a resolution, however, would be more complete with a proper title.

9th. That no act shall ever be revised by mere reference to its title; but the act revised, or section amended, shall be set forth and published at full length. Article 4, section 21.

10th. That the restriction last above-named has no application to a joint resolution, and, consequently, such a resolution may be revised or amended by a mere reference to its title, and without setting forth and publishing the part amended at length.

11th. That no act shall take effect until the same shall have been published and circulated in the several counties of the state by authority, except in case of emergency, which emergency shall be declared in the preamble or body of the law. Article 4, section 28.

12th. That the restriction last above-named has no application to a joint resolution, but that such a resolution always takes effect upon its passage unless a different provision is made; consequently, an emergency clause is never a proper part of a joint resolution.

13th. That every bill, when it shall have passed both Houses, must be submitted to the Governor for his action. Article 5, section 14.

14th. That the requirement last above-mentioned has no application to a joint resolution; and that such a resolution should never be submitted to the Governor for his action. That the Governor's approval or veto of a joint resolution would be extraconstitutional, inoperative, and void.

15th. That the removal of a state officer from his office, must be either by impeachment or by joint resolution. Article 6,

section 7.

16th. That every power which the General Assembly can exercise by joint resolution (except the single one of removing a state officer), may as effectually, though not always as appropriately, be performed by a bill.

17th. That the constitutional office and scope of a joint reso

lution, as compared with a bill, is quite limited; and such a resolution (except in the case of the removal of a state officer,) is only proper when the General Assembly seeks merely to express an opinion, give advice or counsel, or to present a petition, request, remonstrance, or protest, to some other body, officer, or tribunal. As action, instructing Senators, and requesting Representatives in Congress, to do or omit certain things, is nothing more than a petition, remonstrance, or request, it is properly put in the form of a joint resolution.

Another question which has received a different practical solution at different sessions of the Legislature, would seem to deserve attention. That question is, how many votes does it require to suspend the rule making it necessary that every bill shall be read by sections on three several days in each House? Does it require two-thirds of all the members elected to the House in which the bill is pending, or may the rule be suspended by two-thirds of those present, they constituting a quorum?

Section 18, of article 4, of the Constitution, reads as follows, viz.:

:

"Every bill shall be read by sections on three several days in each House, unless in case of emergency two-thirds of the House in which such bill may be depending shall, by a vote of yeas and nays, deem it expedient to dispense with this rule; but the reading of a bill by sections on its final passage, shall in no case be dispensed with, and the wote on the passage of every bill or joint resolution shall be taken by yeas and nays."

This section is, in part, borrowed from the previous Constitution of 1816, and to properly understand it, the corresponding provision in the old Constitution should be examined, the practice under it noticed, and the mischief designed to be remedied considered.

The corresponding provision in the old Constitution reads as follows, viz.:

Every bill shall be read on three different days in each House, unless, in case of emergency, two-thirds of the House

where the bill may be depending, shall deem it expedient to dispense with this rule."

The difference between these corresponding provisions in the old Constitution and in the new, is as follows, viz. :—

1st. The amendment requires the bill to be read on three several days by sections, whilst the original provision only required it to be read on three several days, without making it necessary that the reading should be by sections.

2d. The amendment requires the vote on dispensing with the rule to be by yeas and nays-the old provision did not.

3d. The new provision prohibits the reading a bill by sections from being dispensed with on its final passage, whilst the old did not.

4th. The amended provision requires the vote on the passage of every bill to be by yeas and nays, whilst the original provision contained no such requirement.

Both provisions permit two-thirds of the House in which the bill is depending, in case of emergency, to dispense with the rule.

The word House in the old provision, and in the amended one, manifestly mean the same thing, and are used in the same

sense.

What was the practice under the old Constitution? The answer is that, the rule was suspended without a call of the yeas and nays on the question of the suspension; the bill read, frequently a first, second, and third time by its title only, on the same day, and passed without a single call of the yeas and nays from first to last.

To prevent this abuse, the section was changed as we now find it. It was never contended under the old Constitution, that two-thirds of all the members elected to the House in which the bill was depending, were necessary to dispense with the rule.

By the old, as well as the new Constitution, two-thirds of each House constitute a quorum.

If it had been the intention of the Convention, in changing

the section under consideration, to require two-thirds of all the members elected to either House to suspend the rule, that idea would have been expressed in terms, instead of retaining the phraseology of the old instrument.

This is more obvious when it is considered that, the Constitution does in several sections require a certain proportion of all the members elected to each House to do certain things. For instance, section 25, of article 4, makes a majority of all the members elected to each House necessary to pass a bill. Suppose the provision had been (instead of that above named) in the following language:-a majority of each House shall be necessary to pass a bill; is it possible that this supposed provision would require as many votes to pass a bill as is required under the actual provision? Or place, if you please, two actual provisions of the Constitution in parallel colums, for the sake of illustrating the subject:

Section 14, Article 4. Either House may punish its members for disorderly behavior, and may, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member.

Section 7, Article 6. All state officers shall, for crime, incapacity, or negligence, be liable to be removed from office, either by impeachment by the House of Representatives, to be tried by the Senate, or by a joint resolution of the General Assembly; two-thirds of the members elected to each branch voting in either case therefor.

Now, is it not plain that, although a two-thirds vote is required by each of these sections, yet it is two-thirds of quite a different aggregate?

In the one case, either House may punish its members; this means that either the Senate or the House of Representatives, being in session, with a quorum present, may punish, and that punishment may, with the concurrence of two-thirds of those present (they constituting a quorum), extend even to expulsion. It will not be pretended that, if a quorum be present in either House, that quorum may not, by a majority vote, punish a member by censure, or by any other proper punishment less than

expulsion. If this is so, how is it possible to construe the section so as to require more than two-thirds of the same body or quorum to expel?

In the other case, under the section relative to the removal of an officer, two-thirds of the members elected to each branch must vote for the removal. Branch here is synonymous with House, and can it be that, the language last quoted means no more than would have been signified, if the language had been "two-thirds of each House voting therefor"?

The House of Representatives, as now constituted, consists of one hundred members, and the Senate of fifty, so that sixtyseven is a quorum in the one, and thirty-four in the other.

Suppose there is just a quorum present in the Senate, twentysix Senators voting for a bill may pass it; but unless two-thirds of that quorum may suspend the rule, so as to place the bill in a position where it can be voted upon, the result is that, it only requires, under this state of facts, twenty-six Senators to pass the bill, while it would require a unanimous vote of the thirtyfour Senators present to suspend the rule, so that the bill could be taken up. Does not this result show that such a construction cannot be correct?

But suppose the rule to be suspended or dispensed with, what may be done under that suspension as to the particular bill proposed to be acted upon? The answer is, everything that the rule prohibited may be done except that the final reading must be by sections, and the vote on its passage must be by yeas and nays. The rule being suspended, the bill may be read three times on the same day, and the first and second reading may be by its title only, unless the rules adopted by the House prevent this. It is believed to be constitutionally competent for the House in which a bill is pending (the rule being first suspended), to order the bill to be immediately read a first and second time by its title, and put upon its passage. This may be done under a single suspension of the rule, but of course the final reading must be by sections, and the vote on its passage must be by yeas