I suspect that while nuclear weapons have introduced a new dimension of risk, another dimension of risk has been introduced by typewriters, mimeograph machines, radio, telegraph, and telephone. Choking people to death with information is one of the oldest bureaucratic techniques known to man. Never have there been such opportunities as now.

Mr. TUFTS. You speak in your statement of the Secretary of State's peculiar, compelling needs, and you say something about where these needs arise in his role of special adviser to the President, chief negotiator for the Government, and so forth. In your consideration of the Secretary's many roles, how do you think he should assign his priorities? What roles should receive priority

Mr. NEUSTADT. I think a Secretary, unless he is hired specifically for a different purpose as Mr. Stettinius was, a Secretary hired for the job in the more normal course will and should try to put first his role as a senior adviser to the President. I think he must put immediately after that, really as part of it, the role which I didn't specifically mention but implied of collegial relations with that other senior adviser, the Secretary of Defense. I believe Mr. Harriman singled this out for you the other day as a special Cabinet relationship. I think that is quite right.

If a Secretary of State takes fully seriously his mandate as expressed by the Bundy letter of September 1961, then he would have to put next his role of attempting to stand at the center of the group of Cabinet officers concerned with national security affairs, while attempting to act as agent of coordination.

This would leave him very little time for all the roles assigned him and demanded of him within his own organization, but it would seem to me that a Secretary who started off to be a Presidential adviser would have to put ahead of department management these other obligations.

Mr. Turts. It seems to me as I listened to the discussion this morning, repeatedly we have come to the point that it is the State-Defense relationship that is the key, and where the big problems of coordination arise. The Secretary of State, after all, already has, by law and tradition and practice, the authority for supervision of the aid program and the information program, the disarmament agency, and

so on.

It seems to me that the State-Defense role is where the major problems of coordination arise. Therefore, I wondered whether by performing your second role, the collegial relationship with the Secretary of Defense, he is not getting at the heart of his third task.

Mr. NEUSTADT. He is getting at the heart of it, but there are two other aspects that a buddy-buddy relationship with the Secretary of Defense will not automatically take care of. One is the aspect that in form is within his departmental mandate; coordinating with the traditional bureaus those autonomous units, AID, ACDA, USIA which takes policy advice from him, and so forth. This is really a matter of interagency relations, even though in form some of these agencies are within the Department.

The other aspect involves the Secretary of the Treasury. Treasury is our third Foreign Office. The only exception I would take to Mr. Harriman's remarks and I agree that one should put the Defense

relation first-is that I think in these times, so long as the balance of payments and all it represents is with us, and so long as the Secretary in his internal job of debt financing is heavily and delicately involved in a host of external relations, involved among other things in banking community interrelations around the world-one can never afford to regard Treasury as a marginal agency in the national security sphere.

On some issues the State-Treasury relationship will be as crucial as it is all the time in the State-Defense area.

Mr. TUFTS. Thank you.

Senator JACKSON. Now I would like to call on Prof. Laurel Engberg, minority consultant.

Mr. ENGBERG. Professor Neustadt, our responsibility is in security staffing and operations, and I would like to consider two questions, one in each area.

In regard to operation of our foreign policy, being a combination of military, economic, and cultural and social resources at the present time, can State develop needed competency in these fields and be the President's prime adviser in national security?

Assuming that this can be done, how can State take such a primary role as a coordinator of security policy and adviser to the President without becoming the type of superagency that this committee previously rejected?

Mr. NEUSTADT. In answer to the first part of your question, the necessary competence, I personally doubt that one can ever hope to build inside of State all the specialties needed. I think it is probably a mistake to try. What one does need to build in State is great generalist capability, combined with great competence in political analysis. Political analysis is supposed to be State's stock-in-trade. We need to add great skill in dealing with, interpreting other analytical specialties. But all the other specialists don't have to be in State. We couldn't get them in there if we tried.

Speaking of political analysis, I don't think there is always present in the State Department, sufficient appreciation for the difference between politics as diplomacy and politics as politics, not only at home but abroad.

