Ambassador cannot make it work, there must be either some weakness in his leadership, his judgment, or his personality; or else he must have extraordinarily difficult teammates. In the latter case, he now has authority to insist on personnel changes though this extreme step is used but infrequently and with restraint.

As to the functioning of the country team concept at the Washington end, the problem is much more difficult and complex as your "Basic Issues" paper spells out. I do not believe it works too smoothly, but I am not too familiar with the current situation and have no solution or recommendation to suggest. Previous testimony, particularly that of Professor Neustadt, seems to have brought out the nature of the Washington difficulties. But a good "generalist" Ambassador should make it work in the field.

Your study has drawn attention to the question of overreporting from the field and the "astronomical proportions" reached in exchange of messages with Washington. I share your view that the volume is staggering and in part unnecessary; and the chief beneficiary may well be the eye doctor. But the remedy is not easy to find. On the one hand, those in Washington engaged in "operations" are swamped with material, much of which they have no time to read, let alone digest, nor do they really need to; on the other hand, the researchers and intelligence specialists understandably have voracious appetites for papers on every conceivable subject and angle thereof. The planners, I suppose, are somewhere in between.

Overwhelmed by the communications load, distribution and budgetary problems among others, the State Department is, I believe, making a serious effort to reduce volume and improve quality and form of reporting. But in this shrinking interdependent world the needs and demands for reports on the most varied subjects from many other Washington departments and agencies are growing and cannot and should not be neglected.

I do believe, however, that much telegraphic traffic can be shifted to mail and courier transmission and should be. One important factor in overreporting by cable has a simple and human cause: Any experienced Ambassador knows that a mail report is very seldom read by anyone above the country desk officer level. So in his desire, rightly or wrongly, to bring his report to the attention of higher echelons he telegraphs it. Afflicted with the prevalent disease of "localitis," his problem or development looms much larger and seems more urgent in his mind than in those of the harassed higher officials in Washington struggling to put out fires in a whole world in turmoil. One final point: Your study suggests that the Ambassador exercise more power of decision on matters other than major policy questions rather than seek or await instructions from Washington with the inevitable delays and multiple clearances required from people less informed on the local situation, policy and atmosphere than he is. Mr. Harriman told you he favored minimizing the practice of issuing instructions, though of course giving general guidance on the manner in which a subject should be discussed. With this I heartily concur. Having served in higher offices in Washington, I was somewhat familiar with the wheels of the bureaucratic machine and with our general policies. I made it a practice never to seek instructions unless I was either in doubt as to policy or felt that the weighty reinforce

ment of Washington instructions would enhance the chances of success in obtaining our objective. On various occasions, I followed the device suggested in your study of informing Washington of my intent to take certain action by a certain date, thus alerting the State Department and affording it an opportunity to call me off or delay my

move.

I have felt that too often ambassadors have shown too much caution or timidity, usually those with lesser experience or unfamiliarity with the way wheels mesh and grind in Washington and what is involved in getting out an instruction to the field. Certainly, wherever possible, the Ambassador should be given the broadest discretion as to timing, as to form and as to level of approach in any démarche to the government to which he is accredited.

There was another device I found useful in dealing with Washington. I required that all reports, mail or telegraphic, use the impersonal word "Embassy" as the source, thus: "The Embassy understands," "The Embassy suggests," "The Embassy proposes," et cetera. But if I wished to underline that the report was important and expressed my personal view, I would use the personal pronoun "I,” thus: "I understand," "I suggest," "I propose. If the subject matter concerned primarily some other department, say Defense, I would phrase it "The Army attaché and I suggest," et cetera. Over the years, knowledge of this practice enabled those on the receiving end to know for sure that the Ambassador not only had seen the message but that it represented his own views and he wanted to emphasize that fact. This, I think, was helpful to those weighing the matter at hand.

I should like to close with two quotations. Professor Neustadt told you:

What one does need to build in State is great generalist capability, combined with great competence in political analysis. Political analysis is supposed to be State's stock-in-trade. We need to add great skill in dealing with, interpreting other analytical specialties. But all the other specialists don't have to be in State. We couldn't get them in there if we tried. * All these don't have

to be put into State if State has good generalists who can tap outside experts and combine their concerns with its own.

