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forbidden in general terms, a fact giving another reason for the narrower construction of § 4962. If that was the true construction once, it is the construction still. Again, when the present act was passed, there was no foreign copyright for an American author, and Congress knew and he knew, as he knows now, if he contents himself with home protection, that his work might be reprinted without notice of any sort. Such reprints rather inconsistently are called piracies in argument. But whatever the moral aspects may be, the piracy is a legal right, and as such its exercise must be contemplated by the author. It does not matter whether he does so with regret at the loss of money or with joy at the prospect of fame, and it is difficult to see any greater difference between giving consent to the foreign publication and intentionally creating the opportunity, the inducement and the right. But it hardly would be argued that because no copyright had been taken out in England and therefore the reprint there was lawful, an American copyright could be defeated by importing the English book and reprinting from that. Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U. S. 123, 150. It would be even bolder to say that the American author would have stood worse if in the days before he could get a copyright in England he had made an arrangement with English - publishers to secure some payment from them. Yet that is the logic of the appellant's case.

If a publication without notice of an American copyright did not affect the copyright before the days when it was possible to get an English copyright also, it is not to be supposed that Congress, by arranging with England for that possibility, gave a new meaning to the old § 4962, increasing the burden of American authors, and attempted to intrude its requirements into any notice that might be provided by the English law. The words of the section remained unchanged, notwithstanding the grant of a limited liberty of importation, while other sections were amended where there was reason for a change.

It may be that in most cases the importation of a pirated English copy of an American book would be unlawful, whereas

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it is argued that the importation was lawful in the case at bar. The appellee makes a strong argument that the appellant's importation was wrong. But it is hard to see how the right to copy a book, whether lawfully or unlawfully imported, can be affected by the mode in which it got here. The analogies of the law are the other way. A person is subject to the jurisdiction, even if he was brought there by wrong. Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192. A document is admissible in evidence, although it was improperly obtained. Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189 Massachusetts, 457, 470; 3 Wigmore, Evidence, §2183. The argument for the appellant dwells somewhat fancifully on the possibilities of innocence being led astray. All those possibilities might exist if a pirated volume should be smuggled into the United States. Moreover the appellant argues, with the support of the opinion of an Attorney General and a Solicitor General, that under § 4956 and its amendments two copies of an unauthorized edition lawfully might be imported for use. 21 Op. Atty. Gen. 159, 162. The statutes cannot be expected to do more than to secure the author and the public so far as is reasonably practicable. The obvious plan is not to be distorted by the chance that ingenuity may find some way to slip through the law uncaught.

As we are satisfied that the statute does not require notice of the American copyright on books published abroad and sold only for use there, we agree with the parties that it is unnecessary to discuss nice questions as to when a foreign reprint may or may not be imported into the United States under the present provisions of our law.

Decree affirmed.

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DONNELL v. HERRING-HALL-MARVIN SAFE
COMPANY.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

No. 106. Argued January 14, 15, 1908.—Decided February 3, 1908.

A stockholder, even though also an officer, of a corporation bearing his family name does not necessarily lose his right to carry on the business of manufacturing the same commodity under his own name because that corporation sold its good will, trade name, etc., and as a stockholder and officer he participated in the sale. He is not entitled, however, to use, and may be enjoined by the purchaser from using, any name, mark or advertisement indicating that he is the successor of the original corporation or that his goods are the product of that corporation or of its successor, nor can he interfere in any manner with the good will so pur. chased.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. George P. Merrick and Mr. S. S. Gregory for petitioner: A family surname is incapable of exclusive appropriation by anyone as against others of the same name, who are using it legitimately in their own business.

In the absence of contract, fraud or estoppel any man may use his own name in all legitimate ways and as the whole or part of a corporate name.

One corporation is not entitled to restrain another from using in its corporate title the name to which others have a common right.

The essence of the wrong in unfair competition, consists in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor, for those of another. And if competition is so conducted as not to mislead the public nor palm off the goods of one as those of another, no wrong exists.

