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the phony or slanted economic theory or financial policy advanced in arguments. He must, of course, be adequately prepared to look askance at any exaggerated claims whether for a weapon or a course of action-even when made in the exalted name of "scientific methods." It might, in such cases, be useful to remember the rather sly question, attributed to some doubting disciples, as to whether scientific methods applied to horse breeding to improve transportation could ever have produced the modern automobile engine. After all, human will, creativeness and talent must be given credit for something by somebody.
Furthermore, the military officer should be ready to identify and evaluate the impact of the swings in politico-social emotions and fashions which are so frequently the affliction of our national security and foreign policy. It is these factors which so largely influence us and produce those weird reversals and grotesque lurches that give us a policy often referred to as "crisis oriented" but which can, I think, be more accurately described as the “Yo-yo system"that is, you throw it away one minute and snatch it back the next.
In short, the military career oficer must be highly skilled in his own profession, but he cannot afford to become trapped in narrow professionalism. Nor, indeed, can his country permit him to do so.
General Eisenhower—a most distinguished predecessor in the Thayer Awardin his farewell message as President made a statement strangely overlooked by most commentators-who pounced so eagerly on his reference to the dangers of a "military-industrial complex"—yet neglected advice of equal or greater weight. He wisely—and also pointedly—said "in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite."
The noted British writer, C. P. Snow, himself an eminent scientist, similarly warned against the danger of a scientific overlord-against a scientist in a position of isolated power.
What is true of the scientist is true of the military expert. It is not the unwarranted power of the scientist or of the military officer or of any other expert that is now cause for our concern. Isolation is what creates the real problemthat is, power insulated from competing skills or the claims of other groups for recognition of possible alternative courses of action. Consequently, if "knowledge is power”, as the old axiom tells us, then insulated knowledge fails to meet fully our needs in the making of public policy.
I believe the time has come for a new Thayer-like break-out from the relatively narrow concept of the military profession and rigid doctrines held by my i generation into studies of wider scope. In particular, we must develop a faster
response to the technological and scientific revolution with its resulting impact on strategy and doctrine. I am convinced that this extension of proper military
concern can best be built on the firm foundation of the military sciences and 4 of the discipline and high standards of character based on the great traditions
of this magnificent military Academy and those of its sister services. For the $ virtues nourished here are your priceless inheritance from The Long Gray Line * and must remain one of the few unchanging values in a radically changing world.
I submit, gentlemen, that only an expanding mind can deal with a world of expanding complexities; and that broadening your horizons will not diminish the value of your special military skills but will, on the contrary, enhance their validity and usefulness in those great Councils of Government where, as servants of the Republic, you will sit as keepers of the faith and guardians of the peace.
LETTER OF SECRETARY OF THE NAVY PAUL H. NITZE TO ADMIRAL CHARLES D. GRIF
FIN, PRESIDENT OF THE FY 1965 FLAG SELECTION BOARD, MAY 18, 1964 DEAB ADMIRAL GRIFFIN: In giving consideration to the responsibility I have for participating in the process of selection of officers for flag rank, I have come to the following views.
1. Far more important than anything I may write or say upon this subject is the designation of a selection board, consisting of members in which I have the utmost confidence that they will be wisely responsive to the requirements of the naval service. For this reason, I gave personal attention to this aspect of the selection process. It is my conviction that in this year's board we have members who are attuned to the changing nature of the requirements for flag officers, who will be able to determine from the performance of officers within the duty patterns of their past years, those who are best fitted to provide lead. ership in an appreciably different future.
2. Having said that, I should nevertheless like to record my view of how the requirements of the past may have differed from the requirements of the future and the effect this should have on your approach to the selection process.
3. I believe that it continues to be most important for the Navy to select officers of flag rank who will be superb leaders in sea-going commands. This does not mean, however, that we need to place so much emphasis upon competence in sea-going billets that we fail to give substantial emphasis to competence to provide leadership in critical positions involving technical and management responsibilities. I believe that it should be possible to identify those oficers whose performance at sea has given evidence that they will be brilliant leaders of task forces and fleets, but who have demonstrated those additional characteristics of leadership that quality them for positions of greatest respon. sibility ashore.
4. I shall not presume to try to describe for you, who are far more experienced in Naval operations than I, the characteristics that mark a man as a potentially great operational commander. I do believe that I have had the profes. sional experience to provide guidance and insights in regard to those additional qualities which would be most likely to provide great benefit to the Navy in assignments other than at sea.
5. You will have been briefed by the Chief of Naval Personnel on those billets which can best be filled by officers of various sub-specializations. I have the view that these sub-specializations are most important and that this fact should be recognized by each selection board and given serious, but not overriding weight. By that I seek to emphasize that I do not consider it mandatory that any given board endeavor to provide selections from all specializations which require flag officers, but, rather, that we should expect that over a period of several years the law of averages will permit us to fill required specializations while giving major emphasis to the selection of more broadly qualified leadership.
