state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, in authorizing the board of control to fix the rates of toll without notice to the parties interested, or affording them any opportunity of contesting the validity or propriety of such tolls, either in the first instance or afterwards. Second. That the statute in authorizing the improvements of rivers and the collection of tolls for them is in conflict with the clause of the constitution of the United States which declares that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, in that it impairs the contract contained in the ordinance of 1787, "for the government of the territory of the United States north-west of the river Ohio," giving to the people of that territory the right to the free use of the navigable waters leading into the St. Lawrence, without any tax, impost, or duty therefor. The fourth article of that ordinance declares that "the navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and Saint Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same, shall be common highways, and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of the said territory as to the citizens of the United States, and those of any other states that may be admitted into the confederacy, without any tax, impost, or duty therefor." But the court refused to give these instructions, or either of them; and the defendant excepted. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for $8,731.88, upon which judgment was entered. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of the state, (53 Mich. 593, 19 N. W. Rep. 199,) and the case is brought here on writ of error.

M. J. Smiley, for plaintiff in error. T. J. Ramsdell, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows:

The plaintiff in error, the defendant below, misapprehends the purport of the provision that no state shall deprive one of property without due process of law, when he considers the exaction of tolls under a statute for the use of an improved water-way as a deprivation of property within its meaning. There is no taking of property from him by such exaction within the prohibition, any more than there is a taking of property from a traveler in requiring him to pay for his lodgings in a public inn. There is in such a transaction only an exchange of money for its supposed equivalent. The tolls exacted from the defendant are merely compensation for benefits conferred, by which the floating of his logs down the stream was facilitated.

There is no analogy between the imposition of taxes and the levying of tolls for improvement of highways; and any attempt to justify or condemn proceedings in the one case, by reference to those in the other, must be misleading. Taxes are levied for the support of government, and their amount is regulated by its necessities. Tolls are the compensation for the use of another's property, or of improvements made by him; and their amount is determined by the cost of the property, or of the improvements, and considerations of the return which such values or expenditures should yield. The legislature, acting upon information received, may prescribe, at once, the tolls to be charged; but, ordinarily, it leaves their amount to be fixed by officers or boards appointed for that purpose, who may previously inspect the works, and ascertain the probable amount of business which will be transacted by means of them, and thus be more likely to adjust wisely the rates of toll in conformity with that business. This subject, like a multitude of other matters, can be better regulated by them than by the legislature. In the administration of government, matters of detail are usually placed under the direction of officials. The execution of general directions of the law is left, in a great degree, to their judgment and fidelity. Any other course would be attended with infinite embarrassment.

In authorizing the board of control to fix rates of toll for the floating of logs and timber over the improved portions of the Manistee river, certain

limits are prescribed to its action; but within those limits the matter is left to its judginent. No notice can be given to parties, who may have occasion to use the stream, to attend before the board and present their views upon the tolls to be charged. Such parties cannot be known in advance. The occasion for using the improved stream may arise at any time in the year; perhaps after the tolls have been established. The whole subject is one of administrative regulation, in which a certain amount of discretionary authority is necessarily confided to officers intrusted with its execution. Should there be any gross injustice in the rate of tolls fixed, it would not, in our system of government, remain long uncorrected.

The Manistee river is wholly within the limits of Michigan. The state, therefore, can authorize any improvement which in its judgment will enhance its value as a means of transportation from one part of the state to another. The internal commerce of a state-that is, the commerce which is wholly confined within its limits-is as much under its control as foreign or interstate commerce is under the control of the general government; and, to encourage the growth of this commerce and render it safe, the states may provide for the removal of obstructions from their rivers and harbors, and deepen their channels, and improve them in other ways, if, as is said in County of Mobile v. Kimball, the free navigation of those waters, as permitted under the laws of the United States, is not impaired, or any system for the improvement of their navigation provided by the general government is not defeated. 102 U. S. 691, 699. And, to meet the cost of such improvements, the states may levy a general tax or lay a toll upon all who use the rivers and harbors as improved. The improvements are, in that respect, like wharves and docks constructed to facilitate commerce in loading and unloading vessels. Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543, 548, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 313. Regulations of tolls or charges in such cases are mere matters of administration, under the entire control of the state. There was no contract in the fourth article of the ordinance of 1787 respecting the freedom of the navigable waters of the territory north-west of the Ohio river emptying into the St. Lawrence, which bound the people of the territory, or of any portion of it, when subsequently formed into a state and admitted into the Union. The ordinance of 1787 was passed a year and some months before the constitution of the United States went into operation. Its framers, and the congress of the confederation which passed it, evidently considered that the principles and declaration of rights and privileges expressed in its articles would always be of binding obligation upon the people of the territory. The ordinance in terms ordains and declares that its articles "shall be considered as articles of compact between the original states and the people and states in the said territory, and forever remain unalterable, unless by common consent." And, for many years after the adoption of the constitution, its provisions were treated by various acts of congress as in force, except as modified by such acts. In some of the acts organizing portions of the territory under separate territorial governments, it is declared that the rights and privileges granted by the ordinance are secured to the inhabitants of those territories. Yet, from the very conditions on which the states formed out of that territory were admitted into the Union, the provisions of the ordinance became inoperative except as adopted by them All the states thus formed were, in the language of the resolutions or acts of congress, "admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original states, in all respects whatever." Michigan, on her admission, became, therefore, entitled to and possessed of all the rights of sovereignty and dominion which belonged to the original states, and could at any time afterwards exercise full control over its navigable waters except as restrained by the constitution of the United States, and laws of congress passed in pursuance thereof. Permoli v. First Municipality of New Orleans, 3 How. 589, 600; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, Id. 212; Escanaba v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 688, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185; Van

Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, 159, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 670; Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 544, 546, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 313.

But, independently of these considerations, there is nothing in the language of the fourth article of the ordinance, respecting the navigable waters of the territory emptying into the St. Lawrence, which, if binding upon the state, would prevent it from authorizing the improvements made in the navigation of the Manistee river. As we said in Huse v. Glover, (decided at the last term:) "The provision of the clause, that the navigable streams shall be highways without any tax, impost, or duty, has reference to their navigation in their natural state. It did not contemplate that such navigation might not be improved by artificial means, by the removal of obstructions, or by the making of dams for deepening the waters, or by turning into the rivers waters from other streams to increase their depth. For outlays caused by such works the state may exact reasonable tolls. 119 U. S. 548, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 315. And again: "By the terms tax, impost, and duty, mentioned in the ordinance, is meant a charge for the use of the government, not compensation for improvements." 119 U. S. 549, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 316.

We perceive no error in the record, and the judgment of the supreme court of Michigan must be affirmed; and it is so ordered.

RUGGLES v. MANISTEE RIVER IMP. Co.

(November 14, 1887.)

In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan.

The same questions are presented as in Sands v. Manistee River Imp. Co., ante, 113, and, in conformity with the decision there rendered, the judgment herein is affirmed."

GUARANTEE INS., T. & S. D. Co., Adm'r, etc., and another v. SELLERS and others.1

(November 14, 1887.)

1. PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS-FURNACES-IDENTITY WITH FOREIGN PATENT.

The American patent granted to Charles W. and Frederick Siemens, of Great Britain, on March 1, 1864, for an improved regenerator furnace, is for the same invention as the English patent granted to the same parties on July 19, 1861.

2. SAME-DURATION OF-FOREIGN PATENT.

An English patent and an American patent were taken out for the same invention by plaintiff's intestate, but plaintiff claimed that the American patent contained certain improvements. Held that, even if so, that fact would not exempt it from the operation of the law fixing its termination. A patent cannot be construed to run partly from one date, and partly from another.

3. SAME.

The United States act of 1839, 26, allowed a patent to be taken out here at any time after the inventor had taken out a patent for the same invention in a foreign country provided, it should not have been introduced into public and common use in the United States prior to an application for a patent here: and provided, also, that in all cases every such patent should be limited to the term of 14 years from the date or publication of such foreign letters patent. The act of 1861, 16, provided that all patents hereafter granted should remain in force for the term of 17 years from the date of issue; and all extension of such patents was prohibited. Held that, so far as the "14 years" were concerned, the act of 1861 repealed the act of 1839; it substituted 17 years for 14 years; but that the provision that the term of such patent should commence to run fron the time of publication of the foreign patent was not repealed thereby.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Chas. S. Whitman, for appellants. S. S. Hollingsworth and Jos. C. Fraley, for appellees.

Affirming 16 Fed. Rep. 856.

BRADLEY, J. This is a suit on a patent granted to the appellants, Charles W. and Frederick Siemens, of Great Britain, on the twelfth day of January, 1869, being a reissue of a patent originally granted to the appellants on the first day of March, 1864. This patent was for an improved regenerator furnace, so called, intended to be used where a high degree of heat is required. By the arrangements of this invention the products of combustion, after passing through the furnace, and before entering the chimney, are utilized in heating what are called the regenerators, consisting of bricks, or other refractory materials, loosely piled up in two pairs of separate chambers through which, alternately, after being thus heated, the air and gases are made to pass on their way to the furnace, and thus become raised to an intense degree of heat before entering it. While one pair of regenerators is being thus heated by the outgoing products of combustion or flame, the other pair are giving out their heat to the air and gases which are passing into the furnace; and then, by a reversal of dampers, the current is changed, and the air and gases are made to pass through the newly-heated regenerators, and the products of combustion or flame through those that have become partially cooled; and so on alternately. The apparatus has various incidental appliances necessary to its successful operation. Thus, as the regenerator chambers are placed underneath the furnace, spaces are formed between them and the furnace bottom, for the purpose of admitting a circulation of air to cool the parts, and prevent their being destroyed by the intense heat. Another arrangement is that of a separate and distinct furnace, of peculiar form, for the consumption of the raw fuel, so constructed and operated that the gases produced thereby are carried over by a suitable flue to one of the heated regenerators, while atmospheric air is admitted into the other regenerator of the same pair. The air and gases are thus kept separate until about to enter the furnace by separate flues, when they meet and commingle and produce a rapid combustion and a most intense heat. This is the general nature of the invention, and this explanation will be sufficient for understanding the claims of the patent, which are four in number, and are as follows, to-wit:

