the order approving the deed made to the purchaser. The sale was confirmed, the deed to the purchaser approved, and the latter authorized to take possession, by the order of July 5, 1881. The reservations in that order did not authorize the court to set aside the confirmation of the sale and cancel the deed to the purchaser. The confirmation of the sale and the approval of the deed were, rather, subject to the power reserved, to protect and enforce, by subsequent orders, any claim or lien then pending either in that court, or, by its leave, in a state court. So far as Newman is concerned, such protection can be given, and should be given only, by an order directing the entire property, covered by the $1,600,000 mortgage, to be sold, in satisfaction of his claim or lien, without annulling the former sale or the confirmation thereof, and without withdrawing or canceling the deed made by the master to the purchaser. To the extent indicated the decree is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

STATE OF WISCONSIN v. PELICAN INS. Co. OF NEW ORLEANS.

(May 14, 1888.)

COURTS-UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT-SUITS BY STATES-PENAL ACTIONS. Rev. St. Wis. § 1920, imposing a forfeiture of $500 per month upon any insurance company of another state doing business in Wisconsin without having deposited with the proper officers a full statement of its property and business during the preceding year, such forfeiture to be recovered in an action in the name of the state, is strictly a penal statute punishing an offense against the state; and, therefore, under the judiciary act of September 24, 1789, c. 20, § 13, (Rev. St. U. S. § 687,) giving the supreme court of the United States "exclusive jurisdiction of controversies of a civil nature where a state is a party," etc., this court has no jurisdiction of an action brought by the state of Wisconsin against an insurance company of another state upon a judgment for the penalty imposed by that statute.

2. SAME-ACTIONS ON JUDGMENTS-FAITH AND CREDIT OF JUDGMENTS-CAUSE OF AC

TION.

Const. U. S. art. 4, § 1, and Rev. St. U. S. § 905, providing that the judgments of the courts of any state are to have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the state in which they were rendered, does not preclude this court from inquiring, in determining its jurisdiction of an action brought upon a judgment of a state court for a penalty in favor of the state against a citizen of another state, whether the cause of action upon which the judgment was rendered was such that this court would have had original jurisdiction of it. Those provisions establish a rule of evidence, but do not affect questions of jurisdiction.

3. SAME-CITIZENSHIP-CORPORATIONS.

A corporation created by a state is a citizen of that state, within the meaning of the constitution and statutes defining the jurisdiction of the federal courts.

This was an action of debt, commenced in this court by the state of Wisconsin against a corporation of Louisiana. The declaration was as follows: "The plaintiff, the state of Wisconsin, and one of the states of the United States, now comes and complains of the defendant, the Pelican Insurance Company of New Orleans, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the state of Louisiana, in a plea of debt, for that whereas, the plaintiff, the said state of Wisconsin, on the 16th day of September in the year 1886, at the county of Dane, in the said state of Wisconsin, and in and before the Dane county circuit court, in said state, such court being then and there a court of general jurisdiction under the laws of said state, and by the consideration and judgment of the said court, recovered against the said defendant, the said Pelican Insurance Company, a judgment in favor of the said plaintiff for the sum of eight thousand five hundred dollars damages, together with the further sum of forty-five dollars and thirty-nine cents for costs and disbursements, amounting in all to the sum of eight thousand five hundred and fortyfive dollars and thirty-nine cents, which said judgment still remains in that court in full force and effect, and not in any wise modified, reversed, set aside,

