service a considerable period of time, and he had not changed his ways or his judgments, but he worked for a different boss.

This is an unusual case. I think, on the whole, the efficiency reports are most conscientiously prepared, and there is every attempt, in most cases, to give a fair appraisal of the man's capabilities or the woman's capabilities of their work.

Parallel to the Department of State, there are activities in the foreign field of great importance to foreign policy carried out by the U.S. Information Agency, the Agency for International Development. We decided to call it previously the Mutual Security Administration, which I think is much closer to its meaning. I want to underline the fact that less and less of the contributions that we make to other countries are in the forms of grants.

Most of them are now in loans. An increasing percentage is in loans. And it is for the purpose of development. In addition to that are our military assistance programs.

It has become increasingly evident that all of the activities abroad must be coordinated, both in Washington and in the field. It is the responsibility of the Secretary of State to coordinate the activities in Washington. In the field, the concept of the country team was reaffirmed and clarified on May 29, 1961, when President Kennedy wrote letters to each of our Ambassadors, instructing him to coordi nate all of our Government's activities in the country to which he is accredited.

There can be no doubt about the wisdom of this system. This responsibility requires Ambassadors to have an intimate knowledge of the various activities of our Government abroad, as well as unusual qualities of leadership to bring together in many cases strong personalities dedicated to their particular functions.

These new responsibilities underline the importance of the opportunities for training which are given to Foreign Service officers in the Foreign Service Institute and the various service colleges which broaden the knowledge and understanding of all of our services.

About two-thirds of our Ambassadors are now drawn from the Foreign Service. The other third is drawn from men of wide experience in many field of activity. I am strongly of the opinion that these men contribute greatly to the effectiveness of our representation abroad.

The ambassador from the Foreign Service and those drawn from outside Government each contributes and sets a standard for the other and one standard will affect the other. The noncareer ambassador is apt to bring a freshness of approach, a rather more vivid language in his reporting, which is a relief to read after the more stereotyped style.

But, what is more, since he is not dependent upon his job, he is inclined to be more independent in expressing his judgments. However, as he is not afraid of being fired, he is at times too independent, but this is a quality which encourages others to a reasonable balance. I would like to refer to my previous testimony, if I may:

I cannot find words strong enough to express my feeling about the selection of our Ambassadors because of large political contributions. There are no longer unimportant posts which can be used for political rewards.

The welfare and security of our Nation are at stake in every country, and our Ambassadors should be selected on the basis of their qualifications. There are better ways to finance our political parties than at the expense of our national interest and our national security.

I am not letting off, Mr. Chairman, either party from this criticism of past practices.

In spite of the speed of communication, I believe our Ambassadors. today have more important functions than ever. The relationships which he builds with other governments and the manner in which he carries out instructions, can play a vital role in the development of our relations with the country to which he is accredited.

The Department has been criticized at times for permitting desk officers, who are usually much junior to the Ambassadors, to issue specific instructions. I believe the practice of issuing instructions should be minimized. Our Ambassador in the field should be given guidance to be used in his own judgment, as to the manner in which he approaches a subject and discusses a subject, but he should not be given specific instructions as to the language to be used except in particularly important cases.

I have found that this system utilizes to better advantage the talents of our embassies, not only Ambassadors but the staff members.

Furthermore, since the end of the war, our role in the world has completely changed. We are no longer observers in the world scene. Events in almost all parts of the world now affect us, and therefore we have become participants in much that is going on.

Our Ambassador and his staff have therefore to understand the nature of their responsibilities and be prepared to protect our interests with their own initiative in whatever the developments may be.

One matter of increasing importance is the need for speed in our communications system. It is now quite good, but needs improvement. I suggest this subcommittee give consideration to the manner in which this can be done. In this nuclear age, we cannot afford to run the risk of delay, either in information to Washington, or in word to the field.

On the other hand, I find that we have not become accustomed to the speed of jet transportation, for too much goes by telegram rather than by air pouch. One reason is that it has become a habit for senior officers to read only telegrams, leaving airgrams to the desk officers.

