granted to the United States in the Constitution remains in the States; the Constitution of the United States was a powerconferring, not a power-destroying document. But nothing can be clearer than that the right of fixing rates for interstate commerce is no longer in the States; a fixing of rates by legislation or commission would be a regulation of interstate commerce, which Congress alone has power to regulate. It would seem to follow without possibility of doubt that the power which was taken away from the States by the Constitution, because it was a power to regulate commerce, was at the same time conferred, as such power, on the Congress. But as there has been no express decision to that effect, the question may be regarded as to that extent unsettled.

§ 1337. Power to fix rates is inherent in legislative power to regulate carriage.

Legislative power over carriage, such as is given to the Congress by the Constitution in cases of interstate commerce, carries with it the power to fix rates, either directly or through a commission. "This power of regulation," said Mr. Chief Justice Waite, referring to the fixing of maximum railroad rates, "is a power of government, continuing in its nature." 1 And in the case of Munn v. Illinois, the same Judge said:2 "The controlling fact is the power to regulate at all. If that exists, the right to establish the maximum of charge, as one of the means of regulation, is implied."

§ 1338. Congress allowed to fix maximum rates.

Congress, acting under other powers, has fixed rates, and has been sustained in so doing. Thus in Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company v. Manning the Supreme Court upheld

1 Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307, 325, 29 L. Ed. 636 (1886). 294 U. S. 113, 134, 26 L. Ed. 77 (1876).

an act of Congress which fixed telephone rates in the District of Columbia.

§ 1339. Power of Congress to fix rates for interstate commerce has been assumed.

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Though the question has never been presented directly to the Court and made the ground of its decision, yet the Supreme Court has in its decisions obiter assumed the existence of the power. Thus in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway (the Maximum Rate Case) Mr. Justice Brewer said: "There were three obvious and dissimilar courses open for consideration. Congress might itself prescribe the rates; or it might commit to some subordinate tribunal this duty; or it might leave with the companies the right to fix rates, subject to regulations and restrictions." The question debated is whether it vested in the Commission the power and the duty to fix rates; and the fact that this is a debatable question, and has been most strenuously and earnestly debated, is very persuasive that it did not. The grant of such a power is never to be implied. The power itself is so vast and comprehensive, so largely affecting the rights of carrier and shipper, as well as indirectly all commercial transactions, the language by which the power is given had been so often used and was so familiar to the legislative mind and is capable of such definite and exact statement, that no just rule of construction would tolerate a grant of such power by mere implication. Administrative control over railroads through boards or commissions was no new thing." This language appears to recognize as vested in Congress the power which in theory we have found there-the power by itself or its commission to fix railroad rates.

3186 U. S. 238, 46 L. Ed. 1144, 22 Sup. Ct. 881 (1902).

4 167 U. S. 479, 494, 17 Sup. Ct. 896 (1897).

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX A.

RULES OF PRACTICE BEFORE THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE

COMMISSION.

1.

PUBLIC SESSIONS.

The general sessions of the Commission for hearing contested cases will be held at its office in the Sun building, No. 1317 F street, N. W., Washington, D. C., on such days and at such hour as the Commission may designate.

When special sessions are held at other places, such regulations as may be necessary will be made by the Commission.

Sessions for receiving, considering, and acting upon petitions, applications, and other communications, and also for considering and acting upon any business of the Commission other than the hearing of contested cases, will be held at its said office at 11 o'clock a. m. daily when the Commission is in Washington.

II.

PARTIES TO CASES.

Any person, firm, company, corporation, or association, mercantile, agricultural, or manufacturing society, body politic or municipal organization, or the railroad commissioner or commission of any State or Territory, may complain to the Commission by petition, of anything done, or omitted to be done, in violation of the provisions of the act to regulate commerce by any common carrier or carriers subject to the provisions of said act. Where a complaint relates to the rates or practices of a single carrier, no other carrier need be a party, but if it relates to matters in which two or more carriers, engaged in transportation by continuous carriage or shipment, are interested, the several carriers participating in such carriage or shipment are proper parties defendant.

Where a complaint relates to rates or practices of carriers operating different lines, and the object of the proceeding is to secure correction of such rates or practices on each of said lines, all the carriers operating such lines must be made defendants.