appealed from, or otherwise vacated; and the said plaintiff, the said state of Wisconsin, hath not obtained any satisfaction upon the said judgment, but, on the contrary, the whole thereof, together with interest thereon from said date of such judgment, remains wholly unpaid and owing, whereby an action hath accrued unto the said plaintiff, the said state of Wisconsin, to demand and have from and of the said defendant the said sum of eight thousand five hundred and forty-five dollars and thirty-nine cents, with interest. Wherefore the said plaintiff, the said state of Wisconsin, saith that the plaintiff is injured and hath sustained damage to the said amount of eight thousand five hundred and forty-five dollars and thirty-nine cents, with interest, and therefore it brings this suit." Annexed to the declaration was a copy of the record of the judgment therein described, which showed that it was rendered on default of the defendant, after service of summons on three persons, each of whom was stated in the officer's return to be a resident and citizen of Wisconsin and an agent of the defendant, upon a complaint alleging that the defendant had done business in the state for 30 months without having itself, or by any officer, agent, or other person in its behalf, prepared or deposited in the office of the commissioner of insurance of the state annual statements of its business, as required by the provision of section 1920 of the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin, and that the defendant had thereby become indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $15,000, according to that provision. By that section of the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin, it is enacted that the president or vicepresident and secretary of each fire insurance corporation doing business in the state shall annually, within the month of January, prepare and deposit in the office of the commissioner of insurance a statement, verified by their oaths, of the business of the corporation during the year, and of the condition thereof on the 31st day of December then next preceding, exhibiting various items, enumerated in the statute, as to its capital stock, property or assets, liabilities, income, and expenditures, and any other items or facts which the commissioner of insurance may require, and that "for any failure to make and deposit such annual statement, or to promptly reply in writing to any inquiry addressed by the commissioner of insurance in relation to the business of any such corporation, or for willfully making any false statement therein, every such corporation or officer so failing or making such false statement shall forfeit five hundred dollars, and for neglecting to file such annual statement an additional five hundred dollars for every month that such corporation shall continue thereafter to transact any insurance business in this state until such statement be filed." By the statute of Wisconsin of 1885, c. 395, (which took effect April 12, 1885,) § 1, it is "made the duty of the commissioner of insurance to prosecute to final judgment, in the name of the state, or to compromise, settle, or compound, every forfeiture incurred by an insurance corporation by its failure to comply with, or for its violation of, any law of the state, of which he may be credibly informed;" and by section 2, "one-half of every sum collected, paid, or received by virtue of section 1 of this act shall be paid into the state treasury, and the remainder shall belong to the commissioner of insurance, who shall pay all expenses incurred in prosecuting all actions brought to enforce the payment of such forfeitures, both in and out of the state, and shall pay all expenses incident to the collection of such forfeitures." In the present action in this court the defendant filed several pleas, the first of which was as follows: "The defendant is a civil corporation organized under the terms of the Revised Statutes of the State of Louisana, sections 638 to 688, both inclusive, and is authorized to effect fire insurances, and is subject to suit, and required to determine its domicile, in the city aforesaid, and to maintain and designate an officer of that company to receive their citations and other judicial writs and notices. This duty has been fulfilled from the date of the organization, and the charter of the company has been recorded and published, as those statutes require, in the office of the recorder of mort

gages, and a city paper, for the time defined in the statute. No other designation has been made or required of the defendant. The section six hundred and eighty-seven of the Revised Statutes of the United States defines the original jurisdiction of this court, and designates as subjects for the exercise of that jurisdiction, where a state is the complainant, citizens of states other than of the plaintiff or complainant; and, that there should be no error on the subject, the first section of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States exactly describes all of those who are citizens. They are natural persons born or naturalized within the limits of the United States; and having a residence in any state determines the state in which he may have privilege or immunity as a citizen. Moreover, the complaint of the plaintiff discloses that this defendant is a fire insurance company, without political character or interstate relations, and had its origin and domicile in New Orleans, and that the said corporation had offended the state of Wisconsin by imputed and alleged disobedience or inattention to her statute laws, and had incurred heavy forfeitures and penalties by such offenses, to the sum stated in the demand, and for the collection of which fines and forfeitures this suit has been commenced in this court. But the defendant says that the statute of the United States above cited further defines the cause for the exercise of original jurisdiction that the controversy should be of a civil nature. It excludes from cognizance of this court the punitive statutes and divers litigations arising out of the internal and peculiar or peevish regulations, accompanied with fines, forfeitures, and arbitrary exactions, which a state may impose upon citizens or corporations of other states from a just cause, or from caprice or captiousness. The controversy must be of a civil nature, and not of the punitive nature, as shown by this record. Wherefore this defendant submits to this court that the complaint of this plaintiff does not show a cause within the original jurisdiction of the court, nor within the terms of the statutes of the United States." To this plea the plaintiff filed a general demurrer, upon which the case was set down for argument.

