1. ADMIRALTY-Maritime Liens-Mortgage of VesselPriority of Record - Following Decisions of State Courts. A claim arising under a mortgage of a vessel is not superior to a lien under Rev. St. Ill. 1874, ch. 12, § 1, for supplies and necessaries to the vessel in her home port in the State of Illinois, although they were furnished after the mortgage was recorded in conformity with Rev. St. U. S. § 4192.-THE J. E. RUMBELL, U. S. S. C., 13 S. C. Rep. 498.

2. ATTACHMENT-Intervention.-A petition by subsequent attaching creditors intervening in the prior attachment suit, which alleges in substance that the prior attachment was the result of a collusive agreement between plaintiff and defendant, and that it was made with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud defendant's creditors, and especially petitioners, who were bona fide creditors, or that it was suffered or procured to be made for the use and benefit of defendant, is good as against a general demurrer, and it is immaterial that it is not alleged that plaintiff's debt was fictitious.-MARTIN CLOTHING CO. v. PAGE, Tex., 21 S. W. Rep. 702.

3. ATTACHMENT-Levy on a writ of attachment sufficiently describes the property seized when it states that the levy was made on a certain stock of dry goods, clothing, boots and shoes, hats and caps, trunks, valises, goods, wares, and merchandise in a certain storehouse on lot number 6, in block 22, in town of Temple, valued at the sum of $1,000, found in possession of J. Shapera."-SWEETSER V. SPARKS, Tex., 21 S. W. Rep. 724.

Return.-A return indorsed

4. ATTACHMENT Property in Another County. When property is seized under a writ of attachment issued in a suit brought in another county, and a third person, claiming the property, files with the sheriff the affidavit and bond required in such case by Code 1881, ch. 33, the statutes provides that such officer shall return these papers to the clerk of the county where the property was seized, and that such clerk shall place the cause for the determination of the rights of the parties as to the property on the trial docket of the court of his county at the next term; the person claiming the property being the plaintiff, and the sheriff and the plaintiff in attachment, defendants: Held, that the provision requiring the trial of the rights of the parties in the county in which the property was seized is mandatory, and a writ of prohibition will issue if the court of another county attempts to proceed with the trial.-STATE V. SUPERIOR COURT OF PIERCE COUNTY, Wash., 32 Pac. Rep. 553.

5. ATTORNEY-Authority.-Authority conferred on an attorney to take all steps necessary to recover land, and an agreement between him and his client whereby he is to receive a half interest in the land he may recover, does not authorize him to abandon his client's claim to such land.-HICKEY V. STRINGER, Tex., 21 S. W. Rep. 716.

6. BANKS AND BANKING Collections. - A Cincinnati bank wrote to a Philadelphia bank: "Will collect at par all points west of Pennsylvania, and remit, the 1st, 11th, and 21st of each month." The latter accepted this proposition, and thereafter, from time to time, forwarded paper indorsed "For collection." Business was carried on under this arrangement for several months, when the Cincinnati bank failed, having in its hands, or in the hands of its subagent banks, the proceeds of paper thus forwarded: Held, that the relation between the banks was that of principal and agent until the collection of the paper and the receipt of the money by the Cincinnati bank, after which time the relation was that of debtor and creditor; and hence that the receiver of the Cincinnati bank could not be charged, as trustee, with any moneys which were collected, and passed into its general funds, before the

failure, or which before that time were collected by subagents, and credited to it on a debt which it owed them, but that he could be so charged with moneys collected by a subagent before the failure, and afterwards paid to the receiver. - COMMERCIAL NAT. BANK V. ARMSTRONG, U. S. S. C., 13 S. C. Rep. 533.

7. BOND-Release of Sureties. - A surety on a bond' executed by a subcontractor to the original contractor for the performance of certain work on a building is not released by reason of changes in the original plans and specifications, made by the subcontractor under an agreement with the owner, but without the knowlHENRICUS v. edge and consent of the contractor. ENGLERT, N. Y., 33 N. E. Rep. 550.

8. CARRIERS-Live Stock-Connecting Roads.-In an action against a railroad company for delay in the transportation of live stock, where defendant does not deny under oath an allegation in the petition that the contract of shipment was executed by a connecting carrier as defendant's agent, the contract is admissible in evidence, though it does not show on its face that it was executed for or on behalf of defendant.-INTERNATIONAL & G. N. R. Co. v. ANDERSON, Tex., 21 S. W. Rep. 691.

