Deposition.

1. (Oct., 1873.) A notice without date, given to a party, that depositions will be taken "on the 12th of September" (no year mentioned), at the office of a person named, " in the city of Guilford, State of Maine," is insufficient to let in a deposition taken on the 12th of September, 1867, "in the town of Guilford ;" it not appearing whether the town or township of Guilford was the same as the city of Guilford; and the opposite party not. having attended at the taking of the depositions, and so waived the defect in the notice. Knode v. Williamson, 17 Wall. 587.

2. (1870.) Under the circumstances stated in the opinion, it was held that the District Court did not err in allowing a deposition taken and filed by one party to be read in evidence by the other. Andrews v. Graves, 1 Dill. 108.

Exceptions.

1. (April, 1870.) It was held that shingles described in the warrant as the "growth and manufacture" of the provinces of Canada were so described as to make their importation without payment of duty a fraud on the revenue. Stockwell v. United

States, 3 Cliff. 285.

2. It is a defect in the warrant not to allege that the district judge became satisfied, by complaint and affidavit, that the alleged frauds on the revenue had been committed. This, however, could not avail the defendants in this case, -(1) because they did not at the trial except to the ruling of the court, admitting books, documents, &c., upon that ground; (2) because the books, &c., were properly admitted, even if the search warrant were illegal. Ib.

3. Exceptions to the ruling of a court, in admitting evidence, should be sufficiently specific to enable it to understand the precise ground upon which the objection is based. Ib.

4. It was objected that the books, &c., were not in themselves legal evidence. Held, that as the same were not set forth in the bill of exceptions, nor in any way made part of it, the presumption was that the ruling of the district judge was correct, and the point was not open for examination. Ib.

1. (Jan., 1842.) Whatever may be the defects or illegality of the final process, no error can be assigned in the Supreme Court, on a writ of error for that cause. The remedy, according to the modern practice, is by motion in the court below, to quash the execution. Amis v. Smith, 16 Pet. 303.

2. The provisions of the third section of the Act of Congress of May 19, 1828, adopted the forthcoming bond in Mississippi as a part of the final process of that State at the time of the passage of the act. "A final process" is understood by the court.

to be all the writs of execution then in use in the State courts of Mississippi, which were properly applicable to the courts of the United States; and the phrase, "the proceedings thereupon," is understood to mean the exercise of all the duties of the ministerial officers of the State, prescribed by the laws of the State, for the purpose of obtaining the fruits of judgments; among those are the provisions of the laws relating to forthcoming bonds, which must be regarded as part of the final process. Ib.

3. The proceeding which produced the forthcoming bond was purely ministerial; the judicial mind was in no way employed in its production. It does not then possess the attributes of a judgment; and ought therefore to be treated in this court as final process, or, at least, as part of the final process. Ib.

4. No rule under the third section of the act of 1828, which authorizes the courts of the United States to alter final process so as to conform it to any changes which may be adopted by State legislation and State adjudications made by a district judge, will be recognized by the Supreme Court as binding, except those made by the District Courts exercising Circuit Court powers. Ib.

5. (Jan., 1843.) If an execution be issued before the proper parties are thus made, it is unauthorized and void, and no right of property will pass by a sale under it. Taylor v. Savage, 1 How. 282.

6. (Jan., 1846.) In cases of conflicting executions issued out of the federal and state courts, a priority is given to that under

which there is an actual seizure of the property first. Clarke, 4 How. 4.

Brown v.

7. (Dec., 1866.) A writ of fieri facias, tested and issued after the death of the party against whom the judgment is recovered, is void, and confers no power on the ministerial officer to execute it. Mitchell v. St. Maxent, 4 Wall. 237.

8. The rule applies where the proceedings are commenced by seizing property, under a writ of attachment, under the laws of Florida, as at the common law. Ib.

9. (Nov., 1871.) Under the act of, March 3, 1821 (3 Stat. 643), the deputy clerk of the United States District Court for Louisiana was authorized to sign process in his own name as such deputy, and a venditioni exponas so signed and in other respects regular, and under the seal of the court, is valid. Bragg v. Lorio, 1 Woods, 209.

10. (July, 1843.) A writ of venditioni exponas issued before the expiration of the year is irregular, and will be quashed on motion, and a supersedeas thereto ordered. United States v. Conway, Hempst. 313.

Finding. Verdict.

1. (Feb., 1817.) A verdict is bad if it varies from the issue in a substantial matter, or if it find only a part of that which is in issue; and, though the court may give form to a general finding, so as to harmonize with the issue, yet, if it appears that the finding is different from the issue, or is confined to a part only of the matter in issue, no judgment can be rendered upon the verdict. Patterson v. United States, 2 Wheat. 221.

