LANDLORD AND TENANT.

5. Where a building is voluntarily erected on the land of another, it be-
comes part of the realty and belongs to the owner of the land. Bonney v.
Foss, 197.

6. A notice to quit on the 17th of January, where the letting was from
December 18th "to January 18," is not legal. Waters v. Young, 398.

7. The title to the whole crop, raised on shares with a landlord, is in the
tenant until divided and possession given. Sargent v. Courrier, 585.

8. After levy of execution against the tenant, no agreement with the land-
lord will defeat the levy. Id.

9. A landlord who negligently constructs his premises, or negligently
suffers them to remain defective, is liable to his tenant or a stranger injured
thereby. Scott v. Simons, 646.

10. There is no implied warranty that leased premises are fit for use. Id.
11. Or that landlord will keep them in repair. Id.

LARCENY. See CRIMINAL LAW, III.

LEASE. See EXECUTION, 4; RAILROAD, 10.

LETTER.

LIEN.

-

See PARTNERSHIP, 40, 41.

See ADMIRALTY, 1, 4, 16, 23, 24, 28; ATTORNEY, 6, 7, 8; BAILMENT,
3; BANKS AND BANKER, 4; CATTLE, 2; DECEDENTS' ESTATE, 1; ME-
CHANICS AND MATERIAL MEN, 2, 3; POWErs, 2.

1. An equitable lien on land may be created at the same time that there is
a personal obligation by covenant. Johnson v. Johnson, 393.

2. One who has power to charge his lands and agrees to do so, will be
deemed in equity to have done so. Id.

3. A charge may be created by fair and reasonable implication as well as
by express words of trust.

Id.

4. Equity will enforce a charge upon land by appointing a trustee to make
a sale after the lapse of a reasonable time. Id.

5. THE LIEN OF WAREHOUSEMEN AND WHARFINGERS, 465.

6. MARITIME LIENS, 593.

7. One who contracts to haul lumber at a certain price per thousand, has
a lien on the whole quantity for his labor, and not a separate lien on each
thousand. Bean v. Brown, 707.

LIMITATIONS. See BILLS AND NOTES, 2; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 29; IN-
SURANCE, 2.

1. Foreign corporations cannot take advantage of the Statutes of Limita-
tions of New York. Tioga Railroad v. B. & C. Railroad, 257.

2. A daughter who sues her father's estate for services, must prove an ex-
press contract, and a distinct acknowledgment of the debt within six years of
the commencement of suit. Watson's Executors v. Stem, 526.

3. The distinct admission of an existing indebtedness presumes a valid in-
debtedness. Id.

4. The reason why statutes of limitation are suspended during war, is on
account of inaccessibility or inability to sue. Seymour v. Bailey, 585.

5. Such disability continues only while the party is abiding in his own
country. Id.

6. Payment of interest by a partner, after dissolution of the firm, but within
six years of the maturity of a note, will renew it as against the Statute of
Limitations. Merritt et al. v. Day et al., 700.

7. One member of the firm being a married woman will not alter the effect
of such renewal. Id.

8. To transfer the title to personal property by operation of the statute,
there must be some appropriation if it or some act of dominion over it, incon-
sistent with the absolue right of the owner of it. Baker v. Chase, 707.

LUMBER. See LIEN, 7.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

1. A verdict of guilty, which was subsequently set aside, is no evidence of
probable cause in a suit for malicious prosecution. Richter v. Koster, 57.

2. Malice cannot be inferred in defendant because he testified before the

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

grand jury as to a criminal offence, supposed to have been committed by plain-
tiff. Richter v. Koster, 57.

MANDAMUS.

1. Is not the appropriate remedy to enforce payment of money due by mu-
nicipal corporation for work and labor. The State ex rel. Little v. Township
of Union, 124.

2. Is a compulsory not a revisory writ. Ex parte Harris, 646.

3. Not the proper remedy to try right to public office. Id.

4. The approval of the official bond of a public officer is the exercise of
judical and not ministerial power. Id.

5. Quo warranto and not mandamus is the proper remedy to try the title of
an officer de facto who has been appointed to fill the place of a party elected,
who has failed to file his bond in time. Id.

MARRIAGE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, I.

MASTER AND SERVANT. See CONTRACT, 14.

