there are differences of opinion, perhaps sharp differences of opinion. Let me illustrate this, if I may take a few minutes. I do this by going back to my own personal experience.

In 1951 when I first came to Europe for permanent assignment I was impressed, as everyone was at that particular time, with the fact that no one was building factories, there was relatively little in the shops, I am speaking not of all countries, but this was the general impression.

The shops were not full. There were too many people on the streets, suggesting there were too few of them at work. There was relatively little construction.

Now, in the last 5 or 6 years we have seen the most fantastic development, the most fantastic growth. Many factors have contributed to this certainly the imagination and courage of the planners in government and industry, and money has played a very important part.

Time has been a factor. But no one would have invested the time and the effort and the money to make this tremendous change possible unless they had confidence and a real basis for confidence that they would enjoy the profits from this next week, next month, and next year.

So, the principal element here is confidence. What has created that confidence? The fact that the countries of the alliance recognized there was a threat in 1949, faced up to it, and decided to do something and proceeded to do something about it, something that the people can

see.

It is not a matter of having committees, boards, and councils meet; people can actually see some strength is being created. This gives them confidence from the bottom up. This has been the basis on which they built this tremendous improvement.

I think this speaks well for the state of the alliance at the present time. Another fact that impresses me and has a great bearing on the future of the alliance, is what this has done for the people, what the alliance has done for the people of the member countries and for the member countries themselves.

I have been impressed with the fact that the small countries have a voice in the councils that influence and control their destinies to an extent that they have never had before in history.

This has come now to them as a right. They accept it as a right. As an example, and this is one I have used many, many times and perhaps some of you have heard me mention it before-but it is the best one.

A year and a half ago Mr. Khrushchev was threatening the countries of Europe, particularly the small countries of Europe. He said that he would destroy the orange and olive groves in the Mediterranean countries. He also said he would destroy the Acropolis with his H-bombs and his missiles.

The Prime Minister of Greece replied immediately. He started out by saying he was shocked by this threat. He had to acknowledge that Mr. Khrushchev probably had the physical means of destroying the Acropolis but what he could not do was to destroy the ideals of which those stones were symbols to freemen everywhere.

He told Mr. Khrushchev that if it was his intention by this threat to weaken the ties, the support of Greece to the alliance, the effect on the Greek people would be precisely the opposite, and that Greece would continue to be a member of the alliance and to pursue her interest in peace and freedom in the forum that is offered by NATO.

This is important as a courageous statement by a small country. So, from the standpoint of courage, it is a strong and effective statement, but this is not really the impressive thing.

The impressive thing is that he was in a position to make the statement without asking a big brother: May I now speak to this big neighbor who is threatening me? He accepted it as a right. This was just a right. When in history have small countries been able to exercise that right?

We speak of the rights of man and we should, but there are several standards in this right. We Americans enjoy a pretty high standard in the exercise of the rights of man. Some countries, smaller, more exposed, in a more delicate position, not only now but throughout history have enjoyed the right in principle but not in practice.

One of the things the alliance has contributed is to give more people the ability to exercise the rights of man, the full rights of man. This is important. This again is partly an answer to your point on the strength of the alliance.

Both these points, the industrial expansion and the fact that the countries now have a position, prestige, an influence that they have never had before, has a great bearing on the future of the alliance because these are ends. Forces are means to an end. But these are ends in themselves. This is what we started out to do and we have done it.

We are doing it and we are continuing to do it today despite other problems. What does this mean for the future?

This means so much and has meant so much to so many people over such a large area for such a long period of time now that they are not going to give it up. They are not going to give it up. I think we have a platform so that the alliance is going to continue and is going to grow in strength.

I am confident that we are going to solve the problems. I think they will be more difficult before they are less difficult but still we have a foundation where all the people-and I mean all the people, of all the countries, without exception-all the people will view the alliance as important to them. This will surely make of the alliance and the Organization an institution of even greater importance in the future.

Mr. Chairman, the man who said nothing succeeds like success had something. That is what we have. We have great success-great success over a period of 14 years.

Unless there are specific questions, I won't comment at this time on the specific problems that face us. We must remember that we have accomplished these ends which I have outlined to you. We have established a very substantial force, conventional and nuclear, which has played and continues to play a very important part in the balance of deterrence throughout the world.

This strength will grow. It not only contributes to defense and deterrence but also has a tendency to bind the alliance together.

You must remember that in spite of the particular problems of today and the particular position, for instance, of one country at this moment, that country as well as others contributes to the allied forces and it is a part of the allied command and an important part of the allied command in Europe.

I believe that it will continue to be. First, because it is the right and sound and sensible thing to do. But the final and perhaps the. best test is that it is in the self interest of that country, as it is of the other countries, to do it this way.

Senator JACKSON. Among other things, debate and dissent should not be equated with weakness?

General NORSTAD. No.

Senator JACKSON. We are fortunate in having with us two guests of the committee, Senator Saltonstall and Senator Goldwater.

We will call on the committee members first. Senator Javits who is a member of the subcommittee has been called to another committee, General. He regretted he could not stay on. They are marking up a bill.

I would like to call on Senator Mundt.

Senator MUNDT. May I associate myself first of all, General Norstad, in saluting you for your very impressive and informative statement. I associate myself with the chairman's comments in that connection. I think my first question will be a followup to the one that was opened up by the chairman in regard to NATO.

During the last 2 years I have been a member of the NATO Parliamentary Conference in Paris and there have talked to you privately and have heard you address the NATO Parliamentary Assembly publicly. My question goes to the matter of whether or not a change is coming over NATO in connection with our plans or their plans with relation to atomic weapons.