In the Far Eastern Bureau, we tried this past month an experiment with four embassies. In these cases, experience has shown that the average time of the pouch is approximately 2 days. We instructed these embassies to send only priority messages by telegram, and the balance in airgrams marked for expeditious handling.

I assured the embassies that we would give equal attention to these special airgrams as we previously had given to telegrams. It is too early to report meaningfully on the results, but I am inclined to believe that the volume of telegrams can be substantially reduced.

And, incidentally, it is a relief and saves a lot of time for the receiving officer to read the plain language of airgrams, rather than the artificial brevity of cables.

I pointed out to the embassies they should not increase the length of their messages, but they should, of course, write them in clear Eng

lish, and also through the type and the paragraphing, one can glance through an airgram rapidly whereas it is very difficult to read a cable, both because it is cablese and also because of the type that is used, and the failure to break up sentences and paragraphs.

Our missions abroad are apt to feel that they will be judged by the mass of telegrams, airgrams, and other communications sent back to Washington. But volume is no substitute for quality. In my opinion, the present bulk of reporting should be reduced.

A good report will be brief, at least in summary, and contain incisive judgments and thoughtful interpretations. It is an abdication of responsibility when a mission passes back to intelligence analysts and to desk officers in Washington the task of finding meaning in the raw material.

In this jet age, there should be more travel from Washington to the field, and from the field to Washington. This is the case in all businesses, and money should be provided to permit the same procedures to be used by Government, which is of far greater national importance than business activity.

Face-to-face meetings produce more expeditious and wiser decisions than is possible through the written word. I have experience both in business and Government in that connection. It is extremely difficult, without talking either by telephone or face to face, to get across the nuances of the judgments and to pass back and forth the balance of opinions on both sides.

The problem is we must consider what is going on in other parts of the world as well as what is going on in the United States. It is important that we understand, before making decisions, what is motivating the other country. Even though we do not agree with their action, we should clearly understand why they are taking certain action in order to be able to deal with it.

In addition, it is hard for people in the field, unless they come home reasonably frequently, to understand what is going on in our own country, and, obviously, our foreign policies must be kept tuned to the judgments and opinions in our country.

When most of our embassies are within 24 hours from Washington, and, as a matter of fact, many of them in Europe and Africa are only 7 hours away, and, in fact, now you can go to Japan in 14 hours, the time consumed in travel is negligible as compared to that saved through endless and at times inconclusive correspondence.

In addition, there should be more travel between embassies within regions. There is a disease known as localitis which is almost impossible to protect against in long periods of isolation. Discussions between ambassadors having overlapping or conflicting problems lead to much better understanding and better recommendations and actions in the field.

In closing, I would like to refer to what I said to this subcommittee when I was a private citizen. I might have some diffidence in saying it now that I am again working for the executive branch:

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take the liberty of suggesting that this subcommittee inquire into the problem of how a Secretary of State can discharge his obligations to the Congress effectively, yet with less time-consuming burdens ***. It is not merely the time he spends testifying, but also the time needed to prepare himself to answer any conceivable question which may come up ***. He must of course be available to the Congress when needed

I recognize that this is a matter for the Congress to determine. Thank you, gentlemen. This is obviously a very inadequate presentation, but if it should lead to any questions, I shall be very happy to attempt to answer them.

Senator JACKSON. Governor, I want to say you have made a very helpful and very informative and provocative statement.

In a letter to me on September 4, 1961, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, stated that the President wishes the Secretary of State to serve "as the agent of coordination in all our major policies toward other nations."

I want to ask you if State is having any difficulty in carrying out this task, this important task of coordination, and what, if anything, could be done to make it easier for the State Department to play this role.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I don't think the Secretary of State has difficulty. The President's instructions are, of course, carried out by all Cabinet members. I do believe that there is difficulty on the lower level, which is the essence of things.

