such agent made the same in good faith when there was a ruling of the Commissioner that § 452 did not apply to special agents, and that he complied with the requirements of the act and continued in occupation after he had ceased to be a special agent. Ib.

5. Railway land grants. Rulings as to Union Pacific main line grant held applicable to lands within grant for construction of Sioux City branch road. The rulings of this court that the Union Pacific Railroad main line grant, within place limits, made by the act of July 1, 1862, 12 Stat. 489, and the amendatory act of July 2, 1864, 13 Stat. 356, was in præsenti, and that after definite location of its road the grantee company could maintain ejectment and that title could be acquired against it by adverse possession, held in this case to apply to lands embraced within the grant for construction of the Sioux City branch road, notwithstanding such branch was to be constructed by a company to be thereafter incorporated. Missouri Valley Land Co. v. Wiese, 234; Missouri Valley Land Co. v. Wrich, 250.

6. Railway right of way; when grant effective-Superiority of homestead entry. Under the act of March 3, 1875, c. 152, 18 Stat. 482, granting to railroads the right of way through public lands of the United States, such grant takes effect either on the actual construction of the road, or on the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, after the definite location and the filing of a profile of the road in the local land office, as provided in § 4 of the act; and a valid homestead entry made after final survey but before either the construction of the road or the approval by the Secretary of the profile, is superior to the rights of the company. (Jamestown & Northern Railway Co. v. Jones, 177 U. S. 125, explained and followed.) Minneapolis, St. Paul &c. Ry. Co. v. Doughty, 251.

See TAXES AND TAXATION, 12.

PUBLIC OFFICERS.

See ARMY AND NAVY;
PUBLIC LANDS, 4.

PUBLIC SAFETY.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 18.

PUBLIC USE.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 17;

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 2, 11, 17.

RAILROADS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 17, 18;

PUBLIC LANDS, 5, 6;

RECEIVERS, 3.

RAILWAY LAND GRANTS.

See PUBLIC LANDS, 5.

RATES, FREIGHT.

See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 1, 2.

RATES OF POSTAGE

1. Rights of receiver of bank.

See INJUNCTION, 4.

RFCEIVERS.

The receiver of a bank stands in no better position than the bank stood as a going concern. Rankin v. City National Bank, 541.

2. Charge of liabilities incurred by.

A receiver, as soon as he is appointed and qualifies, comes under the sole direction of the court and his engagements are those of the court, and the liabilities he incurs are chargeable upon the property and not against the parties at whose instance he was appointed and who have no authority over him and cannot control his actions. Atlantic Trust Co. v. Chapman, 360.

3. Same.

While cases may arise in which it may be equitable to charge the parties at whose instance a receiver is appointed with the expenses of the receivership, in the absence of special circumstances the general rule, which is applicable in this case, is that such expenses are a charge upon the property or fund without any personal liability therefor on the part of those parties; and the mere inadequacy of the fund to meet such expenses does not render a plaintiff who has not been guilty of any irregularity liable therefor. Ib.

4. Termination of receivership of railroad.

A receivership of a railroad as a going concern, although at times necessary and proper-as in this case, where the refusal to appoint a receiver would have led to sacrifice of property, confusion among the creditors, and great inconvenience to the travelling public—should not be unnecessarily prolonged, and in case of unnecessary delay the court should listen to the application of any creditor upon due notice to the receiver for the prompt termination of the trust or vacation of the order appointing receivers. Re Metropolitan Railway Receivership, 90.! See BILLS AND NOTES; JURISDICTION, C 3, 4; EQUITY, 1, 3;

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 1.

RECORD ON APPEAL. ́

See APPEAL AND ERROR, 3, 4.

REMEDIES.

See TAXES AND TAXATION, 1.

REHEARING.

Petition for rehearing and motion to modify judgment, denied. Wabash

Railroad v. Adelbert College, 609.

REPRESENTATIVE OR CLASS SUIT.

See ACTIONS.

RES JUDICATA.

See BANKRUPTCY, 1;

JUDGMENTS AND DECREES.

RESTITUTION.

See EQUITY, 1.

RESTRAINING ORDER.

See INJUNCTION, 1.

RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
See ANTI-TRUST ACT, 1.

REVISED STATUTES.
See ACTS OF CONGRESS.

SECOND JEOPARDY.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 19.

SEIZURES.

See TAXES AND TAXATION, 3.

SISSETON AND WAHPETON INDIANS.
See INDIANS, 3.

SIXTH AMENDMENT.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 20.

STATES.

