We want our officials in allied groups to have influence and to be effective advocates of our interests. There is no better way to help them than to show that they have influence in our own counsels and have the respect and confidence of the men for whom they work.

Finally, the tasks of national security, I believe, may well be more complex and demanding today than ever before. Foreseeing as early as 1946 our basic dilemma, Henry Stimson said these wise words:

"The sinfulness and weakness of man are evident to anyone who lives in the active world. But men are also good and great, kind and wise. Honor begets honor; trust begets trust; faith begets faith; and hope is the mainspring of life. I have lived with the reality of war, and I have praised soldiers; but the hope of honorable, faithful peace is a greater thing, and I have lived with that, too. That a man must live with both together is inherent in the nature of our present stormy stage of human progress, but it has also many times been the nature of progress in the past, and it is not reason for despair."

The choices before us are profoundly difficult and they lie within firmly fixed limits: we must devise the means that will discourage and prevent war with its terrible destructiveness, but we cannot weaken the guarantees of freedom, we cannot forfeit the means of defending the future of our Nation and of the individual liberty without which we could not live.

SPEECH BY GEN. LAURIS NORSTAD, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, MAYFLOWER HOTEL,
WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 14, 1963

It is an honor to be here this evening and a pleasure indeed to be with so many old friends and colleagues. I am touched by your kindness to me; beyond that, I am moved by your presence here. It means to me that we share the same beliefs and that we are all willing to work for what we believe.

I am honored to accept the chairmanship of the Atlantic Council of the United States. Coming as I retire from my profession, it permits me to continue to serve a cause which in any event would have remained a dominant interest-the cause of the Atlantic Alliance. My aim and purpose will be to carry on the work inspired and directed by Governor Herter. I am greatly pleased to continue my association with the distinguished citizens who are the officers and the directors of the Council.

"Toward a true Atlantic community”—these familiar words describe the high aim and goal of the Council's work. There were, as we all know, several publicspirited groups of Americans who worked in past years for this same aim. The fact that these groups have been brought together under one roof is progress in itself. The Atlantic Council is now the principal citizen group in this country supporting NATO and other Atlantic community interests. It is, further, the American chapter of the Atlantic Treaty Association, the international body of which Ambassador Burgess is the chairman. It is also the American sponsor of the Atlantic Institute of which another very distinguished American, Ambassador Lodge, is the director general.

This streamlining of effort and purpose is healthy indeed. We have a good example of it in this room this evening. I came to you expecting to be a guest and now it looks as if I am going to be with you for some time. I can only hope that, as a "Man Who Came to Dinner," I will not overstay my welcome.

Anyone who has been long associated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization comes to have for it and for its purposes and principles an allegiance that is compelling and a hope that grows. Having served the alliance for so many years, I am perhaps particularly marked by this influence, and frankly I hope that I am. The influence of the NATO idea is entirely for the goodfor the individual, for the Nation, and for the world. My work with this great Organization has, I believe, deepened my devotion to my own country, strengthened my faith in its aims for a peaceful and prospering world.

This is not the time or the place for a detailed report of military strengths or weaknesses. That weaknesses do exist, some quite serious, is a matter of public record. On the other hand, the fact that the alliance possesses very real military strength, conventional and nuclear, is also recognized. Looked at in the political and military context of today, our forces are significant: they are to be reckoned with on the land, at sea, and in the air. I am confident that this strength will continue to grow-as it should, as it must.

When I was a young man I was taught, as I suppose we all were, that one should not overindulge in the luxury of looking backward-that the direction of progress was forward. But as I was bringing to a close my military career, I found myself measuring the meaning of some of the changes and events of the last 12 years.

The memory I have of Europe in the last of the 1940's and early 1950's, and a powerful one it is, is of a climate of apathy and despair. The signs were everywhere, in the streets crowded with unemployed, in the nearly empty stores, in the smokeless factories; but most sharply on the faces of the people themselves, faces on which were written the fear and the hopelessness of that hour. I recall, as many of you will, that the question at that time--a question asked by intelligent, well-informed people was not whether war would come but rather in what month, on what day.

Between the then and the now, the contrast is all but unbelievable. Now we see a Europe that is strong, confident, dynamic. It is a Europe which is as much a success of American policy-as I am sure the Europeans would be the first to admit- as it is of their own efforts. For more than a decade after the war, the weakness of Europe was a major factor influencing the policy of this country. In the decade ahead, the strength of Europe will play a major role in shaping our plans, our programs, and our objectives as a nation. We are no longer dealing with war-shattered peoples. We are dealing with countries which on the basis of their improved status, their achievements in recent years, will demand to an increasing extent recognition as true partners. I believe also that they will appreciate to an increasing extent that with rights and recognition come increased obligations to the alliance and beyond. A strong Europe is, thank God, a fact of life.