State always claims for itself the political advisory role, by which is ordinarily meant the role of diplomatic advice, diplomatic judg ment. But one of the difficulties I sense from the outside, in some of the recent situations to which the chairman has alluded, is inadequate consideration for, or perhaps argument for, aspects arising out of social trends and party trends and bureaucratic politics in Britain, to say nothing of palace politics, and other sorts, in France. Sensitive advice on things like these is as important as the other kind of political advice, diplomatic advice. We look to State for both kinds, whether we get them or not.

This is a lot to ask from State and beyond this I think we have a right-and a chance to ask for competence in seeking and in using other sorts of expertise found elsewhere: military, scientific, specialized economic, and so forth. All these don't have to be put into State if State has good generalists who can tap outside experts and combine their concerns with its own. This takes familiarity with other specialties and some in-house capability, but not, I should think, great masses of specialized staffs.

To try to go beyond that—well, I think that is asking enough. To try to go beyond is asking too much.

Mr. ENGBERG. In view of what you said a moment ago about the difficulty of getting information from the other departments, will State's position in these other areas be valid if they don't have an element of expertise in these other fields?

Mr. NEUSTADT. One aspect of the super-Cabinet proposals with which the previous subcommittee dealt was the czardom concept of coordination, a decisional role, a court of first resort role, as I said in my statement. I see nothing of the sort for the State Department as a coordinator. The task here is not to decide, but to channel, to funnel, to sharpen, to make sure that the other experts are consulted and that conflicts are rendered plain and decidable. That is the essence of preparatory staff work. This requires that an agency with its own expertise have great self-restraint, great generalist capability, if it is going to weigh the perspectives native to it against the perspectives of other people.

My hope is merely that we can get the generalist skill in the State Department to do this kind of channeling and weighing with appropriate restraint. We ought to be able to get it more nearly from a department which specializes in diplomatic judgments than from experts who specialize in hardware judgments. It is easier to visualize this from the State Department than from the Defense Department.

It may be that the daily work of the State Department, which is to take in diplomatic cables and to get them out, to deal with foreign offices, and other diplomats primarily-it may be that the perspective stemming from that daily work just overwhelms the effort to serve also as generalist coordinators of contending perspectives.

Yet this combination is what I think we have to try to achieve in the upper reaches of the State Department.

Mr. ENGBERG. You don't feel, then, that there would be, in sort of a de facto sense, the development of a super-State Department agency? Mr. NEUSTADT. Well, it depends on what you mean by "super."

Mr. ENGBERG. If it is a prime adviser to the President on security problems and if he depends upon State for this type of thing and State has to either by informal or formal means get the necessary information on all of these highly important and related fields in determining the policy that it is recommending, wouldn't there be a tendency to think of it as being a superagency, a top agency?

Mr. NEUSTADT. If all these things followed precisely as you put them, yes; but I don't think there is any chance that they will. The Secretary of Defense is unlikely to be a shrinking violet; neither is the Secretary of the Treasury. I can't make promises about personalities in the future, but their institutional positions are such that they will be able to make their voices heard and their subordinates will have strong rights and will push to get them exercised. As for the White House I am most doubtful that it would depend on staff in the Secretary's Office to bring up all the papers which the President's aides would merely scan for proper form and then have the President sign. This seems to me a most unlikely eventuality.

All one really wants from State is this: On issues which a Bundy office cannot handle because they aren't at the top of the President's own list, or after a decision is made because he shifts off to something

else while they have to be tidied up and tended to, all one wants-all I hope is that staff in the Secretary's Office will conscientiously and carefully, and with a sense of serving the whole Government, make sure that all the people with a right to know, all the people with a right to be involved, to express opinions, will get a crack at the right time and place.

This is asking a lot, but this is all I am asking. The better State is able to do this, the more confidence will develop in the Pentagon and in the Treasury. The more effective this begins to be, the less will be the tendencies to do the things Mr. Tufts and I were talking about, to hide information.

If other agencies find the State Department staff a good resource for them, a good avenue for them, they will use it. In the best of all possible worlds, it is still a far cry from czardom or from the single or sole source of advice. This is merely a means of getting the preparatory work done, putting advice in shape, everybody's advice in shape, and getting the followup work done, passing the word, checking on what has been done, getting both kinds of work better handled beyond the range where White House staffers can do it themselves on an ad hoc basis.

