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ments of Government. If we do not have that balance, then we can get ourselves into difficulties from time to time.
Mr. HARRIMAN. I agree, Mr. Chairman, completely.
Of course, in the case of Skybolt, it had foreign policy considerations for us and it was a very important problem for the British Government politically and domestically. Naturally, most of our actions in one way or another affect the internal conditions in other countries. That is why I say it is so important to understand why other countries do certain things.
You mentioned President de Gaulle. I think it is quite important before you close your mind on what our attitude should be, to know what motivates President de Gaulle. I am not here to discuss that.
In this case of Skybolt, it was a very important political question in its proper sense. It hit at the pride and sense of independence and the security of the British nation, and, therefore, led to a great deal of difficulty.
I think fortunately the skill with which the President and Prime Minister Macmillan dealt with it in Nassau, and the cooperation of both the State Department and particularly the Defense Department, that situation was ironed out.
Of course, it is very clearly an indication of where almost everything we do here of any importance has some repercussions the world over.
Senator Jackson. This is very important. I personally had an experience not too long ago, and I cannot in a public session give the details of it, when a certain officer came to me regarding some changes that were going to be made in our base structure.
It so happened that he had not thought through, nor had anyone else under his command, what the implications would be if the announcement that he carried to my office would be made at that time.
I told him, “I think you better go back and talk to your superior, and, in turn, get in touch with the Secretary of State."
Apparently he did that, because they withdrew the announcement. But had this officer—and this tells a very important story—had this officer given out the statement that was about to be released, it would have caused very serious international repercussions at that time.
This case brings home the importance of coordination between Defense and State in depth. This officer was handling something that to him was routine. Unless such an officer has a broad understanding of national security, and this is what the war colleges are supposed to to be for, anything could happen.
I am sure you agree with the importance of the coordination between State and Defense in these matters.
Mr. HARRIMAN. It is extremely important. Of course, one problem always is that when a report is made, it is naturally reported in the United States in terms of the manner in which it affects the United States. The selection of emphasis of reports sometimes is very detrimental to our relations with other countries.
There was recently a report issued by one of the senatorial committees that traveled. It was reported in the press accurately, as far as it affected the United States, but it did not carry the details of how it affected the other countries.
It caused a great deal of difficulty to other countries. We cabled back and forth and finally the report, itself, arrived at one of the countries where we were having difficulties as a result of it.
In fact, we were told the report had been devastating. When the report finally arrived, the Embassy reported, “The best answer to the report is the report itself. Send us 75 copies."
That is really a matter of communication which is extremely difficult, and the interpretation by the press, not being critical of it, very frequently causes difficulties abroad.
That is one of the democratic processes which we have to live with, and one of the penalties that we pay by having a free and open press, and unmanaged.
Senator JACKSON. I guess you can gather that I am an advocate of a strong, vigorous Department of State. Certainly one of the objectives of our committee is to see that your job and the job of the Secretary, who has a most difficult task, is made easier.
In the end, we hope that this country will be more effective in the world, and that our military power, which is enormous, will be used wisely to further our vital interests and to maintain the peace. In fact, I think the big challenge that we face today is not so much the question of developing new weapons systems. We will do that, and we are doing it.
I think our military posture is strong. The central issue is: Will we use this accumulated military power wisely to achieve the desired foreign policy objectives of our country and to maintain the peace? This is the great problem. This is the great challenge.
It is much easier to turn out military hardware. You can mobilize the technicians, the scientists, the engineers. But to be able to make those hard, tough, difficult, foreign policy decisions in a climate of catastrophic weapons, and to maintain your dignity and your right to freedom, this is the greatest challenge that we face.
The Department of State, at the right hand of the President, carries the heaviest responsibilities in this task. I want to say that I feel a lot better about our Government having you as the new Under Secretary for Political Affairs.
I have nothing but admiration and respect for your courage and your vigor. You mentioned age, a tribute to the young men. I do not think we ought to discriminate.
Mr. HARRIMAN. Thank you, sir.
Senator Jackson. I must say you are a very young, vigorous officer in the Department of State. Anyone who has tried to keep up with you will not contest that statement.
Mr. HARRIMAN. Thank you, sir.
Senator JACKSON. I wanted to say my admonition was the wise use
Mr. HARRIMAN. May I compliment you and your committee and your very capable and cooperative staff that I have had the privilege of working with now for a number of years. I do believe they serve
your purposes, as you describe them, effectively and well. They have been very cooperative with me and all others.
Senator JACKSON. I must say that this committee is the staff. Without the staff we would not be a committee.
The committee will now recess, and we will reconvene on Monday morning at 10 o'clock.
(Whereupon, the subcommittee recessed at 11:40 a.m., to reconvene Monday, March 25, at 10 a.m.)
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
MONDAY, MARCH 25, 1963
STAFFING AND OPERATIONS,
Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 3302, New Senate Office Building, Senator Henry M. Jackson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Jackson, Javits, and Miller.
Staff members present: Dorothy Fosdick, staff director; Robert W. Tufts, chief consultant; Richard S. Page, research assistant; Judith J. Spahr, chief clerk; and Laurel A. Engberg, minority consultant.
OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN
Senator JACKSON. The subcommittee will come to order.
This is the third public meeting of the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations. The Senate has charged the subcommittee with an important and complex undertaking: to review the administration of national security policies and processes in this country and abroad.
We are making our study nonpartisan and professional. We will make the findings and recommendations for improvement wherever these appear appropriate.
Our first meetings have been devoted to laying the foundation for the subcommittee's subsequent work. We have received illuminating and extremely helpful testimony from two distinguished Americans Gen. Lauris Norstad and Gov. W. Averell Harriman.
It has been said that “to administer is to rule.” In our system, the final responsibility for administration of national security affairs lies with the President. The new scope and requirements of the office make it a new Presidency, notably different from what it was in safer times.
The outstanding student of the "new Presidency” is our witness this morning, Dr. Richard E. Neustadt, professor of government, Columbia University. It is no secret that his distinguished book “Presidential Power” (1960), was carefully read by the President for the insights it provided into the problems of the Presidency.
We have asked Professor Neustadt here, not only as a university obServer of the Presidency, but also as a person with Government experience. In Mr. Truman's time, he served at the Bureau of the Budget and on the White House staff. He has served since as a consultant to a number of Government agencies and to the President