542, which, however, related directly only to section 5399, that the offense of obstruction denounced by the first part of section 5398 was not complete unless the scienter extended to the character of the officer and of the process. A like rule was stated in U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, touching the statute relating to obstructing the mail. Whether it applies to the latter part of section 5398, and to indictments for assaults, in themselves unlawful, on federal officers engaged in performing their duties as such, we need not determine. It may be that congress has authority to protect its officers, while officially engaged, from all assaults unlawful at common law, and by the closing part of this paragraph intended so to do. On all this we pass no opinion, but we assume that the scienter must be proved as to all the elements involved. If so, it must be alleged as to all such elements and each of them. Neither section 1025 of the Revised Statutes, nor the rule that for statute offenses of this class it is ordinarily sufficient to follow the language of the enactment, relieves the United States from alleging in some form every matter of substance; and this matter is of that character. This was stated in U. S. v. Simmons, 96 U. S. 360, 362, the case so frequently relied on for the ordinary rule. It was pointedly and directly applied in U. S. v. Carll, 105 U. S. 611, and has been since then many times recognized by the supreme court, even as late as Dunbar v. U. S., 156 U. S. 185, 192, 193, 15 Sup. Ct. 325. After these rulings and expressions of that court, the earlier rulings of the inferior federal tribunals can hardly be resorted to with profit. It is truly said in Com. v. Boynton, 12 Cush. 499, 500, "that wherever the intention of a party is necessary to constitute an offense, such intent must be alleged in every material part of the description where it so constitutes it." Therefore the only question is whether it is so alleged in this case; and this may be determined by applying the recognized rules of criminal pleadings, as well as by following the ordinary rules of Construction. Looking particularly at the former, we think the practical interpretation given by long usage to indictments for this class of offenses is that the words "knowingly and willfully" apply to all which follows them, although the grammatical connection is not strictly made. Most of the forms in Wharton's Precedents of Indictments and Pleas, including those which we have already cited, are thus framed, without any specific allegation of any knowledge of the character of the officer or his duty. This precise point seems to have been taken in substance, and overruled, in Com. v. Kirby, 2 Cush. 576, 582. We have examined the indictment in U. S. v. Keen, 5 Mason, 453, Fed. Cas. No. 15,511, for resisting a customs inspector by assault, and find it was drawn in like manner, although it seems to have been thought necessary to establish at the trial that the accused had knowledge of the character of the officer. That indictment was drawn by Andrew Dunlap. We regard all this as sufficient evidence of the settled and accepted practice in pleading matters of the kind in question here. The mere fact federal statute seems immaterial. statutes, or to the common law, state or common-law pleadings. that this is a proceeding under a Federal statutes cognate to state by analogy take with them the Safety in practice and proceed ings requires the assistance of recognized rules, and the federal courts cannot find such rules except as they adopt them from the common law or from the state tribunals. Moreover, the ruling in Com. v. Kirby implies that it was necessary to aver and prove that the accused had knowledge of the character of the officer; and nothing more can be required in this case by the words "knowingly and willfully," found in the statute. The word "knowingly" has no place in indictments for ordinary assaults; and that word, as found in this indictment, therefore, by reasonable implication, has reference to other matters than the assault itself, and those are the official character of the deputy marshal and the duty in which he was engaged. In St. Clair v. U. S., 154 U. S. 134, 146, 14 Sup. Ct. 1002, the supreme court, in a capital case, did not require critical accuracy in repeating words alleging knowledge, but left something to inference. And here, in view of a long-continued and recognized form of pleading, which leaves behind no substantial doubt as to what was intended to be alleged, we must hold the indictment sufficient. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. WOLFF et al. v. UNITED STATES. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. 