of the production of work and of reporting, the military staffs are perhaps a little disproportionate to the total output of the Embassy. Otherwise, I think there are no real problems here, except the need for a gradual expansion in three main respects: One, in the consular field, because of the very considerable development of tourist travel and of exchanges between the two countries; second, in the Cultural Section of the Embassy, in order to enable us to handle better the many, many exchanges that are now developing; and finally, in the Political Section, in order to enable us to expand our coverage on a global basis and maintain close contact with the expanding diplomatic corps in Moscow.

At the time when I was in Moscow after the war, there were only 20-odd missions there. Now there are over 60. And many of these, of course, represent the new countries of Asia and Africa, as well as an increase in Latin American representation.

I could comment a little further on the nature of the work that we do and will make just a few remarks. However, this might perhaps come out better in questioning from the members of the subcommittee.

I mentioned that we do not try to do any deep research there. We have people who are steeped in Soviet studies, have been for many, many years, and our main effort is to sense the atmosphere, to see as many Russians as we can and have talks with them, and to report the kind of things that are not available in published materials, which can much better be studied in Washington.

We flag the attention of the Department and other agencies to developments there, to moods and attitudes and popular opinions. We sense them and see them. And in this respect, we work very closely with the research area of the Department and other agencies in Washington.

They inform us promptly of their line of thought on given things. We can challenge this and correct it and make policy recommendations on the basis of that.

We have certainly tried to maximize the ways in which we can know more about Soviet society. We do this not only in Moscow, but by a program of constant travel in the Soviet Union, and certainly the greatest instrument that has been developed in this respect is the exchange programs with the Soviet Union. We have just concluded the fourth one now. Each has been for a 2-year period. And in each case we have been able to broaden and to increase these exchanges.

These exchanges are of mutual interest; the Russians send people here, as we send people there. I think it is just as useful one way as the other, from our point of view. When these people come, we try not only to bring them in touch with broad segments of society, but ourselves to accompany them and to have them in as guests at the Embassy residence and things like that. So that today the contacts between Russians, Soviet citizens, and Americans, are infinitely broader than they were in the days when I was there during the Stalin regime.

I think, Mr. Chairman, I will stop here.

Senator JACKSON. You mentioned 114 Americans. How many Russians do you employ?

Ambassador KOHLER. We have about 120 Russian employees, all in clerical or service functions.

I might say that the physical setup of the post is that we have one large building, which is combined offices and an apartment building for a number of the members of our staff. The substantive offices are all located far upstairs, and are purely American.

Senator JACKSON. How does the number that we have in our Embassy in Moscow compare with the Soviet Embassy staff here in Washington?

Ambassador KOHLER. At the moment, they are somewhat larger, though we have usually maintained somewhat of a balance.

I have that here.

Senator JACKSON. Approximately the same?

Ambassador KOHLER. Very close. On July 1, 1963, the Soviet Embassy here had 122.

Senator JACKSON. Do they employ any Americans?
Ambassador KOHLER. I think they do not.

Senator JACKSON. Do they force us to hire Russians?
Ambassador KOHLER. No; they do not.

Senator JACKSON. This is a voluntary decision on our part?

Ambassador KOHLER. That is right. And the Russians that we get as employees, necessarily, we get through official Soviet agencies, because there is no such thing as private employment agencies in the Soviet Union.

Senator JACKSON. You mentioned the 2-year rule of service. I assume you do make exceptions to that.

Ambassador KOHLER. Oh, yes.

Senator JACKSON. Would you indicate what percentage and what group would fall within the exception?

Ambassador KOHLER. The exception, generally speaking, will be for a functional specialist who is also a Soviet specialist, who is not immediately replaceable.

This has been true in the past, for example, in the economic field, where in the past the State Department had not prepared enough people who were both Russian language and area specialists and trained economists, so that we have kept our Economic Counselor, who is presently there, for an extra year, until we could find and develop and prepare a suitable man.

