it is good from its starting point to any station short of its destination or from any station between its termini and the point of destination. If presented for use and accepted in payment of fare it is at once used, and cannot be used again. So where a ticket from Buffalo to New York expired on the 26th of September, and the bearer took the train for New York on the evening of that day and his ticket was called for and punched, he had paid his fare for the whole journey, although the train did not reach his destination until the next day.8

§ 674. Passenger cannot take two journeys for a single fare. A passenger cannot for a single fare travel part of the distance for which he has paid his fare upon one train and part on another; for that would be paying for a single journey and really taking two. A stop-over without the payment of an additional fare can be taken only by the express permission of the carrier.9

This law is summarized thus by Mr. Justice Deady in Roberts v. Koehler:10 "A ticket for transportation on a railway between certain termini, which is silent as to the time when or

7 Auerbach v. New York C. & H. R. R. R., 89 N. Y. 281, 42 Am. Rep. 290 (1882).

8 Auerbach v. New York C. & H. R. R. R., 89 N. Y. 281, 42 Am. Rep. 290 (1882).

9 Cheney v. B. & M. R. R., 11 Met. (Mass.) 121, 45 Am. Dec. 190 note (1846); State v. Overton, 24 N. J. Law, 435, 61 Am. Dec. 671 (1854); Cleveland, Col. & Cinn. R. R. v. Bartram, 11 Ohio St. 457 (1860); Vankirk v. Pennsylvania R. R., 76 Pa. 66, 18 Am. Rep. 404 (1874).

10 30 Fed. 94 (1887).

within which it may be used, does not authorize the holder to stop over at any point between such termini, and resume his journey thereon on the next or any following train. The contract involved in the sale and purchase of such a ticket is an entire one, and not divisible. It is a contract to carry the passenger through to the point of his destination as one continuous service, and not by piecemeal, to suit his convenience or pleas

§ 675. Passenger cannot pay two partial fares for a single journey.

For this reason a passenger has no right to split up a single journey into two by tendering fare from the point of departure to an intermediate station, and then, continuing on the train, tender fare from the intermediate station to his destination, even though he might thus secure a cheaper passage by taking advantage of cheaper rates between two of the stations. This point was fully considered in the case of the London & Northwestern Railway v. Hinchcliffe.12 The facts in the case were these: The defendant, intending to travel by a particular train from Huddersfield to Manchester on the plaintiff's railway, took a ticket to Stalybridge, an intermedite station, and after giving up this ticket on the arrival of the train at Stalybridge remained in the carriage and tendered to the plaintiffs' servants 7d., which was the amount of the fare from Staylbridge to Manchester, the difference between the fare from Huddersfield to Stalybridge and the through fare from Huddersfield to Manchester being 9d. The plaintiffs refused the amount tendered, but allowed the defendant, to travel on in the same train to Manchester, and sued him for the excess through fare; it was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover.

11 Citing 2 Ror. Rys. 971, § 10; 2 Wood, Ry. Law, § 347; Cleveland, &c., Ry. Co. v. Bartram, 11 Ohio St. 457; Drew v. Central Pac. Ry. Co., 51 Cal. 425.

12 [1903] 2 K. B. 32.

On this principle it was held in an Australian case that a rule providing that no passenger should take a ticket at any intermediate station for the purpose of continuing his journey in the same train as that in which he arrived, except from some stopping place where booking clerks are not provided, was reasonable and valid. 13

Mr. Chief Justice Darley said: "It has been pointed out that this by-law prevents a double evil. First, it prevents pergetting an advantage

sons who live beyond a holiday district of cheap fares not intended for them. Secondly, it prevents dishonest persons from traveling without a ticket over portions of the journey. For instance, if this by-law were not in force, a person might, in coming from Goulburn to Sydney, take a ticket from Goulburn to the next station, and then travel on to Campbelltown, and take a ticket from there to Sydney; thus traveling over a considerable portion of the journey without a ticket. To obviate this, it would be necessary to look at the tickets at every station, which would lead to inconvenience and delay, not only to the railway department, but to the public. In the present case the respondent, by re-booking, obtained the advantage of the tourist rates between Moss Vale and Sydney, which were never intended for him. If he had remained in the train, and informed the guard that he wanted to go on to Sydney, he would have had to pay the full fare from Goulburn to Sydney."14