6. After giving careful consideration to qualification for sea command and required specializations, I believe the selection board should place great stress on seeking evidence, in the past performance of prospective flag oficers, of the qualities of flexibility of mind, analytical thought processes, creativity and imagination which will best qualify them to compete with the increasingly professional and intellectual civilian leadership within an increasingly int rated Defense Department. I think that the evidence of such qualifications can be found in many categories of billets. However, I can think of none where the naval officer is put to a greater test of ability to rise above his background and possible prejudices than by demonstrated outstanding performance in Joint and International Staffs and Agencies. It is here that the common dogma of any one service must give way to the give and take of analysis from differing perspectives. It is here that he must rely less on the lessons of past experience and more on his basic qualities of intellect and thoughtfulness.
7. It seems to me that still another method of getting at the qualities mentioned in paragraph 6 above is through scrutiny of the manner in which the pro spective flag officer has adapted himself to changes in professional billets involving distinctly different skills. That is, an officer who has performed brilliantly in a series of positions of related skills may not be as broadly capable of the kind of performance we need in the Navy of the future as one who has demonstrated similar performance in a series of different skills
8. As a separate matter, if the Navy is to make its proper contribution to those councils where more than one military service is represented, it is important for the program of early selection of the past several years to continue in conformity with the general guidance provided by the Chief of Naval Personnel and approved by me. At the same time, in order that motivation to continue sustained performance in the more senior years may be provided, I consider it important that there be conformity also to the general guidance for numbers to be selected in the more senior categories.
9. I hope that the results of this board will provide a balance through 8 range in seniority, a range in specializations, and most importantly, a strong leavening of line officers broadly qualified to provide not only brilliant opera tional command but also unique intellectual leadership in any new and different positions-Navy, Joint, or International-into which they may be ordered Sincerely,
PAUL H. NITZE
Secretary of the Nevy. Adm. CHARLES D. GRIFFIN, Commander in Chief, 0.8. Naval Forces, Europe, Fleet Post Office, New York, N.Y.
EXTRACT FROM SPEECH BY EDWARD L. KATZENBACH, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (EDUCATION) AT UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY. WEBT POINT, NEW YORK, APRIL 24, 1964
THE MILITARY MIND
A favorite subject of mine is the military mind. One of the reasons this is so is because there is so much mileage in it these days, what between “Fail Safe", "Dr. Strangelove", and "Seven Days in May."
Other less facetious reasons for my interest in the military mind are its importance to the nation and the cost of its preparation and education. All things considered, the cost is about a billion dollars. In terms of area alone, if campuses of all our military training and educational establishments were put together, they would equal in area size the size of the City of Los Angeles, added to the City of Chicago, added to Greater New York City. Nor do these campuses lack for students. We have in school at any one time up to 300,000 or between ten and fifteen percent of the total military population of the United States. All of these people aren't learning to take apart machineguns and nuclear missilesand radar sets or one thing and another. Many are studying at universities. One Service, for example, has graduate students at 88 different universities in this country and abroad. Consequently, I would imagine that today the Armed Forces are as well an educated profession in terms of the number of years they spend in school as any other. This fact is impressed upon me every morning when I come in and see the Air Force Colonel who is my Director of Eduction Programs because he has not only a Bachelor of Science Degree from West Point, but also a Master of Public Administration from Harvard, a Master of Business Administration from George Washington, and a Doctor of Education from the University of Denver.
But what does this erudite military mind really think about? Few people, I suppose, know or even profess to know. The military mind, of course, really isn't unlike other professional minds. It deals with intellectual problems in basically the same way that an academic mind or a medical mind or an engineering mind or a legal mind attack their respective problems. It deals with very real, intellectual problems concerning the profession of arms. Ones which I imagine most of you haven't thought about before. I'd like to illustrate one in the very simplest possible terms, the machine gun, a weapon which is in some degree familiar to all of us.
Consider for a moment the problem of being confronted for the very first time with a weapon that can shoot at so many rounds per minute, that can traverse and go up and down and shoot overhead, that takes a large amount of ammunition, that heats after a certain period of time and then freezes with heat. How would this thing be used ? Do you use it on attack? Do you use it on defense? Do you mount it on something? Do you use it on the flanks? How do you supply it with ammunition? Does its firepower allow for a re duction in conventionally armed troops? It took as bright a group of intellectuals as the world has really known eight years to figure out these programs. in terms so that they're willing to buy machine guns. That was the German General Staff at the turn of the century. But now, of course, military people's problems have increased a good deal more than that in intellectual terms. Have. you ever thought about the history of, say, the thousand years between 847 and 1847 and then 1847-1947? That thousand to a hundred year span and then that in terms of the ten years just between 1947 and 1957. Between 847 and 1847 was the period of castles and crossbows and longbows and big Swiss pikes and gunpowder and cannons and the new engineering. Compare that to the period from 1847 to 1947 in terms of battleships, oil, gasoline, repeating weapons, tanks, planes, and the atomic bomb, and then think of it in terms of the ten years after that-automation, miniaturization, hydrogen bomb, missiles, space. You have about a thousand to a hundred to ten ratio of technological compression.