The same is true of our Agricultural Attaché. We have kept him nearly 4 years, because we are a little short on people who know both agriculture and the Russian language and area.

Otherwise, I think we now have a corps of officers who can be interchangeable and whose technical and functional knowledge, as well as their Russian language and area training, are interchangeable.

I except the Ambassador from this, because he is an appointee of the President, and in the past there has been quite a bit of continuity in this. My immediate predecessor was there nearly 5 years, Ambassador Thompson, and his predecessor, Ambassador Bohlen, was there about 4 years.

Senator JACKSON. You feel that in this area, of course being impersonal about it, it is helpful for the Ambassador to have a longer tour?

Ambassador KOHLER. Being impersonal about it, I do think so. It takes time to make contacts and to develop them in this society.

Senator JACKSON. How does your work in Moscow differ, say, from the work in other American embassies behind the Iron Curtain?

I think you were in Rumania before. Is there any country where you might wish to illustrate the difference? Czechoslovakia?

Ambassador KOHLER. I should point out that I have not been posted in the Eastern European countries since the war. That was before the war. I have, however, handled relations with those countries as Assistant Secretary here in the State Department.

I would say that the principal difference is that in Moscow we have a double-barreled operation. One is a kind of global operation, where we are dealing with the Soviet-United States relationship throughout the world, and we look at problems all the way from Southeast Asia to Germany to Latin America to Africa.

Then the other aspect is our conduct of diplomatic relations on a bilateral basis with the Soviet Union. I believe it is today reasonably accurate to say that the posts in Eastern Europe tend to concentrate on the bilateral aspect. Otherwise, the conditions of work I think are very similar, and the functions. Those embassies also tend to be specialized embassies, staffed with language officers.

Senator JACKSON. I would assume that you follow closely the relations between members of the Communist bloc and the relationship between a given bloc country and the center of power, Moscow.

Ambassador KOHLER. This we do very carefully, and in this respect we have the closest kind of working relationships with our embassies in the Eastern European countries, with a complete exchange of information.

We also have invited all our colleagues in Eastern Europe to pay us visits, and in due course, I hope to visit them.

Senator JACKSON. Do you have any "American team" concept that you apply within the bloc? In other words, is there an exchange of information between your ambassador and the other American ambassadors in the bloc area, letting them know what you are doing in Moscow? Do you have conferences from time to time?

Ambassador KOHLER. Just last October we had a meeting of the Eastern European chiefs of mission, in Bonn.

Senator JACKSON. This is a variation of the country team concepta regional team in this case.

Ambassador KOHLER. It is. We work very closely together. And the exchange of information that is pertinent to each other's work is complete.

Senator JACKSON. I wanted to ask you: How do you handle some of these rather embarrassing encounters, where the burden of the effort on the part of the Soviet official is to try to make a monkey out of you or some other American and to embarrass you and our country! How do you handle that kind of occasion? Do you have any general instructions for this sort of situation? I suppose it is like trying to write a directive on common sense.

Ambassador KOHLER. I think this is more a question of whether you have got good sense or whether you have had a lot of experience.

And these encounters-well, I may say they are the exception. I should say generally speaking it is a straightforward relationship even when you disagree.

There have been occasions when there have been passages between Soviet leaders and myself where I think if you simply stand up in a self-respecting way and with the knowledge of the attitude of your own Government and people, and speak your piece, you cannot be too embarrassed.

Senator JACKSON. It is pretty fundamental, then, in the relations with the Soviet Union, that you be firm but fair in stating your position. You do not get excited, but you just lay it on the line with a "here it is" attitude for the most part.

Ambassador KOHLER. I think that is exactly right. And for the most part, it is a pleasant enough relationship.

Senator JACKSON. But in general, you have to be keenly cognizant of any special situation in the world at a given time, when their demeanor, their overall behavior, might be different from the norm? Ambassador KOHLER. I think you have stated it very well, Mr. Chairman.

