LATERAL ENTRY INTO THE FOREIGN SERVICE

I hope that, for some years at least, the practice will be continued to open the Foreign Service to a select and limited number of excep tionally talented people serving in other Government agencies, whose record, experience, interest, and aptitude for the work would add great strength to the Foreign Service.

Many Government agencies now have personnel abroad-Treasury, Commerce, AID, USIS, the military forces, etc. Every now and then one comes across an officer from another agency with unusual qualities for Foreign Service work, a proven record of superior work, and a deep interest in the field of foreign affairs. Such officers should be integrated at the middle grades so that they will have a number of years of solid on-the-job training and experience within the Foreign Service itself to prepare them for senior positions of responsibility. These officers, in addition to bringing welcome talent, serve to sharpen the competition among Foreign Service officers for promotion. It is often only an accident that leads one man into the Foreign Service early in his career and another into a related field, and the fertilization of the Foreign Service by the addition of talented outsiders seems to me to be a practical and desirable way to improve the standard of our Foreign Service.

SPECIALIST VERSUS GENERALIST

This subject has been endlessly debated, but I have long felt that the argument was more theoretical than real. The great need in oversea work is for more people of the highest quality to fill senior officer positions: deputy chief of mission, political and economic counselors, consul general, and special assistant on aid matters. There are certain requirements at the senior level: great energy; passionate interest in the work; mature judgment in foreign affairs that comes only with long and varied experience in the Foreign Service; the capacity to lead and inspire staff; insistence on precision in all parts of the work: a liking for working in foreign countries with all its interest as well as disadvantages; a capacity to adjust to change; and a capacity to win the respect, and, hopefully, the affection of his colleagues and the people of the countries in which he serves. These do not exhaust the list of requirements, but they are among the main ones. Officers who do not possess these qualities should be kept from appointment to senior positions, or weeded out, if they occupy them, in order to make room for topflight officers.

It is not whether a man is a generalist or specialist that brings him to the top, but whether he has capacity, breadth, interest, and initiative what we call "flair." I have known agricultural, commercial, labor, and treasury attachés who do a fine routine job in their special fields to which no one can take exception. But the specialist with "flair" can make a contribution to the work of an embassy that goes far beyond his field. For example, an agricultural attaché in the normal course of his work has the opportunity to meet farmers and peasants, develop contacts with agricultural leaders, civil servants working on agricultural matters, managers of agricultural banks and cooperatives, etc. If he sees his job in its widest context, he can in the course of his routine work on crops, prices, marketing, etc., develop

invaluable information and reports on the economic and social conditions of farmers, peasants, and farm laborers; on their political attitudes and organizations; on the effect of general economic or finance policy on agriculture; on the relation of the farm community to the whole gamut of society. In short, he can use his specialty to illuminate for the benefit of the embassy all manner of political, economic, and social problems. The same is true of the commercial attachés, labor attachés, treasury attachés, and others.

The broader the interest of the specialist, the greater his capacity and initiative, the more he can contribute to the operations of an embassy and the higher he can aspire in the Foreign Service.

Conversely, the senior generalist who is familiar with all problems but has failed to develop a deep and critical grasp of any of the major fields will lack the self-confidence required to make independent judgments, evaluations, and decisions that he is called on to make week in and week out in a variety of fields. In these days the senior generalist working abroad must have a sufficiently extensive knowledge of economics, labor, agriculture, aid programs, and Communist history, doctrine, and methods-to cite some of the more important areas-or he will be at a great disadvantage in dealing with the complicated problems which confront most embassies.

Stated in another way, the great need in the Foreign Service is for more officers at the top-whether they are generalists or specialistswho have drive and the kind of experience that enables them to relate one field to another. The Foreign Service has many bright and hard working specialists and generalists: what it needs is to select, encourage, guide, and train the most promising for appointment to the senior positions.

ORGANIZATION OF AN EMBASSY AND THE PROBLEM OF COORDINATION I will introduce this section with two stories.