1. Comity; removal of property to another jurisdiction for adjustment of claims against alien.

While aliens are ordinarily permitted to resort to our courts for redress of

wrongs and protection of rights, the removal of property to another jurisdiction for adjustment of claims against it is a matter of comity and not of absolute right, and, in the absence of treaty stipulations, it is within the power of a State to determine its policy in regard thereto. Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 570.

2. Police power; right of State or municipality to limit, contract away or destroy. The right to exercise the police power is a continuing one that cannot be limited or contracted away by the State or its municipality, nor can it be destroyed by compromise as it is immaterial upon what consideratio the attempted contract is based. Northern Pacific Railway v. Dulut,

3. Police power; incidental revenue does not affect character of regulation. The police power of the State is very extensive and is frequently exercised where it also results in raising revenue, and in this case an ordinance imposing a license tax on a class of dealers in intoxicating liquor was held to be a police regulation notwithstanding it also produced a revenue. Phillips v. Mobile, 472; Richard v. Mobile, 480.

4. Police power; licensing sale of intoxicating liquors introduced into State in original packages.

An ordinance imposing a license on persons selling beer by the barrel is an exercise of the police power of the State, and as such is authorized by the Wilson Act, 26 Stat. 313, notwithstanding such liquors were introduced into the State in original packages. Ib.

5. Police power; regulation of working hours of women.

The right of a State to regulate the working hours of women rests on the police power and the right to preserve the health of the women of the State, and is not affected by other laws of the State granting or denying to women the same rights as to contract and the elective franchise as are enjoyed by men. Muller v. Oregon, 412.

1. Ejusdem generis-Scope of words "or other immoral purposes" in act aimed principally at prostitution.

While under the rule of ejusdem generis the words "or other immoral purpose" would only include a purpose of the same nature as the principal subject to which they were added they do include purposes of the same nature, such as concubinage, when the principal subject is prostitution and the importation of women therefor. United States v. Bitty, 393.

2. Of penal laws.

While penal laws are to be strictly construed they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intent of the legislature. Ib.

3. Penal Statutes.

A revenue statute containing provisions of a highly penal nature should be construed in a fair and reasonable manner, and, notwithstanding plain and unambiguous language, provisions for the prevention of evasion of taxation, which naturally are applicable to taxable articles only, will not be held applicable to articles not taxable, wholly harmless, and not used

for an illegal purpose, in an improper manner, or in any way affording opportunities to defraud the revenue. United States v. Graf Distilling Co., 198

4. When views of public to be regarded-Construction of act prohibiting importation of alien women for immoral purposes.

In construing an act of Congress prohibiting the importation of alien women for prostitution or other immoral purposes regard must be had to the views commonly entertained among the people of the United States as to what is moral and immoral in the relations between man and woman and concubinage is generally regarded in this country as immoral. United States v. Bitty, 393.

5. Effect of erroneous construction of statute, by public officer, to confer rights. An erroneous interpretation of a statute by the Commissioner of the Department to which it applies, does not confer any legal rights on one acting in conformity with such interpretation, in opposition to the express terms of the statute. Prosser v. Finn, 67.

6. Conclusiveness of recitals in act.

A mere recital in an act, whether of fact or of law, is not conclusive unless it be clear that the legislature intended that it be accepted as a fact in the case. (Kinkead v. United States, 150 U. S. 433); Blacklock v. United States, 75.

7. Effect on statute of partial unconstitutionality-Severable provision. The provision in § 10 of the act of June 1, 1898, making it a criminal offense against the United States for a carrier engaged in interstate commerce, or an agent or officer thereof, to discharge an employé simply because of his membership in a labor organization, is severable, and its unconstitutionality may not affect other provisions of the act or provisions of that section thereof. Adair v. United States, 161.

8. Section 13, Rev. Stat., saving penalties incurred under statutes repealed; effect on subsequent statutes.

The provisions of § 13, Rev. Stat., that the repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty incurred under the statute repealed, are to be treated as if incorporated in, and as a part of, subsequent enactments of Congress, and, under the general principle of construction requiring effect to be given to all parts of a law, that section must be enforced as forming part of such subsequent enactments except in those instances where, either by express declaration or necessary implication such enforcement would nullify the legislative intent. Great Northern Ry Co. v. United States, 452.

9. Elkins law of February 19, 1903, not repealed by Hepburn law of June 29, 1906, so as to deprive Government of right to prosecute for violations of former committed prior to enactment of latter.

The act of Congress of June 29, 1906, c. 359, 34 Stat. 584, known as the Hepburn law, as construed in the light of § 13, Rev. Stat., as it must be con