“We claim, in combination with a furnace, A, and its chimney or smokedischarge flue, P, a system or series of air and gas regenerators, B1, B2, B3, B+, constructed substantially as specified, and having conduits and dampers arranged so that air and gas may be led into and through such regenerators and furnace and out of the chimney, in manner and so as to be operated as and for the purpose or purposes hereinbefore described. We also claim the arrangement and combination of the air space or open chamber, C, with the furnace and its system of regenerators, arranged and applied together, substantially in manner and so as to operate as described. [The air space here referred to is that by which the hearth of the furnace and other parts are cooled and prevented from destruction by the intense heat.] We also claim the arrangement and combination of the air chamber or space, D, or the same and the space, E, with the furnace, regenerators, conduits, and damper chests applied thereto, the whole being substantially as specified. [The air chamber, D, admits the atmospheric air to the regenerator.] We also claim the combination of a furnace with one or more regenerators or means of receiving its waste smoke and gaseous products, and intercepting or receiving heat therefrom, and also with means or devices by which all or a portion of the heat so intercepted or received may be absorbed by the influent air or gas during its passage into or to such furnace, for the purpose of improving or promoting combustion therein."

The defendants do not deny that the appellants were the authors of the very ingenious invention claimed by the patent; and they do not seriously deny that they use it. The principal defense which they set up is that the appellants took out an English patent for the same invention, dated January 22, 1861, and sealed July 19, 1861; and that, by force of the acts of 1839 and

1861, the American patent expired at the end of 17 years from the sealing of the English patent, namely, on the nineteenth day of July, 1878; and they deny that they used the said invention before the last-mentioned date, and no evidence is given that they did so. The questions to be decided, therefore, are whether the English patent (which was given in evidence) was for the same invention as the American patent; and, if so, whether the latter is limited to expire at the end of 17 years from the sealing of the former. We think that both of these questions must be answered in the affirmative.

As to the first question, we have carefully compared the two patents, the English and American, and can see no essential difference between them. They describe the same furnace in all essential particulars. The English specification is more detailed, and the drawings are more minute and full; but the same thing is described in both. There is only one claim in the English patent, it is true. But that claim, under the English patent system, entitled the patentees to their entire invention, and is at least as broad and comprehensive as all four claims in the American patent. It is in these terms: "Having now described the nature of our invention, and the best modes we are acquainted with of performing the same, we wish it to be understood that we do not confine ourselves to the precise details shown on the accompanying drawings; but we claim as our invention the various arrangements of regenerative furnaces worked by the gases resulting from an imperfect combustion of solid fuel in separate places, as herein before set forth."

It is contended by the counsel of the complainants that the American patent contains improvements which are not exhibited in the English patent. But, if this were so, it would not help the complainants. The principal invention is in both, and, if the American patent contains additional improvements, this fact cannot save the patent from the operation of the law which is invoked, if it is subject to that law at all. A patent cannot be exempted from the operation of the law by adding some new improvements to the invention; and cannot be construed as running partly from one date, and partly from another. This would be productive of endless confusion.

We have, then, to examine the question whether the term of the American patent was limited to run from its own date, or from the date (or sealing, which is equivalent to the publication) of the English patent. The reissued patent sued on is dated January 12, 1869, but the original patent, which is the one to be looked at, was dated March 1, 1864. It was issued, therefore, before the act of 1870, by which the patent laws were revised, and while the acts of 1836, 1839, and 1861 were in force. The act of 1836, as well as previous acts, made the term of a patent fourteen years; but it authorized an extension of the term for seven years longer, if it should appear that the patentee, without neglect or fault on his part, failed to obtain a reasonable remuneration for his invention. By the same act, (section 7,) if an invention for which a patent was sought, had been patented in a foreign country before the application for a patent here, it was a bar to obtaining a patent in this country, unless (section 8) such foreign letters patent had been taken out by the applicant himself within six months previous to the filing of his specification and drawings. The act of 1839 (section 6) removed the limitation of six months, and allowed a patent to be taken out here at any time after the inventor had taken out a patent for the same invention in a foreign country: provided, it should not have been introduced into public and common use in the United States prior to the application for a patent here: "and provided, also, that in all cases every such patent shall be limited to the term of fourteen years from the date or publication of such foreign letters patent. The act of 1861 introduced several changes in the administration of the patentoffice, and gave a right to patents for designs. The last section (section 16) declared as follows, to-wit: "That all patents hereafter granted shall remain in force for the term of seventeen years from the date of issue; and all ex