When I first entered foreign service work in March 1942, I called on Mr. Harriman in London and said we had not had much chance to talk in Washington about the work he wanted me to do and I would be grateful if he would give me some further guidance. I have never forgotten his reply. "It's not what I want you to do: that's not the way I work. What I want to know is what you want me to do. Look around in your field and find out what can be done to help the war effort. To start you off, there is a great shortage of shipping. See what can be done to reduce the turn-around time in British ports. Also there's a great shortage of machine tools. See what can be done to have British factories work their machine tools on second and third shifts. If you can't solve problems at your level and need my help, let me know."

When I arrived in Korea in June 1961, I called the senior staff together and among other things said I would hold a morning meeting of the senior staff at 10:30. No meeting would last longer than 1 hour, and they could schedule their work and appointments accordingly. One of my senior officers asked for an earlier hour since he always holds his section meeting after the ambassador's in order to acquaint his subordinates with the discussion and ambassador's views. The 10:30 hour, he said, would crowd his morning. I said I had chosen

that hour so that he would have time to study incoming communications, read the morning press, and hold his section meeting beforehand. He would then be in position each day to bring to the meeting information, views, and recommendations, developed by him and his section, that the senior staff and I needed if each of us is to do our job properly and in a coordinated way.

There are two theories of running a mission: one is from the top down, the other from the bottom up. I favor the second, for an ambassador must rely on his staff and on staff work, or he will be overwhelmed with details and direction and will be perennially troubled with the problem of coordination.

The system of morning meetings which I use is similar to one used in London by Mr. Julius Holmes, now Ambassador to Tehran, when he was minister and deputy chief of mission in London in 1948-50. It is also much like the system used by Ambassador Briggs when he was in Greece.

Three times a week I meet with my senior staff: the deputy chief of mission, the political and economic counselors, the head of USIS, the special assistant on intelligence, the special assistant for economic and military aid problems, and the treasury attaché.

Once a week at 10:30 there is a general staff meeting, attended by the foregoing plus the U.S. military commander or his representative, the director of USOM, the chief of the military aid program, the service attachés, the head of the consular section, and the head of the administrative section. At this meeting we discuss the developments of the week in respect to the American official community insofar as they are of general interest.

Country team meetings are treated below in a separate section. Additionally I meet once a week with the commander of the U.S. forces, with additional meetings as required. Meetings with the director of USOM are frequent but are not on a fixed schedule. The chief of the Embassy administrative section reports to me once a week on his area. The deputy chief of mission, as I recorded above, sits in on all meetings.

These are the scheduled meetings. There are in addition constant short meetings with senior officers on specific problems: an outgoing or incoming telegram to be discussed; a dispatch to be reviewed; a hot rumor to be evaluated; an important item in the press or conversation to be called to the ambassador's attention, etc. The great need is for officers, especially at the section chief level, to have immediate and direct access to the ambassador at any time.

In a very real sense the deputy chief of mission and section chiefs are the people who manage and coordinate an embassy's operations. It is up to them to see that an outgoing telegram or dispatch has been fully cleared; that it is written with accuracy and precision and in clear English; that any proposition is thought through before action is taken on the matter or it is brought to the ambassador's attention; that action is initiated and taken by the appropriate person; that work is dore promptly and efficiently, and so on. If the four or five senior officers are made to take these responsibilities, they very soon acquire habits of working that make an embassy run smoothly, and they impose the same habits on their subordinates.

With such arrangements an ambassador can keep abreast of all principal matters, can coordinate the work as a whole without the use of intermediaries, and reserves his time and energy for what is most important.

COUNTRY TEAM

The country team meets as required. It is a useful and necessary device for obtaining a coordinated view and action on matters of common or related concern to the Embassy, USOM, and military aid mission, and, in the case of Korea, the U.S. military command, and for educating the different elements in each other's problems. Some people have the mistaken idea that the country team is the place where an ambassador imposes his views on others, using the authority given him by the President. This is not the case. An ambassador leads, he does not order. The various elements of the country team have their own agencies and regulations and policies that have to be considered. What the ambassador strives for is an agreed view which he himself is in accord with and to infuse his own views. When a common view cannot be reached, the country team device helps the ambassador to narrow and identify the differences so that he can formulate with greater precision his own position on a controversial matter. In practice, differences will be rare where the key members are all capable and strong, personally respect each other, and have the opportunity to argue their case at a country team meeting.