1. A company guilty of negligence in the employment of an incompetent
servant, will be liable for injury resulting to a co-employee through such ser-
vant's fault. C. & A. Railroad Co. v. Sullivan's Adm'r, 58.

2. Habitual intemperance of a conductor, and knowledge thereof by his
employers, is sufficient to render them liable. Id.

3. Where a builder or contractor selects his own workmen and has the im-
mediate control over the work, and directs the manner in which it shall be
done, such builder or contractor is responsible for injuries resulting from the
careless and negligent manner in which the work is done. Brown v. Weiner,
354.

4. The liability of a master for the negligence of his servants extends only
to such acts or omissions as come within the scope of the servant's employ-
ment. Therefore, where the servant of a railway corporation, not having
authority from the corporation to employ other servants, engaged one G. to
assist him in moving a crate of crockery, and, through the negligence or
inefficiency of G., combined with the carelessness of the servant, the crate was
overturned, striking the plaintiff, whereby it was claimed he suffered a severe
injury: Held, That the corporation was not liable for the negligence of G.,
nor for the fault of their servant in employing G. to assist him, even admit-
ting G. to have been an unsuitable and improper person to engage for that
service. Jewell v. Grand Trunk Railroad, 358.

5. A servant is liable to his master, where damages have been recovered
against the latter for the servant's negligence or misconduct. Grand Trunk
Railroad v. Latham's Adm'r, 462.

6. The servant is liable for the costs and counsel fees in the snit against
his master. Id.

7. A servant cannot recover from his employers for an injury resulting
from his own negligence. Lyon v. Detroit, L. & L. M. Railroad Co., 708.
8. Nor where the injury was one of the risks of the employment. Id.
9. The rule whereby a servant is precluded from indemnity against injury
caused by the negligence of a fellow-servant, only extends to the ordinary em-
ployment of the servant. If the servant is ordered by a superior servant to
do a dangerous act, out of his ordinary course, whereby he suffers damage, the
master will be responsible. Mann v. Oriental Mill Co., 725.

MECHANICS AND MATERIAL-MEN.

1. A mechanic's statutory lien for work done and material furnished in the
erection of a house is assignable. Rodgers v. Omaha Hotel Co., 246.

2. The difference between statutory liens and common-law liens, depending
on possession, discussed Id.

3. If five years elapse between the issuing of a sci. fa on a mechanics' lien
and the entry of judgment the lien is gone. Hunter v. Lanning et al., 462.
4. A debt may survive when the lien is gone. Id.

5. Proceedings on a mechanics' lien being in rem the lien must appear by
the record. Id

6. Owner cannot be prejudiced by continuing the debt against the cor-
tractor. Id.

MERGER. See MORTGAGE, 7.

MORTGAGE.

See BUILDING ASSOCIATION; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 21;
SURETY, 1; WASTE, 1.

1. Purchaser under a decree of foreclosure of a mortgage is not eutitled to
possession of premises until the execution of the master's deed to him.
Myers et al. v. Murray et al., 58.

2. Possession of premises by mortgagor is not adverse to mortgagee so as
to ripen into a title superior to the latter's. Allen v. Everly, 58.

3. Where lapse of time is not pleaded in bar, but relied on as evidence of
payment, it may be rebutted by showing the debt is not paid. Id.

4. The fact of payment must be shown where affirmative relief is asked; it
will not be granted on the presumption arising from lapse of time. Id.
5. After condition broken the legal title is in mortgagee.
Id.

6. The provision of the Maryland Code requiring an affidavit that the con-
sideration of a mortgage is true and bonâ fide applies to technical mortgages
only, not to deeds of trust. Carson's Adm'rs v. Phelps, 100.

7. The purchase of the fee, at a foreclosure sale, by the mortgagee, does
not necessarily merge or extinguish his mortgage. Parker v. Child, 323.
8. First mortgagee who purchases, may require second mortgagee to redeem,
or be foreclosed. Id.

9. First mortgagee entitled to be redeemed to full extent of purchase-
money paid by him. Id.

10. He must account for rents and profits during his occupation. Id.
11. A personal decree for deficiency, against mortgagor, is not a lien, until
after sale of mortgaged premises, and deficiency shown to exist. Bell v. Gil-
more, 324.

