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command of a U.S. area military commander. The line of authority to
these forces runs from me, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in Washington and to the area commander in the field.
Although this means that the Chief of the American Diplomatic
Mission is not in the line of military command, nevertheless, as Chief
of Mission, you should work closely with the appropriate area military
commander to assure the full exchange of information. If it is your
opinion that activities by the U.S. military forces may adversely affect
our overall relations with the people or government of
should promptly discuss the matter with the military commander and,
if necessary, request a decision by higher authority.

, you

President John F. Kennedy, letter to American Ambassadors,
May 29, 1961

In the postwar years the United States greatly expanded its overseas operations. Alongside the old diplomatic missions large, semiindependent organizations for economic and military aid and cultural and information programs grew up. Labor, Agriculture and other agencies sent representatives abroad. American military bases and installations, with sizable American forces, were established in many countries. Many of these organizations and representatives had their own lines of reporting to Washington and had statutory authority and responsibilities defined by Congress.

The volume and variety of American business with foreign countries dramatically increased. The texts of international agreements between the United States and foreign governments concluded in the 12 years between 1950 and 1962 fill 30 large volumes occupying 7 feet of shelf space! Many of these agreements dealt with highly technical matters and had to be negotiated with the help of experts from Washington.

All of these developments placed the authority and prestige of the ambassador in doubt and put great strains on the old diplomatic machinery. In 1951 President Truman took steps to support the ambassador's primacy. The concept of the country team, with the ambassador at its head, was initiated. Further steps in this direction were taken by President Eisenhower. President Kennedy's letter of May 29, 1961, is the most recent attempt to confirm the ambassador's leading position.

But in the field, as in Washington, the task of coordination has grown more complex as the instruments of national policy have multiplied. The major elements of the modern diplomatic mission are State, AID, USIS, the service attachés (Army, Navy, and Air Force), military assistance advisory groups (MAAGS), and CIA. Often there is also an area military commander.

Although all members of the country team acknowledge the ambassador's position, respect his precedence as chief of mission, tell him about their work, show him their cables, and invite his comments, their dependence on him and their desire to be coordinated by him differ greatly. As a general rule, their readiness to accept his right of decision varies with the degree to which they are involved in operational matters, such as the conduct of aid programs, and have their own reporting lines to Washington.

The political counselors and other old-line members of the diplomatic staff are most dependent on the ambassador and have the greatest interest in supporting him. They have no line of reporting except through the ambassador-and informal letters to colleagues

in Washington. At the other end of the spectrum is the MAAG. Its work is highly operational, it has its own lines to the Pentagon, and it tends to take a restricted view of the ambassador's right to interpose himself between it and the Pentagon on budgetary, programing, and operational decisions. The other groups fall somewhere between these positions. CIA is closer to the MAAG model, while USIS falls closer to the diplomatic model and AID somewhere in the middle.

Country team processes have, therefore, quite different meanings for the several participants, seeming almost a waste of time to those heavily involved in day-to-day operations. The fact that deadlines. and other decision-spurring pressures seldom hit the participants at the same time contributes to the unevenness of interest in the work of the country team. What is usually involved is action by one group at a time on a matter of great moment to it and of little immediate interest to the others. In the eyes of, say, a MAAG chief preparing his budget, the other members seem at best to be little more than spectators and at worst a threat. On particular issues, however, the ambassador's support may be helpful and this strengthens his position. But in general each group of operators would be happy to be left alone by the others.

To a degree the primacy of the ambassador is a polite fiction, especially where budgetary and programing decisions are concerned. Most elements of the country team do not, in other words, regard themselves as parts of the ambassador's staff-rather they look outside the country, to intermediate headquarters or Washington, for guidance and support and their loyalties tend to run in the same direction. Nevertheless, it is apparent that a strong ambassador can pull a team together and exert great influence.