8 676. Part of journey completed before collection of fare. It not infrequently happens that a passenger has completed part of his journey before the fare is demanded and collected; and a passenger is sometimes found dishonest enough to attempt

13 Davies v. Williamson, 21 N. S. W. L. R. (Law) 124 (1899).

14 But see Horton v. Erie R. R., 83 N. Y. Supp. 733 (App. Div.), (1903). And compare Savannah B. of F. & T. v. Charleston & S. Ry., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 601 (1898).

to ride to his destination upon payment of fare for the remaining distance. That this attempt is illegal has been made plain. The journey in which he is engaged is the whole journey from his place of departure to his destination; and the fare which is due, and which alone is due, is the fare for the whole distance.15 The same thing is true if for some reason he would have a legal right to leave the train at an intermediate station without paying fare, but instead of doing so chooses to remain on the train and complete his journey. This was the ground of the decision in a case decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri. In that case the plaintiff, bound on a journey from A to B, could not get a seat until he reached X, an intermediate station; and he then refused to pay fare from A to B, but instead of doing so tendered fare from X to B only. He was ejected for non-payment of fare, and the court held that the ejection was justified; though he might lawfully have left the train at X, the first station, without paying fare, since he could get no seat. 16

§ 677. Resumption of journey by rejected passenger.

When because of the refusal of a passenger to pay his fare he is ejected from the train at a point between regular stations, he has no right to take the train again upon tendering fare, since the place is not one where any person has a right to demand that he be received as a passenger."

In O'Brien v. Boston and Worcester Railroad 18 Mr. Justice Bigelow said: "After being rightfully expelled from the train,

15 Manning v. Louisville & N. R. R., 95 Ala. 392, 11 So. 8, 36 Am. St. Rep. 225, 16 L. R. A. 55 (1891).

16 Davis v. Kansas City, S. J. & C. B. R. R., 53 Mo. 317, 14 Am. Rep. 457 (1873).

17 O'Brien v. Boston & W. R. R., 15 Gray (Mass.), 20, 77 Am. Dec. 347 (1860); Hibbard v. New York & E. R. R., 15 N. Y. 455 (1857); Pickens v. Richmond & D. R. R., 104 N. C. 312, 10 S. E. 556 (1889).

18 Supra.

he could not again enter the same cars and require the defendants to perform the same contract which he had previously broken. Besides, the defendants are not bound to receive passengers at any part of their route but only at the regular stations or appointed places on the line of the road, established by them at reasonable distances for the proper accommodation of the public. The plaintiff had therefore no right to enter the cars at the place where the train was stopped for the purpose of ejecting him. A person who had committed no breach of contract could not claim any such right; a fortiori the plaintiff could not."

In some cases it is held that even if he is expelled at a regular station and offers to pay the entire fare, he cannot demand further carriage, since he has forfeited his right to be carried on that journey.'

19

Where, however, the passenger had a ticket for the station at which he was ejected, but wrongfully claimed that his ticket entitled him to be carried further, he was entitled to take the train and ride on to his destination upon paying the additional fare.20 Mr. Justice Guffy said: "Lebanon Junction is admitted to be a point where the train stopped, and it did not stop there for the purpose of ejecting the plaintiff, and after he had quietly and submissively yielded to expulsion he was entitled to the same rights and privileges that any other citizen or passenger had who wanted to go to Louisville, as he manifestly did, for he took the next train for that point."

678. Passenger expelled at a regular station.

If the passenger is expelled at a regular station, where passengers have a right to demand reception, he certainly cannot take the train again without paying full fare from the original

19 State v. Campbell, 32 N. J. Law, 309, B. & W. 145 (1867); Pease v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 101 N. Y. 367, 5 N. E. 37, 54 Am. Rep. 699 (1886).

20 Louisville & N. R. R. v. Breckinridge, 99 Ky. 1, 34 S. W. 702 (1896).