1. CUSTOMS DUTIES-GILT BRAID. No. 1,741. December 17, 1895.) "Soutache gilt braid," consisting of cotton cables around which is braided a gilt thread composed of metal wire and cotton thread, is dutiable under Act Oct. 1, 1890, par. 215, as a manufactured article composed in part of metal, and not under paragraph 196, as metal thread of gilt, silver, or other metals, not specially provided for. 2. SAME-ARTICLES NOT ENUMERATED. An article is "enumerated," so as to be without the provision that on manufactured articles not "enumerated" the duty shall be assessed at the highest rate at which the same would be chargeable if composed wholly of the component material of chief value, not only when the article is mentioned by its specific trade name, but also when it may be fairly included within some generic clause contained in the tariff schedule, so as to be distinguished from other articles. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Appeal by H. Wolff & Co. from a decision affirming a decision of the board of general appraisers, which sustained the collector's classification for duty of certain imported merchandise. Evart Brown, for appellants. Henry D. Sedgwick, for appellee. Before WALLACE, LACOMBE, and SHIPMAN, Circuit Judges. LACOMBE, Circuit Judge. The merchandise in question was invoiced as "soutache or." It is a gilt braid. The center consists of four cotton cables, and around these is braided a gilt-metal thread. The metal thread is itself composed of metal wire known as "tinsel wire," "lame," or "lahn," and cotton thread. The metal thread was worth about 75 per cent. of the value of the braid; and it is conceded that the metal per se is the component of chief value, the other component being cotton in the form of thread or cables. The collector assessed the articles for duty under paragraph 215 of the act of October 1, 1890, as "manufactures, articles, or wares not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, composed wholly or in part of *** metal, and whether wholly or partly manufactured." The importers insist that they should have been classified for duty under paragraph 196, either directly or by virtue of section 5 of the same act. Paragraph 196 provides for "bullions and metal thread of gold, silver or other metals, not specially provided for." They contend that, inasmuch as the metal thread not only constitutes 75 per cent. of the value, but is the special and distinguishing feature, the gilt braid as imported is substantially metal thread, and its classification as such would be in accord with the intent of the statute. The findings of the board of general appraisers and the undisputed testimony forbid such a disposition of the case. Not only is the merchandise not commercially known as metal thread nor as bullions, but the process of manufacture to which the metal thread and the cotton cables have been subjected have advanced them beyond their original condition into a new and distinctive article of commerce, with a specific trade name, viz. "soutache gilt braid." Of such braids, as of the velveteen dress facings, which were before this court in U. S. v. Kursheedt Manuf'g Co., 4 C. C. A. 262, 54 Fed. 159, it may be said that "they have lost their commercial identity as [metal threads] and have been advanced to a form in which they have acquired a new commercial name, and are adapted for a distinctively new use." They are no longer, therefore, within the enumeration of paragraph 196. Section 5 provides that "on articles not enumerated, manufactured of two or more materials, the duty shall be assessed at the highest rate at which the same would be chargeable if composed wholly of the component material of chief value," etc This section, however, only applies to articles not enumerated in the preceding schedules, and the merchandise in question is therein enumerated. It has been abundantly settled by repeated decisions of the supreme court that an article is "enumerated," not only when it is mentioned by its specific trade name, but also when it may be fairly included within some generic clause contained in the tariff schedules, being thus designated in any way to distinguish it from other articles. Thus, in Arthur v. Sussfield, 96 U. S. 128, spectacles were held to be enumerated either as "manufactures of which steel is a component part" or as "manufactures of which glass shall be a component material." Arthur's Ex'rs v. Butterfield, 125 U. S. 77, 8 Sup. Ct. 714, goat's hair goods used for women's dresses were held to be enumerated as "manufactures of hair." In Mason v. Robertson, 139 U. S. 624, 11 Sup. Ct. 668, bi-chromate of soda was held to be enumerated by the phrase, "all chemical compounds and salts." To the same effect are Hartranft v. Meyer, 135 U. S. 237, 10 Sup. Ct. 751, and Junge v. Hedden, 146 U. S. 238, 13 Sup. Ct. 88. In The appellants rely on Benziger v. Robertson, 122 U. S. 211, 7 Sup. Ct. 1169. The merchandise in that case consisted of rosaries. A rosary is a string of beads, with a little chain and cross of metal, the beads being made of glass, wood, steel, bone, ivory, silver, and mother of pearl. The collector assessed them as "beads." The importer claimed that they should have been rated as manufactures of glass, wood, steel, etc. They were known in trade and commerce as "rosaries," and there was no specific duty laid upon them eo nomine. The supreme court sustained the collector's classification, and it is true that in the opinion it is stated that the rosaries were not enumerated articles, thus overruling the claim of the plaintiff in error