1. Sufficiency of evidence to support findings of lower court.
In this case this court holds that the Supreme Court of the Territory did
not err in finding that there was evidence to support the findings made
by the trial court and that those findings sustained the judgment.
Southern Pine Co. v. Ward, 126.
2. When appellate court not justified in reversing verdict of jury.
In this case this court finds that the evidence was so far conflicting as to
remove the verdict of the jury from reversal by an appellate tribunal.
Drumm-Flato Commission Co. v. Edmisson, 534.
See APPEAL AND ERROR, 1;
LOCAL LAW (OKLA., 4).
EXECUTION SALES.
See ESTOPPEL;
LOCAL LAW (NEW MEX.).
EXECUTIVE POWERS.
See INDIANS, 1.
EXEMPTIONS FROM TAXATION.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3;
TAXES AND TAXATION, 6, 7.
EXTRADITION.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 14, 19.
FEDERAL QUESTION.
See JURISDICTION;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 14.
FIFTH AMENDMENT.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 16.
FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS.
See COPYRIGHT.
FORFEITURES.
See CORPORATIONS, 2;
JURISDICTION, A 6.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 11, 17;
TAXES AND TAXATION, 8.
FREIGHT RATES.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 1, 2.
FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 14.
FUNCTUS OFFICIO.
See EMINENT DOMAIN.
GENERAL LAND OFFICE.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 4.
GERMAN EMPIRE.
See TREATIES.
GOVERNMENTAL POWERS.
See CONGRESS, POWERS OF.
When not allowed to interfere with regular procedure-Application of rule in
case of commitment for contempt.
The usual rule is that a prisoner cannot anticipate the regular course of
proceedings having for their end to determine whether he shall be held
or released by alleging want of jurisdiction and petitioning for a habeas
corpus; and the same rule is applicable in the case of one committed
for contempt until a small fine shall be paid for disobeying an injunc-
tion order of the Circuit Court, and who petitions for a habeas on the
ground that the order disobeyed was void because issued in a suit
which was coram non judice. Ex parte Simon, 144.
See IMMIGRATION, 2;
JURISDICTION, C 1.
HEPBURN LAW.
See STATUTES, A 9.
HOMESTEADS.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 6.
HOURS OF LABOR.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11, 12;
STATES, 5.
1. As to conclusiveness of decision of Commissioner of Immigration denying
right of entry.
The conclusiveness of the decision of the Commissioner of Immigration,
denying a person the right to enter the United States under the immi-
gration laws, must give way to the right of a citizen to enter and also
to the right of a person seeking to enter, and alleging that he is a citizen,
to prove his citizenship, and it is for the courts to finally determine the
rights of such person. Chin Yow v. United States, 8.
2. Right of one claiming to be citizen-Denial of due proces of law-Juris-
diction of Federal court.
A Chinese person seeking to enter the United States and alleging citizen-
ship is entitled to a fair hearing, and if, without a fair hearing or being
allowed to call his witnesses, he is denied admission and delivered to
the steamship company for deportation, he is imprisoned without the
process of law to which he is entitled; and although he has not estab-
lished his right to enter the country, the Federal court has jurisdiction
to determine on habeas corpus whether he was denied a proper hearing
and if so, to determine the merits; but unless and until it is proved that
a proper hearing was denied the merits are not open. United States
v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, distinguished. Denial of a hearing by duc
process cannot be established merely by proving that the decision on
the hearing that was had was wrong. Ib.
IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT OBLIGATION.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 4,
CORPORATIONS, 2.
IMPORTATION OF ALIEN WOMEN.
See ALIENS.
See TAXES AND TAXATION, 15, 16.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCES.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 10;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 7.
1. Allotted lands; alienation of; extension of control by President to cutting of
timber, and disposition of proceeds thereof.
The restrictions on the right of alienation of lands to be allotted in severalty
under the Chippewa Treaty of 1854 extends to the disposition of timber
on the land as well as to the land itself; and the consent of the President
to a contract for cutting timber does not end his control over the mat-
ter; he may put conditions upon the disposition of the proceeds.
(United States v. Paine Lumber Co., 206 U. S. 467, distinguished.) Starr
v. Campbell, 527.