9. CARRIERS Live-stock Shipments. Where an express company undertakes to transport a shipment of horses, knowing at the time that a portion of its route is obstructed by floods, the existence of the floods is not such an act of God as will relieve the company from liability for injuries to the horses while being carried over another route. - ADAMS EXPRESS Co. v. JACKSON, Tenn., 21 S. W. Rep. 666.

10. CARRIERS-Passengers-Negligence.-A passenger, entitled to safe transportation over railroad and ferry connecting therewith,upon invitation of the employees of the railroad company managing the ferry passed from a boat by a way upon the ferry bridge, provided for animals and vehicles. As he was so doing a runaway horse, belonging to the railroad company, careering at random about the ferry house, bolted over a bow, which aided in the support of the ferry bridge, into the way where the passenger was, and injured him: Held, that by being in the way indicated the passenger was not guilty of negligence which contributed to his injury. -WATSON V. CAMDEN & A. R. Co. N. J., 26 Atl. Rep. 136.

11. CARRIERS-Passengers-Street Car-Negligence.It is not negligence per se for a passenger on a street car to stand on the step of the car, outside of a gate placed between the step and the platform, at the express or implied invitation of the driver; the danger not being so obvious that it can be said that a reasonable man would disobey the inivtation. SEYMOUR V. CITIZENS' RY. Co., Mo., 21 S. W. Rep. 739.

12. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Legislative Power.-Laws 1892, ch. 311, provides, "in the proceedings now pending in the superior court for the abolition of certain grade crossings in the city of N, no change shall be made in the grade of the public ways in said city where the same are now crossed by one or more railroads at grade, without the consent of the city council:" Held, that the act was intended to amend and change the law applicable to the particular grade crossings referred to therein, described in the "pending proceedings," and not to all the grade crossings of the city, and is constitutional.-IN RE MAYOR, ETC., of CITY OF NORTHAMTON, Mass., 33 N. E. Rep. 568.

13. CONTRACT.-A building contract provided that the owner should pay the contractor "upon the presentation of certificates," signed by the architect, and that the decision of the architect as to the value of extra or deducted work should be final. The contractor obtained from the architect a certificate showing the respective values of extra and deducted work, and stating the balance due from the owner, which certificate the contractor gave back to the architect, who afterwards refused to give him any further certificate: Held, that the contractor was entitled to recover sa id balance from the owner, although he had not presented

him with the certificate. - ARNOLD V. BOURNIQUE, Ill., 33 N. E. Rep. 530.

14. CONTRACT Construction. A contract recited that defendants, husband and wife, jointly and severally agree to pay plaintiff a certain sum "advanced or loaned to us, or any further sum of money which he may loan to us at such time as circumstances may occur, that is to say, that, if in any event either of us should die, then the survivor shall assume the debt, and pay it as if both were living; and we further agree that if the money is not paid before the expiration of five years from the first day of January, 1889, last past, then we jointly or severally agree to give a mortgage to" plaintiff on land described: Held, that no time of payment was fixed by the contract.-SIVERS V. SIVERS, Cal., 32 Pac. Rep. 571.

15. CONTRACT-Liquidated Damages. -When damages may be sustained by the breach of a single stipulation, and they are uncertain in amount, and not readily susceptible of proof under the rules of evidence, then, if the parties have agreed upon a sum of money as the measure of compensation for such breach, and that sum is not disproportionate to the presumable loss, it WALLIS may be recovered as liquidated damages. IRON WORKS V. MONMOUTH PARK ASS'N, N. J., 26 Atl. Rep. 140.

16. CORPORATIONS - Capital Stock - Tender.-In the subscription book of a railroad company W made a written agreement to take 20 shares of stock when the road reached V: Held, that it was not necessary for the company to tender a certificate of the stock before bringing suit on the contract.-WEBB V. BALTIMORE & E. S. R. Co., Md., 26 Atl. Rep. 113.

17. CORPORATIONS-Corporate Existence.-Under Rev. St. art. 599, providing that no person who assumes an obligation to a corporation as such shall resist the enforcement of such obligation on the ground that there was in fact no such corporation, until that fact has been adjudged in a direct proceeding had for that purpose, a person who has entered into a rental contract with a corporation as such is estopped to deny its corporate existence in an action against him to recover rents and for the possession of the leased premises.LAMB V. BEAUMONT TEMPERANCE HALL CO., Tex., 21 S. W. Rep. 713.

