and just rate, compared with the price it charges for the same kind of freight transportation to or from any other point. [Code (1897), sec. 2126.]

In Blair v. Sioux City & P. Ry., 109 Iowa, 369, 80 N. W. 673 (1899), it was held that a petition alleging that two railroad companies voluntarily established joint rates, and charged plaintiff a rate in excess of the same joint rates on like shipments, at the same time, which were made to other points, for like distances, over their lines of road, makes a prima facie case showing discrimination.

§ 1218. Kansas.

Nor shall it charge more for transporting freight from any point on its line than a fair and just proportion of the price it charges for the same kind of freight transported from any other point; nor shall it be lawful to charge a greater freight rate to haul any class of goods for a shorter distance than for a longer one in the same general direction under like conditions, and over the same system of road in Kansas, except by the consent of the commissioners. [General Laws (1901), section 5985, Laws of 1901, chap. 286, section 25.]

§ 1219. Kentucky.

It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation owning or operating a railroad in this State, or any common carrier, to charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers, or of property of like kind, under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line, in the same direction, the shorter being included within the longer distance; but this shall not be construed as authorizing any common carrier, or person, or corporation owning or operating a railroad in this State to receive as great compensation for a shorter as for a longer distance; provided, That upon application to the railroad commission, such common carrier, or person, or corporation owning or operating a railroad in this State may, in special cases, after investigation by the commission,

be authorized to charge less for longer than for shorter distances for the transportation of passengers or property; and the Commission may from time to time prescribe the extent to which such common carrier, or person, or corporation, owning or operating a railroad in this State may be relieved from the operations of this section. [Constitution, sec. 218.]

If any person owning or operating a railroad in this State, or any common carrier, shall charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers or property of like kind, under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, for a shorter than for a longer distance, over the same line, in the same direction, the shorter being included within the longer distance, such person shall for each offense be guilty of a misdemeanor, and fined not less than $100 nor more than $500, to be recovered by indictment. in the Franklin Circuit Court or the Circuit Court of any county into or through which the railroad or common carrier so violating runs or carries on its business. Upon complaint made to the railroad commission that any railroad or common carrier has violated the provisions of this section, it shall be the duty of the commission to investigate the grounds of complaint, and if, after such investigation, the commission deems it proper to exonerate the railroad or common carrier from the operation of the provisions of this section, an order in writing to that effect shall be made by the commission, and a copy thereof delivered to the complainant and the railroad or common carrier, and the same shall be published as a part of the report of the commission; and after such order, the railroad or carrier shall not be prosecuted or fined on account of the complaint made. If the commission, after investigation, fails to exonerate the railroad or carrier from the operation of the provisions of this section, an order in writing to that effect shall be made by the commission, and a copy thereof delivered to the complainant and the railroad or common carrier, and the same shall be published as a part of the report of the commission;

and after such order, it shall be the duty of the commission to furnish a statement of the facts, together with a copy of its order, to the grand jury of any county, the Circuit Court of which has jurisdiction, in order that the railroad company or carrier may be indicted for the offense; and the commission shall use propert efforts to see that such company or carrier is indicted and prosecuted. [General Laws (1894), sec. 820.]

In Illinois C. Ry. v. Com., 23 Ky. Law Rep. 544, 63 S. W. 448 (1901), it was held that (1) Const., § 218, and Ky. St., § 820, prohibiting a common carrier charging more for a short haul than for a long haul, where the shorter distance is included in the longer distance, are not in conflict with the Constitution of the United States or any act of Congress; that (2) the Railroad Commissioners may consider the application of a railroad company, and determine that for the present and future it shall be relieved of the operation of those provisions of the Constitution and statutes in the transportation of a particular commodity between certain points; that (3) the action of the Railroad Commissioners, in exonerating a common carrier from the operation of those sections of the Constitution and statutes, is not retrospective, and does not relieve the carrier of punishment for past offenses; and that (4) a railroad company may be indicted for charging more for a short haul than for a long haul, in violation of Constitution, § 218, and Ky. St., § 820, without recommendation by the Railroad Commission.

But it was held in Louisville & N. Ry. v. Walker, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 453, 63 S. W. 20 (1901), that Const., § 218, did not apply unless the shorter was included within the longer distance, and that a carrier did not violate the law where the long haul is altogether on its main line, while the short haul originates on a branch road, as the shipment is an entirety, and cannot be split into parts to bring it within the law.