To this I say "Amen."

The second quotation is from Dr. Tufts' memorandum on "The Secretary of State: Agent of Coordination." He writes that to do his job of coordination an ambassador must have on his personal staff an officer responsible to him to review the actions of the U.S. agencies operating in that country. He concludes:

If we are serious about employing a Secretary of State and his Department to achieve coordination, one step that can be taken is to see that the Ambassador's office becomes such a checkpoint (of coordination) and that it is staffed for the job.

To that, too, I say "Amen."

Thank you,

Gentlemen.

Senator JACKSON. Thank you very much, Ambassador Matthews. We appreciate having your fine statement. I have questions, but I will defer at this time to Senator Mundt.

Senator MUNDT. I would like to explore with the Ambassador, because of his long background of experience, a little further what he

has in mind in his discussion about having the Ambassador in the field exercise more power.

Ambassador MATTHEWS. More what, sir?

Senator MUNDT. More authority and more power to make decisions without consultations with Washington. I would like to relate that to the testimony of Ellis Briggs last Friday who pointed out that we shift our ambassadors around in a series of what he called musical chairs. If I remember the statistic correctly, the average tenure of an ambassador over the last number of years-I don't know how many but quite a few-was 17 months, and that we have only one ambassador presently serving who has been in his post as long as 5 years. Looking at it from the standpoint of a layman, I would be greatly concerned if we had ambassadors making decisions in the field without consultation with their superiors in Washington on the basis of what they could conceivably learn about a country in 17 months. I would like to have your comment on my reservations.

Ambassador MATTHEWS. Senator, first I would like to say that I agree with Mr. Briggs in his musical chairs analogy that it is highly desirable that an ambassador should stay certainly a reasonable period. I was more fortunate than he was in the length of my stay in various posts. In my 40 years I had only a total of 11 posts, including 3 stays in Washington, which is an average of over 32 years per post. In my last post I was practically 5 years. But I would agree that as far as an ambassador who had been in his post only for a short period that he should feel more free to consult Washington and more need to consult Washington for instructions than one who has been there sometime, knows the atmosphere, the policy, the people, the government. I think it makes quite a difference. I certainly agree, to repeat, that he should be kept in his post a much longer period than is usual.

Senator MUNDT. I am glad you say that. I was sure you would. It seems to me that we can approach the problem entirely at the wrong end of the spectrum when we talk about giving Ambassadors in the field more authority and more responsibility and give them greater channels to direct the destiny of world history and the future and safety of America. I think we should not even be discussing that until we solve the problem at this end of the line of first finding competent ambassadors, and secondly, trying to develop a professional status for ambassadors so that they are not replaced by campaign contributors. And third, keeping them there long enough so that a smart man in the right place can make the right decisions.

To me there can be nothing more dangerous to our whole national posture than to develop a policy now that we are going to give Ambassadors more authority and then start having decisions made affecting the whole country by the best of people with the noblest of intentions with a paucity of experience which would jeopardize the security of the world. I think we should be very cautious about granting Ambassadors a single extra right to make decisions affecting the country until we take the two preliminary steps of getting the right people and professionalizing their status and being sure they are trained and giving them the experience. After which I quite agree that decisionmaking power should be greatly expanded.

I also like your approach to this matter of multiplicity of paper which to me in a world on fire has never impressed me as being one of the major problems of the world anyhow. I am not too much concerned whether we get too many reports. There are so many other problems that I would like to see us working on the notes and dots and dashes on the sheet music instead of concentrating on the flyspecks around the edges. I think it is important that we get to the basic things. I like what you suggested.

You say we have too much paperwork. Let us divide it up. Send some in by dogsled or by boat and let the important things come in by radio or by cable. I think that is fine. I think in a way having a lot of paperwork is not too bad. It sort of compels a fellow who is writing in the first place to organize his thinking and make an expression for which he is responsible. While nobody may currently look at it, it may serve some historic purpose ultimately and it gets filed away and it is not too expensive a process to sort and maintain.