The recent NATO meetings and the Nassau Conference remind us that policy conferences tend to be reported chiefly in terms of weapons and military structure. Since nuclear weapons have become the symbol of power in our time, their importance in policy considerations has taken on the very greatest dimension. It is clear, however, that such discussions look beyond weapons, powerful and dangerous as they may be, and explore the objectives of nations, groups of nations, and of the alliance itself.

Having retired from the active service, I need not and perhaps should not at this time involve myself in details of military organization, much less present myself as an expert on weapons and equipment. I do wish to speak of what is at the very heart of this great problem of nuclear power in its military application-the questions of the locus of authority and how that authority should be exercised.

These questions of authority and control are now very much with us. They will remain with us whatever level of nuclear effort may be considered appropriate for the alliance and regardless of the form in which that effort may be organized.

Here the views in Europe, as in the United States, vary over a wide range. Nevertheless, there are some common denominators which appear fundamental. Most Europeans are convinced that nuclear weapons, in some strength and in some form, are essential to their defense. They want a guarantee of the continuing availability of the weapons on which they must place dependence for the preservation of their freedom. Further, they wish a voice, an influence, in the decisionmaking process. They feel they need this in order to fulfill their responsibilities to their own people as well as to the alliance.

These convictions are very real to the Europeans. I find them eminently rea-. sonable. Like the renewed strength of Europe, they must be accepted as a fact of life.

The time has come to grasp this problem. There must be willingness on the part of all to consider the views, the needs, of others. Since every nation stands to gain, and should gain, from a successful resolution of the problem, each must be prepared to give in its own and in the common interest.

Let me say that I am well aware of the complexity of this subject and the danger of trying to make it appear simpler than it is. But before I am too long out of uniform, while experience is still fresh, I would like to make a few suggestions and conclusions of my own. They are not offered as the solution to this difficult problem. It is enough that they should contribute something to the discussion now taking place.

I believe it is the desire of almost all NATO nations that the authority over the nuclear capability which supports NATO defense plans should be vested in the alliance itself. To meet this desire, the nuclear weapons deployed for

the purpose of giving reality and substance to the NATO principles should be wholly committed to the alliance. I am opposed to the proliferation of independent control and authority, as most of us are. In my judgment, the actual physical custody of the weapons or warheads, therefore, should be retained by the donor country.

By taking on this new authority, the NATO Council would assume a wider responsibility. To discharge this responsibility, the Council should develop, as indeed it has started to do, guidelines, rules of engagement, principles, and established conditions for the possible use of the weapons in the defense of the people and territory of the alliance.

In principle, the responsibility relating to the NATO nuclear capability is a collective one; it must be shared by all of the 15 member countries. However, a conference of 15 powers is hardly an effective operational or executive body. It should not be expected to direct military operations nor, in emergency, to take those urgent decisions which might be required to initiate such operations. One answer to this problem would be for the Council to create a smaller executive body wholly responsive to it. In its simplest form this body might consist of a representative from the countries contributing to the NATO nuclear stockpile: the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. To make sure that all 15 countries are represented, that all views are heard, and to assist in integrating the overall efforts of the alliance, the Secretary General, who serves all member nations, could preside over this executive group but not necessarily as a voting member.

The formula I am suggesting seeks to respect the rights and responsibilities of each NATO member. It aims to add strength and substance to the alliance as a political authority. It seeks a solution within the structure and spirit of NATO. On the other hand, it should go some distance toward meeting the particular requirements of certain countries, France for instance, since its recognizes the special position of the three NATO nations possessing a nuclear capability.

There are at least two possible variations of the executive group to which I have just referred. For instance, the size, the strength, and the geographic position of the Federal Republic of Germany, the involvement of that country in almost every aspect of the defense of central Europe, must somehow be taken into account. Perhaps this could initially be met by giving Germany some appropriate representative status with the executive body. Another possible variant would be to have two additional members elected from among the NATO nations on a rotating basis, although enlargement of the body might limit its effectiveness.

I believe the NATO nations agree that their responsibility is a collective one. The Council as a whole could, therefore, as I have suggested, direct and supervise the development of the alliance's nuclear capability and lay down rules governing its use. In a military emergency, the Council as a whole should of course be consulted if time allows. But in the most urgent situations, the executive body should, in my opinion, take action in the first instance, being guided by the rules established by the Council, the highest political authority of the alliance. Because a prompt and positive decision would be essential in a quickly developing situation, the rule of unanimity may not be workable even in this small group. If a unanimous decision could not be reached, a majority vote could govern, and in my judgment should govern. In such an event, the member in the minority could reserve the option of withholding the forces of his own country, although in logic it would be desirable to commit them and in practice this would probably be inevitable. However, the weapons which the dissenting country will already have made available for use by the forces of other countries, under the common NATO plans, must remain committed and available. A formula of the sort I have just outlined would, I am convinced, permit the NATO political authorities promptly to exercise their powers in a military emergency. It may meet some of the desires-the demands-of the Europeans for a voice, a real voice, in the control of military power.