2. (Dec., 1852.) A verdict on an issue to try whether a sale was fraudulent, finding the same to be fraudulent, will not be set aside on a certificate or affidavit of some of the jurors, afterwards. made, as to what they meant. Doss v. Tyack, 14 How. 298.

3. (May, 1881.) In a suit at law brought in the District Court by a national bank against a town, to recover the amount of sundry coupons on bonds issued by the town in aid of a railroad company, a trial by jury was waived in writing, and the suit, under a written agreement, was tried by the district judge, without a jury. After a finding and a judgment for the plaintiff, a bill of exceptions was signed, and the defendant sued out a writ

of error. Held, that no questions arising on the bill of exceptions could be considered by the Circuit Court on the writ of error, because the facts were found by the District Court without a jury. Town of Lyons v. Lyons National Bank, 19 Blatchf. 279.

Habeas Corpus.

1. (Dec., 1867.) Where it appears by the return to a writ of habeas corpus issued by a state tribunal, that the respondent holds the petitioner under authority or color of authority from the United States, the state tribunal or officer has no jurisdiction to proceed further, but must discharge the writ. Matter of Farrand, 1 Abb. U. S. 140.

2. The question whether such authority is valid cannot be examined in a state court, but is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunals of the United States.

Ib.

3. A commander in the army of the United States made return to a writ of habeas corpus issued by a state court, showing that he held the petitioner as a recruit in the army, and pursuant to laws of the United States regulating enlistments. The state court examined the validity of the enlistment, determined it to be invalid, and directed the recruit to be discharged. The officer refused to discharge him, and the state court committed the officer for contempt. Held, by the District Court of the United States for the District of Kentucky, on a habeas corpus sued out by the commander, that the state court exceeded its jurisdiction in examining the validity of the enlistment; that it had no power to proceed beyond ascertaining that the officer held the recruit by color of authority from the United States; and that the officer, in detaining the recruit notwithstanding the order of discharge by the state court, acted in pursuance of a law of the United States, and, being imprisoned therefor by the state court, was himself entitled to be discharged by virtue of the act of March 2, 1833. Ib.

4. (1864.) The authority given to judges of the United States courts, by sec. 14 of the act of Sept. 24, 1789 (1 Stat. 81), to grant writs of habeas corpus, extends to cases where a prisoner is in custody under a valid conviction and sentence, but claims release upon the ground of a pardon. Greathouse's Case, 2 Abb. U. S. 382.

5. (April, 1843.) By the Judiciary Act of 1789, the courts and judges of the United States are expressly authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus; and reference must be made to the common law to ascertain the nature of that writ. Matter of Keeler, Hempst. 306.

6. Applications of this nature must be supported by oath, taken before some competent officer of whom judicial notice will be taken, or who is shown to be such by proper evidence. Ib.

7. The writ will not be granted where the application is sworn to before a justice of the peace of another state, and there is no evidence of the official character of such justice. Ib.

8. (Oct., 1867.) Sec. 14 of the Judiciary Act (1 Stat. 81), which authorizes the courts of the United States to issue writs of habeas corpus, is not restrained in its operation by the proviso thereto, except in the case of prisoners in jail under or by color of the authority of a state of the United States, in which case the writ can only issue to bring the prisoner into court to testify. Bennett v. Bennett, Deady, 300.

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9. According to the usages and principles of law," mentioned. in sec. 14 of the Judiciary Act, the power thereby given to the District Court to issue writs of habeas corpus may be exercised by the judge thereof at chambers. Ib.

10. (April, 1846.) Whether a judge of a court of the United States can exercise the power of issuing writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum in vacation, even for the purpose of bringing witnesses into court at the approaching session, quære. Ex parte Barnes, 1 Sprague, 133.

11. (Sept., 1863.) What is meant by "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus." In re Fagan, 2 Sprague, 91.

12. Suspension of the privilege of the writ practically distinguished from the prohibition of the issue of the writ and other preliminary intermediate proceedings. Ib.

13. The intent of the proclamation of the President of the United States of Sept. 15, 1863, 13 U. S. Stats. at Large, Appendix iv., suspending the privilege of that writ. Ib.

14. The proclamation was authorized by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1863, 12 U. S. Stats. at Large, 755. Ib.

15. (July, 1866.) The power given to the Secretary of War to discharge minors unlawfully enlisted in the army does not take away the jurisdiction of the federal courts to inquire on