2. Annuities; payments chargeable against.
While there are no general rules of law determining what payments are
chargeable against Indian annuities, when annuities which have been
confiscated on account of an outbreak of the annuitant Indians are
restored, sums paid by the Government for the support of the an-
nuitants on account of their destitution must be taken into account,
and in this case the restored annuities are also chargeable with the
amount of depredations during the outbreak for which the Indians
were liable under a treaty made subsequently to that granting the
annuity and before the outbreak. The Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians,
561.
3. Annuities; adjustment of claim of Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands.
This court affirms the judgment of the Court of Claims adjusting the claim
of the Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands of Sioux Indians for their con-
fiscated annuities restored under acts of Congress and in regard to
which jurisdiction was conferred by the act of June 21, 1906, c. 3504,
34 Stat. 372. Ib.
4. Intoxicating liquors-Construction of § 2139, Rev. Stat.-Territory em-
braced within prohibition of.
While the prohibition of § 2139, Rev. Stat., as amended in 1892, against
introducing intoxicating liquors into Indian country does not em-
brace any body of territory in which the Indian title has been un-
conditionally extinguished, that statute must be interpreted in con-
nection with whatever special agreement may have been made between
the United States and the Indians in regard to the extinguishment of
the title and the extension of control over the land ceded by the United
States. Dick v. United States, 340.
5. Intoxicating liquors-Construction of agreement of May 1, 1893, with Nez
Perce Indians.
Under the agreement of May 1, 1893, ratified, 28 Stat. 286, 326, between
the United States and the Nez Perce Indians, the United States re-
tained control over the lands ceded for the purpose of controlling the
use of liquor therein for twenty-five years, and during that period
§ 2139, Rev. Stat., remains in force, notwithstanding such lands are
within the State of Idaho. Ib.
See CONGRESS, POWERS OF, 4, 5.
1. Restraining order authorized by § 718, Rev. Stat.
While the restraining order authorized by § 718, Rev. Stat., is a species of
temporary injunction it is only authorized until a pending motion for a
temporary injunction can be disposed of. Houghton v. Meyer, 149.
2. Determination of liability of givers of undertaking.
The givers of an undertaking cannot be held for any period not covered
thereby on the conjecture that they would have given a new under-
taking had one been required. Their liability must be determined on
the one actually given. Ib.
3. As to construction of undertaking to be given to obtain restraining order
under § 718, Rev. Stat.
The undertaking given to obtain a restraining order under § 718, Rev. Stat.,
must be construed in the light of that section and it necessarily is super-
seded by an order or decree granting an injunction and thereupon
expires by its own limitation, notwithstanding such order or decree
may subsequently be reversed. Ib.
4. Liability on bond given by those for whose benefit the restraining order
authorized by § 718, Rev. Stat., was issued against the Postmaster General.
In this case, the obligors on the undertaking obtained an order restraining
the Postmaster General from refusing to transmit their matter at
second class rates. The motion on the order was not brought on but
on the hearing on the merits the trial court, by decree, granted a per-
manent injunction. This decree was reversed. In an action brought
by the Postmaster General, on the undertaking, claiming damages for
entire period until final reversal of decree held that the liability on the
undertaking was limited to the difference in postage on matter mailed
between the date of the restraining order and the entry of the decree
of the trial court which superseded the restraining order. This was
not a case in which the parties should be relieved from the obligation
of the undertaking for damages during the period for which it was
in force. Russell v. Farley, 105 U. S. 433, distinguished. Ib.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 1;
JURISDICTION, C 1; TAXES AND TAXATION, 14;
See LOCAL LAW (Okla., 2).
INTERNAL REVENUE.
See STATUTES, A 3;
TAXES AND TAXATION.
1. Rates, discrimination in. Rates for tank car and barrel shipments.
An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, that carriers not charg-
ing for tanks on tank-oil shipments desist from charging for the barrel
on barrel shipments, or else furnish tank cars to all shippers applying
therefor, held, in this case, to be equivalent to a holding that the charge
for the barrel, is not in itself excessive, and therefore, also held, that
barrel-oil shippers who had not demanded tank cars had not been dis-
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