S. Shellabarger, J. M. Wilson, and H. W. Cheynowith, for plaintiff. J. A. Campbell, for defendant.

Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

This action is brought upon a judgment recovered by the state of Wisconsin in one of her own courts against the Pelican Insurance Company, a Louisiana corporation, for penalties imposed by a statute of Wisconsin for not making returns to the insurance commissioner of the state, as required by that statute. The leading question argued at the bar is whether such an action is within the original jurisdiction of this court. The ground on which the jurisdiction is invoked, is not the nature of the cause, but the character of the parties; the plaintiff being one of the states of the Union, and the defendant a corporation of another of those states. The constitution of the United States, as originally established, ordains in article 3, § 2, that the judicial power of the United States shall extend "to controversies between two or more states, between a state and citizens of another state, between citizens of different states, between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects;" and that in all cases "in which a state shall be party" this court shall have original jurisdiction. The eleventh article of amendment simply declares that "the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit, in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." By the constitution, therefore, this court has original jurisdiction of suits brought by a state against citizens of another state, as well as of controversies between two states; and it is well settled that a corpora

tion created by a state is a citizen of the state, within the meaning of those provisions of the constitution and statutes of the United States which define the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Railroad Co. v. Railroad Co., 112 U. S. 414, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 178; Pennsylvania v. Bridge Co., 13 How. 518. Yet, notwithstanding the comprehensive words of the constitution, the mere fact that a state is the plaintiff is not a conclusive test that the controversy is one in which this court is authorized to grant relief against another state or her citizens; and a consideration of the cases in which it has heretofore had occasion to pass upon the construction and effect of these provisions of the constitution may throw light on the determination of the question before us. As to "controversies between two or more states." The most numerous class of which this court has entertained jurisdiction is that of controversies between two states as to the boundaries of their territory, such as were determined before the Revolution by the king in council, and under the articles of confederation (while there was no national judiciary) by committees or commissioners appointed by congress. 2 Story, Const. § 1681; New Jersey v. New York, 3 Pet. 461, 5 Pet. 284, and 6 Pet. 323; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 724, 736, 754, 13 Pet. 23, 14 Pet. 210, 15 Pet. 233, and 4 How. 591, 628; Missouri v. Iowa, 7 How. 660, and 10 How. 1; Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 478; Alabama v. Georgia, 23 How. 505; Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39; Missouri v. Kentucky, Id. 395. See, also, Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50, 72, 73. The books of reports contain but few other cases in which the aid of this court has been invoked in controversies between two states. In Fowler v. Lindsey and Fowler v. Miller, actions of ejectment were pending in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Connecticut between private citizens for lands over which the states of Connecticut and New York both claimed jurisdiction; and a writ of certiorari to remove those actions into this court as belonging exclusively to its jurisdiction was refused, because a state was neither nominally nor substantially a party to them. 3 Dall. 411. Upon a bill in equity afterwards filed in this court by the state of New York against the state of Connecticut to stay the actions of ejectment, this court refused the injunction prayed for, because the state of New York was not a party to them, and had no such interest in their decision as would support the bill. New York v. Connecticut, 4 Dall. 1, 3. This court has declined to take jurisdiction of suits between states to compel the performance of obligations which, if the states had been independent nations, could not have been enforced judicially, but only through the political departments of their governments. Thus, in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, where the state of Kentucky, by her governor, applied to this court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, for a writ of mandamus to the governor of Ohio to compel him to surrender a fugitive from justice, this court, while holding that the case was a controversy between two states, decided that it had no authority to grant the writ. And in New Hampshire v. Louisiana, and New York v. Louisiana, 108 U. S. 76, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 176, it was adjudged that a state to whom, pursuant to her statutes, some of her citizens, holding bonds of another state, had assigned them in order to enable her to sue on and collect them for the benefit of the assignors, could not maintain a suit against the other state in this court. See, also, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 20, 28, 51, 75. In South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S. 4, this court, speaking by Mr. Justice STRONG, left the question open whether "a state, when suing in this court for the prevention of a nuisance in a navigable river of the United States, must not aver and show that it will sustain some special and peculiar injury therefrom, such as would enable a private person to maintain a similar action in another court;" and dismissed the bill because no unlawful obstruction of navigation was proved. Id. 14. As to "controversies between a state and the citizens of another state." The object of vesting in the courts of the United States juris