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18. CORPORATIONS Equitable Mortgage. Where a written instrument which recites that a corporation has mortgaged certain property, but does not state the names of the officers of the corporation, nor that it has authorized the execution of such an instrument, is executed by one B, president, and one C, secretary and treasurer, sealed with their seals, and acknowledged by them as their act, such instrument will not be held to be an equitable mortgage, in the absence of allegations and proof that it was attempted to be executed by the corporation, or its authorized agents, as security for an obligation of the corporation.-BROWN V. FARMERS' SUPPLY DEPOT Co., Oreg., 32 Pac. Rep. 548.

19. CORPORATIONS-Foreign Corporations.-Act April 3, 1889, providing that any foreign corporation desiring to transact or solicit business, or establish a general or special office in Texas, shall file a certified copy of its articles of incorporation with the secretary of State, and "no such corporation can maintain any sult in any of the courts of this State upon any demand, unless at the time such contract was made the corporporation had filed its articles of incorporation," does not apply to an action by a foreign corporation to recover for goods sold to a resident of Texas at its place of ⚫ business in a foreign State, as such transaction is not interstate commerce," where it is not stated that the parties contemplated shipping the goods from that State into Texas.-REED & BARTON V. WALKER, Tex., 21 S. W. Rep. 687. 20. COUNTIES Highways Constitutional Law. Since counties are merely parts of the State government, subject entirely to legislative control, Gen. St. § 1087, which renders counties liable for injuries caused by defects in highways or bridges, is not unconstitu

tional as depriving counties of their property without due process of law.-BLUM V. RICHLAND COUNTY, S. Car., 17 S. E. Rep. 20.

21. CONVERSION.-The fact that F permitted certain wheat in controversy in a replevin suit to be stored in his barn by the defendants, who afterwards carried it away, and sold it, did not constitute conversion by F, where it was subsequently awarded to plaintiff, where F received no consideration, and had no knowledge of the controversy concerning its ownership. Where plaintiff insists that he is entitled to judgment against all the defendants or none, and he is not entitled to judgment against some of them, he waives his right to the determination of the question as to whether he is entitled to judgment against any.VALENTINE V. DUFF, Ind., 33 N. E. Rep. 529.

22. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Rape.-On a trial for rape it is not error, in that it compels defendant to testify against himself, to admit testimony relating to his identification as the guilty party by the prosecutrix on the morning after the rape, and while in jail, it appearing that the identification was made by the prosecutrix pointing out defendant as the perpetrator of the outrage from six or eight men, stripped of hats and coats, and brought into her presence.—BRUCE v. STATE, Tex., 21 S. W. Rep. 681.

23. CRIMINAL LAW-Appeal.-Where an appeal taken from a sentence of death is dismissed, and the case re manded to the circuit court, with directions to fix another day for the execution of the sentence, and the circuit judge sets a new day for execution in accordance with directions, no appeal will lie therefrom, since it would, in effect, be an appeal from the judgment of the supreme court.-STATE V. LEVELLE, S. Car., 17 S. E. Rep. 30.

24. CRIMINAL LAW- Assault with Intent to Kill. — Where, on a trial for assault with intent to kill one J, the evidence shows that defendant, standing about 40 yards from J, armed with a gun charged with No. 8 shot, fired at J, fully intending to kill, and that the shot buried themselves "out of sight" in a plank fence behind J, defendant's contention that there was no assault to murder, because of the distance between the parties and the size of the shot used, will not be sustained.-HATTON V. STATE, Tex., 21 S. W. Rep. 679.

25. CRIMINAL LAW-Former Jeopardy.-Hill's Code, § 206, authorizing the court to discharge a jury when there is no probability of their agreement, is not in conflict with Const. art. 1, § 12, providing that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, and is valid.-STATE V. SHAFFER, Oreg., 32 Pac. Rep. 545.

Where,

26. CRIMINAL TRIAL- Theft-Instructions. on a trial for theft, defendant offers no testimony accounting for his possession of the property, recently stolen, error cannot be predicated on the court's failure to charge on the law applicable to the possession of such property.-BALDWIN V. STATE, Tex., 21 S. W. Rep. 679.

