Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy

Portada
Cambridge University Press, 2006 M12 25
For millennia, policymakers and statesmen have grappled with questions about the concept of victory in war. How long does it take to achieve victory and how do we know when victory is achieved? And, as highlighted by the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, is it possible to win a war and yet lose the peace? The premise of this book is that we do not have a modern theory about victory and that, in order to answer these questions, we need one. This book explores historical definitions of victory, how victory has evolved, and how it has been implemented in war. It also subsequently develops the intellectual foundations of a modern pre-theory of victory, and discusses the military instruments necessary for victory in the twenty-first century using case studies that include US military intervention in Panama, Libya, Persian Gulf War, Bosnia/Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Dentro del libro

Páginas seleccionadas

Contenido

Sección 1
15
Sección 2
41
Sección 3
42
Sección 4
43
Sección 5
49
Sección 6
52
Sección 7
53
Sección 8
55
Sección 24
150
Sección 25
156
Sección 26
163
Sección 27
164
Sección 28
172
Sección 29
177
Sección 30
178
Sección 31
186

Sección 9
68
Sección 10
70
Sección 11
72
Sección 12
74
Sección 13
75
Sección 14
76
Sección 15
82
Sección 16
83
Sección 17
91
Sección 18
100
Sección 19
104
Sección 20
105
Sección 21
126
Sección 22
139
Sección 23
149
Sección 32
198
Sección 33
205
Sección 34
215
Sección 35
219
Sección 36
223
Sección 37
230
Sección 38
232
Sección 39
237
Sección 40
243
Sección 41
244
Sección 42
263
Sección 43
265
Sección 44
276
Sección 45
278
Sección 46
291

Otras ediciones - Ver todas

Términos y frases comunes

Pasajes populares

Página 270 - An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.
Página 141 - Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
Página 131 - GENERAL: — Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply, I would say, that peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon — namely, That the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged.
Página 98 - Victory— victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival.

Referencias a este libro

Acerca del autor (2006)

William C. Martel is Professor of National Security Affairs and Alan Shepherd Chair of Space Technology and Policy at the Naval War College. He received his doctorate in international relations from the University of Massachusetts (Amherst), and was a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow and MacArthur Scholar at the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. A member of the professional staff of the RAND Corporation in Washington, he directed studies on proliferation, US governmental process for managing proliferation, and research and development. His scholarly works include Strategic Nuclear War (Greenwood Press, 1986), How to Stop a War (Doubleday, 1987), The Technological Arsenal (Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001).

Información bibliográfica