The ideas I have presented involve difficulties I know. There are technical problems of organization. There may well be problems of law. There are cer tainly political involvements, perhaps most especially for those NATO members who would not be included in a three- or four- or five-member executive body. However, I am sure that our European allies will consider any constructive proposal. They realize, at least as well as we do on this side of the Atlantic, that the future of the alliance may well depend on an early answer to the question of authority over the NATO nuclear capability.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is by no means the only structure binding together the Atlantic community but it is, I think, the most important. Perhaps this importance stems from its having come into being for the purpose of dealing with a primary, even primal, responsibility of government-self defense. But while we do not forget the need for military forces and weapons and take satisfaction from NATO's increasingly effective shield, we also realize that military defense is not the sole purpose, the only reason for being, of the alliance.

NATO's founders, with wisdom and statesmanship, recognized that an alliance so created must, while looking to its military power, draw its true strength from an ever-expanding area of common interest-political, economic, and moral. The founders, therefore, provided in article 2 of the treaty, that the parties should "strengthen their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of principles upon which these institutions are founded and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being."

The alliance was designed to preserve the peace, to provide security, to guarantee our freedom; but it was also designed to preserve, to improve and to expand, a way of life that is free and dynamic and which, in reality as well as in purpose, provides for the welfare of the peoples of all our countries and of the countries beyond.

Of the freedoms we enjoy, we cherish and defend, a vital one is freedom of expression-a freedom that includes the sovereign right to criticize. Our day seems to have generated a passion for criticism which at times astonishes our friends and I am sure confuses our foes. On occasion it may even bewilder us. It is certainly plain enough that this right is now being exercised to the full by members of the alliance on both sides of the Atlantic.

I, for one, question the form that some of the criticism is taking. It is true, quite true, that the alliance reveals, for all to see, deficiencies and disagreements, some of them serious. But to see only the problems is to miss the most important fact of the alliance: the fact of its basic unity.

Berlin has, over a period of years, offered the most frequent and perhaps the best examples of the allies standing together. But to use a more recent illustration, we witnessed at the height of the Cuban crisis what I believe should rank as an outstanding demonstration—a spectacular demonstration-of allied unity.

The facts concerning NATO's action during the Cuban test are quite straightforward. They must have been as encouraging to President Kennedy and the American authorities as they were chilling to Mr. Khrushchev.

On that important Monday when the President disclosed the situation to the American people, our chairman this evening, Mr. Acheson, presented the U.S. position to the North Atlantic Council in Paris. There the unanimous support of the alliance was assured. That our 15 sovereign states could achieve unanimity on such a grave issue was remarkable enough; what made the happening unique was the promptness with which the unanimity was reached and the positiveness of the declaration to stand together. There has never been anything to match this in the annals of alliances. Here was proof of unity when unity truly counted. Here was proof positive of what has been built.

You are all aware of the preoccupation of the Europeans with the development of new political alinements, the creation of a new structure of relationships. Six months to a year ago I was impressed that forces at work in Europe, as well as influences from this side of the Atlantic, were focusing emphasis on what might be called a "European" solution-the establishment of a European bloc to balance the strength and the power found on this side of the ocean. I believe that there is now a tendency to take a longer second look. It is recognized, of course, that some specific purposes within the Atlantic community will call for smaller groupings of nations. At the same time, there is growing interest in holding on to the good that has come from the larger association of the 15 countries of NATO-and, with this, a desire to preserve what has been tried and proved. This interest relates particularly to matters of defense.

The future Europe will be defined by Europeans, as it should be. But I, for one, welcome the present trend-the thoughtful second look. It is my own firm conviction that the pattern of the future, if we are to survive, and we will, is going to be the full pattern of the Atlantic community. I join the representatives of many nations who under the leadership of Governor Herter just a year ago stated in the Declaration of Paris "that our survival as free men, demand the creation of a true Atlantic community."

This evening I have spoken of strength and of the organization of strength largely in politicomilitary terms. These are current issues. But we seek peace, and this is a noble aspiration. The destructiveness of weapons places upon us all the urgent responsibility of devising means that will discourage, that will prevent war. It may well be that no generation in history has faced a responsibility as intricate and exacting as the one which has descended upon our own. For the choices before us are immensely difficult: we must reduce the risk of catastrophic war but we cannot forfeit the means of defending the liberty without which we could not live.

Some time ago a London newspaper assessed our progress by saying that even the simple word that stands for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, has itself "come to be synonymous with other combinations of letters which also stir deep emotions in the hearts of men-freedom, peace, independence, human comradeship, and the will to survive."

Here is measure of the past. Here is mandate for greater unity. Here, finally, is promise that we can and will leave a better world to our children and our children's children.

(Whereupon the committee was recessed at 12:35 p.m. to reconvene on Friday, March 22, at 10 a.m.)