27. CRIMINAL PRACTICE-Attempt to Commit Rape.In order to maintain a prosecution for an attempt to commit rape, the indictment need not charge rape, but may charge directly an attempt only.-West v. STATE, Tex., 21 S. W. Rep. 686.

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28. CRIMINAL PRACTICE-Forgery.-Where, on a trial for forgery, the indictment charges the offense in the language of the statute, and sets forth the instrument forged according its purport, it is sufficient, though it fails to allege defendant's intent to defraud any particular person.-STATE V. ROWLEN, Mo., 21 S. W. Rep. 729.

29. CRIMINAL TRIAL-Homicide-Competency of Jurors. Where, at an examination of jurors in a criminal cause, it appears that there had not been formed in their minds any such conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of defendant as disqualified them from sitting as jurors, the overruling of defendant's challenge to such jurors was proper.-MCKINNEY V. STATE, Tex., 21 S. W. Rep. 683.

30. DIVORCE-Instructions.-A charge that "an opprobrious epithet, conveying the idea of a lack of chastity, would to a wanton cause no pain, while, applied to a pure and gentle wife, no tongue can tell the anguish, the shame, the sense of humiliation, it would bring," is objectionable, as being argumentative, and upon the weight of the evidence.-HANNA V. HANNA, Tex., 21 S. W. Rep. 720.

31. DOWER-Antenuptial Agreement. In a suit for the assignment of dower the evidence showed that complainant's husband had died seised of lands worth $28,000, and had left personal estate worth $13,000. By an antenuptial agreement the complainant had agreed to take $2,000, payable two years after her husband's death, in lieu of all her claims against his estate: Held, that the provision for the wife was so inadequate that it constituted no bar to dower in the absence of affirmative proof that when she signed the agreement she had notice of the extent of her husband's property and of the effect of the agreement.-TAYLOR V. TAY. LOR, Ill., 33 N. E. Rep. 532.

32. EVIDENCE- Ancient Deed - Forgery. The fact that a deed attacked as a forgery is an ancient instrument does not impose on the attacking party the burden of proving it a forgery; and it is error, therefore, to so instruct.-STOOKSBERRY V. SWAN, Tex., 21 S. W. Rep. 694.

33. EMINENT DOMAIN — Municipal Corporations Street. Where a railroad company acquires a right of way for the construction of a bridge over city property by contract with the city conditioned that the right of way must be used so as not to interfere with the city's right to open a street under such right of way, the company cannot thereafter repudiate its agreement, and acquire a right of way by condemnation, as inability to agree with the owner is a jurisdictional fact necessary to legalize condemnation proceedings; Revision, p. 928, § 100, authorizing condemnation proceedings only where the company cannot agree with the owner for the use or purchase of lands.-STATE V. NATIONAL DOCKS RY. Co., N. J., 26 Atl. Rep. 145.

34. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL Since the holder of the legal title to land will not be required in equity to convey to the equitable owner while the latter is indebted to the former, though the indebtedness grew out of transactions independent of the land, where defendant agreed by parol to exchange certain lands with H, and the agreement was so far performed as to entitle H to conveyance but for an independent debt due defendant, defendant is not estopped in equity to deny H's title as against his execution creditor.EVANS V. BELMONT LAND Co., Tenn., 21 S. W. Rep. 670. 35. EQUITY-Multifariousness.-Where a bill in equity states several distinct causes of suit against several defendnats, who are unconnected in interest and liability, a decree dismissing the bill for multifariousness was proper.-WELLS V. SEWELL'S POINT GUANO Co., Va., 17 S. E. Rep. 2.

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36. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. Probate Practice.-Under the provisions of the Arkansas statute regulating the administration of estates, where a meeting of the heirs of the deceased intestate is held, representatives of four-fifths of the interests in the estate being present, and it is agreed that certain persons shall be appointed administrators, one of whom is to reside on and manage the realty, neither those who are present, and consent to the agreement, nor those who are absent, but acquiesce, and make no objection for twelve years, can refuse to be bound thereby. And the heirs, after so long a time, cannot obtain relief in equity on the ground that orders made by the probate court for the renting of the realty and for other purposes, in pursuance of the agreement, are without authority in law, unless it appears that fraud was practiced upon the probate court or upon the heirs.-SMITH V. WORTHINGTON, U. S. C. C. of App., 53 Fed. Rep. 977.

