Second Department, October, 1911. [Vol. 146. breach of a contract are general and not special, it is not proper to compel the party claiming them to specify the particulars thereof. (Commercial Nat. Bank v. Hand, 9 App. Div. 614; Bolognesi v. Hirzel, 58 id. 530; Radcliffe v. New York Cab Co., Limited, 134 id. 450.) Unless the allegations of the answer with regard to the expenditure of $2,500 in repairs, fittings and preparation for the conduct of such business for a period of ten years is a sufficient allegation of special damage resulting from a breach of the agreement on plaintiff's part to procure defendant a lease, there is no allegation of such damage. Beyond that, the damages are general only. But by a previous clause of the order defendant had been required to furnish an itemized statement showing the kind and quantity of repairs, fittings and preparations, and an itemized statement of the cost and expenses thereof. This was all the plaintiff was entitled to on the subject of damages. The order should be modified by striking out the 5th paragraph thereof, and as so modified should be affirmed, without costs. JENKS, P. J., CARR, WOODWARD and RICH, JJ., concurred. Order modified by striking out the 5th paragraph thereof, and as so modified affirmed, without costs. MICHAEL ROSE, Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF WHITE PLAINS, Respondent. Second Department, October 20, 1911. Practice dismissal at opening new matter in defense deemed controverted without pleading-municipal contract — hours of labor. A defense consisting of new matter not constituting a counterclaim is deemed controverted. The plaintiff without pleading may traverse or avoid it and is entitled to the benefit of every possible answer to it the same as if pleaded. Where in an action to recover a balance due on a municipal contract the answer alleged as a defense a failure to comply with the contract in regard to the hours of employment of laborers, in consequence of which App. Div.] Second Department, October, 1911. the contract became void, it is error to grant a motion made on the opening to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that plaintiff had violated the contract in the manner alleged. APPEAL by the plaintiff, Michael Rose, from a judgment of the County Court of Westchester county in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of said county on the 2d day of June, 1910, upon the dismissal of the complaint by direction of the court upon the pleadings on the opening of a trial at the Westchester Trial Term. Humphrey J. Lynch, for the appellant. H. R. Barrett, for the respondent. BURR, J.: Plaintiff sues to recover a balance due upon contract. Defendant by its answer admits the making of a contract with plaintiff, but alleges that under the terms thereof it was incumbent upon him as a condition precedent to demanding payment thereunder to obtain from the superintendent of highways and president of the village of White Plains certificates in writing as to the completion of the work and file the same with the board of water commissioners, and that such certificates were not obtained and filed. The answer further alleged a failure to comply with the provisions of said contract respecting the hours of employment of laborers, workmen or mechanics, in consequence of which the contract became void. When the action was brought on for trial, a motion was made to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that plaintiff had not fulfilled the contract in respect to the obtaining of certificates, and had violated the same in respect to the other matters referred to. The motion was granted, and from the judgment thereupon entered plaintiff appeals. It does not appear from the pleadings that the contract set up in defendant's answer is the same contract which is the basis of plaintiff's cause of action. From the argument of plaintiff's counsel at the time that the motion was made, it would seem, however, that such was the case, for he asked to amend the complaint by alleging a waiver of the production of the certificates, and this motion was granted. There Second Department, October, 1911. [Vol. 146. remained, then, as the basis of the motion, only the alleged violation of the contract respecting the employment of labor. Without determining at the present time the effect of such violation, it is sufficient to say that this was matter of proof and not of pleading. Defendant's answer. set up an alleged affirmative defense and not a counterclaim. No order was obtained compelling a reply thereto. A defense consisting of new matter not constituting a counterclaim is deemed controverted, and plaintiff without pleading may traverse or avoid it and is entitled to the benefit of every possible answer to it the same as if pleaded. (Nichols Pr. 987, § 883.) The judgment of the County Court of Westchester county should be reversed and a new trial ordered, costs to abide the event. JENKS, P. J., HIRSCHBERG, THOMAS and CARR, JJ., concurred. Judgment of the County Court of Westchester county reversed and new trial ordered, costs to abide the event. WALTER DURKIN, an Infant, by MICHAEL T. DURKIN, His Guardian ad Litem, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Respondent. Second Department, October 20, 1911. Municipal corporation - park land statute authorizing sale - real property liability of city to licensees - no affirmative duty. Where the Legislature passed an act authorizing the Brooklyn