12. An agreement with mortgagee at sale, to pay his mortgage if he would
not bid, which results in making the mortgagor liable for a greater deficiency,
is a fraud on the latter which vitiates the sale. Morris v. Woodward, 326.
13. A mortgage of personal property enforcible in chancery may be created
by a verbal agreement. Shelburne v. Letsinger, 647.

14. Such agreement must be established by clear and convincing proof;
casual and indefinite expressions will not suffice. Id.

15. A transfer of notes of a third party, as collateral security for a note,
and the execution of a chattel mortgage with condition to collect or negotiate
them for the purpose of liquidating the original note, is a mortgage and not a
vledge. Fraker v. Reeve et al., 707.

16. If the mortgagee sell the notes at auction he will not be liable for a
conversion. Id.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 22.

1. A projection over a sidewalk in a city, which is dangerous to persons
using the sidewalk is a nuisance. Grove v. City of Fort Wayne, 59.

2. The city has power under the statutes to abate such nuisance, and if it
fail to do so will be liable for injuries resulting therefrom. Id.

3. The power of a city over its streets and the right of the public to them,
extends upward indefinitely. Id.

4. Where the proceeds of bonds sold by a city in anticipation of street im-
provements have been used in the meantime, the interest cannot be included
in assessing the expenses against the landowners. Buker et al. v. City of
Elizabeth, 258.

5. If the bonds are sold by legislative authority at less than par, the dis-
count can be included. Id.

6. The provision in the Jersey City charter of 1871, that a lot shall be
assessed for its share of the labor and materials for the intersections, is in
total disregard of the doctrine that assessments shall not exceed the benefit to
each lot, and an assessment made under it must be set aside. Van Tassal v.
Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City, 285.

7. So, also, an assessment made under the laws of 1873, for excavating
rock, is illegal, if made against the whole frontage.

Id.

8. The cost of flagging a sidewalk may be made against the whole front-

age, if no grading of the street is included. Id.

VOL. XXIII.-101

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

9. A city is not responsible for the negligence of its officers. Elliott v.
City of Philadelphia, 258.

10. In order to charge a city for negligence the law must have imposed a
duty on it, so as to make the neglect culpable. Id.

11. The officers of a city are quasi civil officers of the governmeut.

Id.

12. An assessment under the charter of the village of Passaic, providing
that the whole cost of an improvement shall be assessed upon the frontage, in
proportion to the benefit to each lot, is illegal. The Delaware, L. & W. Rail-
road, pros. v. Village of Passaic, 259.

13. Since the case of Agens v. City of Newark, an assessment made under
a statute fixing a standard other than actual benefit, cannot be sustained. Id.
14. Municipal corporations may hold property in trust for any purpose not
foreign to their institution. Sargent v. Cornish, 324.

15. A town can hold a sum of money in trust, to invest the income in the
purchase and display of United States flags. Id.

16. It cannot raise money by taxation for the purpose of executing the
trust. Id.

17. A city is liable for neglecting to keep its streets safe and convenient
for travel. Watson v. Tripp, 396.

18. It cannot divest itself of this duty unless by statute. Id.

19. A contract with a railway company that the company shall keep the
streets in order, and be liable for any injury for neglect, will not exempt the
city. Id.

20. An ordinance of a town prescribing the mode of assessing charges
for street improvements, continues valid after the incorporation of town.
Neff v. Bates et al., 647.

21. An owner with knowledge that his predecessor in title undertook to
dedicate certain land for a street, will be estopped from disputing an assess-
ment made against lots on such street, on the ground that it was not legally
dedicated. Id.

22. A city is not liable for damage done by surface water running down a
new street. Town of Union v. Durkes, 708.

23. Unless such water is drawn from a natural watercourse. Id.

24. Is liable for neglect of its officers in not keeping its streets and bridges
in repair. McLaughlin v. City of Corry, 757.

25. If the authorities are negligent in allowing an obstruction in a public
highway, they are liable to a person injured thereby. Id.

26. A city is liable for injuries resulting from snow and ice allowed to ac-
cumulate on its sidewalks. Id.

27. The measure of damages is the direct expenses by reason of the injury,
the inconvenience, pain, pecuniary loss, and loss of earning power of party
injured. Id.