37. EXPERT EVIDENCE-Architect.-An architect who has been engaged in that [business for a number of

years is prima facie qualified to give his opinion on any question in respect to the construction, strength, and sufficiency of a building which is a proper subject for opinion evidence.-TURNER V. HAAR, MO., 21 S. W. Rep. 737.

38. FEDERAL COURTS-Bond-Corporation as Surety. -A corporation will not be accepted as surety on a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court when there is fair ground to question whether power to bind itself by such a contract is conferred by the acts under which it is incorporated.-BLACK V. BLACK, U. S. C. C., 53 Fed. Rep. 985.

39. FEDERAL COURTS- Jurisdiction - Foreclosure.Where an attachment is levied on realty in a suit in the State court, and proceedings in equity to cancel an alleged fraudulent conveyance of the attached property are also instituted therein, the United States Circuit Court cannot acquire jurisdiction as to the land for the time being, so as to enable it to enjoin the litigants in the State court from proceeding therein, at the instance of a party to such equitable suit, who was filed a bill in the federal court to foreclose a mortgage upon the land in question.-GATES V. BACKI, U. S. C. C. App., 53 Fed. Rep. 961.

40. FEDERAL COURTS-Supreme Court.-In an action for unlawful detainer, tried by the court without à jury, a general finding that defendant is guilty in manner and form as charged, with findings as to the amount of plaintiff's damages, and the value of the rents and profits, where there is no special finding of facts or agreed statement of facts, has, by Rev. St. §§ 648, 649, the same effect as the verdict of a jury, precludes the supreme court from examining the testimony, and limits its inquiry to the sufficiency of the complaint and the rulings preserved on questions of law arising on the trial.-LEHNEN V. DICKSON, U. S. S. C., 13 S. C. Rep. 481.

41. FEDERAL COURT Mandamus.-The Supreme Court of the United States has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to the circuit court of appeals to compel it to receive and consider new proofs in an admiralty appeal in a cause which is within the legitimate jurisdiction of the court.-IN RE HAWKINS, U. S. S. C., 13 S. C. Rep. 512.

42. FINES Imprisonment until Payment. Pen. Code, relating to proceedings in police courts, provides that a jndgment that defendant pay a fine may also direct that he be imprisoned until the fine is satisfied, in the proportion of one day's imprison. ment for every dollar of the fine. Section 1205, which was a similar provision, till amended by St. 1891, p. 52, provides that the imprisonment "must not exceed one day for every two dollars of the fine:" Held, that section 1446 was not affected by the amendment to section 1205, which is a limitation on the powers of superior courts.-IN RE MULHOLLAND, Cal., 32 Pac. Rep. 568.

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43. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF Sale of Goods. A parol agreement to sell and assign a bond and mortgage is a contract for the sale of goods, wares, and merchandise within the sixth section of the statute of frauds.-GREENWOOD V. LAW, N. J., 26 Atl. Rep. 134. 44. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE Limitations.-Gen. St. ch. 44, art. 2, § 2, provides for setting aside certain mortgages and transfers of property made in fraud of creditors where the action therefor is brought "within six months after" the instrument is placed on record: Held that, in computing the time for bringing the action, the day on which the instrument is placed on record should be included.-LEBUS V. WAYNE RATTERMAN CO., Ky., 21 S. W. Rep. 652.

45. GUARANTY-Collection of Claims.-Where one of two copartners, to whom, on the dissolution of the partnership, is transferred the stock in trade, executes to the other, who took the accounts and claims of the firm, a bond conditioned for the payment of onehalf of the amount thereof, "that shall prove uncollectible," the obligation is not a guaranty of such claims, and the obligee need not prosecute them to

judgment and execution before he can sue on the bond.-RALPH V. ELDREDGE, N. Y., 33 N. E. Rep.

559.

46. GUARANTY-Notice of Default.-In an action on a guaranty it appeared that defendants, in writing, guarantied that M would deliver to plaintiff 500 cases of tomatoes, according to his written contract with him. On the strength of the guaranty, plaintiff paid M the price of the tomatoes: Held, that there was no obligation on plaintiff to notify defendants of the default of M in order to make defendants liable.HEYMAN V. DOOLEY, Md., 26 Atl. Rep. 117.