that they were enumerated, not, in ieed, by name, but by material. In Aloe v. Churchill, 44 Fed. 50 (a case cited with approval by the supreme court in Seeberger v. Schlesinger, 152 U. S. 589, 14 Sup. Ct. 729), it is suggested that Benziger v. Robertson may be distinguished from the other cases cited supra on the ground that "the metal part of the rosaries involved in that case was such an inconsiderable part of the articles that it was deemed more reasonable to assess the duty as on beads, which are the distinguishing feature of such articles." Counsel for the United States in the case at bar suggests that in the record in Benziger v. Robertson, which is not before this court, there was evidence that the articles "were called 'beads' or 'rosaries,'" and were bought and sold under the name of "beads." Whatever may have been the controlling element in the Benziger Case, however, it cannot, standing alone, be taken as repealing the earlier case of Arthur's Ex'rs v. Butterfield, supra, especially in view of the fact that the rule that a descriptive enumeration is sufficient to take an article out of the operation of a section providing only for nonenumerated articles has been since repeatedly reaffirmed in the cases cited supra from 125 U. S., 8 Sup. Ct.; 135 U. S., 10 Sup. Ct.; 139 U. S., 11 Sup. Ct.; and 146 U. S., 13 Sup. Ct. Inasmuch, therefore, as the articles are not bullions or metal thread, and are "manufactures, articles or wares, not specially enumerated, composed in part of metal, and wholly manufactured," the decision of the circuit court is affirmed. UNITED STATES V. MAGNON. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. No. 2,064. CUSTOMS DUTIES-INSTRUMENTS OF TRADE. December 17, 1895.) Snakes brought into the country by a snake charmer purely for use in exhibitions, and not for sale, are not dutiable as "live animals not specially provided for," but are free of duty, under Act Oct. 1, 1890, par. 686, as instruments of her trade. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. On the application of Jeanne Magnon the circuit court reversed a decision of the board of general appraisers which sustained the collector of the port of New York in his classification of 28 live snakes belonging to her as dutiable articles (66 Fed. 151), and the United States appeals. Henry C. Platt, for appellant. Evart Brown, for appellee. Before WALLACE, LACOMBE, and SHIPMAN, Circuit Judges. LACOMBE, Circuit Judge. The appellee is a so-called "snake charmer," who earns her livelihood by exhibitions wherein she handles the snakes and twines them around her body. They are her property, and are used only in these exhibitions. She came to this country in the steamship Bohemia, on March 30, 1894, to exhibit with Hagenbeck's show, bringing her snakes with her. The collector classified the snakes under paragraph 251 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, which imposes a duty of 20 per cent. ad valorem on "all other live animals not specially provided for." There is no special provision in the act for snakes, eo nomine, or under any generic title except as live animals. The appellee paid the duty, and duly protested, claiming that they were free of duty under paragraph 686, which reads: "Par. 686. Professional books, implements, instruments and tools of trade, occupation and employment, in the actual possession at the time of persons arriving in the United States; but this exemption shall not be construed to include machinery or other articles imported for use in any manufacturing establishment, or for any other person or persons, or for sale." In their decision the board of general appraisers say: "The appellant failed to appear, or to offer any evidence in support of her claim. In the absence of such proof, the protest is overruled." Upon the hearing in the circuit court the importer supplied this deficiency in proof, showing that her snakes were employed solely by herself in the exhibition of her so-called "snake-charming performances," which was her occupation and means of livelihood. They were brought over by her solely for her own use. The judge who heard the case in the circuit court cites from Webster's Dictionary the fourth definition of "instrument," viz.: "One who, or that which, is made a means or caused to serve a purpose;" and adds: "These snakes are clearly instruments within this definition. They are instruments with which she practices her profession, and are her professional instruments. As such, she seems to have been entitled to have them come with her duty free." In this decision we concur. It is no doubt true that we usually associate the word "instrument" with inanimate objects, but that is no reason why the word, when used in a tariff act, should not be given its comprehensive meaning when there is nothing to indicate an intention to restrict such meaning. It is no more surprising to find live animals referred to in such a statute as “instruments" than it is to find them referred to as "articles." This very tariff act of 1890 begins with the statement in its first section that on and after October 6, 1890, unless otherwise specially provided for |