Some suggest that an ambassador should have responsibility for preparing a complete country program and for reviewing and approving all parts of it, so that the final program would be his and so that he would be put by the nature of the process in the role of umpire and adjudicator of competing claims for resources. Because of the way agency programs are prepared in Washington, however, this would present great difficulties. A consequence is that decisions on military and economic aid and other programs are pulled toward the Presidential level in Washington and that the competition for resources tends to run between overall appropriations for military versus economic aid, and so forth, rather than between the need for military aid in comparison with economic aid in a particular country.

Despite these observations the field is refreshingly free of interagency strife. In general the deep jurisdictional clashes evident in Washington are absent. Divisions are present but are watered down, partly, no doubt, because the team acquires a certain solidarity by virtue of common experiences in dealing with the local government, on the one hand, and with Washington, on the other.

One of an ambassador's problems is that the country team is an interdepartmental organization which has no corresponding organization to which it is responsible or to which it can look for guidance, direction, and support. In Washington the decision-making process is, so to speak, vertical-up departmental lines which converge only at the Presidential level. In the field, coordination is horizontal, with differences being resolved and policies harmonized by the ambassador.

THE PLANNING FUNCTION IN THE FIELD

Ideally, one would suppose, the country team should be the chief source of country plans. It is on the spot and should be familiar with the obstacles to the accomplishment of U.S. objectives. Yet with few exceptions little planning is in fact done in the field and what is done is patchy.

The operational groups are so deeply involved in day-to-day operations that they have little time for planning, even if they have officers with the training and experience for the planning task. And they seldom do. There is, furthermore, no stated requirement for a coordinated country plan or program, in which economic and military aid, cultural and information programs, and other elements of American policy are drawn together and focused on U.S. objectives. There is no place in the embassy where this task could now be done.

Among the best people in the field are some of the political and economic counselors and their staffs. But the reporting content of their jobs and the burden of representation and negotiation is so great that they have little time for thinking about what the United States is trying to accomplish in the country and what combination of activities would best serve American purposes.

Increasingly, the United States is seeking to accomplish its goals through regional programs and international organizations, but it has not yet taken adequate steps to relate country missions to regional planning.

As things stand in the field, apart from exceptional cases, Washington cannot rely on the country team for planning. Yet satisfactory arrangements for preparing coordinated country and regional plans are still to be devised in Washington also. This is one of the major problems of staffing and organizing for national security. Whether efforts should be made to staff the missions for planning, or whether country and regional planning groups should be organized in Washington, or whether some combination of the two should be found are questions that demand attention.

THE REPORTING FUNCTION

Reporting occupies a very large part of a mission's time and energies. The volume of messages between Washington and the field has reached almost astronomical proportions. The daily volume of telegraphic traffic alone between State and the embassies is more than 300,000 words! Much is necessary but much is of doubtful usefulness. Despite the volume of reporting Washington often feels and is poorly informed. The reason is largely that the decision-making process is not well enough understood so that headquarters can identify a need until it arises. Reporting requirements are therefore not clear. No one knows how to issue general instructions on who should be told what and when. As a result the rule seems to be: Report Everything. The field tries to cover every base and to anticipate every requirement in the hope that any information Washington may need will be available when wanted. The resulting flood of information swamps Washington's absorptive capacities.

This reporting is of very uneven quality. Some is brilliant, but the top executives seldom have time to look at it. Most is routine. But all of it must be read by someone- a fact which accounts for a great

deal of employment in Washington. Some of this talent could, one is confident, be employed in more useful ways.

Moreover the whole personnel system encourages reporting. Young officers get credit for writing reports, especially voluntary reports on matters outside their assigned responsibilities. An officer's reports are an important basis for evaluating his performance and recommending promotions. This may be sound personnel practice but it burdens the system with too much reporting and encourages wrong ideas about the proper allocation of time between direct observation and study of a country's problems and report writing.

Good reporting is essentially operational, directly serving the needs of men who must make decisions and direct operations. Much reporting at present is remotely related, if at all, to the decision-action process. Top executives are so heavily occupied that they have virtually no time for reading anything not immediately relevant to the day's problems.