47. HOMESTEAD-Assignment.-Under Rev. St. 1891, ch. 52, § 1, which declares that "every householder having a family shall be entitled to an estate of homestead in the farm or lot of land and buildings thereon, owned or rightly possessed by lease or otherwise, and occupied by him or her as a residence," one living on land which he has contracted to purchase has an estate of homestead therein.-STAFFORD v. WOODS, Ill., 33 N. E. Rep. 539.

48. HOMESTEAD Release.Under Rev. St. 1891, ch. 52, §§ 1, 4, which provide that homesteads shall be exempt from the laws of conveyance, and that no release, waiver, or conveyance of a homestead estate shall be valid unless it is in writing, subscribed and acknowledged, by the householder and his wife, a written agreement to convey land in fee, clear of all incumbrances, without any mention of the homestead, does not compel the vendor to release his homestead in the land. Redfern v. Redfern, 38 Ill. 509, followed.STODOLKA N. NOVOTNY, Ill., 33 N. E. Rep. 534.

49. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Conveyance.-Where a husband conveys an estate to his wife, to have and to hold during her natural life, with power to use the profits to her separate use, the estate conveyed is an estate for life to the sole use of the wife.-VICK V. GOWER, Tenn., 21 S. W. Rep. 677.

50. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Sale.-A notarial act executed by the wife, in which she sells her paraphernal property, is null and void as against her if the same was executed under the coercive influence of the husband. VICKNAIR V. TROSCLAIR, La., 12 South. Rep. 486.

51. IMMIGRATION Importations for Purposes of Prostitution.-An indictment charging that defendants did knowingly and willfully import and bring into the southern district of New York, from Naples, Italy, six woman, named, for the purposes of prostitution within the United States, sufficiently charges the offense proscribed by Act March 3, 1875, § 3 (18 St. p. 477), forbidding the knowing and willful importation of women into the United States for the purposes of prostitution.-UNITED STATES V. PAGLIANO, U.S. C. C., N. Y., 53 Fed. Rep. 1001.

52. INFANT-Judgment by Default.-Where a judg ment has been entered by default against infant defendants a writ of error to reverse such judgment may be prosecuted by next friend, though a guardian ad litem was appointed to represent their interests in the suit, it appearing that such guardian has neglected for about eight years to prosecute the writ, and it not appearing from the record that he objects to such prosecution.-CARLTON V. MILLER, Tex., 21 S. W. Rep.

679.

53. INJUNCTION-Municipal Corporation-Contract.The fact that a city has entered into a contract with a gas company, by which the latter is to furnish gas for lighting the city for a period of years, is not ground for an injunction to restrain the city from contracting with another company for electric lights for lighting streets and public places, when the interests of the city seem to require such a course; and, if the gas company is injured by a refusual on the part of the city to have its streets lighted with gas, its remedy is by an action for damages.-CITY OF NEWPORT V. NEWPORT LIGHT CO., Ky., 21 S. W. Rep. 645.

54. INSURANCE COMPANIES - Assessment.-Where it does not clearly appear that an assessment ordered by the court of common pleas, on the members of a

mutual fire insurance company, to pay losses and the expenses of a receivership, is grossly excessive, the decree ordering it will not be disturbed, since the determination of the amount of such assessment rests in the sound discretion of such court.-WOOD v. STANDARD MUT. LIVE-STOCK INS. CO. OF READING, Penn., 26 Atl. Rep. 103.

55. INSURANCE Conditions Change of Risk.-In actions on fire insurance policies issued to an incorpo. rated religious society on its church, it appeared that plaintiff procured a painter to remove the old paint from, and repaint, the building, which was of wood; that to remove the old paint, the painter burned it off by a naphtha torch, and that the painter had been engaged in the work for nearly a month when the building caught fire on a board where the torch had recently been applied: Held, that there was an alteration of "the situation or circumstances affecting the risk," within the meaning of a condition in the policies providing that in case of such alteration without the consent of the companies, the policies shall be Void.-FIRST CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH V. HOLYOKE MUT. FIRE INS. Co., Mass., 33 N. E. Rep. 572.