Mr. ENGBERG. John Corson, in a recent Public Administration Review article, and Don Price, in 1961, in a publication put out by the American Assembly, and you, yourself, in your formal presentation, pointed out that men's loyalties are very apt to run to their own program. Corson and Price pointed out that advancement in the Government services depends on becoming proficient in terms of specialized interests of a single bureau, but ability to perform in a general policy area, assuming such an ability is developed, tends to come on the job. A Secretary is apt to be a relatively short-term person, and in many instances is somewhat inexperienced in that field. A President has a 4- or 8-year term and also comes in, in our type of government, sometimes as an amateur, sometimes inexperienced. As a result, the President depends upon the Secretary of State for advice in this field. The Secretary depends upon his Department for his briefing and for the various background types of information that he is going

to use.

What is your thinking about this tendency of the staffing to be relatively parochial and have a vested interest in their particular interest in the sense that it tends to affect the type of information that they give to the Secretary which he carries then on to the President? Mr. NEUSTADT. Well, I think the tendency is very deeply rooted in our system and is not going to be eradicated.

Mr. ENGBERG. I agree with you there.

Mr. NEUSTADT. And it is perfectly legitimate, the system being what it is. I think that most career officials are very conscientious in attempting to faithfully represent their superiors' needs. The narrowness of perspective is bound to creep in.

I think we have to try more than we are already trying to counteract this in certain key echelons, by all kinds of devices. Most of them have already been presented to this subcommittee or its predecessor; exchanges of staff, an ever more imaginative use of War College methods for mingling military and civilian officials, an ever more imaginative use of our new situation in the field-a situation to which your staff report on basic issues has alluded-making sure that younger

officers in the national security complex, out in the field, who are close to one another's business in a way they never were before, making sure that in career development they have every chance to interchange their roles and work wherever possible.

Ideally, and this is a bigger ideal than I care to spend much money on or tie myself to the stake for, ideally we should be able, over the next decade, to broaden in very considerable measure the career development both of Foreign Service officers and of military officers headed for Pentagon work or field assignments at high levels. If we mix them up enough and mix up their work enough out in the field as well as at home, in operations as well as in training, we do a lot to counter the parochial tendencies.

We will never do away with these tendencies, but the mere fact that we have become accustomed over the last decade to interrelationships which Mr. Secretary Johnson found sort of abominable gives me some hope that over the next decade, if we really start building these interrelationships into career development, we can gain at least with respect to the crucial combination of Defense and State-not an identity of interests or experience or work, but sensitivity about the other guy's perspective and work to a degree we have never had before.

If we start the Foreign Service officer young enough, and many of our younger officers are extremely able, and start the military officer young enough into these new relationships, I should think that by 1975 we ought to have a civil service quite adequate for the problems of 1963, and that is progress.

Mr. ENGBERG. Wouldn't you think in this transitional period possibly some of the suggestions Senator Miller made before, having an agency to tie together these various areas and to probe into some of the parochial approaches of the different areas, might be feasible? Mr. NEUSTADT. Yes, sir. I have to say to you in all candor that Senator Miller is holding open my line of retreat, my escape hatch, and that if we can't make this thing work without another echelon, then I think we have to face the fact, and establish it. I think this question has been before us now since 1947, with all the experimenting since it is still before us.

I know a number of very able career officials in the Executive Office of the President who have been convinced for years that in the long run we shall have to come to an Office of National Security Affairs, and Executive Office staff for national security affairs; that the State Department cannot be at once a department and then something more.

I think this is a perfectly tenable position. It is only out of conservatism that I urge us not to hasten toward this without making every effort to do it the other way.

Mr. ENGBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator JACKSON. Are there any further questions?

Dr. Neustadt, on behalf of the committee, we want to express to you our deep appreciation for an excellent statement, outstanding testimony, and invaluable counsel and advice. We hope appropriate officials in the executive branch will also give due heed to what was said here this morning.

Thank you very much.

Mr. NEUSTADT. Thank you, sir.