28. What plaintiff received as wages would not go in mitigation of the
damages. Id.

1. The right to fish for oysters in the navigable waters of the state is
common to all the citizens of New Jersey. Paul et al. v. Hazelton, 259.

2. The legislature may grant the exclusive right to one citizen to plant
oysters in the bed of a stream. ld.

3. Trespass will be for an invasion of this right. Id.

4. Fishery is an acknowledged right, but is subordinate to the rights of
navigation. Cobb v. Bennett, 260.

5. A vessel wantonly running into a net in a private fishery in a navigable
stream, will be held liable for the damage. Id.

NEGLIGENCE. See BILLS AND NOTES, 32; HIGHWAY, 8; MASTER AND SER-
VANT, 4; RAILROAD, 6, 9, 25; 26.

1. The doctrine of comparative negligence is discarded, and contributory
now prevails. Johnson v. Tillson, 59.

2. An instruction that defendant is liable for his negligence, unless plain-
tiff was equally guilty of negligence, is erroneous.

Id.

NEGLIGENCE.

3. Where injury results from negligence of a contractor for the erection of
a house, the owner will not be liable. Pfau v. Williamson, 59.

4. As a general rule, the question of negligence is for the jury. Crissey
v. Hestonville Railway, 124.

5. Where negligence is concurrent a child will not be held to the same
degree of care as an adult.

Id.

6. Whether permitting a child of thirteen to stand on front platform of a
street car, and to get off from it, was negligence, is for the jury. Id.

7. It is the duty of a railway company to cause its cars to stop for pas-
sengers to get on or off. Id.

8. Where an injury is the result of two concurring causes, the party re
sponsible for one is not exempt from liability because the other party is
equally culpable. Lake v. Milliken et al., 198.

9. Every wrongdoer is responsible for all the consequences resulting from
his misconduct. Id.

10. NEGLIGENCE AND THE RULE OF DAMAGES THerefor, 265.

11. Where there is no testimony as to whether a traveller stopped and
listened before going on a railroad, the question of his negligence is for the
jury. Penna. Railroad Co. v. Weber, 526.

12. The presumption in the absence of evidence is that the traveller stops
and listens before crossing a railroad.

Id.

13. The burden of proof is on the railroad to show want of care. Id.

NEW TRIAL. See PRACTICE, 10.

NOTICE. See BILLS AND NOTES, IV; HIGHWAY, 2; PARTNERSHIP, 40;
VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 23.

1. A debtor who was absent from home in the service of the rebellion,
cannot come into equity and complain that his creditors obtained payment
of their debts through judicial process founded on constructive notice.
McQuiddy v. Ware, 124.

2. Especially where there is no allegation of want of actual knowledge.
Id.

3. The statutes of Missouri give three years for review of a decree founded
on constructive notice.

Id.

4. Six years without an attempt to review is laches. Id.

NUISANCE.

Mc-

1. The legislature has power to declare a place where intoxicating liquors
are sold in violation of law, to be drunk on the premises, a nuisance.
Laughlin v. The State, 59.

2. It is neither a cruel nor an unusual punishment to adjudge the abatement
of a nuisance.

Id.

3. It is no objection to a bill for an injunction to restrain a nuisance that
the complainants are nineteen separate owners of the residences alleged to be
injured. Robinson et al. v. Baugh, 586.

4. No verification of a bill is required, where the only relief contemplated
is to be granted on final hearing. Id.

5. A trial at law is not a necessary pre-requisite to a bill in equity to re-
strain a nuisance. Id.

6. That some of the complainants were maintaining similar nuisances, is
no excuse for respondent.

Id.

7. An individual cannot maintain an action for a common nuisance unless
he shows special damage. Green v. Nunnemacher et al., 708.

8. One who has a right to enjoy the use of waters of a river which flows
upon his land, may maintain a private action for having their purity destroyed
by an upper proprietor. Id.

9. An averment that the nuisance complained of causes such an unwhole-
some condition of the atmosphere as to deprive complainant of many of his
customers as a tavern-keeper, shows such special injury as would entitle him
to an action.
ld.

10. A complaint which shows that the western boundary of complainant's
premises is the "right bank" of a river flowing in a northerly direction, does
not give complainant the rights of a riparian proprietor. Id.