I would like to read from my testimony given the last time. I think it still holds true. Much of the coordination cannot be done by the Secretary himself dealing with the Cabinet members. I have found that the very closest cooperation-perhaps it has never been any closer-is between the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State as it is today. Not only in the Defense Department, but with other departments work has to be done with interdepartmental committees. I believe what I said 3 years ago still applies, although I think there have been some improvements:

In a government as large and as complicated as ours, there is no alternative to the interdepartmental committee to coordinate policy and action. The reason for the existence of each such committee, however, should be kept under constant review. There should be a committee-killing outfit to review constantly the need for existence the existence of different committees. Many have become a waste of time. Many were established when a need existed but now serve no apparent purpose except to give social outlet to staff members.

There is nothing some members of a staff like more than to leave their office, quit working, sit about, smoke their pipes, and exchange views with other departments.

When I was Secretary of Commerce, I found that many interdepartmental committees

and I went over each one of them myself

were being used for what I might call bureaucratic espionage. A department might send a junior staff member to a committee meeting in order to report back to his seniors on the plans of other departments. Armed with this information, the seniors could obstruct programs which did not meet with their own departmental bureaucratic objectives.

A committee can be of value only if the departmental representative is a man able to speak for the department and to make decisions, then and there. The only exception should be if the decisions involved are of such major importance as to require top level agreement. This should be adopted as a principle.

I worked a good deal in London during the war with the war cabinet and I found the British War Cabinet committee meetings were far more effective than ours, for many reasons. One reason particularly was because they had an experienced member of the Secretariat of the War Cabinet who was present at the meeting and wrote up the minutes.

In many cases, even when there was a conflict of opinion in the first place, he was able to judge the basis for a bringing together of different opinions. I don't think we have worked out the best method of interdepartmental interchange.

I knew it was not satisfactory when I was Secretary of Commerce in 1946, 1947, and 1948. But certainly, insofar as the Cabinet members are concerned, the President's instructions are being carried out fully and in good spirit.

Senator JACKSON. Governor, in the same vein I want to ask you how the Secretary of State can be better informed to deal with the varied and diversified concerns for which he must be responsible.

In other words, how is he properly informed about arms control negotiations, problems in the foreign aid field and in other areas, getting the information early and in time from subordinates within the Department and within the other agencies as they bear on his duties and responsibilities as the first adviser to the President, as the senior Cabinet officer.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I can only speak in theory. I don't know Mr. Rusk's work habits, but I find him extremely well informed on such matters as you described; in fact, on all matters.

He receives that information, I know, from many sources. The Intelligence and Research Bureau in the Department is very effective in giving up-to-date information, and the analysis of that information. Usually it is necessary, as you have indicated, not only to know the facts, but also to have them analyzed so that he can reach a judgment about what should be done about the facts.

The Policy Planning Staff is another Bureau which is of great assistance. In addition to this, he has the needed staff that does analyze matters for him. The Secretary reads, of course, a great deal himself. At the present time, the President requires of the Secretary of State the most careful knowledge of all matters that affect foreign policy.

In my experience, I have found Mr. Rusk exceptionally well informed, not only of the subjects but of the analysis of the subjects, and with sufficient depth in order to have a sound appreciation of the problem.

Senator JACKSON. I, of course, do not want to ask any questions that would require a personal knowledge of the duties and responsibilities of the Secretary of State. You, naturally, have to speak from your broad general experience in the field of diplomacy and the field of foreign relations.

But, would you agree in general that a condition precedent to improving the job of coordination is adequate and good information? Mr. HARRIMAN. That is correct, sir.

Senator JACKSON. There is one other point.

Mr. HARRIMAN. One of the most difficult things, of course, is to analyze the volume of cables that come in every morning and to be sure that the Secretary sees the important ones. That is being done by, I should have said, a very capable section known as the Secretariat, which serves both him and the Under Secretary, and certain Assistant Secretaries, by bringing to the attention of all, the more important cables.