But by upgrading the kind of communications, as you did so well in your statement with your language suggestions, and as it can be separated, cable messages from the other kind of messages, it seems to me you keep the continuous flow of everything that the field thinks it should report to Washington but you still concentrate on the type of messages which the top level people should see.

This is a good approach to a problem of that kind. Basically I think your big consideration is that you play up the place where the reforms should begin before we start shifting too much of the responsibility for foreign policy out into the field. Your own career was very illustrious and you were very fortunate in being kept at posts long enough to be well informed. Out of that experience do you believe that a tenure of, say, 5 years by a well qualified man in a post which he understands, is to be desired as against shifting them around in this crazy quilt method which we have somehow evolved for which nobody assumes responsibility but which apparently nobody has the courage to correct? So it just goes on and on like a little river. What would be your view?

Ambassador MATTHEWS. Senator, I agree with you with great enthusiasm, that the longer a person is kept in a post the better. If you get a competent ambassador and can keep him there 5 years, I am sure it would greatly improve our position in the world in the various countries in which they are stationed and also his authority and knowledge and experience would be of more value to Washington. Senator MUNDT. In your long experience overseas, and here, too, coming in contact with your counterparts from foreign countries, do you find that generally they tend to keep good people in their place longer than we could do, or is this a sort of mania which permeates all foreign offices wherever they are?

Ambassador MATTHEWS. No, sir, I think most of them keep their people at a post for a much greater period of time. There are exceptions, of course, but usually that is the case.

Senator MUNDT. I will yield to my colleagues. I may have other questions a little later. Thank you.

Senator JACKSON. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, it is a great pleasure to be here with you and I want to thank you in a

personal way for all your kindness. I guess the first Government document I ever received was a diplomatic courier letter signed by you in 1940, the next was my draft notice.

Ambassador MATTHEWS. I am glad it didn't hinder you.

Senator PELL. I notice in your testimony that you list the various people who met with you every Monday and Friday and I notice you list the consul in charge at the end of the list after the administrative officer, various attachés, and the USIA representative. I wonder if this does not bring out one of the problems in our Service, in that the nearest thing to a generalist in the diplomatic service today is the consul. At the moment, as you will recall from your own distinguished career, having entered originally as a diplomatic secretary, and from your knowledge of the Service as a whole, promotions come much harder to those in the consular service than those in the political line. Do you see any way that the consular service can be perhaps upgraded a bit and promotions made more available there? I recall meeting a very bright young man on the other side of the world last autumn who liked consular work and enjoyed it and nevertheless realized that by persevering in it, he was jeopardizing his own chances for promotion.

Ambassador MATTHEWS. Senator, I think with the present promotion system that the consul has an equal chance with one serving in political or economic work in an embassy. I think also many of our officers are transferred, certainly in the earlier stages from one type of duty to another. It is the same service but different functions. Senator PELL. I wonder if the staff, Mr. Chairman, might be persuaded to dig up the figures from the State Department on the last promotion panels as to whether there is a larger number of people who are promoted who spent the majority time of their service in the political line as opposed to consular work.

Senator JACKSON. We will ask for that information and include the reply as part of the record.

(The material referred to follows:)

Hon. HENRY M. JACKSON,
U.S. Senate.

JULY 3, 1963.

DEAR SENATOR JACKSON: We have carefully studied your letter of June 20 requesting information on the relative promotional opportunities of Foreign Service officers engaged in consular, administrative, political, economic, and other activities.

Unfortunately, there are no statistics available which could supply a meaningful answer to the question you raise. In order to get such information it would be necessary to examine the personnel record of every officer on the promotion list and attempt to measure the time each had spent on consular work as compared to political work. The validity of any answer might also be in doubt since it is sometimes difficult to determine whether a particular job should be classified as a political position in whole or in part.

The Department makes every effort to assure that officers are graded on their performance and not with regard to the particular area of work to which they may be assigned. Mindful of section 626 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, we carefully select the members of the Foreign Service officer selection boards to assure appropriate representation from each of the major functional specialties. In a further effort to achieve objectivity, we invite representation from the Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, and Department of Labor, and from private life. Last year's public members included two labor union executives, an agriculturist, an editor, two educationalists, and a publishing executive.