Again, a joint traffic arrangement, by which connecting carriers haul from a point on one road to a point on the other road for less than the first carrier charges from the same point on its road to its terminus, between the points, is not in violation of St., § 820, making it an of fense for a carrier to charge more for hauling for a shorter than for a longer distance "over the same line" in the same direction, the shorter being included in the longer distance, as is held in Com. v. Chesapeake & O. Ry., 115 Ky. 57, 72 S. W. 361 (1903). Nor does Const., § 215, providing that all railway companies shall transport freight of the same class for all persons from and to the same points and upon the same conditions, in the same manner, and for the same charges, prohibit a railway company from charging a through rate which is less than the sum of

the local rates between the two points, as the recent case of Southern Ry. in Ky. v. Com., 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1078, 77 S. W. 207 (1903), decides.

On the other hand it is established by Louisville & N. Ry. v. Com., 21 Ky. Law Rep. 232, 51 S. W. 164, 1012 (1899), and by Louisville & N. Ry. v. Com., 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1380, 46 S. W. 707, 47 S. W. 210, 598 (1898), that competition does not justify a carrier in charging more for a shorter than for a longer distance, as the words "substantially similar circumstances and conditions" relate to the actual cost of transportation. By a parity of reasoning, however, it is held in Louisville & N. Ry. v. Com., 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1099, 48 S. W. 416 (1898), and in Louisville & N. Ry. v. Com. (Ky. App.), 46 S. W. 702 (1898), that if there is dissimiliarity of conditions of shipment, so that the longer shipment is really the cheaper to handle, none of these clauses apply.

As to respective powers under these sections it was held in Louisville & N. Ry. v. Com., 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1380, 47 S. W. 598 (1898), that under Const., § 218, prohibiting common carriers from charging more for a short than for a long haul, but providing that the Railroad Commission may in "special cases grant relief from the operation of the section, the action of the Commission in refusing such relief cannot be reviewed by the courts. And in Illinois C. Ry. v. Com., 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1159, 64 S. W. 975, it was held that, as no indictment could be returned by the grand jury for a violation of the statute until the Railroad Commission had refused to exonerate the carrier, such statute is not violative of Const., § 218, prohibiting any common carrier from charging more for transporting passengers or property for a shorter than for a longer distance, and providing that the Railroad Commission may prescribe the extent to which a carrier may be relieved from the operation of the section since the question as to what penalty shall be imposed, or when, is left to the discretion of the Legislature.

See also as to remedies under these sections Louisville & N. Ry. v. Com., 00 Ky. 000, 46 S. W. 702 (1898); Hutcheson v. Louisville & N. R. R., 00 Ky. 000, 63 S. W. 33 (1901); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Com., 00 Ky. 000, 71 S. W. 910 (1903); and McChord v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. R., 183 U. S. 483, 46 L. Ed. 289, 22 Sup. Ct. 165 (1901).

§ 1220. Louisiana.

The power and authority is hereby vested in the Commission, and it is hereby made its duty to prevent such companies from charging any greater compensation in the aggregate for the like kind of property or passengers, or messages, for a shorter than a longer distance, over the same line, unless authorized by the Commission to do so in special cases. [Constitution (1898), Art. 284.]

§ 1221. Massachusetts.

No railroad corporation shall charge or receive for the transportation of freight to any station on its road a greater amount than is at the time charged or received for the transportation of the like class and quantity of freight from the same original point of departure to a station at a greater distance on its road in the same direction. Two or more railroad corporations. whose roads connect shall not charge or receive for the transportation of freight to any station on the road of either of them a greater amount than is at the time charged or received for the transportation of the like class and quantity of freight from the same original point of departure to a station at a greater distance on the road of either of them in the same direction. In the construction of this section, the amount charged or received for the transportation of freight shall include all terminal charges; and the road of a corporation shall include all the road in use by it, whether owned or operated under a contract or lease. [Revised Laws (1902), ch. 111, sec. 243.]

In Com. v. Worcester & N. R. R., 124 Mass. 561 (1878), it was held that this section applied only to the transportation of freight by such a corporation as a common carrier over its own road, and not over other railroads, for which it charged and received nothing except as collecting agent of the corporations owning such other railroads.

§ 1222. Michigan.

That it shall be unlawful for any railroad company doing business in this State, operating the shortest competing line of railroad, to charge a greater amount of toll or compensation for the transportation of freight from any noncompeting point on its line of railroad than it shall charge at the nearest railroad competing point on its line of road in opposite direction, to that from which such freight is to be moved, when of the same class, in like quantity, and for the same destination in this State. It is also hereby further provided that whenever freight is taken from any point on the