Senator JACKSON. Moscow, of course, is the center of Communist power. A good many people from the President on down are concerned with American-Soviet relations. A great proportion of the time of the State Department is directed to this part of the world. What do you feel is the contribution that our ambassador to the Soviet Union can make to American foreign policy in this area, and how do you do it? How do you arrange for consultations in Washington? Do your views get a hearing? Could you just comment in general on your role in the policy process?

Ambassador KOHLER. I could.

Leaving the personality of the incumbent aside, I think the role of the ambassador in the Soviet Union is a very key one. The leadership there is rather concentrated. You get to know all of them and the opportunities to communicate with them are very frequent now.

You get from them senses of what is bothering them in a way that you do not get out of any published material in a country where there is a completely controlled press and where everything that is in the press is purposeful in one way or another.

Senator JACKSON. Just on this point, do you and your staff have adequate access to Soviet leaders so that you can get some correct estimate or feel as to their state of mind and what they are thinking outside of the doctrinaire published policy?

Ambassador KOHLER. I think one can get a good sense of it. It is not always straightforward and just coming directly to you.

An illustration would be, I think, the question of the relationship between Moscow and Peking during the past couple of years that I have been there. Officially, you could not get a Soviet leader to discuss this problem. He would say it was a family matter, and so forth. Unofficially, on social occasions and in private conversations with leading Russians, even though not officially, and in conversations which they did not regard as official, you could get indications well in advance of anything published of their great and growing concern about this problem.

Senator JACKSON. Would you follow through on that point?

Ambassador KOHLER. To go on, then: We do, of course, also follow the published material, although, as I have said, we do not try to make deep analysis of it. But combining the sense that you get of

the environment with what is published about policy for their own people, you can, on a daily basis, flag to particular attention of the State Department various things that should be studied profoundly, indicating a line of approach.

A third way, perhaps, is that we do encourage high American officials to visit us in the Soviet Union, so that they, too, can get some sense of the atmosphere, and bring them into touch with Rumanian leaders or Russian leaders, or, as the case may be, Russian intellectuals, and discuss things with them, so that when they come back then the relationship between the embassy and the home agencies is a closer one. Of course, there is a lot of just plain work to do. I spent 46 days of very tough negotiations to conclude the new 2-year exchange agreement that we signed a couple of months ago.

The Russians, as I think is well known, are tough bargainers. But I think in this kind of thing, where you finally work out a deal that is of mutual interest, they go through with it.

We have been carrying on negotiations for some time now-since last fall for a consular convention with the Soviet Union. This is a technical and rather complicated thing, as you know, and this has been going on steadily. I hope that after I get back, we will be able to bring this to a conclusion before too long.

Of course, we are in contact with the Russians throughout the world, notably, I would say, in East and West Germany, and we have many instances that require going back and forth in the conduct of business. As far away as Southeast Asia, we are constantly making representations to the Russians about their role or their lack of action in their capacity as co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference.

Now, to add to that: From Moscow, I come back fairly frequently for consultation here in Washington. When I do, I have a very busy schedule. I see people throughout the Government. I am debriefed within an inch of my life at the working level, and have conversations, then, with the President and with the Secretary of State as to their feelings. I report to them and get from them a sense of what they want me to do back in Moscow, what I ought to be saying to Chairman Khrushchev or Minister Gromyko, and so forth.

We also have, of course, as I think I mentioned earlier, a considerable exchange between the embassy and the State Department and other Washington agencies, so that we know what they are working on in a research way and can guide and direct and comment on that. This goes into the policy planning field. We receive all their studies, many of them in a preliminary form, and make our comments on them.

Senator JACKSON. Sometimes, I expect, you can evaluate their proposals much better in Moscow than in Washington. At least it is another check.

Ambassador KOHLER. It is another check, and it is a check that is unique.

Senator JACKSON. And you do a lot of that?
Ambassador KOHLER. Oh, a great deal.

Senator JACKSON. Do you feel that the ambassador-speaking personally-in Moscow plays a fairly substantial role in policy as far as American-Soviet relations are concerned?