I understood it had been your position and the position of NATO up until at least January 1 of this year that the desire was to build up our conventional forces of NATO to the indications which are put on paper in the expectation that once that is achieved we would have a force sufficient to repel any impetuous or unpremeditated attack that the Soviets would launch, that it was not the expectation to build up a force sufficient to repel a determined, well planned attack by the Communists to overrun Vestern Europe, and you must rely solely on the conventional force.

That the atomic part of it, that overall strategy in the event of premeditated determined attack would mean that NATO would use its strength to repel such an attack. As I read the papers it seems to me there has been a change in attitude someplace.

Instead of that being the picture, that there should be a sharing of atomic weaponry and development of atomic weaponry on the part of all NATO countries who are interested in so doing and insofar as that would involve our cooperation and our provision of supplies and knowhow and weapons, I wonder if that also entails a change in our position from the earlier point where we retained a certain reserve determination as to how and when those atomic weapons will be used and available with our cooperation.

If I have misrepresented the position of NATO, you correct me.

General NORSTAD. In answer to that question perhaps I will have to do a little defining, at least of my own view.

In the first instance, it is my experience and, I think, the experience and judgment of all military men who have worked on the problem of the defense of Europe, that that probably requires a balance of conventional and nuclear forces.

It is my own view-it is no secret that it is my view-that the full requirements of this task cannot be met without this balance and behind the balance the will to use whatever means is necessary to carry out our commitments and to defend ourselves.

I think, Senator, that we can make one assumption and that is that this country will use whatever weapons it has available which at the time appear necessary to meet our commitments or to provide directly for our defense. We get wound up in a tremendous amount of complicated academic discussion and we sometimes lose sight of that.

But, I do not think any American of any political party from any section of the country would ever take any other position. I have heard no responsible American ever take any other position.

In dealing one way or another with atomic weapons, really before they were born or about the time they were born, I have acquired a great respect for them. I would like nothing better than to say that we can dispense with these weapons at a time when we can do this with less destructive, less dangerous means.

It happens that that is not the case and that cannot be said. There is unfortunately no alternative to maintaining under the present circumstances in the political context in which we live there is no alternative to maintaining force and substantial force in Europe.

There is no alternative to having a substantial part of that force armed with atomic equipment. When, how, and where it is usedall of us will take it as our interest and our purpose to use such weapons only when it is absolutely essential in order to accomplish something that is absolutely essential.

I do not think anyone can prescribe too specific rules. I am frightened by people planning for war in terms we will do this and then we will think about it and then we will progress to that step.

Wars are not run that way. They have never been run that way in history and with the weapons and the speed that we have at the present time they are less likely to be run that way in the future. So we must be prepared. We must be prepared. How are we meeting it?-as I understand the purport of your question-how are we going to meet this atomic requirement? I have some views on this subject which I offered in 1957 and this contributed to the action that was taken by the heads of government in a NATO meeting in December 1957.

We decided that we would have to establish a NATO atomic stockpile. That was established and is being maintained. At that time, they also took the decision that they would have to provide the supreme commander in Europe with intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

We have established an atomic stockpile. This is a supply system. Now there is a program by which we give to the countries, regardless of nationality or location, the delivery means and train them in the use of delivery means but do not turn over the custody of the atomic components themselves.

But this is very similar to the system we use as a matter of fact it is the identical system we use-with American forces where you have a supply system and in accord with properly authenticated orders and directions, the weapons themselves are made available to units that are trained in their use.

We have many types of battlefield weapons. We have a number of air weapons and naval weapons that are in the hands of allied countries. The supply system is run by the United States in order to avoid any dangerous proliferation of control.

This, I believe, meets from the supply standpoint the fundamental military requirement that the military planning be met in this way. And, I emphasize this does not turn over weapons to anyone who does not now possess weapons. I think this is an important point. Then you have the question of the weapons. You have had a great discussion of the Polaris submarine. You have had great discussion of land-based missiles deployed in Europe. My own view on this, Senator, is that it is going to take a mixture or a combination of many, many types.

It is rare that one weapon has within itself all of the characteristics to meet all situations in the best possible manner. This is such a tough one that we have to be able to meet the requirement in the best possible manner or it will not be good enough.

So, I think a combination is essential. I think in time a combination will be worked out. Now the so-called Nassau agreement touches on a part of this problem and it could meet the requirements of an important segment but it is only a part of the problem. In my judgment, it does not meet the whole requirement.

Still to be considered is the question of the land-based missiles with their advantages. Now related to this, and the principal issue, is one to which we have not really addressed ourselves. I have mentioned this several times since 1959 and I think I broke it open in Minneapolis and I broke it open in Pasadena in December 1959 and then I splurged it on the pages and the records of the parliamentary meeting, you will probably remember, in 1960.

This is a question of what influence and control do the European countries, the other members of the alliance who do not possess weapons, have or should they have over the weapons which are designed for their defense, for carrying out NATO tasks which they participate in and direct?

They have had two questions for many years. If the Europeans base their defense on atomic weapons, whether this is this much or as high as the ceiling it makes no difference, if we base our defense upon atomic weapons should there not be some firm guarantee that those weapons will be available to that defense in case of necessity rather than subject to the unilateral decision without consultation of one party?

I am afraid I must accept this as a reasonable question.

Secondly, if they have this guarantee of availability of weapons, the second question, as they put it, is since we are not grasping for control or getting into anything we should not have or should not do, and since we are happy to have somebody else bear a larger share of this burden, should we not have some influence, some degree of influence over how, when, and where, and under what circumstances these weapons will be used?