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The relevance of the analogy is underlined by Prof. Gabriel Almond's comparison of foreign policies to marketed products:
• policies themselves are the products of leadership groups • who carry on the specific work of policy formulation and policy advocacy. The public share in policy decisions may be compared, with important qualifications, to a market. It buys or refuses to buy the “policy products” offered by competing elites.*
Foreign policy involves action. It relates to interactions of purpose among nations. It involves questions of delicacy and entails risks. In sum, it is often controversial domestically as well as among nations. The issues are often close. No administration is likely ever to indulge its officers in the privilege of publicizing whatever views they may have as to what is wrong with what the administration is undertaking. An administration may accept their criticism within channels. It may suffer and even welcome public venting of misgivings. It is not going to permit even a selected group of its own servants freedom to assail as if they were in another status entirely. Of that conclusion one may be certain, .
Of another conclusion we may be equally certain. Just as no administration will give its own servants freedom to assail its policies, so Congress will not grant these same servants the immunity of academic freedom if they should choose to support the administration or to propose a line or lines of their own. It does not take much imagination to picture the field
day an Academy faculty-indulging its academic freedom on say China policy, disengagement in Europe or nuclear arms control-would have afforded the late Senator Joseph McCarthy in his prime.
Academic freedom requires far more tẶan an expression of good intent. Where it is operative, it emanates from terms of contract between a teacher and his institution. The bill, S. 865, gives no evidence of intention to grant relevant terms of tenure and other conditions necessary to academic freedom-nor is this observation to be construed as an argument that the bill should do so. Any such formal attempt would only confuse the attributes of a university with the characteristics of a training institute—to mix education with indoctrination.
Just as it is too much to expect a President or a Secretary of State to suffer a band of professors on the Federal payroll to controvert their decisions before the public or a group of subordinate officers on sabbatical to enter the lists of debate against prevailing policies, so is it unlikely that a future administration would permit continued sway to a set of holdover policy critics put in position by its predecessor. Not academic freedom but political turnover is implicit in the conditions affecting the Academy according to the terms of the bill—no fixed tenure for teaching staff, a Chancellor subject to political appointment and removal, a Board of Regents headed by a politically accountable official and consisting of members subject to political ap pointment and senatorial confirmation, and a requirement of periodic appropriations by Congress.
Proponents of the Academy emphasize the modesty of the sums entailed against the general scale of governmental expenditures. The question of economy, however, involves consideration not so much of the dollars as of the thousands of man-years to be committed. The
prudence of undertaking a new institution virtually from scratch, in hope of attracting professorial talents away from existing establishments, needs to be weighed most carefully against the advantages of programing fuller use of institutions that are already going concerns. A further skeptical question pertains to the desirability of the Washington environment, with its distractions of daily detail, as a scene for studious enterprise. Whether the Academy would realize the proponents' design and whether the benefits accruing from the sums and time to be spent would represent the best results achievable at the price, are matters calling for serious doubt. The project requires deeper consideration than is reflected in the case presented on its behalf.
This bill, in short, is founded on what I believe to be wholly false assumptions including the one that since all the military services have undergraduate academies and graduate war colleges, the civilians should have a synthesized equivalent. I suggest that a wiser course would be to use and develop what is already available. This is good now and can be made better. It consists of three principal groups of institutions: First, the Foreign Service Institute and the Senior Officers Seminar, both of which do a good, if not excellent job, and have no problems that a more generous budget would not solve. Second, the service war colleges and the national war college. I have lectured over many years at all of them and have been impressed not only by the quality of faculty, students, and work done but by the tremendous value of a year's joint study by officers of all services and civilians from the departments concerned with foreign relations. These institutions could at minor cost be enabled to take a few more (and the numbers involved are not large) graduate students from the civilian departments.