56. INTOXICATING LIQUORS - Sales to Drunkards.Rev. St. art. 2473, of the title on "Guardian and Ward," defining an "habitual drunkard" as "one whose mind has become so impaired by the use of intoxicating liquors or drugs that he is incapable of taking care of himself or property," does not apply to the meaning of the term as used in Sayles' Ann. St. art. 3226a, § 4, providing for the execution of a bond by retail liquor dealers conditioned that they will not sell to habitual drunkards.-CAMPBELL V. JONES, Tex., 21 S. W. Rep. 723.

57. JUDGMENT IN GARNISHMENT.-A petition by a creditor of a defendant in garnishment to set aside a judgment against the garnishees on the ground that before the attachment such defendant had assigned petitioner the moneys due him from the garnishees, of which fact they were notified; that they permitted such moneys to be attached and judgment rendered, without notifying petitioner thereof, should be dismissed, where petitioner, after learning such facts, slept on its rights eight months before filing its petition.-LAWRENCE BANK. V. RANEY & BERGER IRON CO., Md., 26 Atl. Rep. 119.

58. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE-Notice.-Code Civil Proc. § 850, provides that when all the parties to an action in a justice's court served with process shall have appeared, or some of them have appeared, and the remaining defendants have made default, the justice must fix a day for the trial of said cause, and notify the who plaintiff and the defendants have appeared thereof:" Held, that the provision requiring such notice of the day of trial is imperative, and a judgment entered without it will be vacated on a writ of review. -JONES V. JUSTICE'S COURT OF LOS ANGELES CITY, Cal., 32 Pac. Rep. 575.

59. JUDGMENT Rendition. In an action wherein defendant has filed a cross-complaint, making plaintiff and other parties defendant thereto, a notice reciting "that the court has rendered its decision and findings and judgment" therein, directed to the plaintiff" and his attorneys of record, service of which is accepted by one of the attorneys, who indorses the acknowledgment of service as "attorney for plaintiff and defendants to cross-complaint," is a notice of the rendition of the decision to all of the losing parties.SCOTT V. GLENN, Cal., 32 Pac. Rep. 573.

60. LANDLORD'S LIEN-Waiver.-Delay of more than 30 days after the removal of a tenant before the landlord begins proceedings to foreclose his lien on the tenant's property for the rent due is a waiver of the lien as against a purchaser of the property.-JENKINS V. PATTON, Tex., 21 S. W. Rep. 693.

attachment of such fixtures by a creditor of the tenant in the absence of any right of the tenant to remove such fixtures after the termination of the lease.-MOREY v. HOYT, Conn., 26 Atl. Rep. 127.

62. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Overflow.-Overflows in in the past history of this State have been of frequent occurrence, and they are therefore not of such "'extraordinary nature that it could not have been foreseen." The destruction of the crops by them is not a sufficient cause for the abatement of the rent, but they are unavoidable accidents, within the meaning of article 2719, Civil Code, and relieve the tenant from repairing damages caused directly by them. - PAYNE V. JAMES, La., 12 South. Rep. 492.

63. LANDLORD AND TENANT. Where lessees take possession of a building, and occupy it for three or four years for the purpose for which it was leased, under a lease providing that they shall make, at their own expense, all necessary improvements and repairs, they are not relieved from liability for rent on removing therefrom before the expiration of the term, on the ground that it was totally unfit for such purpose, and to which use and purpose the lease restricted them, and that it became untenantable and dangerous, and the lessors refused to repair it.-HUBER V. BAUM, Pa., 26 Atl. Rep. 101.

64. LIMITATIONS - Suspensively Absence or Death.Under Comp. Laws Kan. ch. 80, § 21, which provides that if, when a cause of action accrues against a person, he be out of the State," the period limited for the commencement of the action shall not begin to run "until he comes into the State," and if, after the cause of action accrues, "he depart from the State," "the time of his absence" shall not be computed as part of the period within which the action must be brought, the statute of limitations does not run in favor of a debtor while he is personally absent from the State, notwithstanding that he continued to have a usual place of residence in the State, where service of a a summons could be made on him, in accordance with section 4 of the same chapter.-BAUSERMAN V. BLUNT, U. S. S. C., 13 S. C. Rep. 466.

65. MANDAMUS-Title to Office.-Where a person has been appointed to public office, and has qualified, but is prevented by a former incumbent from obtaining possession of the office, the title to the office will not be determined by a court of equity, the appropriate proceeding being by mandamus. COMMISSIONERS V. SCHOOL COM'RS, Md., 26 Atl. Rep. 115.