It is poor operations to keep referring matters to Washington for decision: an ambassador has the responsibility for resolving problems in the field in the light of general policies set by Washington. On the rare occasions when an issue must be referred to Washington, it is the ambassador's responsibility to define the issue for Washington, submit the different views, and make his own recommendation. Likewise when a Washington general policy is no longer valid or workable, it is the ambassador's responsibility to seek a revision or adjustment, using the country team device to obtain an agreed position or an agreed statement of any differences along with his own views for submission to Washington.

In countries like Korea with large and complicated economic and military aid programs, an ambassador cannot and should not himself try to follow the detailed operations of USOM or the MAAG. He must rely on a special assistant on aid matters whose responsibility it is to keep abreast of day-to-day developments and keep him informed of those elements which require his attention. Other members of his staff, especially the economic and political counselors and treasury attaché, will also be helpful to him in this respect. Without the support, screening, and advice of his own staff an ambassador would, on the one hand, be overwhelmed by details, and on the other, would have to rely entirely on the presentation of the USOM mission director or the chief of the MAAG.

The special assistant for aid matters is therefore a key man on an ambassador's staff. He also serves as secretary of the country team, keeps the minutes, prepares the agenda, sees that papers are circulated in advance of the meeting, and does the staff work between meetings. He is thus the focal point for bringing the different elements of any problem together for the country team's consideration. Unfortu

nately there are too few officers in the Foreign Service who have the combination of qualities for this work if it is to be done well: aid experience; economic background; tact; an ability to separate the essential from the dross; an ability to handle detail, to analyze and draft; and a capacity to organize a great variety of problems in an orderly manner. I would hope that more Foreign Service officers would be developed for this most important function.

TOUR OF DUTY

I agree wholeheartedly with Ambassador Briggs' testimony that the average tour of duty of our chiefs of mission is too short, and that except in hardship posts with bad climates, they should serve for longer periods.

In the case of deputy chiefs of mission and section chiefs, I strongly recommend 3- to 4-year tours, for they are the dynamos that run an embassy.

There is also much to be said in the case of some important countries for a brilliant younger officer to be returned to the same country later in his career for a second tour of duty at a senior level.

In many countries it is desirable to keep a superior intermediate officer for longer than 4 years, so that he can develop language facility, wide contacts, and an encyclopedic knowledge of the country that can be tapped by his colleagues. One such long-time officer, with another being readied to take his place when he is transferred, can be invaluable in order to provide continuity in an embassy.

REPORTING AND COMMUNICATIONS

I am pleased to record that the overreporting which was a characteristic of the decade after the war is well on the way to being corrected. Reporting for action purposes tends now to be pithy and precise. Descriptive reporting for information purposes is more and more being replaced by analytic reporting useful for policymaking. Biographic reporting and files in many embassies have vastly improved.

A reform in communications I have long advocated is the introduction of numbered paragraphs in all written materials with subparagraphs (a, b, c) and sub-subparagraphs (i, ii, iii) broken out for easy reading. I have used this system for many years and find that it makes for clearer thinking, crisper writing, fewer words, and, of course, it facilitates discussing any document and cross-referencing. Anyone who has had to deal with complicated written instructions or negotiations that come with unnumbered paragraphs knows how inefficient this system can be. At present the decision whether to number paragraphs is left to the discretion of the departmental or Foreign Service officer. It should be made obligatory.

Mr. Harriman in his testimony referred to the difficulty of reading cables that are typed in capital letters. I agree with him. It may speed transmission and processing, but it takes longer to read and digest. Numbering paragraphs and the use of caps and lower case are in my view a necessary reform.