diction of suits by one state against the citizens of another was to enable such controversies to be determined by a national tribunal, and thereby to avoid the partiality, or suspicion of partiality, which might exist if the plaintiff state were compelled to resort to the courts of the state of which the defendants were citizens. Federalist, No. 80; Chief Justice JAY, in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 475; 2 Story, Const. §§ 1638, 1682. The grant is of "judicial power," and was not intended to confer upon the courts of the United States jurisdiction of a suit or prosecution by the one state of such a nature that it could not, on the settled principles of public and international law, be entertained by the judiciary of the other state at all.

By the law of England and of the United States the penal laws of a country do not reach beyond its own territory, except when extended by express treaty or statute to offenses committed abroad by its own citizens; and they must be administered in its own courts only, and cannot be enforced by the courts of another country. Wheat. Int. Law, (8th Ed.) §§ 113, 121. Chief Justice MARSHALL stated the rule in the most condensed form, as an incontrovertible maxim, "the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 123. The only cases in which the courts of the United States have entertained suits by a foreign state have been to enforce demands of a strictly civil nature. The Sapphire, 11 Wall. 164; King of Spain v. Oliver, 2 Wash. C. C. 429, and Pet. C. C. 217, 276. The case of The Sapphire was a libel in admiralty, filed by the late emperor of the French, and prosecuted by the French republic, after his deposition, to recover damages for a collision between an American ship and a French transport; and Mr. Justice BRADLEY, delivering the judgment of this court sustaining the suit, said: "A foreign sovereign, as well as any other foreign person, who has a demand of a civil nature against any person here, may prosecute it in our courts." 11 Wall. 167. The case of King of Spain v. Oliver, although a suit to recover duties imposed by the revenue laws of Spain, was not founded upon those laws, or brought against a person who had broken them, but was in the nature of an action of assumpsit against other persons alleged to be bound by their own contract to pay the duties; and the action failed because no express or implied contract of the defendants was proved. Pet. C. C. 286-290. The rule that the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another applies, not only to prosecutions and sentences for crimes and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor of the state for the recovery of pecuniary penalties for any violation of statutes for the protection of its revenue, or other municipal laws, and to all judgments for such penalties. If this were not so, all that would be necessary to give ubiquitous effect to a penal law would be to put the claim for a penalty into the shape of a judgment. Whart. Confl. Law, § 833; West. Pr. Int. Law, (1st Ed.) § 388; Pig. Judgm. 209, 210. Lord Kames, in his Principles of Equity, cited and approved by Mr. Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, after having said: "The proper place for punishment is where the crime is committed, and no society takes concern in any crime but what is hurtful to itself," and recognizing the duty to enforce foreign judgments or decrees for civil debts or damages, adds: "But this includes not a decree decerning for a penalty, because no court reckons itself bound to punish, or to concur in punishing, any delict committed extra territorium." 2 Kames, Eq. (3d Ed.) 326, 366; Story, Confi. Law, §§ 600, 622. It is true that if the prosecution in the courts of one country for a violation of its municipal law is in rem, to obtain a forfeiture of specific property within its jurisdiction, a judgment of forfeiture, rendered after due notice, and vesting the title of the property in the state, will be recognized and upheld in the courts of any other country in which the title to the property is brought in issue. Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch, 241; Hudson v. Guestier, Id. 293; Bradstreet v. Insurance Co., 3 Sum. 600, 605; Pig. Judgm. 264. But the recognition of a vested title in property is quite different from the en