park commissioners to sell certain lands which had been formerly acquired by the city for park purposes at such times as they should deem expedient, the city was thereby at once relieved from any trust obligation to maintain the lands as a public park. After the passage of the act the liability of the city with respect to the land was the same as that of a private individual owning similar lands similarly situated; the sale of the land was not a condition precedent to the termination of the trust to maintain it as a park. Persons passing over such land are mere licensees and assume the risks incident to the condition of the premises when they enter thereon. The fact that the city officials knew that the public was in the habit of passing over this land to the same degree, but to no greater degree, than over the adjoining land of private individuals, imposed upon the city no duty of active diligence to protect pedestrians from injury. App. Div.] Second Department, October, 1911. APPEAL by the plaintiff, Walter Durkin, an infant, etc., from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 8th day of December, 1910, upon the dismissal of the complaint by direction of the court after a trial at the Kings County Trial Term. Rufus O. Catlin [Jacob Brenner with him on the brief], for the appellant. James D. Bell [Jesse W. Johnson and Archibald R. Watson with him on the brief], for the respondent. BURR, J.: The crucial question in this case is as to the nature and extent of the duty which defendant owed plaintiff with regard to the property upon which the latter was injured. It was a vacant plot of ground upon Eastern parkway, near Underhill avenue. Originally it was acquired by the former city of Brooklyn for park purposes (Laws of 1860, chap. 488, as amd. by Laws of 1861, chap. 340). By a subsequent act (Laws of 1870, chap. 373, as amd. by Laws of 1873, chap. 795) it was provided that the Brooklyn park commissioners should be authorized to contract and sell at public auction, at such times and on such terms and conditions as they should deem expedient, a portion of said lands lying easterly of Flatbush avenue and including the premises in question. A large portion of such land has been sold and conveyed, but a part thereof, including the lot upon which plaintiff was injured, still belongs to the city. The effect of this was to relieve the city from any trust obligation to maintain this parcel of land as a public park and to empower it to sell the same. (Brooklyn Park Commissioners v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234; City of Brooklyn v. Copeland, 106 id. 496.) This was within the legislative power and discretion. (Id.) After the passage of this act the liability of the city with respect to this land was the same as that of a private individual owning similar land similarly used. Appellant contends that the trust imposed upon the city to hold these lands for a public use was not terminated until the land was actually sold and conveyed. This seems to us too narrow and literal a Second Department, October, 1911. [Vol. 146. construction of the language of the act. By the act of 1860, as amended, the city acquired the fee of these lands, impressed, it is true, with a trust for the benefit of the public. From that trust the city could not by its own act absolve itself. The Legislature might grant such absolution. (Brooklyn Park Commissioners v. Armstrong, supra.) This it did when by the act referred to it declared that the city need not longer retain these lands for park purposes. The sale and conveyance was not a condition precedent to the termination of the trust. It was rather in the nature of an act in furtherance of it by putting the city in a position by which it could improve the remainder of the lands taken for a park through the proceeds of the sale of this portion thereof. To hold otherwise would produce strange and difficult complications. By the act of 1870 the park commissioners were authorized, among other things, before sale to lay out streets through such unused portion of the park lands, and to grade, pave, curb and gutter the same. But if the trust was not completely terminated until all the lands were sold, if a single lot somewhere within the tract, 25 feet wide by 100 feet deep, remained in the ownership of the city, would the land in all of these streets still remain under the control of the park commissioners as part of the park, and would they be responsible for the care and maintenance thereof instead of the city officials ordinarily charged with the performance of such duties? And so long as one lot of the dimensions specified remained unsold, were the park commissioners obliged to maintain and improve this as a park, using therefor a portion of the proceeds of the sale of the residue of such lands, and be responsible for the condition thereof, even although this single lot might be far removed from the remainder of the lands used for park purposes? We think not. The fact that to the knowledge of the city officials the public were in the habit of passing over this land to the same degree but to no greater degree than the land of private individuals immediately adjoining it, imposed no duty of active and affirmative diligence upon the city to protect persons from injury. Persons so using the land were mere licensees and assumed the risks incident to the condition of the premises when they entered upon the same. (2 Thomas Neg. [2d ed.] 2103; Cusick v. |