66. MANDAMUS - Transfer of State Stock.-Where an executor is entitled to a transfer to himself on the books of the State treasurer of State stock standing in the name of his testatrix, the treasurer cannot invoke a rule of his office requiring a certificate from the probate judge authorizing such transfer as a protection for his failure to discharge his duty. - STATE SWINTON V. BATES, S. Car., 17 S. E. Rep. 28.

67. MARRIED WOMAN-Contracts.-A married woman, whose husband, without authority from her, has purchased machinery which has been placed on her separate estate, does not ratify the purchase, or estop herself from denying her husband's authority to make it, by signing, as surety, a note given by the husband for the price, where she does so without any knowledge of the purchase, or for what purpose the note was given.-GOSSARD V. LEA, Tex., 21 S. W. Rep. 703.

68. MASTER AND SERVANT Fellow servant. - Under Const. 1890, § 193, providing that every employee of a railroad corporation shall have the same remedy for an injury produced by an act or omission of the corporation or its employees as are allowed by law to other persons not employees, where the injury results from the negligence of a fellow-servant engaged in another department of labor, a fireman on an engine and a telegraph operator are engaged in different departments of labor. ILLINOIS CENT. R. Co. v. HUNTER, Miss., 12 South. Rep. 482.

injuries caused by a defective coupling, there is no error in a charge that defendant's general denial casts on plaintiff the burden of showing that he has been damaged substantially as alleged; that such damage was caused, as alleged, by a defect in the coupling; and that such defect was known, or might have been known, by the exercise of proper care on the part of defendant, or of those employees whose duty it was to inspect and ascertain such defects; and also the burden of showing the measure or amount of damages he has sustained.-SABINE & E. T. RY. Co. v. EWING, Tex., 21 S. W. Rep. 700.

70. MECHANICS' LIENS-Subcontractors.-In an action by a subcontractor to establish a lien on realty for material furnished for a building thereon, where it appears that the contract in evidence between the owner and contractor was substituted for an original contract, whereby the rights of subcontractors were materially affected, evidence as to when the new contract was made is admissible.-SMITH V. LEVICK, Pa., 26 Atl. Rep. 97.

71. MORTGAGE-Annulment.-In a suit by the syndic of an insolvent's estate to annul a mortgage granted three months before the judicial recognition and declaration of insolvency, it is essential to prove that the mortgage creditor, who it is alleged was preferred, had knowledge of the insolvent condition of the mortgagor.-CHAPOTON V. HER CREDITORS, La., 12 South. Rep. 495.

72. MORTGAGES-Priorities. Defendant agreed with A to sell him certain land, part cash, and balance secured by mortgage. Defendant went with A to a notary's office, where a deed was executed. While the mortgage was being prepared, A said, "Let me see that deed," and took it from the table, and went, without defendant's knowledge, to plaintiff, from whom he negotiated a loan. A then returned to defendant, paid him the money, and executed the mortgage, which defendant at once recorded. Prior to this time plaintiff had the deed and A's mortgage to her recorded: Held, that defendant's mortgage was entitled to priority, as there had been no delivery of the deed to A at the time he negotiated the loan from plaintiff.-GOULD V. WISE, Cal., 32 Pac. Rep. 576.

An

73. MORTGAGES Rights under Assignment. assignee for value of a mortgage by deed of assignment in form a conveyance of land does not thereby attain the position of a purchaser for value without notice, but takes subject to all defenses which the mortgagor or his grantor has to the debt which the mortgage is given to secure. - MAGIE v. REYNOLDS, N. J., 29 Atl. Rep. 150.

74. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Contracts by Officials. -Where the officers of a city purchase a right of way through land for the construction of a sewer pipe, and, without express charter power so to do, bind the city by a guaranty that they will put in such a pipe or valve as will prevent, in case of high water in the river into which the sewer empties, the flowing of the water back through the pipe, to the damage of the land of the grantors of the right of way, such guaranty is ultra vires, and void, for it would make the city insurers of property against such injury, whereas it is only liable for absence of reasonable care and skill in the execution of the work. MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF NASHVILLE V. SUTHERLAND, Tenn., 21 S. W. Rep. 674.

75. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT Collaterals Limitations. The deposit of securities as collateral to demand notes does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations from the date of such notes.-IN RE HARTRANFT'S ESTATE, Pa., 26 Atl. Rep. 104.