Many countries are deeply involved in far-reaching political, economic, social, and military programs. The United States is assisting these programs of modernization and reform in many ways. Analysis of great depth and sophistication is needed as a basis for planning. What strains are these programs putting on the political system? Can they be carried without political collapse? What groups are gaining power and influence and which are losing? What political adjustments would strengthen the system? Are they feasible? How can the United States assist the process of adjustment?

The kind of knowledge and understanding needed to produce answers to such questions is not likely to be gained at a desk, reading second-hand accounts of what is happening in a society. Direct observation and study and a wide acquaintance in many social groups are needed.

But in addition the analyst needs to know his audience and its requirements. Scholarly analyses of great brilliance will be of little use unless they point to operationally significant conclusions. The definition of reporting requirements depends therefore on a clear location of responsibility for policy planning, and close contact between the analyst and the planner.

The reporting function should be carefully reviewed. Some suggest that reporting relevant to day-to-day decisions should be provided on a day-to-day basis in response to requests from the ambassador or Washington. The feasibility of this suggestion depends on the technical adequacy of the Government's communications system, and especially on the disciplined restraint of both the senders and the receivers of messages. Without such restraint, even the best communications system will soon be overloaded.

Some suggest that the kind of analysis needed for planning and programing should be a joint undertaking of teams consisting of members from Washington and the field and linked closely to the planning and programing process. This would require more frequent travel between Washington and the field, but might cost less and produce better results than present practices.

Whatever changes are made, intensive efforts are needed to develop officers who can produce the kind of political and economic analyses that are basic to the radically new nature of American foreign policy. There are now very few officers who have shown an ability to make "depth analyses" of the forces at work in society.

PERSONNEL FOR THE COUNTRY TEAM

Every mission has some first-rate people. But the number of big jobs is far larger than the number of able people available to fill them. With over 100 missions to be staffed-more than double the number only a few years ago every personnel system has been strained. Every Washington headquarters is evidently robbing Peter to pay Paul, trying to cover the most critical spots by shifting its best people around. There is no prospect that recruiting will overcome the deficiency of good people in the near future.

It is therefore all the more important that good people be well used. But under present practices each department and agency must staff its own overseas posts. All too often the result is that an ambassador cannot use his best people in his most important spots. He needs freedom with respect to his own mission to move his good people where they are most needed.

Obviously, however, this runs headlong into existing practice. Personnel systems are organized by departments and agencies. Promotions, assignments, career development programs, organizational loyalties all work against it. Whether the conflicting needs of the ambassador and of the career services can be reconciled is a serious dilemma of personnel administration.

THE DIVISION OF LABOR

The personnel problem is intensified by the problem of the division of labor between Washington and the field.

There is little doubt that the abilities of most missions are underemployed. The country team is familiar with local issues and problems from important questions of policy to minor details of mission housekeeping. Many matters could be handled locally, with action being reported to, but not cleared with, Washington. Ironically, "Washington clearance" often means that a junior officer in Washington is second-guessing a senior officer in the field-and secondguessing him on matters the latter is better qualified to decide than an equally experienced officer in Washington.

Some progress has recently been made in delegating authority to the field for administrative decisions on such matters as housing, travel, and hospitalization. This shift is desirable and should be encouraged.

No similar trend is evident in policy matters. In fact, the contrary is true. More and more issues are being referred to Washington, or handled by officers sent from Washington, or settled in Washington in negotiations with visiting foreign officials.

But

Washington can of course assert its authority in any matter. it should not assert it in every matter. There is a need to re-examine the division of labor between the two.

A proposal worth consideration is that issues might be left to the ambassador unless they are of such sensitivity, complexity, or importance that they demand attention of an Assistant Secretary or officer of higher rank. That is, an ambassador might indicate to Washington that he intends to act in a certain way by a certain date unless otherwise instructed. And Washington might exercise greater self-restraint in issuing instructions-with the philosophy that it may

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