Finally, there are existing academic institutions, state and private, many of which offer excellent facilities, for advanced international studies and research work. If funds were made available for the tuition of officer students and outright grants to the universities for increased overhead and faculty expense for, say, a period of 10 years, both instruction and research under conditions of true academic freedom could be made available. Sincerely yours,
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1963
STAFFING AND OPERATIONS,
Washington, D.C. (This hearing was held in executive session and subsequently ordered made public by the chairman of the committee.]
The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 3112, New Senate Office Building, Senator Henry M. Jackson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding:
Present: Senators Jackson, Muskie, Pell, Ribicoff, and Javits. Staff members present: Dorothy Fosdick, staff director; Robert W. Tufts, chief consultant; Richard S. Page, research assistant; Judith J. Spahr, chief clerk; and Laurel A. Engberg, minority consultant.
Also present: Hon. Frederick G. Dutton, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations; Benjamin Weiner, Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration; and Richard R. Warner, Management Analyst, Office of Management and Organization, Bureau of the Budget.
OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN
Senator JACKSON. The subcommittee will come to order.
The subcommittee continues today its study of the administration of national security at home and abroad. At the center of our concern has been the role of the Secretary of State and the Department of State in the national security policy process.
It is our great privilege to welcome as our witness the Secretary of State, the Honorable Dean Rusk. We are most fortunate that he could be with us today, especially in view of the added burdens which have fallen on his shoulders because of recent tragic events.
The Secretary's record of public service goes back to World War II when he served with the U.S. Army from 1940-46, and as Special Assistant to the Secretary of War from 1946–47. He has had a distinguished career in the State Department as Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs, 1947-49; Deputy Under Secretary of State, 1949–50; and Assistant Secretary of State, 1950-51.
From 1952 to 1961, Mr. Rusk served as president of one of our great private foundations—the Rockefeller Foundation. In 1961 he answered the call to national service and came to Washington as President Kennedy's Secretary of State.
At the outset of the Kennedy administration, heavy reliance was envisaged on the Secretary of State and the Department as an insti
tutional staff resource for the President on a scale commensurate with the full, contemporary reach of foreign affairs. The formalized committee structure and staff secretariats built up on the White House side around the post of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs were scaled down or disestablished. This was done with the declared intent of improving staff performance by transferring staff functions to the Department of State. The abolition of the Operations Coordinating Board and the Planning Board are cases in point.
Over the last 3 years, this concept of administration has run into certain difficulties and it is still in doubt whether the staffing pattern initially projected has been firmly set on the State Department side, so that the State Department can actually play the proffered role as the agent of coordination in all our major policies toward other nations.
As you know, Mr. Secretary, we on this committee believe that the Secretary of State and his Department must play a vigorous and leading role across the board of national security affairs. We want to be of help to you if we can in the continuing effort to improve the effectiveness of your Department.
We will welcome your statement, Mr. Secretary. We are very pleased and honored to have you with us this morning.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I do appreciate this opportunity to discuss with you the staffing and operations of our national security policy. With your permission, I should like to make my opening remarks very brief, indeed, in order that we may spend our time pursuing those questions to which you, yourselves, would like to give highest priority.
It may be that there would arise certain questions on which you would permit me to give more systematic thought than I have at this point, and to furnish a memorandum or statement of views on certain points to you at a somewhat later date.
But first, I would like to pay my respects to your own published study entitled "Basic Issues. I know of no better statement of the problems involved and of the types of questions which are and ought to be in the minds of those responsible for the conduct of our foreign and defense policy. I therefore warmly compliment the committee on that study.
I should like to note certain factors which suggest to me that our objective should be that of steady improvement in organization procedures, but that we would be deluding ourselves if we expected from such efforts miraculous differences in our relations with the rest of the world.
In foreign affairs we are dealing with a world which we can influence, but not control, and it is a world of rapid change. We do business now with more than 112 governments. During the present calendar year, there will have been elections or changes in government in more than 50 of them, including 10 of the 15 NÅTO countries.
If we are to get an accurate impression of that outside world, we should look at not less than 110 maps, each centered on one of the nations we deal with, reminding us that we are the center of the