The right of the individual to use his own name, reputation

Argument for Respondents.

208 U.S.

and experience in that business or occupation for which he is best fitted, is important to the public as well as to the individual, and to deprive him of that right is in restraint of trade and against public policy.

The stockholders of a corporation which has sold its property, business and good will and has been dissolved, may, in the absence of individual contracts not to engage in competition, or after the expiration of such contracts by limitation, engage in competition to the same extent as anyone else. Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff et al., 198 U. S. 118; Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 139 U. S. 540; Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U. S. 169; Elgin National Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Co., 179 U. S. 665; Goodyear India Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U. S. 598; Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311; Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U. S. 460; Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tennessee Mfg. Co., 138 U. S. 537; McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 645; Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U. S. 562; Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 20 Wall. 64.

Mr. Charles H. Aldrich and Mr. Lawrence Maxwell, Jr., with whom Mr. Henry S. McAuley was on the brief, for respondents:

The corporation is a distinct entity separate from its stockholders. But the theory of corporate entity is not allowed to protect fraudulent conduct, hide the truth or defeat the ends of public or private justice. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197; Anthony v. American Glucose Co., 146 N. Y. 407; State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 177; McKinley v. Wheeler, 130 U. S. 630, 636; Myers v. Kalamazoo Buggy Co., 54 Michigan, 215; 1 Purdy's Beach on Corporations, 6.

Stockholders are bound by those acts of their corporation which can only be taken with their assent, and to which they give assent by affirmative vote or acquiescence. Cook on Corporations, § 670, and cases cited; Holmes, Booth & Hayden v. Holmes, Booth & Atwood Co., 37 Connecticut, 278, 294;

208 U. S.

Argument for Respondents.

Richmond Nervine Co. v. Richmond, 159 U. S. 293; Le Page Company v. Russia Cement Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 941; Cement Co. v. Le Page, 147 Massachusetts, 206; Penberthy Injector Co. v. Lee (Mich.), 78 N. W. Rep. 1074.

The name "Hall" having been so long identified with the safe business as to acquire a secondary meaning, the sale of that business as a going concern, including the trade rights and good will, passed to the purchaser the exclusive right to use the name in that business as against all parties participating in the sale. Le Page Co. v. Russia Cement Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 941; C. S. Higgins Co. v. Higgins Soap Co., 144 N. Y. 462; Russia Cement Co. v. Le Page, 147 Massachusetts, 206; Menedez v. Holt, 128 U. S. 514; Hoxey v. Chaney, 143 Massachusetts, 592; Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 139 U. S. 548; Richmond Co. v. Richmond, 159 U. S. 293; Hopkins, Unfair Trade, 109, 110; Dodge Eationery Co. v. Dodge, 78 Pac. Rep. 879; Myers v. Kalamazoo Buggy Co., 54 Michigan, 215.

The Hall's Safe Company, composed of the Halls who sold the original Hall's Safe and Lock Company to the respondent's predecessor, should be enjoined from the use of the word Hall in the safe business because: they have been paid for the name; they are estopped to assert a right to it; their use of the name Hall constitutes a fraud upon respondent. Howe Scale Company v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U. S. 118; Peck Bros. & Co. v. Peck Bros. Co., 113 Fed. Rep. 291; Chickering et al. v. Chickering & Sons, 120 Fed. Rep. 69; Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Royal, 122 Fed. Rep. 337; Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co., 163 U. S. 169; Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Brent, 163 U. S. 205; Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 139 U. S. 540; The Le Page Company v. Russia Cement Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 941; Russia Cement Co. v. Le Page, 147 Massachusetts, 206; Hoxie v. Chaney, 143 Massachusetts, 592; McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245; Frazer v. Frazer Lubricator Co., 121 Illinois, 147; Charles S. Higgins Co. v. Higgins Soap Co., 144 N. Y. 462; Levy v. Walker, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 436; Garrett

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